Normalization between Syria and Türkiye … Putin’s Gift to Erdogan

Russia's President Vladimir Putin and Turkey's President Tayyip Erdogan meet on the sidelines of the 6th summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia (CICA), in Astana, Kazakhstan October 13, 2022. (Reuters)
Russia's President Vladimir Putin and Turkey's President Tayyip Erdogan meet on the sidelines of the 6th summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia (CICA), in Astana, Kazakhstan October 13, 2022. (Reuters)
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Normalization between Syria and Türkiye … Putin’s Gift to Erdogan

Russia's President Vladimir Putin and Turkey's President Tayyip Erdogan meet on the sidelines of the 6th summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia (CICA), in Astana, Kazakhstan October 13, 2022. (Reuters)
Russia's President Vladimir Putin and Turkey's President Tayyip Erdogan meet on the sidelines of the 6th summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia (CICA), in Astana, Kazakhstan October 13, 2022. (Reuters)

The Russian-sponsored Syrian-Turkish military meeting that was held in Moscow on Wednesday is the latest effort to achieve rapprochement between Ankara and Damascus.

It will likely culminate in a “gift” to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan from his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin: a meeting with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad ahead of Turkish elections in 2023.

However, are the normalization efforts serious or simply cosmetic?

Background

Relations between Ankara and Damascus shifted in summer 2011, months after the eruption of the Syrian anti-regime protests. Türkiye became a safe haven and supporter of the opposition against Damascus.

Syria transformed into an arena of violence, chaos and division. It also became a backer of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) that is opposed to Ankara.

Russia intervened in the conflict in the regime’s favor in 2015. Soon, it had troops deployed in Syria, effectively becoming Türkiye’s neighbor. Ankara would then discover the extent of NATO’s support to it, forcing it to cooperate with Moscow to impose a new reality in Syria.

A year later, Türkiye would prioritize preventing the formation of a Kurdish entity on its southern borders. It therefore reached a series of settlements and agreements with Russia that put an end to Kurdish ambitions. It succeeded in gaining control of pockets of regions in Syria, estimated at over 20,000 square kilometers, roughly twice the size of Lebanon.

Putin pushed for rapprochement between Erdogan and Assad with the launch of the Astana talks between Russia, Iran and Türkiye in 2017 and the development of the “hostile cooperation” between Ankara and Moscow.

In early 2020, Moscow succeeded in hosting an open meeting between Syria’s national security chief Ali Mamlouk and Turkish intelligence chief Hakan Fidan. Mamlouk demanded that Türkiye pull out from Syrian regions and reopen the Aleppo-Latakia highway. Fidan wanted deeper cooperation against the YPG.

Putin succeeded in bringing them together, but failed in reaching a major breakthrough.

New attempt

Erdogan has repeatedly been threatening to wage a new military offensive in Syria. He also has his eyes set on the upcoming elections and growing Turkish opposition to Syrian refugees in Türkiye. Notably, Türkiye and Russia have seen their cooperation deepen in wake of the war on Ukraine.

With all of the above, Putin has been paving the way for a meeting between Erdogan and Assad before the summer.

The first step he took was have a secret meeting take place between Mamlouk and Fidan in Moscow in July 2022.

The Syrian official demanded that his country’s sovereignty be respected. He demanded a timetable for Türkiye’s withdrawal from Syrian regions and called on it to cease its support to opposition factions and “terrorists”. He urged Türkiye to reopen the Aleppo-Latakia and Bab al-Hawa-Idlib highways, to take measures against western sanctions and back Syria’s reconstruction.

For his part, Fidan demanded cooperation with Damascus against the YPG and Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). He demanded the establishment of a security zone that excludes these groups 23 kilometers deep into Syria and the establishment of safe zones that can take in a million returning refugees. He also urged cooperation in the Constitutional Committee and resolving the Syrian crisis through United Nations Security Council resolution 2254.

Mamlouk and Fidan failed to reach an agreement and the meeting ended without a breakthrough.

Normalization or not?

In recent months Erdogan wasn’t wondering whether he will meet with Assad or not, but rather when he will meet him. He has repeatedly declared that he is ready to meet with him, listing various reasons, such as resolving differences with the majority of countries in the region before the Turkish elections.

Assad, however, is in no rush to hold a meeting that would favor his rival, whose country he views as an occupying nation.

As Türkiye and Russia intensify their cooperation in Ukraine, the Turkish elections draw near and the Syrian economic crisis deepens, Putin has pushed more and more for normalization and for a meeting to be held between him, Erdogan and Assad. The meeting would be seen as a gift to his “frenemy” and a boost for him to win the elections.

To that end, Russia has proposed holding a series of meetings that include tripartite security talks, meetings between the ministers of defense attended by intelligence officials, and a meeting between the Russian, Turkish and Syrian foreign ministers that will be capped by a summit between Putin, Erdogan and Assad.

