Iran Pressures Damascus on ‘Sovereign Concessions’

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad during his meeting with the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, in the presence of Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi in Tehran in May 2022 (Syrian Presidency)
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad during his meeting with the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, in the presence of Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi in Tehran in May 2022 (Syrian Presidency)
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Iran Pressures Damascus on ‘Sovereign Concessions’

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad during his meeting with the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, in the presence of Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi in Tehran in May 2022 (Syrian Presidency)
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad during his meeting with the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, in the presence of Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi in Tehran in May 2022 (Syrian Presidency)

When Syrian President Bashar al-Assad visited Tehran last May, one of the urgent requests he made was to send oil to contribute to resolving his country’s economic crisis. In the past years, it has become customary for ships to violate sanctions and waterways. Assad also discussed broader regional and international issues.

This was Assad’s second visit since 2011- he visited in 2019- to express his thanks to Tehran for standing militarily, economically, and financially on the side of the regime since the outbreak of protests and the crisis more than a decade ago.

During the visit, Assad met with Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Ebrahim Raisi. Official media reported Assad saying that “strategic relations between Iran and Syria prevented Israel from extending its control over the region.”

For his part, Khamenei said that “Syria had won an international war, and that its credibility is much greater than it was in the past.”

Assad’s visit dealt with big issues. Among them was the American presence in Syria, the coordination between Ankara, Tehran, and Moscow, and the repeated Israeli raids against Iranian sites in Syria. Moreover, the Syrian leader reviewed agreements between Israel and Arab countries.

Iranian sources quoted Khamenei as saying that “some leaders of neighboring countries of Iran and Syria are sitting with the leaders of Israel, but the people of these countries fill the streets with anti-Israeli crowds and slogans.”

Khamenei’s statement was considered a veiled criticism of Damascus’ position on peace agreements between Tel Aviv and Arab capitals. Syria failed to issue critical statements about the accords. Moreover, Syrian officials held political meetings with their counterparts from these countries.

Away from these major headlines, Assad, during his meetings with Khamenei and Raisi, urged Iran to send oil and oil derivatives to save the economic situation in Syria.

Iran gave a “good word” and promised to send three ships. Nevertheless, these pledged ships are still docked in Iran and have not left for Syrian coasts yet.

Damascus made the request again during the visit of Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal al-Miqdad last July. Iran continued with its delay. The Syrian ambassador in Tehran tried to follow up on the issue a lot, but no answer came from Tehran.

Syria’s economic crisis is exacerbating, and the Iranian “procrastination” continues. Damascus was left bewildered by the delay because it is contrary to what has been the norm during the past decade.

Raisi was slated to visit Damascus on Tuesday.

During the visit’s arrangement, Syrian officials were stunned by Iranian demands and proposed draft agreements. Some of the drafts went back to previous agreements signed during a 2017 visit by Syrian Prime Minister Imad Khamis. Other drafts were new.

The new draft agreement, which surprised Damascus, related to how Iranians are to be treated in hospitals and scientific institutions as well as their ability to own property. In effect, Iranians want to be treated as Syrians, but if they commit a crime, Tehran requested they be tried by Iran’s justice system rather than Syrian judiciary.

This draft is like the agreement between Damascus and Moscow at the end of 2015 regarding the establishment of military bases in Hmeimim and Tartous. The Russians were given wide military, royal and diplomatic privileges, with the exception of the judiciary.

It is also reminiscent of those agreements that existed between Western countries and the Ottoman Empire after its collapse and the establishment of Turkey in the 1920s.

Tehran also insisted on obtaining “sovereign guarantees” for the money it spent. Damascus was surprised by the depth of the Iranian demands and Tehran was taken aback by Syria taking matters slowly. Contacts are still ongoing between the two countries in search of a way out of this “silent crisis” and to arrange a major visit to Damascus.

But this is not the first time that relations have gone through a crisis like this.

Tehran had suspended approval of the appointment of a new Syrian ambassador and froze the sending of oil derivatives in 2017 due to its annoyance at Damascus’ slow implementation of strategic agreements with Tehran and its acceleration with Moscow.

Khamis visited Tehran at the beginning of 2017 and signed strategic agreements. They related to an Iranian company backed by the Revolutionary Guard becoming a third mobile operator in Syria, investing in Syrian phosphate for 99 years, acquiring land for agricultural and industrial purposes, and establishing an “oil port” on the Mediterranean.

Moreover, Khamis signed an agreement for a new line of credit from Iran worth $1 billion, half of which will be used to finance the export of crude oil and oil products.

Since 2013, Tehran has provided direct and indirect support to Damascus. This includes lines of credit that exceeded $6.6 billion to finance the export of crude oil and its byproducts.

But Damascus had lost control of the oil and gas wells in northeast Syria. They are now run by US allies. Damascus’ oil production, which was about 380,000 bpd before 2011, decreased to about 90,000 bpd.

While Syrian businessmen close to Damascus and Iran worked on launching a third mobile phone network, Iran failed to get its hand on the ports in Tartus and Latakia. Rather, Russia assumed control of the ports to avoid repeated Israeli bombing.

Russian companies have also taken over phosphate investments in the center of Syria and are trying to pressure the Kurds into giving up control of oil facilities. They are trying to expand in Damascus airport and other airports. They are also involved in many economic projects.

According to a Western diplomat visiting Damascus, “Syria’s economic crisis is the worst in a decade, and Iran wants to exploit this to its advantage.”

