The Syrian Oil: Time for New Approach?

US - Russian Struggle Opens Opportunity for 'War lords'

US forces conduct training with the "Syrian Democratic Forces" in Hasaka countryside on September 7 (EPA)
US forces conduct training with the "Syrian Democratic Forces" in Hasaka countryside on September 7 (EPA)
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The Syrian Oil: Time for New Approach?

US forces conduct training with the "Syrian Democratic Forces" in Hasaka countryside on September 7 (EPA)
US forces conduct training with the "Syrian Democratic Forces" in Hasaka countryside on September 7 (EPA)

With the war in Syria now in its twelfth year and with the US-Russian conflict still ongoing to control the oil sector and its potential, local belligerents and regional opponents have found in oil a rare point of consensus to cooperate and pick clean the country’s wealth and revenues.

Oil production from fields and facilities mainly located in north-eastern Syria was about 400,000 barrels per day prior to the conflict. After the eruption of the conflict in 2011, various warring forces, including opposition factions and ISIS, successively seized control of much of this invaluable oil wealth. Western sanctions placed on the oil sector have caused foreign oil companies to leave the country.

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a US-backed coalition, currently controls one-quarter of Syria’s territory, including the area east of the Euphrates. This means that the SDF now dominates 90 percent of the oil and over 50 percent of the gas fields, as well as the infrastructure owned by foreign companies, according to legitimate contracts signed with the Damascus government, including Gulfsands Petroleum, Total, and Shell. Oil wells and facilities were cordoned off and “protected” by the US-led coalition forces and SDF.

On the other hand, Damascus announced that the oil sector’s losses since the beginning of the crisis amounted to USD 91.5 billion. Oil Minister Bassam Tohme revealed that the daily oil production is 89,000 barrels, mainly in Kurdish-controlled areas. Tohme describes this oil as being “stolen” from the Syrian people.

International Conflict

After the Russian military intervention in late 2015, Damascus signed contracts with Russian companies to invest in the oil and gas sectors in Syria and its territorial waters. It also contracted with Evro Polis, the Yevgeny Prigozhin-linked company financing Wagner mercenaries, to protect oil and gas facilities and liberate them from ISIS in exchange for 25 percent of their proceeds. This included Evro Polis taking control of Suncor’s large Ebla gas development near Palmyra – an operation that led to many casualties.

This agreement was the cover under which the Wagner paramilitary group operated. Wagner was estimated to have as many as 2,500 men in Syria in 2018. They participated in the fighting in Syria or took part in training and preparation camps in Russia. Some of them have been relocated to Libya and now to Ukraine.

In reality, the agreement between Evro Polis and Damascus only covered areas under Damascus control. In early 2018, Wagner mercenaries launched an assault on the Conoco gas plant in the eastern Euphrates, a position of the SDF, but they were hammered by US artillery and airstrikes that killed about 200 mercenaries.

In late 2019, former US President Donald Trump made a shock announcement that American troops would withdraw from the area around Syria’s border with Turkiye, east of the Euphrates, giving Turkiye the green light to invade northern Syria and putting the SDF, Washington’s allies, under new pressure. On October 6, 2019, Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, together with some US and European officials, persuaded President Trump to keep 900 members of the US military there to protect the oil. Trump later said that "a small number of soldiers will remain in the areas that contain oil," stressing that "we have ensured the security and protection of oil."

In July 2020, Washington announced that SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi informed the Trump administration of the signing of an agreement with the American company Delta Crescent Energy to invest in oil after obtaining a waiver from the Treasury Department from the sanctions placed on Syria. Then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said the deal was intended to "modernize oil.”

The situation embarrassed the US Department of Defense which issued conflicting statements. It initially stated that "Syrian oil is for the Syrian people and we remain committed to the unity and territorial integrity of Syria.” It further emphasized that “the US government does not own, control, or manage the oil resources in Syria. The populations in areas liberated from ISIS make their own decisions on local governance.” Former US Defense Secretary Mark Esper announced that "we are now taking measures to strengthen our position in Deir el-Zour to deny ISIS access to the oil fields.” The Pentagon confirmed sending troops and armored vehicles to protect oil fields.

