Sudan's Burhan, Hemedti… a Violent End to an Old Friendship

Commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Mohammad "Hemedti" Dagalo and army commander Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan. (AFP)
Commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Mohammad "Hemedti" Dagalo and army commander Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan. (AFP)
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Sudan's Burhan, Hemedti… a Violent End to an Old Friendship

Commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Mohammad "Hemedti" Dagalo and army commander Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan. (AFP)
Commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Mohammad "Hemedti" Dagalo and army commander Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan. (AFP)

The armed conflict that erupted on Saturday between the Sudanese army, led by Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) headed by Lt. Gen. Mohammad "Hemedti" Dagalo, ended an old friendship and cooperation between the two men, which had started with the beginning of the conflict in the Darfur region in 2003 during the rule of ousted President Omar al-Bashir.

At that time, Hemedti formed a small army to confront armed movements in the region that were resisting the Bashir regime. Thus, he gained the president’s support. Burhan, for his part, was coordinating the army’s operations in Darfur, and started to work closely with Hemedti.

The size of Hemedti’s forces grew over time and became affiliated with the army, while maintaining a kind of independence in their leadership and operations.

This relationship strengthened in April 2019, under the pressure of the massive popular revolution that demanded the fall of Bashir’s regime. The two men agreed to overthrow the president, who was supported by the Muslim Brotherhood, and to form a military council to rule the country.

The third stage in their relationship began shortly after the coup that they orchestrated against the civilian government in October 2021, when Burhan assigned figures of the Bashir regime to key positions. Hemedti objected to the move, sparking resentment among the Islamists, who always considered him a “traitor” because he “stabbed Bashir in the back.”

The disagreement in political positions gradually developed between them, sometimes emerging in the media through indirect statements or sharp accusations.

However, the failure to form a government and the deterioration of the economic and security situation in the country, prompted the various military and civilian parties to sign a framework agreement in December 2022, which was widely accepted by civilians and important and influential parties from the international and regional communities.

Although Burhan and Hemedti signed the agreement, which provides for the transfer of power to civilians and the return of the military to their barracks, a new and stronger conflict emerged between the army and the RSF over the implementation of one of the provisions related to military reform and the integration of the Rapid Support Forces into the army.

A war of words escalated between the two sides, with the deputy head of the Rapid Support Forces, Abdel-Rahim Dagalo (Hemedti’s brother), directly addressing the army commanders who control power in the country and saying: “Our message to our brothers in the ruling authority is to hand over power to the people without further stalling.”

He added: "From now on, we will not allow the killing of young demonstrators or the arrest of politicians. We have been silent for a long time, and we don’t want to become a reason for what is happening, but we will not abandon or go back on the basic principles that unite the Sudanese people."

In response, Burhan reiterated that the integration of the RSF into the army was a necessary condition for implementing the framework agreement.

The dispute over the agreement escalated and turned into an exchange of accusations, culminating in the withdrawal of the Sudanese army and military forces from a security and military reform workshop.

Hemedti considered that the army was attempting to disrupt the implementation of the agreement and to prevent the formation of a civilian government, in order to stay in power.

The crisis reached its climax at the airport in the northern city of Merowe, near the air base of the Sudanese army, when the RSF deployed a large number of vehicles and soldiers near the base, claiming to defend their troops against any potential aircraft strikes.

Sources had told Asharq Al-Awsat that a meeting that included Burhan, Hemedti, the international forces supporting the civil transition, and the signatories to the framework agreement, decided to defuse the crisis by providing assurances to the RSF, and removing the aircraft from the air base. But the army did not abide by the agreement, prompting Hemedti to order his forces coming from the west to continue the march to both Merowe and Khartoum and deploy there.

The situation remained severely tense throughout the past week. Mediation led by multiple parties ended with an announcement that a meeting between the two men would take place over the weekend. But instead, the fighting erupted, confirming the Sudanese people’s fear of an imminent outbreak of violence.



Will Israel’s Interceptors Outlast Iran’s Missiles?

The Israeli Iron Dome air defense system fires to intercept missiles during an Iranian attack over Tel Aviv, Israel, early Wednesday, June 18, 2025. (AP Photo/Leo Correa)
The Israeli Iron Dome air defense system fires to intercept missiles during an Iranian attack over Tel Aviv, Israel, early Wednesday, June 18, 2025. (AP Photo/Leo Correa)
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Will Israel’s Interceptors Outlast Iran’s Missiles?

The Israeli Iron Dome air defense system fires to intercept missiles during an Iranian attack over Tel Aviv, Israel, early Wednesday, June 18, 2025. (AP Photo/Leo Correa)
The Israeli Iron Dome air defense system fires to intercept missiles during an Iranian attack over Tel Aviv, Israel, early Wednesday, June 18, 2025. (AP Photo/Leo Correa)

Israel has a world-leading missile interception system but its bank of interceptors is finite. Now, as the war drags on, Israel is firing interceptors faster than it can produce them.

