Jomaili to Asharq Al-Awsat: Poison Ring from Baghdad to London Kills Target, Handler

Jomaili to Asharq Al-Awsat: Poison Ring from Baghdad to London Kills Target, Handler
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Jomaili to Asharq Al-Awsat: Poison Ring from Baghdad to London Kills Target, Handler

Jomaili to Asharq Al-Awsat: Poison Ring from Baghdad to London Kills Target, Handler

The imprisonment of Salem Al-Jomaili, director of the US branch of the Iraqi intelligence agency under Saddam Hussein, alongside high-ranking officials of the Iraqi regime in Camp Cropper following the US invasion, was marked by a sense of disbelief and astonishment.

Many believed that Saddam could have resorted to a suicide belt or a last bullet and had the audacity to issue an order to his associates to kill him before being captured by American soldiers.

While initially met with skepticism, the news was eventually confirmed, and the detainees in the prison did not hesitate to acknowledge the bravery of the man who had faced danger head-on. Some even speculated that Saddam may have intended to use his appearance in court to put the invasion and its allies on trial.

Subsequently, the US military permitted leaders of Saddam’s opponents to pay a visit to him while he was incarcerated.

However, two notable opponents of the former dictator declined the offer: Masoud Barzani, the head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, who believed that “taking pleasure in someone else's misfortune is unbecoming of a man” and candidly admitted that it was the US forces, not the opposition, who brought about the downfall of Saddam's regime.

The other adversary was Ayad Allawi, the Prime Minister after the regime’s collapse, who still bore the wounds inflicted by Saddam's ax-wielding henchmen in London.

Allawi could not bear the thought of seeing the ex-Iraqi leader behind bars under US custody.

In the final excerpt of a five-part interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Jomaili revealed that Iran had facilitated the US invasion of Iraq.

Through Ahmed Chalabi, Iran entered into agreements with the US that would facilitate their mission in exchange for the return of Iraqi opposition members that Iran was hosting.

Tehran also released a series of misleading information through Chalabi to justify the invasion and seized part of the Iraqi archives.

Under the agreements, Iran allowed US aircraft to use the border strip and adjacent airspace of Iraq for military purposes. The US intelligence agencies were unable to deliver weapons to Jalal Talabani in Sulaymaniyah because they had to pass through the airspace of Turkey, Syria, or Iran.

Iran’s General Qasem Soleimani then personally delivered the weapons to Talabani.

During those times, Soleimani did not play a significant role, and the Revolutionary Guard's interventions were feeble, only extending to southern Lebanon and not visibly in Syria or Yemen.

According to Jomaili, Iranian influence only began to emerge after the collapse of the Iraqi regime.

“We foresaw this and communicated to the Americans in an effort to avert war. We warned them that they would be providing a gateway for Iran to infiltrate the region. However, they did not express any concern on the matter, and the outcome unfolded as we had predicted,” said Jomaili.

 

The Iranian Revenge

 

The retaliation of the Iranians against the intelligence apparatus was horrifying, with executions carried out through their agents. At least 50 officers were killed, including 14 in a single attack on their residences.

Jomaili revealed that the Iranians had also assassinated pilots and bombed targets in Iran during the Iraq-Iran war. The level of revenge even extended to exhuming the graves of officers who had been martyred in the war.

While Iranian agencies facilitated the invasion of Iraq, they also took actions in another direction.

Prior to the invasion, these agencies facilitated Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s passage through Iranian territories to Iraq after he left Afghanistan. The presence of the Al-Qaeda leadership in Iran was already known, as evidenced by Israel’s assassination of one of its members there.

When asked about Saddam’s relations with Kurdish leaders in Iraq, which were difficult and fraught with confrontations, agreements, and ceasefires, Jomaili began to recount the details of those ties.

He recalled a communication channel existing between Saddam and Talabani that was managed by an Iraqi intelligence officer with the rank of director.

When members of Al-Qaeda infiltrated Iraq from Afghanistan through Iran in 2001, Talabani was concerned about their cooperation with the Kurdish Islamist group Ansar al-Islam. The group attacked fighters from the Kurdistan National Union and killed 40 of them, so Talabani requested military and financial assistance from Baghdad, which was provided.

Talabani responded with a message to Saddam thanking him and pledging that the weapons will not be used against the people of Iraq.

 

Resignation Means Death

 

The intelligence agency is not a political party that one can belong to, learn its secrets, and then leave peacefully, reminded Jomaili.

When an officer decides to defect, they are practically signing their own death warrant, he explained, adding that the agency does not spare defectors and would hunt them down.

Men with fake names and sometimes diplomatic passports will pursue their former colleague to execute them.

As the director of the intelligence agency, Barzan al-Tikriti created a publishing and printing institution in London as a front for intelligence work. He appointed a highly skilled individual from the state agencies to oversee it.

Choosing to stay in London, the operative firmly declined to return to Baghdad when his mission ended in 1986.

A team of three, including acquaintances of the target, was sent by the intelligence agency to London to assassinate the operative, who was unsuspecting of their intentions.

The team proposed a meeting at a restaurant, where one member slipped a deadly substance, which was hidden in a ring, into the target’s drink.

The target died from the poison, and the intelligence officer who handled the fatal substance also died soon after. The fate of the second team member is unknown after the Kuwait invasion, while the third died outside Iraq in 2020.

 

Deadly Appointment in Stockholm

 

The intelligence agency had target hunters, affirmed Jomaili.

