Bremer Acknowledges 'Mistakes’ in Disbanding Baath Party, Iraqi Army

Paul Bremer is seen next to US President Bush, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld during the announcement at the White House of the killing of Saddam’s sons in Mosul. (Getty Images)
Paul Bremer is seen next to US President Bush, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld during the announcement at the White House of the killing of Saddam’s sons in Mosul. (Getty Images)
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Bremer Acknowledges 'Mistakes’ in Disbanding Baath Party, Iraqi Army

Paul Bremer is seen next to US President Bush, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld during the announcement at the White House of the killing of Saddam’s sons in Mosul. (Getty Images)
Paul Bremer is seen next to US President Bush, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld during the announcement at the White House of the killing of Saddam’s sons in Mosul. (Getty Images)

When I was about to have this conversation with Ambassador Paul Bremer, an Iraqi-American friend whispered in my ear: “This is not just an ambassador. He is a president, who ruled Iraq for more than a year!”

In his capacity as head of the Coalition Provisional Authority after the war declared by the US President George W. Bush on the night of March 19, 2003 with the aim of overthrowing President Saddam Hussein’s rule in Iraq, the “Kissingerian diplomat” sat face to face at the White House with the president who assigned him two important tasks: get the ball the ball running for the economy, and paving a new path for good governance in Iraq.

He went there armed with this authorization, and fit with what he learned from former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and in the private sector after graduating from Yale and Harvard Universities in the United States and the Institute of Political Studies in France.

Paul Bremer holds tight many secrets. He did not make much reference to the documents of the Iraqi state and the Baath Party after the complete collapse of Saddam's rule on April 9, 2003. He jokingly told me that after he "accomplished" his mission, which began on May 9, 2003 and ended on June 28, 2004, that he paid for American lawyers “more than I earned from my work in Iraq.”

It was an opportunity to share my funny story with the former German Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Christoph Heusegen, who was previously the National Security Adviser under Chancellor Angela Merkel and is currently serving as Chair of the Munich Security Conference.

I jokingly suggested that he reveal his secrets so that I could publish them. I said: “With this, our fame will fly … but in two different ways.” The American diplomat laughed before we actually started this conversation with Asharq Al-Awsat.

Bremer sometimes revealed very important details in the long interview with him, insisting on the “correctness” of the war decision, despite the American failure to obtain a mandate from the UN Security Council. He considered that the interests of the United States take precedence over its duties in international law.

He compared the Baath Party led by Saddam to that of the German Nazi Party under Hitler. He stressed that this is the reason that prompted him to issue his two famous orders, the first was devoted to “De-Baathification” and the other focused on “dismantling” the Iraqi army, admitting that he had committed “two mistakes” in implementing them.

He stated that Bush “ended a thousand-year rule of the Sunnis” in Iraq. Bremer coordinated with the Iraqi opposition: Jalal Talabani, Masoud Barzani, Ahmed Chalabi, Ayad Allawi, Abdulaziz al-Hakim, Mohammad Bahr al-Ulumm Ghazi al-Yawer, Adnan al-Pachachi, and other influential Iraqis who are still present in “American Iraq.”

Only one person, the most important and influential person in Iraq from then until today, refused to receive Bremer or meet with him, and that is Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.

It is the 20th anniversary of the war in Iraq. How would you reflect now on that moment?

You know, a lot of people are talking about looking back 20 years. And so I've looked back. My bottom line is that I think it was the correct decision that Bush made to go in and remove Saddam from power. And I think secondly that despite the difficult situation that Iraqis find themselves in now, 20 years later on balance, Iraq is a better place now that Saddam is gone.

The price was so costly on the Iraqis, and on the Americans as well…

Yes, that's true. But the benefits are also very big for the Iraqis. They now can choose their own government. We in the United States are not faced with Saddam returning to get his weapons of mass destruction, which he planned to do. We know from the documents we captured after he was deposed, that he planned to resume the development of his weapons of mass destruction.

- ‘Nuclear’ Iraq and Iran -

And the region is better off? Do you believe this?

Actually, the region is better off because if Saddam had stayed in power, the region would now face, otherwise, a nuclear armed Iraq facing a nuclear armed Iran. There would be no Iranian agreement to stop nuclear program, which was done in the Obama administration. The Iranians would have to continue their nuclear (program) so the region would be much less stable, we would have two nuclear powers at least: Iran and Iraq.

And that would’ve maybe encouraged, in your opinion, Iran more to produce nuclear weapons?

When I was in Iraq, the American government intelligence agencies concluded that Iran had slowed down, if not stopped its program because they were worried. And we now know that the agreement that was reached by the Obama administration with Iran is being undermined every day by the Iranians. Now, we have a real threat of a problem there.

- UN approval -

The US failed to get a UN Security Council approval for the war. Therefore, the war was illegal. Do you see it this way, or do you have a different take?

