Normalization between Syria and Türkiye … Putin’s Gift to Erdogan

Russia's President Vladimir Putin and Turkey's President Tayyip Erdogan meet on the sidelines of the 6th summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia (CICA), in Astana, Kazakhstan October 13, 2022. (Reuters)
Russia's President Vladimir Putin and Turkey's President Tayyip Erdogan meet on the sidelines of the 6th summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia (CICA), in Astana, Kazakhstan October 13, 2022. (Reuters)
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Normalization between Syria and Türkiye … Putin’s Gift to Erdogan

Russia's President Vladimir Putin and Turkey's President Tayyip Erdogan meet on the sidelines of the 6th summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia (CICA), in Astana, Kazakhstan October 13, 2022. (Reuters)
Russia's President Vladimir Putin and Turkey's President Tayyip Erdogan meet on the sidelines of the 6th summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia (CICA), in Astana, Kazakhstan October 13, 2022. (Reuters)

The Russian-sponsored Syrian-Turkish military meeting that was held in Moscow on Wednesday is the latest effort to achieve rapprochement between Ankara and Damascus.

It will likely culminate in a “gift” to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan from his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin: a meeting with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad ahead of Turkish elections in 2023.

However, are the normalization efforts serious or simply cosmetic?

Background

Relations between Ankara and Damascus shifted in summer 2011, months after the eruption of the Syrian anti-regime protests. Türkiye became a safe haven and supporter of the opposition against Damascus.

Syria transformed into an arena of violence, chaos and division. It also became a backer of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) that is opposed to Ankara.

Russia intervened in the conflict in the regime’s favor in 2015. Soon, it had troops deployed in Syria, effectively becoming Türkiye’s neighbor. Ankara would then discover the extent of NATO’s support to it, forcing it to cooperate with Moscow to impose a new reality in Syria.

A year later, Türkiye would prioritize preventing the formation of a Kurdish entity on its southern borders. It therefore reached a series of settlements and agreements with Russia that put an end to Kurdish ambitions. It succeeded in gaining control of pockets of regions in Syria, estimated at over 20,000 square kilometers, roughly twice the size of Lebanon.

Putin pushed for rapprochement between Erdogan and Assad with the launch of the Astana talks between Russia, Iran and Türkiye in 2017 and the development of the “hostile cooperation” between Ankara and Moscow.

In early 2020, Moscow succeeded in hosting an open meeting between Syria’s national security chief Ali Mamlouk and Turkish intelligence chief Hakan Fidan. Mamlouk demanded that Türkiye pull out from Syrian regions and reopen the Aleppo-Latakia highway. Fidan wanted deeper cooperation against the YPG.

Putin succeeded in bringing them together, but failed in reaching a major breakthrough.

New attempt

Erdogan has repeatedly been threatening to wage a new military offensive in Syria. He also has his eyes set on the upcoming elections and growing Turkish opposition to Syrian refugees in Türkiye. Notably, Türkiye and Russia have seen their cooperation deepen in wake of the war on Ukraine.

With all of the above, Putin has been paving the way for a meeting between Erdogan and Assad before the summer.

The first step he took was have a secret meeting take place between Mamlouk and Fidan in Moscow in July 2022.

The Syrian official demanded that his country’s sovereignty be respected. He demanded a timetable for Türkiye’s withdrawal from Syrian regions and called on it to cease its support to opposition factions and “terrorists”. He urged Türkiye to reopen the Aleppo-Latakia and Bab al-Hawa-Idlib highways, to take measures against western sanctions and back Syria’s reconstruction.

For his part, Fidan demanded cooperation with Damascus against the YPG and Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). He demanded the establishment of a security zone that excludes these groups 23 kilometers deep into Syria and the establishment of safe zones that can take in a million returning refugees. He also urged cooperation in the Constitutional Committee and resolving the Syrian crisis through United Nations Security Council resolution 2254.

Mamlouk and Fidan failed to reach an agreement and the meeting ended without a breakthrough.

Normalization or not?

In recent months Erdogan wasn’t wondering whether he will meet with Assad or not, but rather when he will meet him. He has repeatedly declared that he is ready to meet with him, listing various reasons, such as resolving differences with the majority of countries in the region before the Turkish elections.

Assad, however, is in no rush to hold a meeting that would favor his rival, whose country he views as an occupying nation.

As Türkiye and Russia intensify their cooperation in Ukraine, the Turkish elections draw near and the Syrian economic crisis deepens, Putin has pushed more and more for normalization and for a meeting to be held between him, Erdogan and Assad. The meeting would be seen as a gift to his “frenemy” and a boost for him to win the elections.

To that end, Russia has proposed holding a series of meetings that include tripartite security talks, meetings between the ministers of defense attended by intelligence officials, and a meeting between the Russian, Turkish and Syrian foreign ministers that will be capped by a summit between Putin, Erdogan and Assad.

Russia is trying to offer magical remedies to bridge the divide between Türkiye and Syria. It is offering a series of military, security and political meetings, as well as amendments to the 1998 Adana agreement between Ankara and Damascus that addresses cooperation against the PKK and the possibility of a Turkish incursion 5 kilometers deep into Syria.

The amendments would merge the Adana and 2019 Sochi agreements to include the deployment of Russian-Turkish patrols, the withdrawal of the YPG 30 kilometers away from the Turkish border and the deployment of Syrian border guards along the border with Türkiye.

