Quake Pushes Forward Normalization Efforts with Syria as Assad Heads to Oman

15 February 2023, Syria, Damascus: A photo released by the official Syrian Arab news agency (SANA) on 15 February shows Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (R) speaking with Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman al-Safadi. (SANA/dpa)
15 February 2023, Syria, Damascus: A photo released by the official Syrian Arab news agency (SANA) on 15 February shows Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (R) speaking with Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman al-Safadi. (SANA/dpa)
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Quake Pushes Forward Normalization Efforts with Syria as Assad Heads to Oman

15 February 2023, Syria, Damascus: A photo released by the official Syrian Arab news agency (SANA) on 15 February shows Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (R) speaking with Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman al-Safadi. (SANA/dpa)
15 February 2023, Syria, Damascus: A photo released by the official Syrian Arab news agency (SANA) on 15 February shows Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (R) speaking with Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman al-Safadi. (SANA/dpa)

The earthquake that struck Syria and Türkiye two weeks ago, that left tens of thousands of people dead and left devastation in its wake, has raised several questions and critical challenges in Arab and western circles over how to respond to the catastrophe. This includes the possibility of distinguishing between Syria and the its ruling regime. It has also pushed forward efforts to normalize relations between Damascus with the Arab world and West.

The first global reaction to the humanitarian disaster was sympathy with the Syrian and Turkish people. It was nearly impossible for any country to express sympathy with Ankara without sympathizing with Damascus as well. This is a humanitarian, not a political disaster. The earthquake is not a civil war.

The main predicament was that the international recognition of the Turkish government does not extend to the same extent to the Damascus government. Yes, the latter does still represent Syria and Syrian “government” is increasingly replacing “regime” in foreign political rhetoric.

This government, however, remains suspended from the Arab League and continues to be boycotted by influential Arab and western countries. It is also still weighed down by a lengthy list of economic sanctions, accusations and damning reports against state institutions and figures over their handling of the crisis since the eruption of the protests in 2011.

The regions that were most affected by the earthquake lie outside of government control. The quake did also strike some government regions in Aleppo, Hama and Latakia.

Devastated and forgotten Syria

Syria has been abandoned and forgotten since the eruption of the war in Ukraine nearly a year ago. It has dropped from international and regional priorities. The earthquake, however, has again turned attention to the country.

A series of political contacts have been held between concerned Arab and non-Arab countries. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has also received a series of telephone calls that would have been unheard of in recent years. He was contacted by Egyptian President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi and was visited in Damascus by Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman al-Safadi. It was the first visit by a Jordanian FM to Syria in years.

On the diplomatic levels, western countries demanded the adoption of a new United Nations resolution that would reopen land borders between Türkiye and opposition-held Syrian regions. Moscow had initially mulled an exchange that would include its approval of the proposal in return for increasing western funding of “early recovery” projects in Syria.

Arab and international contacts with Damascus, however, yielded a deal: another indirect exchange. Assad continues to underline “Syria’s sovereignty over all its territories” in return for his agreement to reopen two more border crossings between Türkiye and northern Syria for three months. He agreed to the delivery of aid from government-held regions to opposition-held Idlib.

Washington also agreed to suspending some sanctions related to bank transfers for six months so as to facilitate humanitarian aid.

Further official contacts and visits between Arab officials and Assad culminated in more leniency: more aid and planes loaded with relief were allowed in Syria without extensive searches. Official field visits were carried out to quake-stricken regions. Official statements were delivered from those regions. The remarks were written on a prepared document and delivered before the cameras. They spoke of condoling the Syrians. They spoke of dialogue and expressed gratitude to “Arab brothers and friends.”

Absent from the remarks were Idlib, Hama, Aleppo and Latakia that were struck by the quake. Omitted were also mentions of “allies”, meaning Iran and Russia, and “occupation”, meaning the United States and Türkiye.