I’ve been involved in foreign policy for 50 years. And as a general rule, it's always preferable to have broad international support. But I do not believe that the United States needs to get UN approval when American interests are at risk.

The Russians are using now what Secretary Powell showed to the Security Council to say there are weapons of mass destructions and other things in Ukraine. Nothing was there. You were in Iraq, you found nothing. Were you aware of all these circumstances?

No, I was not aware. It's important to be precise about matters here. The intelligence that suggested Saddam was actively pursuing weapons of mass destruction, apparently was not correct. But it's important to remember that it wasn't just the United States intelligence agencies that said that we were confident that he was developing these weapons, it was the French, the Germans, the British, and the Russian, all of their intelligence services agreed with the United States.

So, I think if you now say: “Well, wasn't it a mistake?” I think any American president after 9/11 - a major event and trauma to the American people, 3,000 Americans killed - including Al Gore, if he had won the election in 2000, would have looked at US intelligence, and would have said: “We have to do something about Saddam.”

Now, one final point, it is not true to say we found nothing. Charles Duelfer, who was a very able investigator, said: “Saddam has kept the plans, the people and the projects for weapons of mass destruction, and he intended to resume them.”

You’ve just said something remarkable, that the US interest is above the international law…

No, what I said was that the there is no international law that says we have to get a UN approval for defending American interests.

Then, what was the legal basis for the war?

Legal basis in the US was a presidential decision.

So President Bush was the architect of the war? You mentioned in previous interviews that this was done to overthrow not only Saddam, but to overthrow a Sunni rule that lasted a 1,000 years in Iraq. This will have deep ramifications, not only in Iraq, but also in the region.

First, the President makes the decisions. My review of the matter afterwards, long after I left Iraq, is that after the terrorist attacks of the 90s, and 9/11 attacks, any American president, Democrat or Republican, would have agreed with the intelligence that Bush was presented with. And it's interesting that if you look back the in the American Congress in both the Senate and the House by far the majority of the politicians approved of the attack on Iraq.

So, it was not a one man's decision.

No. No.

The US concluded that this is something you must do

Right, I think it's fair to say that there was political consensus across the country when Bush made the decision.

Tell me if I'm wrong, let me use this term, how you as a Kissinger diplomat, I mean, you believe in realpolitik, executed a plan for the neocons in the US. How come?

I didn't execute a plan for the neocons, or oldcons, or whatever. I executed a plan under a direction from the President of the United States, who said to me: “You have two jobs: job 1 is trying to get the economy going again for the Iraqi people, and job 2 is to help the Iraqis onto a path for representative government.” Those are my two commands from the president. And those are the two things that I did.

- The President and I -

Was that just an announcement?

No, that was not an announcement. The president invited me to lunch alone with him, in his little private dining room off the Oval Office for talking. Him and me, that's all, and there we're no note-takers, there was nobody else there…

But you're aware, the president was saying a lot about the “Greater Middle East”, about other issues in relation to the Iraq invasion. The president also said publicly that this will have ramifications for probably decades, not only in Iraq, but also in the region. Twenty years later, he is proving right.

I don't think the president made the decision lightly. I think he understood that would have ramifications. I understood it would have ramifications. But I also understood his goal. His goal was to help the Iraqis recover their country economically and politically.

You replaced Jay Garner, the general appointed to rule Iraq after the invasion, soon after the fall of Saddam. How did that come about? Why did he decide to leave?

I have great respect for General Garner, I thought he did a very good job under very difficult circumstances. My understanding is that (…) somehow my name arrived on Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's desk…

You don't know how?

I do know that he had it. He had a list of 12 or 14 other people. And I don't know what process he went through. Anyway, he in the end recommended me to the president.

You may have mentioned this in your book “My Year in Iraq”. Garner wanted to organize elections within 90 days after the invasion. It did not seem realistic to me. Was it realistic to you?

No, no. In my meetings with the president, and with the National Security Council, and with the Vice President, with the Secretaries of Defense and State before I left, the one clear message from the president and the others, including Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Powell was that we're going to have to take our time.

I was asked about that, and I said: “I agree it will take at a minimum a year, it might take a couple of years. It's going to take a long time, and we have to be patient.” I heard a broadcast on the radio that Garner had just told everybody he was going to appoint a government in 10 days. And I said in my book, I almost drove off the highway. I was so surprised…

You were rushed to go to Iraq. What was the best advice you received before you went?

The best advice that people gave was to focus first on trying to bring some economic benefits to the Iraqi people as quickly as you can (…) Saddam had effectively destroyed the Iraq economy anyway. When I got to Baghdad, just to give an example, in the entire country, they were producing only 300 megawatts of electricity. It's not enough to run, you know, a small village.

- From Spain to Angola -

The country was under embargo. So, this didn't happen overnight?