On Thursday, The New York Times reporters spoke to current and former Israeli officials about the strengths and weaknesses of Israeli air defense.

Aside from a potentially game-changing US intervention that shapes the fate of Iran’s nuclear program, two factors will help decide the length of the Israel-Iran war: Israel’s reserve of missile interceptors and Iran’s stock of long-range missiles.

Since Iran started retaliating against Israel’s fire last week, Israel’s world-leading air defense system has intercepted most incoming Iranian ballistic missiles, giving the Israeli Air Force more time to strike Iran without incurring major losses at home.

But now, as the war drags on, Israel is firing interceptors faster than it can produce them. That has raised questions within the Israeli security establishment about whether the country will run low on air defense missiles before Iran uses up its ballistic arsenal, according to eight current and former officials.

Already, Israel’s military has had to conserve its use of interceptors and is giving greater priority to the defense of densely populated areas and strategic infrastructure, according to the officials. Most spoke on the condition of anonymity to speak more freely.

Interceptors are “not grains of rice,” said Brig. Gen. Ran Kochav, who commanded Israel’s air defense system until 2021 and still serves in the military reserve. “The number is finite.”

“If a missile is supposed to hit refineries in Haifa, it’s clear that it’s more important to intercept that missile than one that will hit the Negev desert,” General Kochav said.

Conserving Israel’s interceptors is “a challenge,” he added. “We can make it, but it’s a challenge.”

Asked for comment on the limits of its interceptor arsenal, the Israeli military said in a brief statement that it “is prepared and ready to handle any scenario and is operating defensively and offensively to remove threats to Israeli civilians.”

No Israeli official would divulge the number of interceptors left at Israel’s disposal; the revelation of such a closely guarded secret could give Iran a military advantage.

The answer will affect Israel’s ability to sustain a long-term, attritional war. The nature of the war will partly be decided by whether Trump decides to join Israel in attacking Iran’s nuclear enrichment site at Fordo, in northern Iran, or whether Iran decides to give up its enrichment program to prevent such an intervention.

But the war’s endgame will also be shaped by how long both sides can sustain the damage to their economies, as well as the damage to national morale caused by a growing civilian death toll.

Israel relies on at least seven kinds of air defense. Most of them involve automated systems that use radar to detect incoming missiles and then provide officers with suggestions of how to intercept them.

Military officials have seconds to react to some short-range fire, but minutes to judge the response to long-range attacks. At times, the automated systems do not offer recommendations, leaving officers to make decisions on their own, General Kochav said.

The Arrow system intercepts long-range missiles at higher altitudes; the David’s Sling system intercepts them at lower altitudes; while the Iron Dome takes out shorter-range rockets, usually fired from Gaza, or the fragments of missiles already intercepted by other defense systems.

The United States has supplied at least two more defense systems, some of them fired from ships in the Mediterranean, and Israel is also trying out a new and relatively untested laser beam. Finally, fighter jets are deployed to shoot down slow-moving drones.

Some Israelis feel it is time to wrap up the war before Israel’s defenses are tested too severely.

At least 24 civilians have been killed by Iran’s strikes, and more than 800 have been injured. Some key infrastructure, including oil refineries in northern Israel, has been hit, along with civilian homes. A hospital in southern Israel was struck on Thursday morning.

Already high by Israeli standards, the death toll could rise sharply if the Israeli military is forced to limit its general use of interceptors in order to guarantee the long-term protection of a few strategic sites like the Dimona nuclear reactor in southern Israel or the military headquarters in Tel Aviv.

“Now that Israel has succeeded in striking most of its nuclear targets in Iran, Israel has a window of two or three days to declare the victory and end the war,” said Zohar Palti, a former senior officer in the Mossad, Israel’s spy agency.

“When planning how to defend Israel in future wars, no one envisaged a scenario in which we would be fighting on so many fronts and defending against so many rounds of ballistic missiles,” said Palti, who was for years involved in Israel’s defensive planning.

Others are confident that Israel will be able to solve the problem by destroying most of Iran’s missile launchers, preventing the Iranian military from using the stocks that it still has.

Iran has both fixed and mobile launchers, scattered across its territory, according to two Israeli officials. Some of its missiles are stored underground, where they are harder to destroy, while others are in aboveground caches, the officials said.

The Israeli military says it has destroyed more than a third of the launchers. Officials and experts say that has already limited the number of missiles that Iran can fire in a single attack.

US officials said Israel’s strikes against the launchers have decimated Iran’s ability to fire its missiles and hurt its ability to create large-scale barrages.

“The real issue is the number of launchers, more than the number of missiles,” said Asaf Cohen, a former Israeli commander who led the Iran department in Israel’s military intelligence directorate.

“The more of them that are hit, the harder it will be for them to launch barrages,” Cohen added. “If they realize they have a problem with launch capacity, they’ll shift to harassment: one or two missiles every so often, aimed at two different areas simultaneously.”

The New York Times