Normalization

The earthquake had mobilized normalization efforts. Arab countries that have normalized ties or were seeking to have used the disaster to intensify efforts through a series of telephone calls and visits. Assad will visit Oman and then the United Arab Emirates in the coming hours.

Some Arab countries have maintained their position towards Damascus that offers humanitarian aid to the victims and ensuring that conditions for the Syrian refugees’ return home are provided. At the same time, they continue to remind the world of Tehran’s ongoing alliance with Damascus, noting Iranian Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani’s visit to Aleppo in wake of the earthquake. He was the first official on the scene, beating the Syrians.

In Europe, the quake has exposed divisions over how to approach Damascus. Countries, such as Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Austria, that used to call for accepting the “status quo” in recent years, now believe that they are in a stronger position to press this demand.

They are now demanding that Europe reconsider its “three nos” in Syria: opposition to normalization, reconstruction and lifting of sanctions before progress is made in the political process.

Other European countries and the US have held coordination meetings in recent days to counter this argument: yes, the earthquake resulted in a humanitarian disaster that demands a response in Syria and Türkiye, but this does not mean abandoning the “three nos” and the political process.

The European division was evident in the position on a conference on Syria and Türkiye’s reconstruction that was called for by the European Union to be held late next month. Countries that have normalized ties with Damascus have called for the Syrian government to be invited and for political agendas to be dropped. They have also demanded calling off a donor conference that is set for Brussels in June. These countries have also said they were prepared to carry out direct unilateral moves with Damascus away from European consensus.

Several factors will determine how Arab and western forces approach Damascus in the coming months. This in turn will determine balances of power and alliances in Syria. One critical factor is how relief aid and funds will be delivered to the devastated region and just how committed various parties are to pledges made behind closed doors. These issues will gain significance in the coming weeks as the extent of the tragedy caused by the earthquake becomes clearer.



What Safe Havens Remain for the Islamic Jihad?

The late Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei receives the late «Hamas» leader Ismail Haniyeh and the leader of the «Jihad» movement, Ziad al-Nakhala, in Tehran, July 2024 (AFP)
The late Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei receives the late «Hamas» leader Ismail Haniyeh and the leader of the «Jihad» movement, Ziad al-Nakhala, in Tehran, July 2024 (AFP)
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What Safe Havens Remain for the Islamic Jihad?

The late Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei receives the late «Hamas» leader Ismail Haniyeh and the leader of the «Jihad» movement, Ziad al-Nakhala, in Tehran, July 2024 (AFP)
The late Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei receives the late «Hamas» leader Ismail Haniyeh and the leader of the «Jihad» movement, Ziad al-Nakhala, in Tehran, July 2024 (AFP)

The US-Israeli war against Iran has reshaped the landscape for Palestinian factions aligned with Tehran, with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad among the most affected. The group has faced financial and security setbacks in both Syria and Lebanon, even as fighting continues in the Gaza Strip.

Sources in the movement told Asharq Al-Awsat that the regional security changes and the war against Iran have further complicated the organization’s remaining safe havens.

While Hamas maintains close ties with Tehran, Islamic Jihad’s relationship with Iran runs deeper. The connection dates back to the group’s founding in the 1980s by Fathi Shaqaqi.

For decades, Islamic Jihad maintained a military and human presence in both Syria and Lebanon, gaining additional protection as Iranian influence expanded in the two countries over the past ten years.

However, the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas’ political bureau, in Tehran in July 2024, followed by an attempted attack on Hamas leaders in Doha in September, served as a major warning to Palestinian faction leaders, particularly Islamic Jihad.

Three countries

According to sources in the group, Secretary-General Ziad al-Nakhalah has sharply reduced his visits to Iran, traveling there only three times since Haniyeh’s assassination. One visit involved a joint delegation from Islamic Jihad and Hamas and lasted several days, while the other two were brief.