No. It had obviously suffered somewhat from the UN sanctions, although we learned quickly about the corruption in the Oil for Food Program. When Saddam came to power, the gross domestic product per capita in Iraq was higher than it was in Spain. The World Bank told us that in 2002, Iraq's per capita income had fallen below that of Angola. The second piece of advice to answer your question was to be sure we were talking to a broad range of Iraqis about what kind of government was possible and what kind of government they wanted.

You mentioned, of course, who you met then from the US side. Did you meet anybody from the Iraqi opposition who were here in the US?

No, I don't remember meeting anybody. I may have met one or two…

Do you know Kanan Makiya. He was critical of why the US decided to make this Coalition Provisional Authority, instead of holding elections and selecting a democratic body…

I have great respect for Mr. Makiya. The people who think there was an alternative could not tell me what it would be. There had been no census in Iraq since 1957. There was no constituent boundaries. There was no effective separation of power between the legislature and the executive. It was all a dictatorship. There was no way to hold elections in Iraq quickly.

So General Garner was wrong about this.

Garner, I think was misunderstood. He was not kept informed of the way Washington was thinking.

- Baathism and Nazism -

You went to Iraq and issued a long set of orders. The first two orders are the most important with far reaching implications, the De-Baathification and then disbanding of the Iraqi army. Why did you do that? The decisions left the country in a very bad situation.

I actually don't think either of those left Iraq in a bad situation at all. I think they were the right decisions.

But where did they come from? So the Department of State in early 2002, a year and a half before the invasion, had established a study group in Washington under a career Arabic speaking American diplomat: Brian Crocker, who ran a yearlong study called “The Future of Iraq”, in which he and his colleagues at the State Department, Defense Department, intelligence services, met with hundreds, actually maybe thousands of Iraqis, most of them obviously in exile, about what should be the future of Iraq.

And there were two conclusions of this study; the first conclusion was that there can be no place in a post-Saddam Iraq for the Baath Party. Why? Because the Baath Party was Saddam's political instrument of control and terror over his own people. The Baath Parties in the Arab world, as you very well know, were modeled on the Nazi Party. But Saddam was in power three times as long as Hitler. So, the conclusion was there can be no place in post-Saddam Iraq for a Baath Party. I was handed, literally the day before I left for Iraq, a draft order.

Handed by who?

By Doug Feith, who was the number three man in the Pentagon (served as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy) under Rumsfeld. It was completely consistent with the conclusion of the State Department's study. Feith handed me this thing and said: “We're thinking of issuing this tomorrow. A Sunday.”

I said: “Wait a minute, I want to get out and talk to some of the people who are working for Garner (in the Office for Construction and Humanitarian Assistance) for Iraq (ORHA).”

It was not issued until I got out there. Then I issued (…) the Baath directive, which was loosely modeled on the decisions that were made by America, the occupying power in Germany in 1945, at the end of the Second World War. They had a program of De-Nazification, which was across the board, anybody with anything to do with the Nazi Party could not have anything to do from the top to the bottom. In contrast, the De-Baathification that was worked by the United States government was aimed only at the top 1% of the Baath Party members.

Now, I made a mistake here in turning the implementation of the very narrow order over to the Iraqi politicians, because it then became an instrument of battle between various factions among the Iraqis, who tried to broaden the implication, to throw many more Baathists, for example teachers, out of their jobs.

What I should have done was I should have turned the implementation over to a carefully selected competent group of Iraqi judges. What I should have done, was pick a panel of five Iraqi judges and said: “You oversee the De-Baathification.” But I turned it wrongly over to the politicians, and when I heard that they were throwing hundreds, thousands of teachers out of jobs, the Minister of Education came to me. So, I had to pull back the authority. So, it was a mistake.

- Two mistakes -

And disbanding the Iraqi army, I heard one time that you made a mistake about it.

Yes and no. So, The Future of Iraq study that we discussed, also looked at the question of the Iraqi military force. Iraq's army, the modern army, which was introduced after the Second World War, played a respectable, responsible role until the Baathists and Saddam came to power.

Then the Iraqi army became the primary instrument of forceful control of the Iraqi people. And again, The Future of Iraq study said the same thing: there can be no place in post-Saddam Iraq for the army. Well, there was no army there at the fall of Baghdad on April 9, 2003.

The Pentagon, the American generals said, General John Abizaid said there is not a single unit of the Iraqi army standing to arms anywhere in Iraq. The army went home.

And that army had conducted what the UN considered a genocidal war against the Kurds in the 1980s, including the use of weapons of mass destruction at the town of Halabja in 1988. The same army, the Republican divisions were used by Saddam to put down the uprising of the Shiites in the South after the first Gulf War. Less than a week after I got the Baghdad, they found the first of the mass graves due to these mass killings, which was outside of Hilah, south of Baghdad. In a way if you said: what was the mistake? It was the choice of the verb disband.

