Syria and the Kurds

 Part of a funeral procession for an SDF member in the city of Qamishli (AFP)
Part of a funeral procession for an SDF member in the city of Qamishli (AFP)
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Syria and the Kurds

 Part of a funeral procession for an SDF member in the city of Qamishli (AFP)
Part of a funeral procession for an SDF member in the city of Qamishli (AFP)

Kurdish leader has said that one of their negotiating counterparts in Damascus questioned whether the registration of Kurdi, the Kurdish language, in the Syrian constitution could one day lead to establishing whistled languages in Syria.

The Syrian-Kurdish negotiator said there shouldn’t be an issue with whistled languages if they could be understood.

This constitutional debate sums up the relationship between Damascus and Qamishli. Over the years, the two sides never came close to each other. Rather, the gap has deepened, suspicion has exacerbated, and the ideology has been imbued with the national dispute.

Presently, Syrian officials heavily doubt the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and its primary component, the People's Defense Units (YPG), a mainly Kurdish militia. With US support, the SDF and the YPG control around a quarter of Syria’s territory and most of the country’s wealth.

Syrian officials have accused the SDF and YPG of “treason,” “conspiring with US occupying forces on dividing Syria,” and “having a separatist agenda.”

As for Kurdish officials, they accuse the Syrian regime of “seeking to turn back the clock to pre-2011,” “holding onto a Baathist chauvinistic mentality” and “refusing to make any real political concessions.”

Damascus insists that the SDF and its political wing, the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), sign a document that includes a commitment to four key items that include recognizing President Bashar al-Assad as president of the whole country, adhering to Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, respecting the Syrian flag as the only symbol of the country, and supporting the Syrian Army.

Moreover, Damascus is requesting the SDF join the Syrian Army.

This “four-item document” hangs on the gate of the headquarters where negotiations are held, awaiting the signatures.

Meanwhile, Qamishli’s negotiating delegation is clinging to the recognition of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) as a part of Syria and adapting laws, such as the Local Administration Law No. 107, to fit this acknowledgment.

Moreover, they are requesting that the Syrian constitution comes to recognize Kurdi as an official language. Maintaining the SDF’s independence from any future Syrian Army and the equitable distribution of the strategic wealth controlled by the SDF are also among Qamishli’s demands.

In depth, Damascus is betting on time.

It believes that a day will come when the US will withdraw from northeastern Syria as it withdrew from Afghanistan. It is convinced that a day will come when Washington will betray the Kurds, as it has throughout history.

Damascus is also betting on its allies in Tehran and Moscow and its opponents in Ankara.

The Kurds are also counting on time and allies. With the passage of time, they expect for temporary realities to turn into “permanent solutions.”

Additionally, the Kurds are depending on their military might, organizational nerve and ideological stock.

Their agenda is also hinged on Western concerns about the return of ISIS in Iraq and Syria.

Developments in the Damascus-Qamishli relationship are contingent on what is happening between the Syrian capital and Ankara.

Thanks to Russia, the winds of normalization of ties are blowing hard between Syria and Türkiye. This is a major concern to the Kurds.

During secret negotiations in Moscow, Syrian and Turkish security officials exchanged many conditions that could lead up to the normalization of ties.

Damascus wants Ankara to present a timetable for the withdrawal of Turkish forces from Syria. It also wants Türkiye to quit supporting Syrian opposition factions. Retaking Idlib and reopening the strategic M4 highway connecting Aleppo to Latakia, are also among Damascus’ demands.

Moreover, the Syrian capital is asking Türkiye to help in supporting reconstruction efforts and circumventing Western sanctions.

Ankara wants to work against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and its Syrian wing, the “YPG.”

The Turkish capital is also seeking to set up security cooperation to control borders. It also wants the return of Syrian refugees, the establishment of safe areas 30 kilometers deep into Syrian territory, and the facilitation of the work of the Syrian Constitutional Committee.