The US-Russian conflict is still ongoing. An opposition leader said that high-ranking Russian officers had repeatedly informed the SDF leaders to allow Russian companies that signed contracts with Damascus to work in the oil fields east of the Euphrates, but the Kurdish officials responded that this required the approval of the US allies that co-control the oil fields.

A stand-off has ensued, with undesirable consequences.

Illegal but all Too Comfortable

The ongoing Russian-US conflict has been aggravated as a result of the war in Ukraine and the stagnation of the military situation in Syria, especially with the absence of a prospect for a political solution while economic and humanitarian needs of the Syrian people escalate. This means that oil has emerged as a factor of tacit cooperation between illegitimate Syrian and foreign belligerents to share the revenues of about 89,000 barrels per day.

According to expert estimates, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) receives around USD 16 per barrel and a further USD 15 goes to the Syrian government. The remaining amount, which could amount up to USD 50 per barrel, is ‘lost’ and ends up in the hands of these war profiteers. The AANES uses part of the production locally, while the mediators and the war profiteers transport another part to government areas (constituting two-thirds of Syria’s territory) for refining or keeping. It is well reported that oil is also smuggled into Iraqi Kurdistan, either for local use or for smuggling into Turkiye. Oil is sold at very low prices and the fields and surrounding environment now suffer considerable damage.

Officials talk about networks operating in the shadows to smuggle oil and its derivatives between the east of the Euphrates, controlled by the SDF whose linchpin is the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), and the Euphrates Shield areas or other enclaves controlled by the Syrian opposition factions and the Turkish army. It is noteworthy that the military forces in these two regions are involved in daily fighting, strikes, and raids, and exchange accusations of disloyalty, treason, and terrorism.

The same applies to the path crossed by oil tanks from the eastern Euphrates to oil refineries in the areas controlled by the Syrian government. The latter accuses the dominant forces in the east of the country of being traitors and agents of the American occupation. In the same vein, an informed source said that officials in the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) advised leaders of the SDF to coordinate with Damascus regarding the sale of oil internally and regionally.

The cooperation between the belligerents extends beyond the borders. Reports indicate that oil is smuggled into Iraqi Kurdistan and some Turkish regions, with the involvement of mediators and individuals close to the decision-makers there, although political and military differences are ongoing between the decision-makers in Qamishli and Erbil. In this regard, an informed Western official said, "most likely, the decision-makers in these areas are not in a hurry to reach a political solution that would impede the flow of money into their pockets. It is most likely that the war profiteers in the local areas of influence and the neighboring countries do not want the war to end.”

An Alternative Approach -

When President Joe Biden assumed office, his administration announced sanction exemptions that allowed some targeted investments, (although this excluded the oil industry), in Eastern Euphrates. However, it decided not to extend the sanction waiver granted to Delta Crescent Energy for many reasons, mainly the objection of foreign companies holding sovereignty rights in the oil fields. For instance, Gulfsands Petroleum (“Gulfsands”) signed a contract with Damascus in 2003 to invest in and develop Block 26 east of the Euphrates. According to its 2021 annual report, unauthorized production from Block 26 since early 2017 has reached about 20,000 barrels per day, meaning that around 35 million barrels have been produced from the block since then.

Meanwhile, London-based Gulfsands is calling for a "win-win" humanitarian initiative that would enable it and other international oil companies to regain control of their assets. Rather than flow to the sanctioned entities and other unauthorized intermediaries , the Gulfsands initiative would see revenues from oil sales transferred to a UN-controlled fund. John Bell, the managing director of Gulfsands, said a new approach was needed to alleviate the enormous suffering in Syria. He added, "Syria needs billions of dollars that can only be generated with oil and gas,” and described the plans as "a gain for the Kurds, Damascus, and the Syrian people." He also posited that a share of oil proceeds would go to a UN-controlled humanitarian account whose payments are fully in line with the international sanctions placed on Syria.

That might seem simple, but analysts have linked the initiative with the Oil-for-Food program enforced in Iraq before the US invasion in 2003. Bell acknowledges that lessons need to be learned from that ill-fated program as he proposes the initiative to the international stakeholders. This is a particularly timely initiative as discussions continue regarding the extension of providing international aid across borders, including the amendment to include the financing of early recovery projects and other humanitarian and health affairs.



