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Yemen Govt Warns ‘All Options Open’ after Houthi Attack on Dhabba Oil Terminal

A Houthi trooper stands guard ahead of the funeral of a late Houthi official, in Sanaa, Yemen, 12 October 2022. (AFP)
A Houthi trooper stands guard ahead of the funeral of a late Houthi official, in Sanaa, Yemen, 12 October 2022. (AFP)
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Yemen Govt Warns ‘All Options Open’ after Houthi Attack on Dhabba Oil Terminal

A Houthi trooper stands guard ahead of the funeral of a late Houthi official, in Sanaa, Yemen, 12 October 2022. (AFP)
A Houthi trooper stands guard ahead of the funeral of a late Houthi official, in Sanaa, Yemen, 12 October 2022. (AFP)

The Iran-backed Houthi militias’ attack on the al-Dhabba oil terminal on Friday sparked outrage in Yemen and Arab and international condemnation.

The government said on Friday its forces had intercepted armed drones launched on the southern oil terminal in Hadramout province by the militias as an oil tanker was preparing to dock.

A Yemeni government official said Houthi drones attacked the oil terminal, located in the southern town of al-Shihr, as Nissos oil tanker was preparing to enter the terminal.

Yemeni observers believed that the attack was an “Iranian message” to threaten energy markets and trade routes.

The Houthis claimed responsibility for the attack, saying they sought to prevent the government from exporting oil.

The government responded by warning that “all options are open” to retaliate to the attack in what was understood as a sign that it could resume military operations that were halted by the nationwide ceasefire that was adopted on April 2. The truce expired in October after the Houthis refused to extend and expand it.

The government revealed that this was not the first Houthi attack against oil facilities in October. The militias had carried out attacks against the Radoum oil port in Shabwa on October 18 and 19, it said.

“The Houthis are clearly insistent on targeting civilian and trade installations in violation of international law,” said the government, describing the attacks as “blatant threats to regional and international energy supplies.”

It reiterated its keenness on providing the necessary conditions to reimpose the truce in the country and avert military escalation.

It warned, however, that the Houthis “are crossing all red lines,” citing their threats to neighboring countries and all oil companies in the region, and rejection of all peace initiatives “in pursuit of the agendas of the Iranian regime.”

Moreover, it warned that the Houthis are insisting on “paving the way for a new more criminal and severe phase in the war” that will have an even greater impact on the humanitarian situation in Yemen.

“All options are open in dealing with this Houthi terrorist attack and military escalation,” it added, calling on “all countries to take firm and strong measures to condemn the terrorist act and the Iranian regime behind it.”

Failure to do so will have negative repercussions on the peace process in Yemen and global energy supplies, the government warned.

Foreign Minister Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak carried out intense contacts with United Nations envoy Hans Grundberg, US envoy Tim Lenderking, Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council Dr. Nayef al-Hajraf and several European ambassadors to condemn the attack and pressure the Houthis to cease their violations.

The Houthis “have crossed all red lines,” he declared, urging the need to take a firm stance against this terrorist act.

Official sources said the FM discussed with Grundberg the repercussions of the attacks on al-Dhabba and Radoum, saying they undermine all international peace efforts.

The Houthis are delivering a message that they will never be partners in peace, but rather a terrorist group that threatens peace and stability in Yemen, the region and world, the state news agency Saba reported him as saying.

Bin Mubarak also held telephone talks with Lenderking to condemn the attack.

He called on the US and international community to take a firm stance against the terrorist Houthi threats and hold the perpetrators to account.

Widespread condemnation

The Houthi attacks were the first to target oil export ports on the Arabian Sea, drawing widespread Arab and international condemnation.

Egypt held the militias responsible for the escalation and impeding efforts to renew the nationwide truce.

It underscored the need for the Houthis to respond immediately with international and regional efforts to renew the truce in a way that would pave the way for a permanent ceasefire and political settlement in the country.

Egypt stressed its firm support to the unity of Yemen and its sovereignty over all its territories and solidarity with it against all threats.