There are demands, counterclaims and deep disputes. But what is certain is that the level of Kurdish concern is growing against the background of preparations to start coordination between Damascus and Ankara to fight the “Kurdish separatist entity.”

A secret Syrian-Turkish-Iranian agreement under Russian auspices on the sidelines of a summit in Tehran last July has seen the three countries exchanging security information.

This allowed for the escalation of Turkish drone strikes against SDF and PKK leaders.

Some strikes even hit the outskirts of US bases east of the Euphrates. For its part, the US kept silent on the strikes because it is unwilling to anger Ankara, a key player whose role is growing in the Ukrainian war.

Moscow’s mediation has also been active between Damascus and Qamishli. However, Moscow has called on SDF leader Mazloum Abdi to head to Damascus to accept and sign the four-item document. It also urged coordinating military deployments between the SDF and the Syrian Army east of the Euphrates.

Moscow is seeking to open a debate between the Syrian government and the opposition through the constitutional gate.

Russia’s latest proposal is to abandon Geneva as a venue for the meetings of the Constitutional Committee, facilitated by the international community and UN envoy Geir Pedersen.

Instead, Russia wants to hold constitutional meetings in a sequential form in Ankara, Moscow, and Isfahan.

Russia’s goal is to turn the constitutional debate into a platform for normalization of ties between Damascus and Ankara, excluding Washington and its allies from the Syrian political track.



The Day ‘Black September’ Shook the Olympic Village in Munich

One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)
One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)
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The Day ‘Black September’ Shook the Olympic Village in Munich

One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)
One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)

Yehya al-Sinwar was ten years old when the Black September Palestinian organization carried out its hostage taking of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics in Munich. Nearly a billion people watched the Munich Massacre unfold on television as German police and Palestinian fighters traded fire during the operation. The events of September 1972 could be compared to the al-Aqsa Flood Operation that sparked Israel’s war on Gaza in October 2023.

Then Israeli Prime Minister Gold Meir refused the kidnappers’ demand to be flown to Egypt with the hostages. The German government ambushed the kidnappers, but its lack of experience led to the massacre that has since become the subject of countless movies, documentaries and books.

After some initial hesitation, Meir yielded to the pressure of several of her ministers and agreed to Operation Wrath of God that would go after and assassinate nearly everyone involved in the Munich attack.

Paris, which is hosting the Olympic Games this summer, is bound to be worried that such a global event would attract terrorists, especially groups inspired by al-Qaeda, and ISIS.

My profession would have it that I met two of the men who took part in planning and carrying out the Munich attack. The first is Salah Khalaf, also known as Abu Iyad, who was a member of the executive committee of the Fatah movement and the second in command after Yasser Arafat. The second was Mohammed Daoud Oudeh, or Abu Daoud, a member of Fatah’s Revolutionary Council.

Abu Daoud speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Arafat and Abbas

More than half a century since the attack, the Israeli Mossad managed to kill the majority of those involved except its three masterminds: Abu Iyad, his aide Fakhri al-Omari (Abu Mohammed) and Abu Daoud.

Abu Iyad and al-Omari were eventually assassinated but by Palestinian, Sabry al-Banna, or Abu Nidal, the founder of Fatah’s Revolutionary Council. Abu Daoud was also wounded in al-Banna's attack.

In Tunis, Abu Daoud told me that al-Omari came up with the Munich attack during a meeting between him and Abu Iyad. Arafat was aware that the hostage taking would take place in Munich and that the Israelis would be swapped with Palestinians held in Israeli jails, recalled Abu Daoud. Mahmoud Abbas, or Abu Mazen, Fatah’s financial officer was tasked with providing the funds for the operation.

Abu Iyad stressed to me that the operation got out of hand because of Meir’s hardline position and the recklessness of the German government. He said the kidnappers had strict orders not to kill the hostages or open fire except when extremely necessary in self-defense. Abu Daoud confirmed the orders.