Drones vs. Airstrikes: How the Deterrence Equation Between Israel and Hezbollah Changed

A fireball rises from a building in the southern Lebanese city of Tyre following an Israeli airstrike (AFP). 
A fireball rises from a building in the southern Lebanese city of Tyre following an Israeli airstrike (AFP). 
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Drones vs. Airstrikes: How the Deterrence Equation Between Israel and Hezbollah Changed

A fireball rises from a building in the southern Lebanese city of Tyre following an Israeli airstrike (AFP). 
A fireball rises from a building in the southern Lebanese city of Tyre following an Israeli airstrike (AFP). 

Israel is pressing forward with firepower, evacuation warnings, and limited ground incursions, while Hezbollah is responding with drones and direct engagements along advanced positions north of the Litani River.

Yet behind this reciprocal escalation, the deterrence equation that governed the border throughout the years following the 2006 war appears to be facing an unprecedented test, as military operations expand and reach areas that until recently were considered beyond the immediate danger zone.

Airstrikes that now reach as far as Zahrani, clashes around Zawtar al-Sharqiya, and Israel’s gradual advance toward the outskirts of Nabatieh all indicate, according to Lebanese military assessments, that the confrontation has entered a different phase.

In this new stage, drones alone are no longer capable of maintaining a deterrent balance, while Israel is pursuing a policy of mounting military pressure aimed at reshaping realities on the ground ahead of any potential settlement or negotiations.

Drones Do Not Create Deterrence

Retired Brig. Gen. Dr. Hisham Jaber, head of the Middle East Center for Studies argued that the drones used by Hezbollah do not achieve genuine deterrence against the continued expansion of Israeli air and ground operations.

He maintained that Israel’s ongoing airstrikes and ground incursions demonstrate that the deterrence equation is no longer functioning.

Jaber also linked battlefield developments to the erosion of the deterrence that had existed after the 2006 war, arguing that “the deterrence that lasted from 2006 to 2023 was real and effective.” However, he said Hezbollah’s entry into a war of attrition after opening its support front for Gaza led to the collapse of that equation.

He further warned that Israel’s objectives may not be limited to Zawtar and its surroundings but could expand farther north.

A Policy of Depopulation and Prolonged Attrition

Jaber said Israel’s policy of warnings and evacuations is designed to empty areas of their civilian populations.

“Once Israel evacuates an area of its residents, it becomes able to strike any movement within it,” he explained. “At that point, anyone traveling by car or motorcycle becomes a potential target.”

He added: “My greatest concern is that southern Lebanon may already have entered a prolonged war of attrition, because current battlefield indicators do not suggest a quick path toward ending this escalation or returning to the previous rules of engagement.”

Assessing both the military and political landscape, he argued that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “will not stop the war in Lebanon at this stage, regardless of the losses incurred,” noting that Israel “has not yet achieved any of its declared military or political objectives.”

He added that “Tel Aviv has failed to disarm Hezbollah and has also been unable to impose the conditions it seeks on Lebanon.”

According to his assessment, current developments indicate that “things will not return to the way they were,” arguing that the conflict has entered a new phase that will have lasting consequences for southern Lebanon and the balance of power there.

As for Hezbollah, Jaber said the group also “cannot simply halt the war midway through, given the complexities of the battlefield and the interwoven regional and international calculations.”

No Deterrent Balance Exists

For his part, retired Brig. Gen. Khalil Helou argued that “the drones used by Hezbollah have failed to establish a deterrent balance against Israel’s intensive air campaign,” stressing that “Israel is inflicting far greater damage and losses than it is receiving.”

He explained that fiber-optic-guided FPV (First-Person View) drones suffer from technical limitations related to both range and payload capacity.

“In practical terms, the range of these drones is between three and 15 kilometers and may reach around 20 kilometers as a reasonable upper limit,” he said. “The cable connecting the drone adds weight and affects its operational capabilities.”

Helou argued that claims of their use at distances of up to 60 kilometers are “militarily unrealistic.”