The European Union mission to Yemen strongly condemned the Houthi attacks, saying: “Fortunately, no lives were lost and the vessel was able to depart safely, but the flagrant menacing of international maritime commerce is unacceptable.

“Houthi attacks on international shipping are an affront to core principles of the Law of the Sea, jeopardizing freedom of navigation through the region’s waterways and blocking access to Yemeni ports. They deprive Yemenis the ability to afford fundamental necessities and could impact the flow of essential goods into Yemen,” it said in a statement.

“The path forward is to reduce tensions, de-escalate, and redouble efforts to end Yemen’s conflict through a negotiated settlement,” it urged.

“This is the only way to ensure that all Yemenis can benefit from the country’s resources and enjoy a more prosperous future. We will continue supporting efforts led by UN Special Envoy Grundberg to renew the truce and reach a political settlement to the conflict in Yemen.”

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Arab World

Armed Gaza Gangs Shift Tactics, Straining Hamas Security

Fighters from Hamas’s armed wing, Al-Qassam Brigades, in Khan Younis, Feb. 20, 2025. (dpa)
Fighters from Hamas’s armed wing, Al-Qassam Brigades, in Khan Younis, Feb. 20, 2025. (dpa)
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Armed Gaza Gangs Shift Tactics, Straining Hamas Security

Fighters from Hamas’s armed wing, Al-Qassam Brigades, in Khan Younis, Feb. 20, 2025. (dpa)
Fighters from Hamas’s armed wing, Al-Qassam Brigades, in Khan Younis, Feb. 20, 2025. (dpa)

For months, a proliferation of armed gangs in Gaza was widely seen as a looming threat to Hamas, which has ruled the enclave since 2007 after seizing it by force following a bitter split with Fatah in the wake of Hamas’s victory in the 2006 legislative elections.

As time passed, however, those expectations faded, as the gangs proved disorganized, fragmented, and incapable of mounting a sustained challenge.

Abu Shabab gang

The most prominent armed gang was led by Yasser Abu Shabab, a Palestinian whom the Hamas-run authorities had previously detained on criminal charges.

After his release from prison at the start of the war in October 2023, he became free to operate. He gradually gained notoriety for seizing and looting humanitarian aid, working with relatives and friends. He later formed an armed group that spread in areas under Israeli control east of Rafah in southern Gaza.

Israel, over time, placed hopes on Abu Shabab’s gang as the first group to emerge and expand, eventually attracting dozens and then a limited number of hundreds of fighters, in what was seen as a potential challenge to Hamas.

Efforts were made not only through the looting of aid arriving via the Kerem Shalom crossing, but also through skirmishes carried out by the gang against gunmen from families opposed to Hamas. These included gunfire and attacks on public and other facilities aimed at asserting the group’s presence.

Hamas confronted these practices on each occasion, with fatalities reported on both sides. The biggest losers, however, were members of families that aligned themselves with the gang and were targeted by Hamas fire as a deterrent.

This approach succeeded in several cases before the most recent ceasefire. It intensified afterward, when Hamas attacked other clans and families, killing, wounding, and arresting dozens, in what it described as a deterrent message to anyone attempting to cooperate with Israel.

For short periods, Abu Shabab’s gang was accused of taking part in the abduction of Palestinians by Israel, including Hamas activists, but this was not proven.

In some cases, it later emerged that Israeli special forces had carried out those operations. The gang was also accused of responsibility for killing Palestinians heading to US-run aid distribution centers, though accounts of those incidents were contradictory.

Other gangs

During the same period, other armed gangs emerged in different areas, including the group led by Hossam Al-Asatal south of Khan Younis, Rami Helles’s gang east of Gaza City, Ashraf Al-Mansi’s group in the north of the strip, and, most recently, the gang led by Shawqi Abu Nseira northeast of Khan Younis.

These groups adopted various names such as “Counterterrorism” and “Popular Forces.”

Abu Shabab was later killed unexpectedly while attempting to mediate a family dispute east of Rafah. Leadership of his group subsequently passed to his deputy, Ghassan Al-Dahini, described as the “mastermind, organizer, and de facto leader” of the Abu Shabab gang.