Weapons smuggled in undergarments

Abu Iyad personally oversaw the smuggling of weapons that would be used in the operation. He was accompanied by a Lebanese lady, Juliet, who had concealed the weapons in her luggage that was carrying her undergarments. When German customs sought to search the luggage for anything suspicious, they were embarrassed to find the underwear and quickly closed the luggage without searching it thoroughly.

Abu Daoud was tasked with storing the luggage at the train station and changing their locations daily to avoid suspicion until the day of the operation.

German security agencies were never alerted to the traveler who moved between Munich hotels using an Iraqi passport. The man was Abu Daoud and he was tasked with scouting the Olympic Village.

Black September

The Black September organization was born in wake of the battles that erupted between the Jordanian army and Palestinian groups in September 1970. The fighting ended the following year with the Palestinians’ defeat. Black September was formed out of desire for revenge against the Jordanian regime and to wage an open confrontation with Israel.

The defeat and ouster from Jordan were a major blow to the Palestinians who believed the country was the best position to confront Israel. Black September would be used to settle several scores. On November 28, 1971, it assassinated Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal as he entered the Sheraton Hotel in Cairo. The incident is still the subject of heated debate to this day with some speculation that al-Tal was actually killed by a sniper on a nearby building, not the Palestinian group.

Egypt released the suspects without trial, raising doubts in Jordan that Cairo may have been involved in the attack or at least turned a blind eye to its planning. Abu Iyad agreed to discuss several issues with me, except al-Tal's assassination given how sensitive it still is.

Several setbacks

In 1972 the Palestinians were dejected. They had suffered a blow in Jordan and Palestinian factions in southern Lebanon lacked the weapons to confront Israeli attacks and incursions. The Palestinian leaders were worried that the factions would succumb to despair.

Over the spring, ideas started floating around to carry out an operation that would attract the world’s attention to the situation of the Palestinians and prove to the people in the camps that the resistance is capable of harming Israel.

Over the summer, Abu Iyad became even more invested in the idea of a major attack, especially with the summer Olympics around the corner. He asked that Abu Daoud visit Bulgaria to obtain weapons equipped with silencers “because we will need them in Europe.” The goal was to deal blows to Mossad agents in Europe.

Earlier that year, Palestinian authorities had sent a letter to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) asking that Palestinian athletes be allowed to compete at the Games, but they received no reply. A second letter was also left without a reply.

The Palestinians were dealt a new blow with the assassination of journalist Ghassan Kanafani in Beirut. He was also the editor of the al-Hadaf magazine, the mouthpiece of the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Meeting at a Rome cafe

Abu Iyad, al-Omari and Abu Daoud met soon after the assassination. Al-Omari proposed launching attacks against Israeli embassies and consulates, but Abu Iyad said that would put the resistance in a confrontation with the countries hosting those missions.

The three would meet again later at a cafe in Rome. Abu Iyad angrily said the IOC was continuing to ignore the Palestinian athletes. Al-Omari replied: “Since they are insisting on ignoring us, then why don’t we try to infiltrate the Olympic Village to kidnap Israeli athletes?” Abu Iyad thought he was crazy. Abu Daoud also noted that the majority of Israeli have received military training so overpowering them would be a challenge.

Abu Iyad went quiet as he mulled over the idea. “We could take hostage the Israelis and demand the release of several of our prisoners from Israel. It’s not a bad idea,” he remarked. He turned to Abu Daoud to say: “Munich is on your way to Bulgaria.”

So, the planning for the Munich operation got underway. Abu Daoud asked Abu Iyad to speak to Abu Mazen about securing funds for the operation.

Abu Daoud couldn't persuade the Bulgarians to hand him weapons, who demanded that they communicate with an official authority, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization or Fatah. Abu Iyad intervened, but the Bulgarians then demanded that the weapons head to the Middle East, not Europe.