He added that “Hezbollah is attempting to achieve battlefield effects and inflict casualties through drones, but developments on the ground show that Israel is imposing far greater damage on both Hezbollah and Lebanon.”

 

 

 


Have Hezbollah’s Drones Changed the Rules of Engagement with Israel?

Smoke rises following Israeli bombardment on the village of Jibchit in southern Lebanon on May 23, 2026. (AFP)
Smoke rises following Israeli bombardment on the village of Jibchit in southern Lebanon on May 23, 2026. (AFP)
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Have Hezbollah’s Drones Changed the Rules of Engagement with Israel?

Smoke rises following Israeli bombardment on the village of Jibchit in southern Lebanon on May 23, 2026. (AFP)
Smoke rises following Israeli bombardment on the village of Jibchit in southern Lebanon on May 23, 2026. (AFP)

The “support war” waged by Lebanon’s Hezbollah in backing Hamas in late 2023 shattered the doctrine of “deterrence” that the Iranian-backed group had embraced and promoted for nearly two decades in its confrontation with its traditional adversary, Israel. Israel, for its part, also helped reinforce this assumption, which proved entirely mistaken the following year. The new round of fighting in 2026 then offered both sides an opportunity to establish a new set of rules governing the conflict.

Israeli patience and cunning

Israel did not rush into a direct war with Hezbollah after the group launched a wave of largely “performative” attacks, beginning with rockets fired at the outskirts of Israeli military positions in the Shebaa Farms. Instead, it quietly steered the confrontation in a different direction, displaying notable restraint and considerable strategic calculation.

This approach was reflected in diplomatic efforts undertaken by Tel Aviv through Washington to persuade Hezbollah to separate the Lebanese front from the Palestinian one. In July 2024, then US envoy Amos Hochstein reportedly told Lebanese officials that he was prepared to deliver what would amount to a political victory for Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah if the group halted its operations.

Nasrallah immediately rejected the proposal. According to those who relayed the message to him, he replied that the war in Gaza would first have to end. After that, other matters could be discussed.

This was not Hezbollah’s first strategic misjudgment. The shape of the new conflict unfolding in Lebanon’s border villages quickly revealed a clear Israeli technological and military advantage. A senior Hezbollah official later disclosed that in previous confrontations, fighters could launch a rocket, calmly gather their equipment after informing command that the launch had been successful, and leave the site before Israeli aircraft arrived.

People react while attending the funeral of an Israeli soldier Captain Doctor Ori Yosef Silvester, a 30-year-old army doctor for the Givati Brigade's Shaked Battalion, who was killed in southern Lebanon, at the Segula Cemetery in Petah Tikva on June 2, 2026. (AFP)

In the new conflict, however, the window between launch and retaliation had narrowed to between five and twenty seconds. As a result, the official said, fighters often dug into the ground and sought immediate cover after firing in the hope of surviving. Every launch effectively became a near-suicidal operation.

Subsequent developments underscored Israel’s superiority even more clearly. Israeli forces carried out a series of precise assassinations targeting Hezbollah military commanders, culminating in a strike that eliminated most of the leadership of the Radwan Force, the group’s elite unit.

Israel then killed Hezbollah’s military commander and launched the “pager operation,” which put thousands of Hezbollah operatives out of action at the push of a button. This was followed by the assassination of Nasrallah in a massive airstrike on Beirut’s southern suburbs and, later, the killing of his successor, Hashem Safieddine.

Instruments of war

According to field sources, the weapons and tactics employed by both sides suggest that they prepared for a prolonged war of attrition rather than a decisive battle.

Beginning in the first week after the latest ceasefire agreement, Hezbollah reduced its reliance on rockets, scaled back the use of suicide drones, and curtailed the deployment of guided anti-tank missiles, whose operators were often vulnerable to detection. Instead, it introduced first-person-view (FPV) drones.

These drones are typically operated within a range of 10 to 15 kilometers in southern Lebanon and are guided through fiber-optic cables linking the aircraft directly to its operator. A thin wire connects the control station to the drone carrying the explosive payload, allowing it to evade electronic jamming.