“Tehran wants to obtain major sovereign concessions at the height of Damascus’ current need for them and Russia’s preoccupation with the Ukraine war.”

Iran wants those concessions to make up for the costs it paid during the war, amounting to about $20 billion over the past decade. It also wants to establish its influence for a long time in the face of the escalation of Israeli military pressure in Syria.



Challenges of the Gaza Humanitarian Aid Pier Offer Lessons for the US Army

A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
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Challenges of the Gaza Humanitarian Aid Pier Offer Lessons for the US Army

A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS

It was their most challenging mission.
US Army soldiers in the 7th Transportation Brigade had previously set up a pier during training and in exercises overseas but never had dealt with the wild combination of turbulent weather, security threats and sweeping personnel restrictions that surrounded the Gaza humanitarian aid project.
Designed as a temporary solution to get badly needed food and supplies to desperate Palestinians, the so-called Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore system, or JLOTS, faced a series of setbacks over the spring and summer. It managed to send more than 20 million tons of aid ashore for people in Gaza facing famine during the Israel-Hamas war.
Service members struggled with what Col. Sam Miller, who was commander during the project, called the biggest “organizational leadership challenge” he had ever experienced.
Speaking to The Associated Press after much of the unit returned home, Miller said the Army learned a number of lessons during the four-month mission. It began when President Joe Biden announced in his State of the Union speech in March that the pier would be built and lasted through July 17, when the Pentagon formally declared that the mission was over and the pier was being permanently dismantled.
The Army is reviewing the $230 million pier operation and what it learned from the experience. One of the takeaways, according to a senior Army official, is that the unit needs to train under more challenging conditions to be better prepared for bad weather and other security issues it faced. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because assessments of the pier project have not been publicly released.
In a report released this week, the inspector general for the US Agency for International Development said Biden ordered the pier's construction even as USAID staffers expressed concerns that it would be difficult and undercut a push to persuade Israel to open “more efficient” land crossings to get food into Gaza.
The Defense Department said the pier “achieved its goal of providing an additive means of delivering high volumes of humanitarian aid to the people of Gaza to help address the acute humanitarian crisis.” The US military knew from the outset “there would be challenges as part of this in this complex emergency,” the statement added.
The Biden administration had set a goal of the US sea route and pier providing food to feed 1.5 million people for 90 days. It fell short, bringing in enough to feed about 450,000 people for a month before shutting down, the USAID inspector general's report said.
The Defense Department’s watchdog also is doing an evaluation of the project.
Beefing up training Army soldiers often must conduct their exercises under difficult conditions designed to replicate war. Learning from the Gaza project — which was the first time the Army set up a pier in actual combat conditions — leaders say they need to find ways to make the training even more challenging.
One of the biggest difficulties of the Gaza pier mission was that no US troops could step ashore — a requirement set by Biden. Instead, US service members were scattered across a floating city of more than 20 ships and platforms miles offshore that had to have food, water, beds, medical care and communications.
Every day, said Miller, there were as many as 1,000 trips that troops and other personnel made from ship to boat to pier to port and back.
“We were moving personnel around the sea and up to the Trident pier on a constant basis,” Miller said. “And every day, there was probably about a thousand movements taking place, which is quite challenging, especially when you have sea conditions that you have to manage.”
Military leaders, he said, had to plan three or four days ahead to ensure they had everything they needed because the trip from the pier to their “safe haven” at Israel's port of Ashdod was about 30 nautical miles.
The trip over and back could take up to 12 hours, in part because the Army had to sail about 5 miles out to sea between Ashdod and the pier to stay a safe distance from shore as they passed Gaza City, Miller said.
Normally, Miller said, when the Army establishes a pier, the unit sets up a command onshore, making it much easier to store and access supplies and equipment or gather troops to lay out orders for the day.
Communication difficulties While his command headquarters was on the US military ship Roy P. Benavidez, Miller said he was constantly moving with his key aides to the various ships and the pier.
“I slept and ate on every platform out there,” he said.
The US Army official concurred that a lot of unexpected logistical issues came up that a pier operation may not usually include.
Because the ships had to use the Ashdod port and a number of civilian workers under terms of the mission, contracts had to be negotiated and written. Agreements had to be worked out so vessels could dock, and workers needed to be hired for tasks that troops couldn't do, including moving aid onto the shore.
Communications were a struggle.
“Some of our systems on the watercraft can be somewhat slower with bandwidth, and you’re not able to get up to the classified level,” Miller said.
He said he used a huge spreadsheet to keep track of all the ships and floating platforms, hundreds of personnel and the movement of millions of tons of aid from Cyprus to the Gaza shore.
When bad weather broke the pier apart, they had to set up ways to get the pieces moved to Ashdod and repaired. Over time, he said, they were able to hire more tugs to help move sections of the pier more quickly.
Some of the pier's biggest problems — including the initial reluctance of aid agencies to distribute supplies throughout Gaza and later safety concerns from the violence — may not apply in other operations where troops may be quickly setting up a pier to get military forces ashore for an assault or disaster response.
“There’s tons of training value and experience that every one of the soldiers, sailors and others got out of this,” Miller said. "There’s going to be other places in the world that may have similar things, but they won’t be as tough as the things that we just went through.”
When the time comes, he said, “we’re going to be much better at doing this type of thing.”
One bit of information could have given the military a better heads-up about the heavy seas that would routinely hammer the pier. Turns out, said the Army official, there was a Gaza surf club, and its headquarters was near where they built the pier.
That "may be an indicator that the waves there were big,” the official said.