Some American officers apparently were talking about maybe we can recall the army. When the Kurds heard that, both leaders of the Kurds, Barzani and Talabani, said to me: If you recall the Iraqi army, we will secede from Iraq.” That would bring on a civil war. The Shiites, who were cooperating with the coalition, under guidance from Ayatollah Al-Sistani also heard the same rumor, and Sheikh Abdul Aziz Abdulaziz Al-Hakim told me: “We will not cooperate if you bring back that army.”

- Democracy or civil war? -

Ambassador, you meant to build a democratic Iraq.

Right.

Instead, the country plunged into a civil war under your control. I don't know the extent of the mistakes that you were describing. But that's what happened.

No, it was not a civil war. What happened was the emergence of al-Qaeda. We know for a fact because it was written down by Zarqawi in a letter he wrote to Osama bin Laden. The intention of al-Qaeda was just to provoke a tribal war between Shiites and Sunnis. And he said that's why they had done the vicious attacks that took place, first on the UN headquarters that killed Sergio de Mello, and then a major attack on the on the mosque in Najaf on August 30, 2003, which killed several hundreds of Shiites.

So, the intention of al-Qaeda was to provoke a civil war. And you say they didn't have democracy. That's not true. They held elections, the first would be held about a year and a half after the liberation of Baghdad in early January 2005, and the Iraqis have held six elections, five national elections and one referendum to approve the Constitution. And Iraq has had six peaceful transfers of power since we left. No other Arab country can say they've done that.

- American model -

Ambassador, you mentioned several very important things, De-Baathification built on De-Nazification. This pretext is being used now by Russia in their invasion to Ukraine.

Any president, and I can say I'm sure President Bush in this case, has to consider the whatever decision he's facing in the context of its impact on the rest of American interests. And I'm sure Bush did that. And he decided, I think correctly, that we could not tolerate letting Saddam continue. And so, he took the difficult decision to invade to get rid of Saddam, which in my view, succeeded. The impact on what American policy in Bangladesh or in Ukraine might be is a separate matter.

No, that's why some Americans, including presidents, said that the Iraq war was a disaster.

I will stand by what I just said to you about the success we had politically, the success we had economically.

So, your conclusion still is that Iraq is better off?

Absolutely. Iraq is better off on any metric… The Arab Spring started in Tunisia, where did they go? Look at Tunisia today.

Nowhere.

With the Iraqis, even under ISIS, even under all of the problems they've had, have selected their own government six times in a row.

So, you don't have good feelings about the Arab Spring?

I'm sorry, it didn't succeed. Iraq suffers now greatly from corruption. No question.

Did you model the new Iraq on the Lebanon model?

No.

Iraq was a secular country under Saddam. When you say that the Sunnis were ruling for a thousand years, but then you pulled Iraq from the Arab neighbors to throw it into the hands of Iran?

I can only talk with confidence about the time when I was there. The Iranians were really not present.

At least, al-Hakim and other figures from the Iraqi opposition were based there.

Well, and some were in Syria, and some of them had been in London, a few had been in Germany with a couple of them in France. It was up to them to figure out what to put in the Constitution, which is what they did. And they established a federal system, not at our suggestion.

Why did you boast on several occasions that Iraq was for a thousand years ruled by the Sunnis? You have stopped that.

That was just a statement of fact.

- Syrian Baath -

It was pretty clear that the Syrian Baathist government was supporting the so-called Iraqi resistance to fight the coalition forces in Iraq. Did you try to talk to the Syrian government?

I'm not aware of any specific discussions between American officials and the Syrians. I do know that the coalition forces in Iraq were more and more concerned about the Syrian support, in particular, the infiltration of people sometimes often recruited in North Africa, particularly in Libya, and trained in Syria and then infiltrated across the border of Al-Qaim.

And Iran played a role.

During my time, there was, as I said, no evidence of the Iranians playing a role.

- Iranians got scared -

Not even what we discovered later on, and it is all over the news nowadays that they harbored some of al-Qaeda members in Iran.

This was not part of the information we had at that time. The most important was the Zarqawi letter, which we intercepted in January 2004. That was clearly established. But he was Jordanian. He wasn't Iranian.

But you worked on fighting terrorism just before, so you were fully aware of the dangers.

Oh, yes. And well Iran. Iran was designated when I was in charge of counter-terrorism in the Reagan administration, Iran was already described as a terrorist state because of the bombings that Hezbollah did in Beirut in 1983.

So, there wasn't any doubt that it was a terrorist state. But the question that I was answering was, was Iran actively meddling or doing stuff. And the answer is: I never saw any convincing information that confirmed that. But there's certainly problems in Iran.