Previously, Nakhalah and several senior figures — particularly Akram al-Ajouri, who oversees the group’s armed wing, the Al-Quds Brigades — considered Iran a key safe haven, along with other capitals, such as Beirut. In recent years, however, the group has also expanded its contacts with Qatar and strengthened ties with Egypt.

A source close to Nakhalah said the leader has recently been moving between Doha and Cairo, staying for extended periods, especially in Doha, where his deputy Mohammed al-Hindi is based almost permanently.

Hindi also travels between Qatar, Egypt and Türkiye, with his role in Egypt largely focused on Gaza-related discussions with Egyptian intelligence officials.

Sources declined to confirm whether Ajouri, who had been based in Beirut’s southern suburbs in recent years, has left the area because of security concerns.

Israel recently killed Adham al-Othman, a commander in the Al-Quds Brigades in Lebanon, in a strike on an apartment used by Hezbollah in Beirut’s southern suburbs. He was known to be close to Ajouri.

Pressure in Syria

Israel had already tightened pressure on the Islamic Jihad in Syria before the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government. A November 2024 airstrike on a group facility in Damascus killed senior figures Abdul Aziz al-Minawi and Rasmi Abu Issa, along with other members.

After the regime’s collapse in December 2024, the pressure intensified. Syria’s new authorities arrested the Islamic Jihad’s representative in the country, Khaled Khaled, and his deputy Abu Ali Yasser in April 2025, holding them for several months.

Movement sources say many of its members in Syria were detained and later released, with interrogations focusing on their weapons and where they were stored.

Some Israeli strikes in recent months have also targeted senior operatives, including field commanders in the Al-Quds Brigades who had previously been wounded in Gaza and remained in Damascus for treatment.

Facing continued Israeli pressure, some Islamic Jihad activists have relocated from Syria to Lebanon or Türkiye. Others have joined Hezbollah fighters in southern Lebanon.

All of this comes as the Islamic Jihad faces a severe financial crisis. Iranian support has largely stopped, affecting salary payments for fighters and limiting the group’s operational budgets both inside Gaza and abroad.


Syrians on Alert to Prevent Accommodation of Displaced Hezbollah Supporters from Lebanon

 Syrians living in Lebanon wait outside the Ministry of Interior Immigration and Passports Department, at the Syrian-Lebanese border, as they return to Syria due to ongoing hostilities between Hezbollah and Israeli forces, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Jdaydet Yabous, Syria, March 3, 2026. (Reuters)
Syrians living in Lebanon wait outside the Ministry of Interior Immigration and Passports Department, at the Syrian-Lebanese border, as they return to Syria due to ongoing hostilities between Hezbollah and Israeli forces, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Jdaydet Yabous, Syria, March 3, 2026. (Reuters)
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Syrians on Alert to Prevent Accommodation of Displaced Hezbollah Supporters from Lebanon

 Syrians living in Lebanon wait outside the Ministry of Interior Immigration and Passports Department, at the Syrian-Lebanese border, as they return to Syria due to ongoing hostilities between Hezbollah and Israeli forces, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Jdaydet Yabous, Syria, March 3, 2026. (Reuters)
Syrians living in Lebanon wait outside the Ministry of Interior Immigration and Passports Department, at the Syrian-Lebanese border, as they return to Syria due to ongoing hostilities between Hezbollah and Israeli forces, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Jdaydet Yabous, Syria, March 3, 2026. (Reuters)

Syrians in Damascus, its countryside, and western Homs countryside are on alert to prevent displaced Lebanese supporters of Hezbollah from entering Syrian territory or being hosted by locals.

The stance marks a sharp departure from previous Israeli wars on Lebanon, when Syrian cities received tens of thousands of Lebanese fleeing the fighting.

As Israel broadened its strikes in the region to include Hezbollah, not just Iran, displacement from southern Lebanon and Beirut's southern suburbs has resumed. This time, however, those fleeing include not only Lebanese but also Syrians who had been living as refugees in Lebanon.