Politically, Russia is proposing that a joint statement be issued with main clauses that underscore a “commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria”, “rejection of separatist agendas” and return of refugees.

Türkiye is home to some 3.7 million Syrian refugees. The issue has been one of the main headlines of the Turkish presidential and parliamentary elections. Erdogan wants to take away this card from his rivals, which is why he is pursuing rapprochement and agreement with Damascus. Ultimately, however, the return of two million refugees back to their homeland is a hard ask.

Assad wants the withdrawal of thousands of Turkish soldiers from Syria, an end to “occupations” and a halt to military and political support to the Syrian opposition. It would be difficult to envisage an alliance with Ankara against the Kurds and meeting with Erdogan before a step is taken towards fulfilling these demands.

Moscow has set the process of normalization between Damascus and Ankara in motion, with all its security, military and political demands, with the final goal being a summit between Putin, Erdogan and Assad.

Normalization will be the chief pursuit of 2023 with its anticipated impact on normalization between Arab countries and Damascus and how far the US will allow it to go ahead.



Sudan's Relentless War: A 70-Year Cycle of Conflict


Army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (left) and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, pictured during their alliance to oust Omar al-Bashir in 2019 (AFP)
Army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (left) and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, pictured during their alliance to oust Omar al-Bashir in 2019 (AFP)
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Sudan's Relentless War: A 70-Year Cycle of Conflict


Army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (left) and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, pictured during their alliance to oust Omar al-Bashir in 2019 (AFP)
Army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (left) and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, pictured during their alliance to oust Omar al-Bashir in 2019 (AFP)

While world conflicts dominate headlines, Sudan’s deepening catastrophe is unfolding largely out of sight; a brutal war that has killed tens of thousands, displaced millions, and flattened entire cities and regions.

More than a year into the conflict, some observers question whether the international community has grown weary of Sudan’s seemingly endless cycles of violence. The country has endured nearly seven decades of civil war, and what is happening now is not an exception, but the latest chapter in a bloody history of rebellion and collapse.

The first of Sudan’s modern wars began even before the country gained independence from Britain. In 1955, army officer Joseph Lagu led the southern “Anyanya” rebellion, named after a venomous snake, launching a guerrilla war that would last until 1972.

A peace agreement brokered by the World Council of Churches and Ethiopia’s late Emperor Haile Selassie ended that conflict with the signing of the Addis Ababa Accord.

But peace proved short-lived. In 1983, then-president Jaafar Nimeiry reignited tensions by announcing the imposition of Islamic Sharia law, known as the “September Laws.” The move prompted the rise of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), led by John Garang, and a renewed southern insurgency that raged for more than two decades, outliving Nimeiry’s regime.

Under Omar al-Bashir, who seized power in a 1989 military coup, the war took on an Islamist tone. His government declared “jihad” and mobilized civilians in support of the fight, but failed to secure a decisive victory.

The conflict eventually gave way to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, better known as the Naivasha Agreement, which was brokered in Kenya and granted South Sudan the right to self-determination.

In 2011, more than 95% of South Sudanese voted to break away from Sudan, giving birth to the world’s newest country, the Republic of South Sudan. The secession marked the culmination of decades of war, which began with demands for a federal system and ended in full-scale conflict. The cost: over 2 million lives lost, and a once-unified nation split in two.

But even before South Sudan’s independence became reality, another brutal conflict had erupted in Sudan’s western Darfur region in 2003. Armed rebel groups from the region took up arms against the central government, accusing it of marginalization and neglect. What followed was a ferocious counterinsurgency campaign that drew global condemnation and triggered a major humanitarian crisis.

As violence escalated, the United Nations deployed one of its largest-ever peacekeeping missions, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), in a bid to stem the bloodshed.

Despite multiple peace deals, including the Juba Agreement signed in October 2020 following the ousting of long-time Islamist ruler, Bashir, fighting never truly ceased.

The Darfur war alone left more than 300,000 people dead and millions displaced. The International Criminal Court charged Bashir and several top officials, including Ahmed Haroun and Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein, with war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Alongside the southern conflict, yet another war erupted in 2011, this time in the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan and the Blue Nile region. The fighting was led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, head of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM–N), a group composed largely of northern fighters who had sided with the South during the earlier civil war under John Garang.

The conflict broke out following contested elections marred by allegations of fraud, and Khartoum’s refusal to implement key provisions of the 2005 Naivasha Agreement, particularly those related to “popular consultations” in the two regions. More than a decade later, war still grips both areas, with no lasting resolution in sight.

Then came April 15, 2023. A fresh war exploded, this time in the heart of the capital, Khartoum, pitting the Sudanese Armed Forces against the powerful paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Now entering its third year, the conflict shows no signs of abating.

According to international reports, the war has killed more than 150,000 people and displaced around 13 million, the largest internal displacement crisis on the planet. Over 3 million Sudanese have fled to neighboring countries.

Large swathes of the capital lie in ruins, and entire states have been devastated. With Khartoum no longer viable as a seat of power, the government and military leadership have relocated to the Red Sea city of Port Sudan.

Unlike previous wars, Sudan’s current conflict has no real audience. Global pressure on the warring factions has been minimal. Media coverage is sparse. And despite warnings from the United Nations describing the crisis as “the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophe,” Sudan's descent into chaos remains largely ignored by the international community.