Following Abu Shabab’s killing, his group lost much of its already limited influence and carried out no significant new activities or skirmishes, particularly after the ceasefire. Some of its members fell into Hamas ambushes and were killed or arrested.

Hamas also struck the gangs led by Helles and Al-Mansi and attempted to target Al-Asatal’s group, while no action was taken against the most recently formed gang led by Abu Nseira.

The Helles and Al-Mansi gangs, operating east of Gaza City and in the north, respectively, tried to assert themselves through minimal clashes.

More recently, however, the Helles gang adopted a new tactic, killing several Gazans who approached the so-called yellow line in the Shujaiya and Tuffah neighborhoods, and forcing residents of a residential block in Tuffah to evacuate at Israel’s request. This marked a new development in the group’s methods.

These moves appear to have prompted Hamas, late Sunday into Monday, to set an ambush for members of that gang on the outskirts of Gaza City.

Details remain unclear, but the “Radea (Deterrence)” force of Gaza’s armed factions’ security apparatus said it had thwarted a “hostile security operation” and inflicted casualties.

Rami Helles, the gang’s leader, confirmed in a Facebook post that one of his fighters, Raad Al-Jamal, had been killed, without providing details. Some sources said Al-Jamal was among the earliest gunmen to join the group.

The gang appears to have attempted to prove itself by assassinating a Hamas activist, as other gangs had done, but its members were caught in the ambush.

All of the gangs, since their formation, have operated on the ground in the service of Israel by entering booby-trapped houses and tunnels to detect explosives.

This has led to the killing and wounding of some of their members, a practice later confirmed by Israeli media, which reported that the Israeli army relied on them because of the frequency of ambushes faced by its forces.

More dangerous tactics

Within the span of a month, the armed gangs shifted to what Palestinians described as “dangerous” tactics after carrying out two assassinations targeting officers in the Hamas-run security services and prominent activists in the movement’s armed wing, the Qassam Brigades, near their homes.

An investigation by Asharq Al-Awsat found that the first assassination, on Dec. 14, 2025, targeted Ahmed Zamzam, an officer in the Internal Security Service, in the Maghazi refugee camp in central Gaza.

It was carried out by gunmen belonging to Shawqi Abu Nseira’s gang. The second, on Jan. 12, targeted Mahmoud Al-Asatal, the head of investigations in the Hamas-run administration in Khan Younis.

That attack was carried out by gunmen linked to Hossam Al-Asatal’s gang. Al-Asatal was a relative of the victim, though his clan had disowned him since he formed his gang in September. Field sources said both operations followed prolonged surveillance of the targets.

The change in tactics raised questions about its rationale. Field sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that, unlike older gangs, Abu Nseira and Hossam Al-Asatal displayed greater loyalty to Israel, operated more boldly, spoke fluent Hebrew with Israeli media, and presented themselves as potential alternatives to Hamas’s rule in Gaza.

According to the sources, the gunmen who carried out the two assassinations were equipped with small body-mounted cameras to document the operations, and some of the weapons used were pistols fitted with silencers.

This pointed clearly to Israeli support, which other gangs did not receive due to their failure to demonstrate real impact.

Multiple field sources also said members of these gangs had obtained new Israeli weapons, including anti-armor munitions, for the first time since Israel began providing them with support, food, and some light arms.

Shifting factors

The ability of these gangs to carry out two assassinations within a month prompted further scrutiny. Asharq Al-Awsat verified through several sources that both Abu Nseira and Al-Asatal had been senior officers in the Palestinian Authority’s security services and possessed significant experience.

The sources said Al-Asatal had received specialized training for years with Israel’s Mossad after being recruited by the Shin Bet, and had been assigned to work outside Palestine. He later took part in the assassination of Qassam Brigades leader Fadi Al-Batsh, an engineer who was not widely known within the group and had been receiving specialized training in Malaysia to develop drones and rockets.

Al-Batsh was killed in April 2018 in an operation in which Al-Asatal participated alongside local agents working for the Mossad. Hamas later succeeded in luring Al-Asatal through one of his brothers, an officer in the Internal Security Service, arresting him and issuing a death sentence against him.

