Will Sudani Adopt the Previous Iraqi Government’s Economic Policies?

A handout picture released by Iraq's prime minister's office shows the new Prime Minister Mohamed Shia al-Sudani arriving for the official handover ceremony at the Republican Palace, the government's seat, in Baghdad's green zone. (Iraq's prime minister's office/ AFP)
A handout picture released by Iraq's prime minister's office shows the new Prime Minister Mohamed Shia al-Sudani arriving for the official handover ceremony at the Republican Palace, the government's seat, in Baghdad's green zone. (Iraq's prime minister's office/ AFP)
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Will Sudani Adopt the Previous Iraqi Government’s Economic Policies?

A handout picture released by Iraq's prime minister's office shows the new Prime Minister Mohamed Shia al-Sudani arriving for the official handover ceremony at the Republican Palace, the government's seat, in Baghdad's green zone. (Iraq's prime minister's office/ AFP)
A handout picture released by Iraq's prime minister's office shows the new Prime Minister Mohamed Shia al-Sudani arriving for the official handover ceremony at the Republican Palace, the government's seat, in Baghdad's green zone. (Iraq's prime minister's office/ AFP)

These days, we are seeing increasing speculation, especially among Iraqi elites and economists, about the extent to which the country’s new prime minister, Mohamed Shia al-Sudani, can reverse some of the critical economic decisions that the Coordination Framework had criticized Mustafa al-Kadhimi’s government of taking. Topping the list are the decision to devaluate the Iraqi dinar and a couple of other economic policies.

Dr. Nabil Al-Marsoumi, an academic and economist, said the program put forward by Sudani’s government did not mention reversing the decision to devaluate the currency by over a fifth - with 1,480 rather than 1,180 dinars becoming the equivalent of one US dollar.

The failure to reverse the decision of the former government demonstrates that its critics, most of whom are part of the pro-Iran Coordination Framework, had exploited the devaluation and its ramifications for the Iraqi people’s purchasing power as a pretext to undermine Kadhimi’s government.

“There was no amendment to the exchange rate in the government’s 2023 budget,” Marsoumi stressed. This affirms that Sudani’s government - and with it, the Coordination Framework deputies who dominate parliament - has backtracked on the exchange rate.

Marsoumi added that reversing the decision taken by Khadimi’s government and bringing the US dollar exchange rate back to 2020 levels would increase the government’s budget by 24 billion dollars.

He noted that over 50 MPs recently petitioned the government to reverse the decision. Sudani’s government, however, did not show any enthusiasm for this step, meaning that the decision taken by the former government had been correct despite the sharp criticism that had been levied at it at the time. Indeed, it is a decision several figures and platforms close to the Coordination Framework continue to criticize it.

Moreover, other economists have noted that the new government’s program did not mention the economic agreements that Kadhimi’s government had concluded with Arab countries.

Many within the Coordination Framework had criticized this decision and fiercely opposed it, especially those that are particularly close to Tehran.

Among them is the accord to sell Iraqi oil to Jordan at a discount and the economic agreements concluded with Egypt and Jordan, and the electric grid agreements with the Gulf states and Türkiye - more evidence that “Iraqi political forces usually pursue their private interests.”

While Sudani had called for reducing the salaries of high-ranking Iraqi officials, which he said would save the government 500 billion dinars (about 400 million dollars) a month, this seems unlikely. Indeed, many observers have said that they doubt Sudani will be able to do that since most ministers and senior officials are affiliated with the parties and groups in power. They are not simply going to roll over and surrender their privileges.

Experts believe that instead of a reduction in salaries, we could see Sudani make cuts to the privileges and financial incentives that come with such positions. In fact, they often cost the government multiples of the officials’ salaries. These incentives often take the form of funds allocated to the minister or official’s office, as well as a budget allocated for security.



What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
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What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo

Austria's energy company OMV was informed by Gazprom that the Russian gas producer would halt deliveries of natural gas via Ukraine to OMV from 0500 GMT on Nov. 16 following OMV winning an arbitration case. Supplies of Russian gas to Europe via Ukraine may completely stop from Jan. 1 2025 after the current five-year deal expires as Kyiv has refused to negotiate the new terms of the transit with Moscow during the war.
Here is what happens if Russian gas transit via Ukraine is completely turned off and who will be affected most, according to Reuters.
HOW BIG ARE THE VOLUMES?
Russian gas supplies to Europe via Ukraine are relatively small. Russia shipped about 15 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas via Ukraine in 2023 - only 8% of peak Russian gas flows to Europe via various routes in 2018-2019.
Russia spent half a century building its European gas market share, which at its peak stood at 35%.
Moscow lost its share to rivals such as Norway, the United States and Qatar since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, prompting the EU to cut its dependence on Russian gas.
EU gas prices rallied in 2022 to record highs after the loss of Russian supplies. The rally won't be repeated given modest volumes and a small number of customers for the remaining volumes, according to EU officials and traders.
UKRAINIAN ROUTE
The Soviet-era Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod pipeline brings gas from Siberia via the town of Sudzha - now under control of Ukrainian military forces - in Russia's Kursk region. It then flows through Ukraine to Slovakia.
In Slovakia, the gas pipeline splits into branches going to the Czech Republic and Austria.
Austria still receives most of its gas via Ukraine, while Russia accounts for around two-thirds of Hungary's gas imports.
Slovakia takes around 3 bcm from energy giant Gazprom per year, also about two-thirds of its needs.
Czech Republic almost completely cut gas imports from the east last year, but has started taking gas from Russia in 2024.
Most other Russian gas routes to Europe are shut including Yamal-Europe via Belarus and Nord Stream under the Baltic.
The only other operational Russian gas pipeline route to Europe is the Blue Stream and TurkStream to Türkiye under the Black Sea. Türkiye sends some Russian gas volumes onward to Europe including to Hungary.
WHY DOES THE UKRAINIAN ROUTE STILL WORK?
While remaining Russian gas transit volumes are small, the issue remains a dilemma for the EU. Many EU members such as France and Germany have said they would not buy Russian gas anymore but the stance of Slovakia, Hungary and Austria, which have closer ties to Moscow, challenges the EU common approach.
The countries, who still receive Russian gas, argue it is the most economic fuel and also blame neighboring EU countries for imposing high transit fees for alternative supplies.
Ukraine still earns $0.8-$1 billion in transit fees from Russian gas transit. Russia earns over $3 billion on sales via Ukraine based on an average gas price of $200 per 1,000 cubic meters, according to Reuters calculations.
Russia's gas pipeline export monopoly Gazprom plunged to a net loss of $7 billion in 2023, its first annual loss since 1999, because of the loss EU's gas markets.
Russia has said it would be ready to extend the transit deal but Kyiv has repeatedly said it won't do it.
Another option is for Gazprom to supply some of the gas via another route, for example via TurkStream, Bulgaria, Serbia or Hungary. However, capacity via these routes is limited.
The EU and Ukraine have also asked Azerbaijan to facilitate discussions with Russia regarding the gas transit deal, an Azeri presidential advisor told Reuters, who declined to give further details.