An Israeli self-propelled howitzer artillery gun fires rounds towards southern Lebanon from a position in the upper Galilee in northern Israel near the border on March 15, 2026. (AFP)

Hezbollah in 2026: A war of drones

Hezbollah sought to regain the initiative in the latest conflict, which erupted in March and coincided with the war with Iran. Israel conveyed a message that it was not interested in opening a front with Lebanon so long as Hezbollah remained on the sidelines.

The group reassured officials in Beirut that it would not initiate hostilities. It nevertheless surprised observers by launching rockets toward northern Israel, prompting a fierce Israeli response.

Unlike the image it initially projected through the launch of six rudimentary rockets, Hezbollah appeared far more organized and capable in the fighting that followed, revealing capabilities that had remained concealed during 15 months of relative calm. The group claimed to be carrying out as many as 100 operations a day against Israeli forces and introduced new weapons systems to the battlefield.

Its ground strategy also evolved. Rather than relying on static defenses or attempting to halt Israeli advances outright, Hezbollah focused on inflicting the greatest possible damage on advancing forces.

Rise of drones

Rockets no longer dominate the battlefield between Israel and Hezbollah. After weeks of fighting that erupted in the spring of 2026, a notable shift emerged in the military operations, with attack and suicide drones moving to the forefront and becoming one of the most influential factors shaping combat on both sides of the border.

For years, Hezbollah’s military identity was closely associated with its vast rocket arsenal, which represented Israel’s primary security concern. The current conflict, however, has shown that the group no longer relies exclusively on rockets. Instead, it has expanded its use of drones on a large scale.

According to Israeli assessments, a substantial share of Hezbollah’s recent attacks has involved attack and suicide drones, while conventional rockets have assumed a less prominent role than before.

Israeli researchers argue that this shift reflects lessons drawn from recent conflicts, particularly the war in Ukraine, where inexpensive drones demonstrated their ability to inflict significant losses on technologically superior forces.

According to Israeli reports and military studies published since the outbreak of the war in March, Hezbollah’s principal weapon is no longer its rocket arsenal alone but the attack and suicide drones that have become the primary threat facing Israeli forces in southern Lebanon.

Israeli soldiers operate a drone. (Israeli army)

Foremost among these are FPV suicide drones guided by thin fiber-optic cables, making them effectively immune to electronic jamming. Their small size, low-altitude flight profiles, and erratic maneuverability pose additional challenges for Israeli radar and air-defense systems.

These drones carry relatively small explosive payloads, typically weighing no more than five kilograms. A Lebanese security source told Asharq Al-Awsat that Hezbollah employs three different types of warheads depending on the intended target—whether a tank, a conventional vehicle, or personnel.

Former Israeli officers say the threat posed by these drones extends beyond fixed military targets. They are also capable of tracking moving forces and striking tanks, vehicles, and field command centers, placing continuous pressure on Israeli ground units in southern Lebanon.

No definitive figures are available regarding the number of suicide drones Hezbollah has used since the beginning of the war. Unofficial Israeli estimates, however, suggest that the number may range from several hundred launches to more than a thousand.

Israel recently stated that Hezbollah had launched more than 120 drones of this type. The group, meanwhile, has released dozens of videos purporting to show drones striking vehicles, armored platforms, electronic systems, and personnel in the field.

Israel says Hezbollah’s operations have killed 20 soldiers and wounded dozens more since March.

In addition, Hezbollah has claimed responsibility for detonating explosive devices against Israeli vehicles deep inside operational areas and for repelling Israeli incursions using light and medium machine guns, as well as rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).

A screengrab image taken from a handout video released by the Israeli army and created on April 27, 2026, shows Israeli army footage of what it says is the destruction of Hezbollah infrastructure in Lebanon, where a ceasefire has been in place since mid-April. (Israel Army / AFP)

Anti-armor missiles

Anti-armor missiles remain the backbone of Hezbollah’s ground warfare capability and have been used against Israeli tanks, vehicles, and fortifications.

Israeli sources point in particular to the Almas missile family, derived from Israel’s Spike missile system. According to those sources, Iran reverse-engineered the weapon after Hezbollah fighters captured an Israeli missile during the 2006 war. Russian-made Kornet systems and other anti-tank platforms also remain in service.

