‘Russian Vacuum’ in Syria, ‘Messages of Fire’ & Normalization

Buildings destroyed because of shelling by Syrian regime forces on Idlib countryside on September 8 (AFP)
Buildings destroyed because of shelling by Syrian regime forces on Idlib countryside on September 8 (AFP)
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‘Russian Vacuum’ in Syria, ‘Messages of Fire’ & Normalization

Buildings destroyed because of shelling by Syrian regime forces on Idlib countryside on September 8 (AFP)
Buildings destroyed because of shelling by Syrian regime forces on Idlib countryside on September 8 (AFP)

Day after day, signs of normalization of ties between Damascus and Ankara are building up. Day by day, Iran’s incursions into Syria are growing. Also, the range of Israeli raids on Iranian and military sites in Syria is expanding with more US involvement in these attacks. However, is there a link between these three developments?

The thread connecting the three developments is the decline of the Russian presence in Syria since Moscow withdrew its S-300 missile system, transferred elite pilots, Wagner mercenaries and leaders, and deployed dozens of Belarusian forces.

The feeling of a “Russian vacuum” in Syria is strong due to the Ukrainian war and the setbacks faced by Moscow’s forces there. Although Russian strategic positioning is still the same, there is an assessment that maintaining the ongoing “war of attrition” in Syria inevitably means major changes taking place in the country.

Exploiting the Russian vacuum, Tehran’s reaction entailed raising its military presence in Syria, recruiting militias east of the war-torn country, and deepening the level of military cooperation between Damascus, the Lebanon-based Hezbollah, and other allies in the region.

Iran’s response was chiefly dependent on land routes despite Tehran trying to achieve its military goals through sea lanes. Most recently, Iran has intensified its shipments and efforts conducted through airports.

Also, Tehran has actively sought reconciliation between Damascus and Ankara.

Iran assesses that if the Russian presence declines, Türkiye will be in a better military position to impose pressure. Also, there is an Iranian-Turkish-Syrian interest to stifle the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG), just as there is a common interest in harassing US forces in northeastern Syria.

As for expanding Israeli raids, Tel Aviv has launched hundreds of strikes during the past years.

Nevertheless, Tel Aviv has mostly abided by its understanding with Moscow on avoiding Russian and Syrian regime forces and Syrian civil institutions. Instead, Israel contented itself with targeting “Iranian sites.”

As a recent development, Israel bombed the Tartus countryside. The attack took place near the Russian base located west of Syria.

Moreover, Israel has bombed the Damascus and Aleppo airports twice each, putting them out of service for a certain period. Tel Aviv also has green-lit attacks targeting Syrian air forces.

Clearly, Tel Aviv and Tehran have entered a race over the “Russian vacuum.”

Israel’s “message” is to prevent the “Iranian entrenchment” in Syria’s northern regions, and some officials in Tel Aviv have even said that “the battle to end the entrenchment has begun.”

Without a doubt, Israel’s escalation constitutes an embarrassment for Moscow and Damascus and is the subject of anticipation for Tehran and its allies.

Given Russian withdrawal, both Hamas and Damascus succumbed to Iranian and Hezbollah pressures to start to work on turning a “new page.”

Quite expectedly, recent statements issued by the Astana Process talks at the Russian-Turkish-Iranian trilateral summit in Tehran devoted much of its vocabulary to criticizing US military presence, “separatist agendas,” and Israeli raids.

It goes without saying that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attack on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan could push the two leaders closer to each other and set them on the path to normalizing ties and restoring a “love” of years gone by.

Putin has a strong desire to arrange matters in Syria while he is preoccupied with the Ukrainian quagmire.

Although Assad and Erdogan agree on not wanting to “drink the cup of normalization,” they also agree that their interest lies in not missing the train.

Normalization of ties will represent a fundamental shift in Turkish support for the Syrian opposition, as well as a shift in Damascus’ acceptance of the Turkish military presence in Syria. What unites the two sides is the concern about the growing Kurdish role east of the Euphrates region.

The Kurdish YPG and Syrian opposition factions are most likely to pay the price in the future.

It is no longer a secret that many security meetings between Turkish and Syrian officials were held in Moscow, Damascus, Latakia countryside, and Tehran.

Syria wants Türkiye’s public pledge to withdraw forces from Syrian territory in advance. Damascus demands a timetable for that, even if the implementation is delayed.

Meanwhile, Ankara wants Damascus to fight the Kurds and open its borders for the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees before the Turkish elections in the middle of next year.

It could be said that Türkiye and Syria have reached the edge of the transition toward a shared political platform.

Diplomatically, each party may appoint a security officer to coordinate in its embassy in the other country’s capital.

Politically, New York is the most likely place to host a meeting between Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Miqdad and his Turkish counterpart Mevlut Cavusoglu. The conference could bring together the deputies of the top diplomats instead.

Also, the Turkish and Syrian foreign ministers may join a Russian-Turkish-Iranian ministerial meeting within the Astana Process. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is pressing to hold such a meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly next week.

The ministerial meeting of the Astana formula and the meetings of UN envoy Geir Pedersen in New York are the only talks that are held on Syria.