Abu Daoud lies wounded after an assassination attempt in Warsaw in 1981. (Getty Images)

Scouting visits

Meanwhile, Abu Daoud was trying to scout the Olympic Village. He met a Palestinian woman who spoke some German and he pretended to be a Brazilian who wanted to get inside the village to meet some friends. The German guard sympathized with him and allowed them inside. Abu Daoud would return again with the executor team, Youssef Nazal and Mohammed Mosalha.

In the village, Abu Daoud approached a woman who happened to be Israeli, and he asked her if he could point her in the direction of where the Israeli team was staying. He told her that he was interested in Israel and wanted to learn more about the country and relay that information back to his family in Brazil.

Abu Daoud, Nazal and Mosalha, all pretending to be Brazilians, scouted the area where they will carry out the operation. The planning took weeks of meetings, training and trips between Athens, Madrid, Sofia, Geneva, Beirut and Libya’s Tripoli. The biggest hurdle they needed to overcome was how to smuggle the weapons to Munich.

Lebanese ‘wife’

Abu Iyad instructed Abu Daoud to wait for him at Frankfurt airport on August 24, 1972. Abu Iyad arrived with a Lebanese lady, Juliet, who was pretending to be his wife. At customs, the German officer ordered Abu Iyad to open his luggage, which was carrying the weapons, for inspection.

Abu Daoud became more nervous. But Abu Iyad, with some feigned annoyance, opened the luggage and began taking out his “wife’s” undergarments, which embarrassed the officer, who quickly allowed the luggage through without further inspection. Abu Daoud and Abu Iyad then took a taxi to their hotel.

Abu Iyad transported the weapons to Germany with the help of his Lebanese “wife”. (Getty Images)

Finishing touches

The remaining members of the executor team flew in from Tripoli. They stayed at three hotels and were provided with tracksuits, as well as bandages and biscuits should the hostage-taking take some time.

The Olympic Games opened on August 26 and the planners waited for the games to get underway and for security to become somewhat lax before they could carry out the attack.

Abu Daoud said a meeting was held in Beirut ahead of the operation to ensure that the attack would not be seen as an act of revenge, but rather as a political message and that blood would not be shed except during extreme moments.

The plans were now complete: The attackers would enter from the fence surrounding the Village and head to building 31 where the Israeli team was staying. They would try to take as many Israelis as possible hostage. Mosalha was tasked with carrying out the negotiations. He would hand over a list of over 200 Palestinians held in Israeli jails.

The hostages would then be flown to a Middle Eastern country, preferably Egypt, which would demand that a prisoner swap be held with Israel, added Abu Daoud.

German security forces try to enter the location where the hostages are held in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)

Night of the operation

Abu Daoud gave the order to carry out the attack on September 4. The attackers, dressed in tracksuits and concealing their weapons in their bags, met by the village fence. As they were about the climb over, they heard a raucous that turned out to be American athletes who had been staying out late drinking. They were sneaking into the village. Abu Daoud recalled that the athletes helped the attackers over the fence not knowing that they were intruders.

Abu Daoud returned to the hotel and waited for news of the attack to make it on the news. Abu Daoud said that had the operation been a failure, the team would meet again at the train station. The operation was set to begin at 4:30 in the morning and by 8:00 news of the attack had made it to the media, captivating the world.

The kidnappers’ helicopter is destroyed during the gunfight at a military airport near Munich. (Getty Images)

Meir’s government refused to negotiate with the kidnappers. The German government ambushed the attackers as they made their way to the airport ahead of being flown to Egypt. The ensuing gunfight left five of the kidnappers, nine hostages and a German policeman dead. Two Israeli athletes were killed in the initial raid of where they were staying.

‘Wrath of God’

Soon after, Meir’s government agreed to operation “Wrath of God” that led to the assassination of several Palestinian officials and diplomats – some of whom had nothing to do with the Munich operation. Israel succeeded in killing several of its targets except for the masterminds.