Sources said Al-Asatal and Abu Nseira possessed broader military thinking than others. Al-Asatal had held the rank of major in the Preventive Security Service, while Abu Nseira served as a major general in the Palestinian police.

By contrast, Rami Helles held the rank of junior officer in the Presidential Guard, as did Ashraf Al-Mansi, who served as a conscript in the same force. Abu Shabab had not belonged to any Palestinian security service, while his deputy, Ghassan Al-Dahini, had served in the National Security Forces.

The experience of Al-Asatal and Abu Nseira, including the former’s recruitment and extensive training by Israeli intelligence and the latter’s past imprisonment by Israel, enabled them to target active Hamas members, particularly newly recruited Qassam Brigades fighters, and recruit them to their side.

Al-Asatal recently announced that a member of the Qassam Brigades’ elite unit in Jabalia had joined his forces, prompting the man’s family to deny he had been part of the elite unit.

Hamas sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that he had been recently recruited and worked as a courier between some leaders, transporting funds, and collecting donations from abroad for charitable projects for displaced people. He was the grandson of one of Hamas’s founders in Jabalia.

The activities of these two gangs have increasingly troubled Hamas from a security standpoint, as Israel continues to intensify its intelligence efforts to carry out assassinations whenever conditions allow.

This has prompted Hamas to raise its alert level and strengthen personal security for its officers and leaders to guard against further assassination attempts, Asharq Al-Awsat has learned.

Hamas and its security services have issued internal security directives urging leaders and members to remain vigilant, vary their routes, carry appropriate weapons to repel any attack, and abandon mobile phones to reduce tracking amid Israeli assistance to the gangs.

They were also instructed to monitor any suspicious movements by individuals believed to be surveilling them and to take countermeasures accordingly.

Arab World

Syria's Sharaa to Make Surprise Moscow Visit Amid Talk of New Ties

An entrance to the Qamishli airbase, northeast Syria, 27 January 2026. (EPA)
An entrance to the Qamishli airbase, northeast Syria, 27 January 2026. (EPA)
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Syria's Sharaa to Make Surprise Moscow Visit Amid Talk of New Ties

An entrance to the Qamishli airbase, northeast Syria, 27 January 2026. (EPA)
An entrance to the Qamishli airbase, northeast Syria, 27 January 2026. (EPA)

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa will arrive in Moscow on Wednesday for talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Syrian media reported, in a surprise visit that comes amid rapid shifts in Russia’s military posture in northeastern Syria.

The reports said Sharaa would hold talks with Putin, but did not provide further details.

The Kremlin confirmed the visit on Tuesday, saying Putin would meet Sharaa in Moscow on Wednesday. It said the two presidents were expected to discuss the state and prospects of bilateral relations across various fields, as well as the current situation in the Middle East.

A Syrian source in Moscow told Asharq Al-Awsat that Sharaa may ask Putin to hand over several “second- and third-tier figures who have direct links to attempts to inflame tensions along Syria’s coast.”

The visit comes just two days after Moscow carried out an urgent withdrawal of its forces and equipment from Qamishli airport, prompting observers to link the two developments.

Russian sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the evacuation was carried out at Damascus’ request after government forces expanded their control over areas in northeastern Syria.

The source said there was “no longer a need for a Russian presence in this region.”

Discarded equipment and supplies lie on the floor inside part of a Russian military base near Qamishli International Airport in northeastern Syria, Tuesday, Jan. 27, 2026, where Russian forces have begun withdrawing from sections of the facility. (AP)

The reports on the Russian withdrawal from northeastern Syria coincided with field accounts by foreign correspondents describing heightened activity in the area, including the removal of military vehicles, armored units, and troops, which were transferred to the Hmeimim airbase.

A Syrian security source on Syria’s western coast said Russian military vehicles and heavy weapons had been moved from Qamishli to the Hmeimim airport over the past two days.

Correspondents in the coastal region documented intensified movements of Russian convoys over the past few days, most of which were carrying sealed crates.

A Reuters correspondent saw Russian flags still flying at Qamishli airport, along with two aircraft bearing Russian markings on the runway.