The scene in and around Damascus appears markedly different from past years. No private cars carrying Lebanese displaced people have been seen in the capital Damascus and its outskirts, unlike during earlier Israeli wars on southern Lebanon under the rule of ousted leader Bashar al-Assad.

In previous waves of displacement, tens of thousands of Lebanese fled to Damascus. Some stayed in hotels, others rented apartments, while a small number were housed in shelters.

The same pattern now applies to Eastern Ghouta. Hezbollah and Iran had turned the area into a strategic rear base while fighting alongside Assad's government during the years of the Syrian uprising.

Hezbollah also housed large numbers of fighters' families there during its war with Israel.

Omar Mohammad Safi, known as Abu Firas, from the town of Beit Sahm in Eastern Ghouta, said the town has not seen the arrival of any Lebanese during the current war, whether Hezbollah supporters or others.

“When Israel attacked Hezbollah the last time, large numbers of fighters' families came and stayed in homes the party had seized in Ghouta, Sayeda Zeinab and elsewhere, but in this war, we have not seen any of them at all in any town,” he told Asharq al-Awsat.

Over the past two days, activists circulated a statement purportedly issued by residents of Damascus and its countryside, especially Eastern Ghouta, warning against renting property to or hosting strangers from southern Lebanon, or Lebanese individuals or families, particularly those linked to Hezbollah.

The statement said Hezbollah, during its support for the former regime, had “committed crimes and massacres,” adding: “We will not forget the massacres of Eastern Ghouta and the chemical massacre.

“Whoever dared to kill us and gloat over us will have no place among us, and we will expel him from the area immediately, along with anyone who shelters him, by all means,” it warned.

During the war in Syria, Hezbollah turned the western Qalamoun area in the Damascus countryside, adjacent to Lebanon's Bekaa region, into a strategic regional rear base.

During the previous war with Israel, the area also hosted tens of thousands of displaced people from Beirut's southern suburbs and southern Lebanon, with facilitation from Assad's government.

But Mahmoud Qusaibiya, known as Abu Alaa, from the town of Jarjir in western Qalamoun, said the town has not seen the arrival of any displaced Lebanese Hezbollah supporters.

“A warning was circulated by elders and prominent figures telling residents not to receive anyone from Hezbollah or their families, because we supported the revolution and they stood with the former government and its remnants,” he told Asharq al-Awsat.

The clearest development has been in the city of Qusayr in western Homs countryside, which Hezbollah seized during the Syrina war.

Rashid Jammoul, known as Abu Mohammad, who comes from the city, said Syrians at the border with Lebanon around Qusayr were on high alert to prevent Hezbollah members, their families, or people linked to them from entering Syrian territory.

“There have been some attempts, but there is an alert by the army and by residents at all legal and illegal crossings,” the man in his sixties told Asharq al-Awsat.

“We will not allow any of them or anyone linked to them to enter or be received after they committed massacres against us, destroyed our villages, and burned our homes.”

Since Israel launched its new war on southern Lebanon, more than 25,000 Syrians have returned to their country.

Syria’s General Authority for Ports and Customs denied that families of Hezbollah members were among those arriving from Lebanon.

Mazen Alloush, director of relations at the authority, said two days ago that since the first day families began fleeing from Lebanon to Syria, social media had been flooded with rumors claiming that families of Hezbollah fighters and supporters were entering Syrian territory through border crossings.

As the rumors spread, some buses leaving the Jousieh border crossing were stopped by young men in the city of Qusayr and attacked on that pretext.

Seeking to clarify the situation, Alloush said all the passengers on those buses were Syrians who had been living in Lebanon and who came from different Syrian provinces.

He said they had entered the country legally.