But if you think in terms of the people in Tehran in the fall of 2003, you know, they had an American army on their eastern border and their western border. They got two armies. And it's precisely in 2003, that the intelligence community, apparently, according to what you can read in the press, concluded that Iran had stopped its active nuclear program.

While the situation was unraveling in Iraq, but also in Afghanistan, you rid the Iranians of two archenemies at the borders. The Americans did them something huge. Did you meet with the Iranians?

No, there were no Iranians to talk to.

- Disagreement with Al-Sisatani -

But you didn't feel that you needed to talk to them.

The only Iranian I would like to talk to was Al-Sistani. But he wouldn't see me. That's fine. I understood. I didn't press. I didn't even really ask. I had a very good intense correspondence with Al-Sistani while I was there.

Through whom?

Various intermediaries. I looked at it. In 13 months, 48 exchanges with Al-Sistani.

Were they oral? Just messages?

Usually oral. Sometimes written.

So you have letters from him.

He has letters from me (laughter).

But do you have letters from him?

I have messages. He didn't put things in writing. That’s not the way somebody does at his level. But my view is that having looked at the whole question on the whole, he played a helpful role in the effort. He very much supported having elections, having the Iraqis choose their government. That was his sort of fundamental belief. And that was of course my job.

But there were periods of tension between you and him?

Given his importance in Iraq, but also in the broader region, I wanted to be sure that he understood what we were trying to do, which was to establish a political process with the Iraqis to choose their government. Here's the problem. The problem came about because Sergio de Mello, who was the UN Special Representative, went to see Al-Sistani shortly after he got to Iraq in early June of 2003.

He came and called on me. We had two meetings, one is in my office and one in his office, he went to Najaf to see Al-Sistani. I later heard from somebody who heard it from Al-Sistani in Najaf that de Mello had said to Al-Sistani that the Americans are going to write a constitution to structure the political body the way they did in Japan (through the Commander of allied forces Douglas MacArthur in 1945), which was completely wrong.

We had no intention of writing a constitution. What we intended was that the Iraqis, if they wanted a constitution, should write it, which is what in the end happened. So most of the communications with Al-Sistani from my side were directed at keeping him closely informed of our discussions, and I'm sure there were other people also, you know, in the Iraqi government were keeping him informed of our discussions about what we wanted, and trying to make clear that we had no intention of writing a constitution.

And a second thing: he wanted immediate elections. And for all the reasons we discussed earlier, it was simply not possible, and the UN agreed that it was not possible. De Mello understood that. So, the content of my communications with Al-Sistani were almost entirely based on wanting him to understand the broad view of what we were trying to accomplish politically, which was a constitution that the Iraqis would write, not us, and elections, and the difficulty of getting that done. In the end, he understood.

It took six or seven months. Really not until January of 2004 did it become clear that Al-Sistani understood that we could not hold immediate elections. We had to get the constitution written. And then that's the sequence we followed. The constitution was written in January and February 2004, and the first elections were held in January 2005.

Did you get his blessing in the end?

I wasn't looking for a blessing. First of all, I was simply trying to keep him informed. My view is that his role was helpful.

- Saddam’s capture -

I want to ask about Saddam. How were you informed about his capture?

The military had the job of trying to capture him. And we coordinated obviously. We all heard rumors, people would come to me, and they'd say where Saddam is. I would pass it to the military. They would go and he wasn't there. You know, they’d say: they saw him driving a taxi cab…

Was it true?

No, we heard rumors like that. I'm just saying that it was crazy. So, the military got a tip in December, that he was somewhere near Tikrit, which was his family place. You know the story that they found a hiding hole that he was in. I was not informed about the search when it took place. But I was called to go back from my room to my office at about 2 am on December 13, 2003, by the commanding officer General Abizaid, the CENTCOM commander.

He said: “We think we have Saddam.” He told me the story and said he looks like him. He's got a scar, or a mole, or something on one leg, and we think it's him. But we have to do a DNA check to be sure. We had some DNA from his sons who had been killed in Mosul in July. But it'll take two days, because the DNA is not here. It's in Germany.

I said: “You're never going to hold this story for two days.” Abizaid said: “Well, we're going to fly him back to Baghdad, and have some of the high value prisoners, particularly Tariq Aziz, to see him, and tell us if that's Saddam.” Several of them saw him and said that it's got to be Saddam. So, I found out at that time, whatever it was 2:00 in the morning. It was great, great news.

How did he look? How was he underground?

The problem we faced was this. His two sons attacked our forces in Mosul in July 2003, and they were killed. We needed to announce that, but we wondered if the Iraqis would believe us. So, the military, Rumsfeld and his people, organized a group of pathologists to go and see the bodies, and confirm whether or not these were Saddam's sons. Because in the Geneva Convention, you're not supposed to show pictures of dead soldiers.