A third category of weapons consists of short- and medium-range rockets and artillery projectiles used extensively against military positions, troop concentrations, and bases in the Galilee and northern Israel. Their use, however, declined relative to drones during many phases of the 2026 conflict.

Reconnaissance and attack drones

Reconnaissance and attack drones rank fourth among Hezbollah’s principal battlefield systems.

Not all of them are suicide drones. Some are used for surveillance, fire correction, and target acquisition, while others carry small munitions and return to base after completing their missions.

Israeli sources have also reported limited use of anti-aircraft missiles and air-defense fire directed at Israeli aircraft.

Nevertheless, these systems have not proven as decisive as drones and anti-armor missiles in the current conflict.

A photograph taken from the southern area of Marjeyoun shows flares fired by the Israeli military descending over the village of Arnoun late on May 13, 2026. (AFP)

Evolving tactics

Israel, too, has adapted its methods of warfare.

Rather than relying primarily on armored formations advancing under air cover, it has sought to reduce casualties and increase mobility.

Lebanese security sources said the Israeli military has adopted tactics centered on small special forces teams moving along unpaved routes to avoid mines and ambushes. At the first sign of resistance, these units withdraw while combat aircraft strike hostile firing positions.

Alongside heavy air raids conducted by fighter jets and precision strikes carried out by drones against individuals traveling in cars and motorcycles, Israel has introduced two additional systems to the battlefield.

The first consists of loitering munitions, which have appeared in footage targeting motorcycles and personnel in the field.

The second is the extensive use of guided artillery rounds in 155 mm and 240 mm calibers, according to field sources in southern Lebanon. These systems have been employed against villages located well beyond the border zone.

The sources described the rounds as laser-guided, providing greater accuracy and enabling strikes at distances reaching up to 30 kilometers inside Lebanese territory.

According to Israeli statements and observations by military research centers during the 2026 war, unmanned aerial systems have been among the most heavily utilized assets in Lebanon. Israel maintains an extensive drone network covering both front-line and rear areas, including the Hermes 900 and Hermes 450 platforms, as well as smaller Skylark reconnaissance drones.

These systems have been used for surveillance, target acquisition, fire direction, and precision strikes against both mobile and fixed targets.

A beachgoer stands in the water against the backdrop of smoke rising from the site of an Israeli strike that targeted the southern Lebanese village of al-Mansouri on May 22, 2026. (AFP)

Precision munitions and guided missiles

Israel has also employed long-range missiles from the Spike NLOS family, as well as precision-guided aerial munitions launched from aircraft and drones against command centers and launch sites.

Tanks and armored units remain central to Israeli ground operations in southern Lebanon, although many have come under attack from drones and anti-armor missiles.

Israel has also employed artillery, surface-to-surface missiles, long-range rocket launchers, and self-propelled guns to strike targets deep inside Lebanon, along with precision ground-to-ground missiles against preselected objectives.

Air-defense systems

Israel possesses several major air-defense systems, most notably Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow.

Yet Israeli reports themselves acknowledge that these systems have faced difficulties countering the small suicide drones used by Hezbollah, particularly those guided through fiber-optic cables.

Israeli media previously reported that the military had introduced the Ro’em artillery system into service in southern Lebanon. The Israeli-made 155 mm system is wheel-mounted for enhanced mobility, features automatic loading, requires a crew of only three rather than seven personnel, offers a firing range of up to 40 kilometers, and incorporates advanced command-and-control capabilities.

Heavy machinery clears the rubble at the site of an overnight Israeli strike in the southern city of Tyre, Lebanon, May 23, 2026. (Reuters)

Rules of engagement

Since the ceasefire took effect, Hezbollah has sought to establish rules of engagement that would confine the fighting to occupied territory by refraining from targeting Israeli towns and settlements in the north. The Israeli military, however, gradually expanded the battlefield through sustained airstrikes and bombardment reaching the outskirts of Sidon.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, retired Brig. Gen. Said Kozah said Hezbollah has been attempting since the ceasefire to establish a new operational equation with Israel based on the principle that every Israeli strike should trigger a response. However, he argued, Israel continues to work against this.