Syria has already become politically and humanitarianly forgotten in international corridors.

Nevertheless, the war-torn nation remains a theater of conflict between the armies of five countries: the US, Russia, Türkiye, Iran, and Israel. These countries are trying to settle scores, direct “messages of fire,” and the race to “fill the void.”



What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

FILED - 05 February 2013, Russia, Sochi: The Gasprom logo is seen at a new power plant in Sochi, Russia.  Photo: Jan Woitas/dpa-Zentralbild/dpa
FILED - 05 February 2013, Russia, Sochi: The Gasprom logo is seen at a new power plant in Sochi, Russia. Photo: Jan Woitas/dpa-Zentralbild/dpa
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What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

FILED - 05 February 2013, Russia, Sochi: The Gasprom logo is seen at a new power plant in Sochi, Russia.  Photo: Jan Woitas/dpa-Zentralbild/dpa
FILED - 05 February 2013, Russia, Sochi: The Gasprom logo is seen at a new power plant in Sochi, Russia. Photo: Jan Woitas/dpa-Zentralbild/dpa

Russian President Vladimir Putin met Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico in the Kremlin on Sunday, a rare visit by a European Union leader to Moscow as a contract allowing for Russian gas to transit through Ukraine nears expiry.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy had said on Thursday that Kyiv could consider continued transit of Russian gas, but only on condition that Moscow did not receive payment until after the war - a condition it was unlikely to accept, Reuters said.
Putin said that day that it was clear there would be no new deal with Kyiv to send Russian gas through Ukraine to Europe.
Here is what happens if Russian gas transit via Ukraine is completely turned off and whom will be affected most.
HOW BIG ARE THE VOLUMES?
Russian gas supplies to Europe via Ukraine are relatively small. Russia shipped about 15 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas via Ukraine in 2023 - only 8% of peak Russian gas flows to Europe via various routes in 2018-19.
Russia spent half a century building its European gas market share, which at its peak stood at 35%.
Moscow has lost its share to rivals such as Norway, the United States and Qatar since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which spurred the EU to cut its dependence on Russian gas.
EU gas prices rallied in 2022 to record highs after the loss of Russian supplies. The rally won't be repeated given modest volumes and a small number of customers for the remaining volumes, according to EU officials and traders.
UKRAINIAN ROUTE
The Soviet-era Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod pipeline brings gas from Siberia via the town of Sudzha - which is now under control of Ukrainian military forces - in Russia's Kursk region. It then flows through Ukraine to Slovakia.
In Slovakia, the gas pipeline splits into branches going to the Czech Republic and Austria.
Russia's overall gas exports via the route have held steady despite the
stoppage
of flows from Gazprom to Austria's OMV in mid-November over a contractual dispute, and legal wranglings as other buyers stepped in to buy the volumes.
Austria still receives most of its gas via Ukraine, while Russia accounts for around two-thirds of Hungary's gas imports.
Slovakia takes around 3 bcm from energy giant Gazprom per year, also about two-thirds of its needs.
The Czech Republic almost completely cut gas imports from the east last year, but began taking gas from Russia in 2024.
Most other Russian gas routes to Europe are shut including Yamal-Europe via Belarus and Nord Stream under the Baltic.
The only other operational Russian gas pipeline route to Europe is the Blue Stream and TurkStream to Turkey under the Black Sea. Turkey sends some Russian gas volumes onward to Europe including to Hungary.
WHY DOES THE UKRAINIAN ROUTE STILL WORK?
While remaining Russian gas transit volumes are small, the issue remains a dilemma for the EU. Many EU members such as France and Germany have said they will not buy Russian gas anymore but the stance of Slovakia, Hungary and Austria, which have closer ties to Moscow, challenges the EU common approach.
The countries, who still receive Russian gas, argue it is the most economic fuel and also blame neighboring EU countries for high transit fees imposed on alternative supplies.
Ukraine still earns $0.8-$1 billion in transit fees per year from Russian gas transit.
According to Reuters calculations, Gazprom's total pipeline gas exports to Europe via all routes in 2024 have increased to 32 bcm from 28.3 bcm in 2023, when they collapsed to the lowest level since the 1970s.
Russia could earn around $5 billion on sales via Ukraine this year based on an average Russian government gas price forecast of $339 per 1,000 cubic meters, according to Reuters calculations.
Russia's gas pipeline export monopoly Gazprom plunged to a net loss of $7 billion in 2023, its first annual loss since 1999, because of the loss of EU gas markets.
Russia has said it would be ready to extend the transit deal but Kyiv has repeatedly said it will not do it.
Another option is for Gazprom to supply some of the gas via another route, for example via TurkStream, Bulgaria, Serbia or Hungary. However, capacity via these routes is limited.
Hungary
has been keen to keep the Ukrainian route open, but said it would continue to receive Russian gas from the south, via the TurkStream pipeline on the bed of the Black Sea.
The EU and Ukraine have also asked Azerbaijan to facilitate discussions with Russia regarding the gas transit deal.
A senior source at Azeri energy company SOCAR told Reuters on Friday that Moscow and Kyiv have failed to agree on the deal brokered by Azerbaijan to continue Russian gas exports to Europe via Ukraine.