Russia is trying to offer magical remedies to bridge the divide between Türkiye and Syria. It is offering a series of military, security and political meetings, as well as amendments to the 1998 Adana agreement between Ankara and Damascus that addresses cooperation against the PKK and the possibility of a Turkish incursion 5 kilometers deep into Syria.

The amendments would merge the Adana and 2019 Sochi agreements to include the deployment of Russian-Turkish patrols, the withdrawal of the YPG 30 kilometers away from the Turkish border and the deployment of Syrian border guards along the border with Türkiye.

Politically, Russia is proposing that a joint statement be issued with main clauses that underscore a “commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria”, “rejection of separatist agendas” and return of refugees.

Türkiye is home to some 3.7 million Syrian refugees. The issue has been one of the main headlines of the Turkish presidential and parliamentary elections. Erdogan wants to take away this card from his rivals, which is why he is pursuing rapprochement and agreement with Damascus. Ultimately, however, the return of two million refugees back to their homeland is a hard ask.

Assad wants the withdrawal of thousands of Turkish soldiers from Syria, an end to “occupations” and a halt to military and political support to the Syrian opposition. It would be difficult to envisage an alliance with Ankara against the Kurds and meeting with Erdogan before a step is taken towards fulfilling these demands.

Moscow has set the process of normalization between Damascus and Ankara in motion, with all its security, military and political demands, with the final goal being a summit between Putin, Erdogan and Assad.

Normalization will be the chief pursuit of 2023 with its anticipated impact on normalization between Arab countries and Damascus and how far the US will allow it to go ahead.



What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
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What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo

Austria's energy company OMV was informed by Gazprom that the Russian gas producer would halt deliveries of natural gas via Ukraine to OMV from 0500 GMT on Nov. 16 following OMV winning an arbitration case. Supplies of Russian gas to Europe via Ukraine may completely stop from Jan. 1 2025 after the current five-year deal expires as Kyiv has refused to negotiate the new terms of the transit with Moscow during the war.
Here is what happens if Russian gas transit via Ukraine is completely turned off and who will be affected most, according to Reuters.
HOW BIG ARE THE VOLUMES?
Russian gas supplies to Europe via Ukraine are relatively small. Russia shipped about 15 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas via Ukraine in 2023 - only 8% of peak Russian gas flows to Europe via various routes in 2018-2019.
Russia spent half a century building its European gas market share, which at its peak stood at 35%.
Moscow lost its share to rivals such as Norway, the United States and Qatar since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, prompting the EU to cut its dependence on Russian gas.
EU gas prices rallied in 2022 to record highs after the loss of Russian supplies. The rally won't be repeated given modest volumes and a small number of customers for the remaining volumes, according to EU officials and traders.
UKRAINIAN ROUTE
The Soviet-era Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod pipeline brings gas from Siberia via the town of Sudzha - now under control of Ukrainian military forces - in Russia's Kursk region. It then flows through Ukraine to Slovakia.
In Slovakia, the gas pipeline splits into branches going to the Czech Republic and Austria.
Austria still receives most of its gas via Ukraine, while Russia accounts for around two-thirds of Hungary's gas imports.
Slovakia takes around 3 bcm from energy giant Gazprom per year, also about two-thirds of its needs.
Czech Republic almost completely cut gas imports from the east last year, but has started taking gas from Russia in 2024.
Most other Russian gas routes to Europe are shut including Yamal-Europe via Belarus and Nord Stream under the Baltic.
The only other operational Russian gas pipeline route to Europe is the Blue Stream and TurkStream to Türkiye under the Black Sea. Türkiye sends some Russian gas volumes onward to Europe including to Hungary.
WHY DOES THE UKRAINIAN ROUTE STILL WORK?
While remaining Russian gas transit volumes are small, the issue remains a dilemma for the EU. Many EU members such as France and Germany have said they would not buy Russian gas anymore but the stance of Slovakia, Hungary and Austria, which have closer ties to Moscow, challenges the EU common approach.
The countries, who still receive Russian gas, argue it is the most economic fuel and also blame neighboring EU countries for imposing high transit fees for alternative supplies.
Ukraine still earns $0.8-$1 billion in transit fees from Russian gas transit. Russia earns over $3 billion on sales via Ukraine based on an average gas price of $200 per 1,000 cubic meters, according to Reuters calculations.
Russia's gas pipeline export monopoly Gazprom plunged to a net loss of $7 billion in 2023, its first annual loss since 1999, because of the loss EU's gas markets.
Russia has said it would be ready to extend the transit deal but Kyiv has repeatedly said it won't do it.
Another option is for Gazprom to supply some of the gas via another route, for example via TurkStream, Bulgaria, Serbia or Hungary. However, capacity via these routes is limited.
The EU and Ukraine have also asked Azerbaijan to facilitate discussions with Russia regarding the gas transit deal, an Azeri presidential advisor told Reuters, who declined to give further details.