Until we had the Iraqi forensic officials, who do the autopsies, and confirm it, at which time, celebratory gunfire took place all over in Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, and Kirkuk. So, we faced the same dilemma again about Saddam. The conclusion was we should take a group of Iraqis to see him where he's being held, which was at the Baghdad airport. I issued an invitation to the members of the governing council, anybody who wants to come.

In the end there were only a few: Adnan Pachachi, Ahmed Chalabi, Mowaffak al-Rubaie and Adil Abdul-Mahdi. Saddam was there, and they immediately knew him by his voice and everything else. So there was no question. Therefore, I felt it was important that Pachachi, who in that month was chairman of the Governing Council, should also be at the announcement. And that's how the announcement came about.

Had you seen Saddam before or spoken to him?

No, I said nothing. He didn't have any idea. I stood at the door.

Before that?

No, I didn't speak a word to him.

Did you have good relations with Ahmed Chalabi and Ayad Allawi?

I talked to them all, often… Talabani, Barzani, of course Mowaffak al-Rubaie, Abdulaziz al-Hakim, and Diaa Jubaili, the author of “The Lion of Basra”. I spent a lot of time with them.



Israeli Leaks Test Prospects for Gaza Deal’s Second Phase

A young girl stands in front of tents that burned after candles were lit for lighting at a displacement camp in Gaza City on Friday (AFP)
A young girl stands in front of tents that burned after candles were lit for lighting at a displacement camp in Gaza City on Friday (AFP)
TT

Israeli Leaks Test Prospects for Gaza Deal’s Second Phase

A young girl stands in front of tents that burned after candles were lit for lighting at a displacement camp in Gaza City on Friday (AFP)
A young girl stands in front of tents that burned after candles were lit for lighting at a displacement camp in Gaza City on Friday (AFP)

A stream of Israeli leaks has highlighted moves toward alternative scenarios in Gaza if the disarmament of Hamas is not carried out soon.

The options being floated range from freezing reconstruction across the enclave and limiting rebuilding to areas under Israeli control to the prospect of renewed military operations.

Experts who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat described the leaks about alternative plans to confront Hamas as pressure tactics and contingency plans, saying they reflect expectations that the main plan to disarm the resistance will not be implemented immediately.

They said such measures further complicate the path of the second phase, making it, even if launched, a lengthy process due to Israeli obstacles.

Israel’s Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper reported on Friday, citing sources, that the army is preparing alternative plans to carry out a new military operation in Gaza to dismantle Hamas infrastructure if an international force fails in its mission.

This followed earlier Israeli talk of starting partial reconstruction in the southern city of Rafah before Hamas is disarmed, according to Israel’s Channel 12. That proposal contradicts efforts by Arab states to pursue a comprehensive reconstruction of Gaza.

The leaks came after a meeting last week between US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Israel Hayom reported at the time that the two had agreed on Jan. 15 as the date to begin the second phase of Trump’s Gaza plan, with a two-month deadline to dismantle Hamas’ weapons, amid presidential threats against the Palestinian movement if it fails to comply.

Mokhtar Ghobashy, Secretary General of the Al-Farabi Center for Strategic Studies, stated that the second phase of the Gaza agreement is inherently complex and that Israel does not want to enter it except on terms that serve its interests.

He said this became clear after the Trump-Netanyahu meeting, noting that there appears to be an agreed path allowing the launch of the second phase, but at a slow pace. Any acceleration, he said, would depend on the interests achieved by both sides, not just the Palestinians.

Barakat Al-Farra, a former Palestinian ambassador to Egypt, said that the repeated Israeli leaks since last week’s Trump-Netanyahu meeting indicate attempts and contingency plans aimed at complicating the second phase, even if it begins, and that its implementation would be delayed due to Israeli obstacles.

Amid the Israeli leaks, the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Pakistan, Türkiye and Qatar issued a joint statement on Friday calling for the implementation of Trump’s Gaza agreement.

They stressed the need for the immediate, full and unhindered entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza through the United Nations and its agencies, as well as the rehabilitation of infrastructure and hospitals and the opening of the Rafah crossing in both directions.

The eight ministers emphasized the urgent need to immediately launch and expand early recovery efforts, including providing permanent and dignified shelter to protect residents from harsh winter conditions.

The statement also renewed the eight countries’ full support for UN Security Council Resolution 2803 and for the comprehensive plan presented by Trump.

The ministers said they are committed to contributing to its successful implementation in a way that ensures the sustainability of the ceasefire, ends the war in Gaza, secures a dignified life for Palestinians, and leads to a credible path toward Palestinian self-determination and statehood.

Resolution 2803 was adopted by the Security Council in November and welcomed Trump’s 20-point plan to end the Gaza conflict, which was issued on September 29, 2025.

Despite the end of the war after the ceasefire agreement entered into force on Oct. 10, 2025, living conditions have not improved significantly due to Israel’s failure to meet its commitments under the deal.