Kozah noted that describing the situation as “rules of engagement” is not entirely accurate because the term is generally used between regular armies or within a clearly defined military framework.

“In practice,” he said, “Hezbollah is attempting to entrench a new set of rules under which any Israeli attack would be met with retaliation—whether through strikes against Israeli positions in occupied Lebanese territory or through rocket fire directed into Israel.”

He added that Hezbollah had recently carried out operations against Israeli positions in the border area, some involving drones and others consisting of infiltration attempts or direct attacks.

He also remarked that rocket launches into Israel had declined in recent days and that many had been intercepted because of the relatively limited numbers employed.

According to Kozah, Hezbollah seeks through these operations to reinforce the legitimacy of retaining its weapons under the banner of resisting occupation within Lebanese territory. At the same time, the group avoids addressing the factors that led to the current level of escalation and occupation.

As for whether Hezbollah has succeeded in imposing this new equation, Kozah said the situation suggests Israel remains the one setting the rules.

“The Israeli military is not limiting its operations to the buffer zone or the so-called ‘Yellow Line,’” he said. “It continues to conduct operations, clearing activities, and strikes against villages north of that line, effectively rejecting the balance Hezbollah is trying to establish.”


Report: World Conflicts Hit Peak in 2025

Palestinians assess damage at the site of an Israeli airstrike in Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip, on June 7, 2026. (AFP)
Palestinians assess damage at the site of an Israeli airstrike in Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip, on June 7, 2026. (AFP)
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Report: World Conflicts Hit Peak in 2025

Palestinians assess damage at the site of an Israeli airstrike in Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip, on June 7, 2026. (AFP)
Palestinians assess damage at the site of an Israeli airstrike in Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip, on June 7, 2026. (AFP)

The world saw the highest number of state conflicts since the Second World War in 2025, a Norwegian study said on Tuesday, warning of a surge in attacks targeting civilians.

The annual "Conflict Trends" report from the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) said 65 conflicts involving at least one state were recorded worldwide last year, a new high since 1946.

Conflicts between states also hit a new 80-year peak, doubling from the year before to eight -- including border clashes between India and Pakistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Cambodia and Thailand, as well as Russia's invasion of Ukraine and Israeli military operations against Syria.

"Unfortunately, there are not a lot of positive things," researcher Siri Aas Rustad told a group of media outlets, including AFP.

"Usually, I'm able to sort of squeeze something positive out of it, but this year it's shocking, the numbers."

Last year was the third deadliest since the end of the Cold War, with around 245,000 deaths directly related to fighting or political violence -- nearly 76,500 of them attributed to attacks directly targeting civilians, compared with 14,200 in 2024.

The sharp increase in civilian deaths is due to the conflict between the army and paramilitaries in Sudan, where the siege and massacres carried out in El-Fasher city in the Darfur region are estimated to have left some 60,000 people dead.

Since the end of the Cold War, only 1994 and 2021 have seen more bloodshed, due to the Rwanda genocide and the war in Ethiopia's Tigray region respectively.

- Africa worst affected -

"What has happened in the past five or six years is that we have several big conflicts going on at the same time and they seem to take over from each other. The world doesn't get any break," Rustad said.

"And that's different from previously -- this continuous high intensity level of conflict globally."

The PRIO study is based on figures compiled by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), attached to Uppsala University.

It distinguishes between three main types of organized violence: conflicts involving at least one state, non-state conflicts, and one-sided violence against civilians.

Africa remained the region most affected by the first type of conflict with 29, followed by Asia, the Middle East, the Americas, and Europe.

Rustad said Israel was "clearly one of the most aggressive countries in the world at the moment", pointing to its involvement in different types of conflicts in Gaza, Syria, Lebanon, against Iran, and against Houthi militants.

She also pointed to the United States, saying President Donald Trump's return to power had brought "not just attacking and increasing violence, but also the trade barriers they're putting up."

"We are putting a lid on collaboration. The (UN) Security Council doesn't work at the moment. We get a much more polarized world," she said.