This Is How Ukraine Has Countered Russia’s Iran-Designed Drones

An Iranian Shahed exploding drone launched by Russia flies through the sky seconds before it struck buildings in Kyiv, Ukraine, on Oct. 17, 2022. (AP)
An Iranian Shahed exploding drone launched by Russia flies through the sky seconds before it struck buildings in Kyiv, Ukraine, on Oct. 17, 2022. (AP)
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This Is How Ukraine Has Countered Russia’s Iran-Designed Drones

An Iranian Shahed exploding drone launched by Russia flies through the sky seconds before it struck buildings in Kyiv, Ukraine, on Oct. 17, 2022. (AP)
An Iranian Shahed exploding drone launched by Russia flies through the sky seconds before it struck buildings in Kyiv, Ukraine, on Oct. 17, 2022. (AP)

Ukraine is preparing to dispatch military drone specialists to Gulf states to help them fend off Iranian-designed drones -- something the Ukrainian army has been doing since the start of Russia's invasion.

The military assault launched in February 2022 spawned a cat-and-mouse game of aerial drone warfare that has forced both sides to constantly innovate -- or perish.

Moscow has dramatically scaled-up the production and sophistication of its drones, based on Iranian-designed Shaheds drones that Tehran has launched at Israel and Gulf states over the last week.

That has forced Ukraine to develop cheap and versatile defense systems that allows it to down hundreds of drones in a single barrage -- experience Kyiv says is unmatched anywhere in the world.

- Interceptors vs Shaheds -

Private Ukrainian arms companies have spearheaded the development of drone interceptors -- cheap, light single-use drones that are designed to knock Russian unmanned aerial vehicles out of the sky.

The interceptors -- usually winged or propeller-like helicopters -- are mainly controlled with inbuilt cameras that beam real-time images to pilots on the ground.

Late last year, President Volodymyr Zelensky released grainy, black-and-white images recorded from interceptors as they crashed into Shaheds. He has instructed manufacturers to produce up to 1,000 a day.

This method of air defense is becoming increasingly prevalent: Ukraine's commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrsky said this week that some 70 percent of all drones launched by Russia at Kyiv and its surrounding region in February were downed by interceptors.

Individual interceptors can cost around as little as $700 or as much as $12,000. But even the most expensive varieties are a fraction of the price of a single missile fired from US Patriot air defense batteries, which are estimated to cost more than $1 million.

"The warfare shifted a lot. First it was drones against humans, soldiers and tanks. Now it's mostly drones against drones," Konstantyn, a deputy commander of an anti-aerial unit deployed in eastern Ukraine recently explained to AFP.

- Anti-aircraft guns, pick-ups -

Ukrainian air defense units also deploy traditional, tried-and-tested weapons: anti-aircraft guns.

These come both in the form of heavy machine guns set on wheels, and make-shift solutions, where troops attach any high-caliber weapon they have onto the back of a pick-up truck.

AFP journalists in Kyiv have seen -- and heard -- these air defense units work during nighttime Russian attacks.

Ukrainian troops also deploy man-portable air-defense systems: guided surface-to-air missiles that are shoulder-launched and originally designed to take down low flying aerial targets.

These portable weapons are used alongside tracking and radar systems.

- F-16s, choppers, Yaks -

Ukraine lobbied its Western allies for supplies of advanced fighter jets for months before finally receiving its first batch of F-16s in mid-2024.

Kyiv has not received many F-16s and there have been reports of issues in training Ukrainian pilots but they are among the aerial arsenal that Ukraine uses to down Shaheds.

The Ukrainian air force also deploys ageing Soviet-era aircraft to down Russian drones, including helicopters like the Mi-24 and Mi-8 or the Yak-52 plane.

- Electronic jamming -

Ukraine has for years deployed a variety of electronic systems that disorientate the navigation systems used by Shaheds to lock onto and fly towards their targets.

By scrambling the networks used by Shaheds inside Ukraine's borders, these means of electronic warfare force Moscow's drones to alter their course and fly back towards Russia.

According to Ukraine air force data, the military has been consistently intercepting or shooting down more than 80 percent of all incoming Russian drones -- hundreds of which are fired every night.