These include allowing the agreed-upon quantities of food, relief, and medical supplies, as well as mobile homes, and opening border crossings.

Ghobashy said the joint statement by the eight Arab and Islamic countries extends pressure efforts to accelerate the move toward the second phase and to enforce Israel’s delayed commitments from the first phase, particularly those related to opening the Rafah crossing in both directions and increasing the flow of aid.

Al-Farra, meanwhile, said mediators have no option but to continue applying pressure to prevent any further complications for the second phase, predicting that 2026 will not differ from previous periods since the Gaza agreement began in October.


Hadhramaut Official Says National Shield Advances, STC Withdrawal Leaves Security Gap

Residents of Al Mahrah governorate voiced support for Yemen’s presidential decisions (Saba News Agency)
Residents of Al Mahrah governorate voiced support for Yemen’s presidential decisions (Saba News Agency)
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Hadhramaut Official Says National Shield Advances, STC Withdrawal Leaves Security Gap

Residents of Al Mahrah governorate voiced support for Yemen’s presidential decisions (Saba News Agency)
Residents of Al Mahrah governorate voiced support for Yemen’s presidential decisions (Saba News Agency)

A Yemeni local authority official confirmed that the National Shield forces had taken full control of the 37th Brigade camp in al-Khasha and pushed on to the city of al-Qatn, moving toward the strategic city of Seiyun in Hadhramaut.

Abdulhadi al-Tamimi, assistant undersecretary of Hadhramaut governorate for valley and desert affairs, told Asharq Al-Awsat that withdrawing forces loyal to the Southern Transitional Council had left a security vacuum at several military sites, saying local authorities, in coordination with residents, were working to address and fill the gap.

Al-Tamimi, who is in Hadhramaut, stated that forces from the Hadhramaut Tribes Alliance and the Hadhramaut Protection Forces are preparing to move toward the coastal area, specifically Mukalla, to support the Hadhrami Elite Forces in maintaining security and preventing clashes with withdrawing STC forces.

The Hadhramaut official thanked Saudi Arabia for its support of Yemen, and Hadhramaut in particular, which he said had endured difficult times.

“We welcome our brothers in the National Shield forces and salute the support of our elder sister, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, under the leadership of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and the Crown Prince and Minister of Defense, for supporting Yemen and backing Hadhramaut, which lived through difficult days due to the invasion of hordes of STC militias into the Hadhramaut Valley and Desert,” he said.

“Those areas had been far from the conflicts Yemen went through and were spared thanks to the wisdom of their people, but this time they came treacherously, seized control of the First Military Region and wreaked havoc there.”

Al-Tamimi stated that the National Shield forces moved at dawn on Friday, following the failure of all de-escalation efforts and attempts to persuade STC leaders to withdraw.

“Unfortunately, many of the STC forces present did not comply with the request to withdraw, leave their weapons and return from where they came, so clashes occurred with support from Saudi air power, and control was taken of the major base, the 37th Armored Brigade camp,” he said.

He added that the forces then advanced to al-Qatn and were heading toward Seiyun, noting that several areas where STC forces had been present were hit by airstrikes, forcing them to flee, most notably the First Military Region.

Al-Tamimi said the rapid withdrawal of STC forces left a security vacuum at camps such as al-Suwayri.

He added that there was also a separate movement on the Hadhramaut, Plateau by the Hadhramaut, Tribes Alliance, led by Sheikh Amr bin Habrish, and the Hadhramaut, Protection Forces, which were joined by many Hadhrami officers and commanders after they took control of the Ghayl bin Yamin camp.

“We are preparing to head to the Hadhramaut, coast to reinforce the Hadhrami Elite Forces there so they are not attacked by the withdrawing force,” he said.

Al-Tamimi stated that the local authority had instructed all districts to form emergency committees to address the situation and secure vital areas until the National Shield forces arrive.

Meanwhile, hospitals in Seiyun received eight wounded people and one fatality as a result of the military developments in Hadhramaut, on Friday, according to local sources.

The Second Military Region issued a statement saying that camps and military sites under its command would remain fully under its responsibility, describing itself as part of the military institution.

The commander of the Second Military Region had previously declared loyalty to the STC, while the statement suggested a shift in position.

The Second Military Region said the Hadhrami Elite Forces “have carried out their national and security duties since their establishment, pledging full commitment to protecting the Hadhramaut coast and its people, maintaining security and social peace, and safeguarding public and private property.


Sudan: How One Hospital Saved Thousands of Lives Amid War

Al Nao Hospital Director Dr. Jamal Eltaeb (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Al Nao Hospital Director Dr. Jamal Eltaeb (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Sudan: How One Hospital Saved Thousands of Lives Amid War

Al Nao Hospital Director Dr. Jamal Eltaeb (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Al Nao Hospital Director Dr. Jamal Eltaeb (Asharq Al-Awsat)

As Sudan’s war dragged on and fighting engulfed the capital Khartoum, the health system collapsed almost entirely. Hospitals shut their doors one after another, until only a single facility remained in operation in the city of Omdurman.