Russia has maintained a limited presence at Qamishli airport since 2019, smaller than its deployment at its airbase and naval facility on Syria’s Mediterranean coast.

In recent months, however, Moscow significantly reinforced its presence at Qamishli, deploying radar systems and missile defense units, and transferring a large number of vehicles and helicopters from Hmeimim to the airport.

The move had been widely seen as a sign of plans for a long-term Russian presence there.

Attention was also drawn to the fact that the Russian pullout was not limited to Qamishli airport, but also included positions in Hasakah province, which has seen security tensions between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces.

According to sources at the Russian airbase in Hmeimim, some of the withdrawing forces were redeployed to western Syria, while others were to return to Russia.

Russian sources did not rule out that developments in northeastern Syria would be at the top of the agenda during the talks, particularly in light of Moscow’s swift response to Damascus’ request to withdraw from the area.

The discussions are also expected to cover bilateral cooperation in various fields, as well as ongoing talks on restructuring the Russian presence at the Hmeimim and Tartous bases on new terms that serve the interests of both sides.

They may also include follow-up discussions, previously launched at the military level, on Russia’s assistance to Syria in rehabilitating the Syrian army, along with logistical requirements for maintaining military equipment, most of which is Russian-made.

A Russian military Ilyushin Il-76 strategic airlift aircraft prepares for take off from Qamishli International Airport in northeastern Syria's Hasakah province on January 27, 2026. (AFP)

The two sides have exchanged several visits at the level of their defense ministries in recent months.

Sources said the visit could lay the groundwork for “new arrangements in relations between Moscow and Damascus, after both sides showed a willingness in recent months to overcome points of disagreement and establish foundations for cooperation in various fields.”

Sharaa last visited Moscow in mid-October, when he met Putin for the first time. Their talks lasted about 2.5 hours.

At the time, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said the discussions covered several areas, most notably humanitarian issues, as well as energy, transport, health care, and tourism.

“Syria needs to rebuild its infrastructure,” Novak said after the talks, adding that Russia was capable of providing support in this area.

He revealed that the two sides discussed prospects for cooperation in other fields, including cultural and humanitarian areas, tourism development, and health care. He noted that Damascus had expressed interest in obtaining Russian wheat and medicines.

Novak added that Moscow and Damascus agreed to hold a joint intergovernmental commission meeting in the near future.

Arab World

US to Conduct Multi-Day Military Exercise in Middle East

The USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier (L) transits the Strait of Hormuz on November 19, 2019. (AFP photo / US Navy / Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Zachary Pearson)
The USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier (L) transits the Strait of Hormuz on November 19, 2019. (AFP photo / US Navy / Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Zachary Pearson)
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US to Conduct Multi-Day Military Exercise in Middle East

The USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier (L) transits the Strait of Hormuz on November 19, 2019. (AFP photo / US Navy / Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Zachary Pearson)
The USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier (L) transits the Strait of Hormuz on November 19, 2019. (AFP photo / US Navy / Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Zachary Pearson)

The United States on Tuesday announced a major multi-day Air Force exercise in the Middle East, as Washington and Tehran face off over Iran's deadly crackdown on anti-government demonstrations.

The announcement came a day after the US military said the Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group had arrived in the Middle East, dramatically boosting American firepower in the region.

The exercise will "demonstrate the ability to deploy, disperse, and sustain combat airpower across" the Middle East, the US Air Force component of Central Command, which is responsible for American forces in the region, said in a statement.

No date or exact location for the exercise were released.

The protests in Iran started in late December, driven by economic grievances, but turned into a mass movement against the ruling authorities, with huge street demonstrations for several days from January 8.

A US-based rights group said Tuesday it had confirmed the deaths of over 6,000 people in protests, adding that it was investigating over 17,000 more potential deaths.

President Donald Trump had repeatedly warned Iran that if it killed protesters, the United States would intervene militarily, and also encouraged Iranians to take over state institutions, saying "help is on the way."

But he pulled back from ordering strikes earlier this month, saying Tehran had halted more than 800 executions under pressure from Washington.