Al Nao Hospital, perched west of the city on the front line of fierce military confrontations, became the capital’s last functioning emergency hospital, receiving the wounded, responding to urgent cases, and saving thousands of lives under relentless fire.

Despite severe security and psychological pressure, a small group of doctors, health workers, volunteers, and technicians held out to keep the hospital running amid indiscriminate shelling, falling rockets and artillery rounds, severe shortages of supplies, power and water outages, the collapse of communications, and an ever-increasing flow of emergency cases.

Throughout the siege and restrictions imposed on the hospital, doctors, medical staff, and volunteers treated the wounded using just three worn-out ambulances.

Their meals were limited to beans and lentils for breakfast and dinner, as no restaurants were operating in the surrounding area, which was saturated with the smell of blood and gunpowder.

Their efforts earned them the Aurora Prize for Awakening Humanity, which is awarded to individuals who risk their lives, freedom, or health to save others.

Harsh days

The field hospital demonstrated its ability to function in the darkest of times.

“I was deeply affected by the deaths of children, and they were in large numbers,” hospital director Dr. Jamal Eltaeb told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“We were receiving more than 100 cases a day, sometimes within a single hour, around 4,000 a month, with injuries ranging from severe to minor, and we treated large numbers of wounded.”

Eltaeb said the hospital began operating on April 17, 2023, just days after the outbreak of the war, through an initiative launched by young volunteers and with extremely limited capabilities to treat the wounded.

“The injuries caused by indiscriminate shelling shook me deeply, especially among children and women,” he said.

“The deaths of young children were the most painful. Even if you are a doctor, you never get used to seeing children with amputated limbs or their abdomens torn open.”

Drowning in chaos

While the streets of Omdurman sank into chaos, the hospital remained alive with activity.

“We worked with the medical staff available and the limited medicines we had,” Eltaeb said. “The Dutch organization Doctors Without Borders provided us with major support.”

He added that after the war began, he moved from Khartoum to Omdurman as a volunteer, before Khartoum State’s health ministry personally asked him to formally manage the hospital in July 2023.

Alongside colleagues Dr. Amir Mohammed Al-Hassan, a specialist in internal medicine and cardiology, and Dr. Yasser Shamboul, a specialist in internal medicine, he began work with limited resources.

“Ministries and institutions were absent,” Eltaeb said.

“The wounded, the sick, the elderly, and children accept no excuses. They just want someone to treat them.”

Painful scenes

In February 2025, a powerful explosion rocked a popular market in Omdurman, quickly flooding the hospital’s emergency room with bodies and injured victims. “That was one of the most difficult days,” Eltaeb said.

“Sabreen Market was crowded with shoppers. We received around 170 injured people in less than two hours, transported by trucks because there was no ambulance service.”

Those who attempted to help were not doctors or health workers, he said, leading to chaotic transport that mixed the dead with the wounded.

Hospital staff sorted the bodies from the living inside the trucks and confirmed 48 deaths, alongside patients with varying injuries, some of whom lost limbs or were left with permanent disabilities.

“But thank God, we saved the lives of the rest,” he said.

The hospital itself came under indiscriminate shelling, yet doctors and medical staff insisted on continuing their work.

Eltaeb said several hospital workers were killed by shelling and rockets, one volunteer died inside the adjacent mosque, two security guards were killed, and a soldier was wounded by a sniper’s bullet inside the hospital.

Aurora humanitarian prize

The Aurora Foundation for Awakening Humanity awarded its 2025 prize, worth $1 million, to Dr. Jamal Eltaeb in recognition of his efforts managing a hospital that served as a final medical line of defense in Khartoum during the armed conflict.

The prize is one of the world’s leading humanitarian awards, honoring those who risk their lives, freedom, or health to save others and alleviate suffering in situations of conflict, crimes against humanity, or human rights violations.

“I do not know who nominated me for this prize,” Eltaeb said. “I was selected from among 880 nominees without my knowledge. When the shortlist was reduced to 25 people, I learned that I had been nominated.”

He said the prize committee searched for him by sending inquiries to hospitals across Europe, looking for a doctor named Jamal Eltaeb. A colleague in anesthesia in London emailed a message to a fellow doctor at Al Nao Hospital, who forwarded it to him.

“When I read the message, I thought it was some kind of joke and did not reply,” he said. After being encouraged to respond, he shared his contact details and received a call the following day, as the shortlist narrowed to 15, then four, before he was named the final winner.

“The prize does not represent me personally,” Eltaeb said. “It represents the hospital family, the doctors, administrators, and workers. I was only leading them. I am no more deserving of this prize than they are.”