At one instance, a female proxy traveled with an intelligence officer. She was placed in the path of a targeted man who hastened to swallow the bait. She took him to an apartment where her colleague officer was present.

The man was surprised by the presence of the operations officer whom he personally knew and realized that he had fallen into a trap, saying to him, “Are you here to kill me?” The officer executed him and threw his parts into a forest at dawn, then left Stockholm with his companion safely.

Another officer was sent to a station in Turkey. He was warned against falling into the trap of beautiful women.

In 1982, the man disappeared suddenly, and it was later discovered that he had left for Germany with a Turkish lady.

The missing man later returned to Turkey, but it was later learned that he had been lured to a special place and was mysteriously eliminated.

According to Jomaili, the intelligence agency allowed these events to leak among its members as a deterrent to anyone who dared to commit a similar act or defect.

 

 



Fakhri Karim: My Complaint to Sistani on Corruption Spurred Suggestion of Saddam-Era Minister

Fakhri Karim, senior adviser to late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Fakhri Karim, senior adviser to late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Fakhri Karim: My Complaint to Sistani on Corruption Spurred Suggestion of Saddam-Era Minister

Fakhri Karim, senior adviser to late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Fakhri Karim, senior adviser to late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

In post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, the prime minister's office gained significant power. It became customary for the prime minister to be Shiite, the president Kurdish, and the speaker of Parliament Sunni.

This power-sharing arrangement, focusing on sectarian representation over institutional structure, has remained strong.

Attempts to break this norm have failed, including when former US President Barack Obama and his Vice President Joe Biden tried to support Ayad Allawi, a Shiite politician, for the presidency. The aim was to keep Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in power with support from both Washington and Tehran.

Despite Allawi’s parliamentary majority win, he didn’t become president.

Arab states were slow to react to changes in Iraq, allowing Iran to step in. Iran supported the US-created Iraqi Governing Council and sought to bring together Shiite factions to join the political process.

Its influence grew due to its backing of groups that opposed Saddam Hussein. Iran gained a key role in Iraq, effectively having veto power over decisions and a say in forming governments, while also expecting an eventual US military withdrawal.

Fakhri Karim, senior adviser to late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, said Iran stepped in to fill a vacuum in Iraq, solidifying its role and protecting its interests.

This made Iran’s Quds Force commander Gen. Qassem Soleimani a key figure in Iraq, shaping everything from the reduction of US military presence to the formation of governments.

A foreign power’s influence in a neighboring country grows only if locals accept its role.

Soleimani and deputy leader of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis were killed in a US strike near Baghdad airport in January 2020.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Karim noted that Soleimani “was dedicated to serving his country’s interests, and the other side should have defended its own role and interests.”

He recalled Soleimani as being “skilled, effective, and able to earn trust, shifting from flexibility to rigidity when needed.”

This was clear in a letter Soleimani sent to Talabani when he considered supporting a no-confidence motion against Maliki’s government.

Karim also mentioned that al-Muhandis was deeply trusted by the Iranian general.

Talabani assigned his senior adviser various missions in Iran, focusing on forming Iraqi governments and relations with Kurdistan.

During a visit to Tehran, Adil Abdul Mahdi, who would later become prime minister, informed Talabani and Karim that “Soleimani’s claim that Iran supports Nouri al-Maliki for prime minister is false.”

“I was told that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei supports me,” argued Abdul Mahdi at the time.

Talabani felt awkward despite being close to Abdul Mahdi. He asked Karim to visit Tehran, where he met Soleimani and al-Muhandis. Soleimani denied Abdul Mahdi’s claims, saying he could take Karim to the Supreme Leader to hear the truth.

For his part, Karim said the Supreme Council didn’t support al-Maliki and that influential cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s stance was hardening. Soleimani assured that the Iranians were in contact with al-Sadr and would handle the issue of the Supreme Council.

When Karim returned, he informed Talabani and Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani that the Badr Organization, led by Hadi al-Amiri, had left the Supreme Council to join Maliki, shifting the balance and allowing the formation of a government without the Council’s interference.

Karim remembered that Iran initially supported Ibrahim al-Jaafari for prime minister (2005-2006). However, Jaafari quickly became a burden on the political process and Shiite leaders then signaled the need for change.

The US Ambassador advised Jaafari to resign, threatening him if he didn't comply.

Maliki’s name wasn’t initially considered; Ali al-Adib from the “Dawa” party, of which Maliki was a member, was the favored choice. But Maliki didn’t support Adib, so after deliberations, the party settled on Maliki instead.

Breakfast with Soleimani

Karim remembers a breakfast meeting with Soleimani and al-Muhandis. He brought up Maliki’s performance during his second term and the widespread corruption in Iraq.

Soleimani suggested discussing it further, but Karim insisted the issue was urgent.

He questioned why, if all major Shiite forces agreed, change couldn’t happen. Soleimani indicated that decisions within the Shiite alliance were made by those who remained in it, prompting Karim to ask if Soleimani was implying it was him. Soleimani then replied : “Think what you wish.”

Sadr’s misstep

In the post-Saddam Hussein era, Sadr emerged as a major political force in Iraq. He led a large popular and armed movement.

Dealing with Sadr was challenging for political factions, especially among Shiites. Some disputes even culminated in armed conflicts. Managing Sadr’s influence was difficult both internally and for external interests, especially given his unpredictability.

When asked about Sadr’s decision to quit politics in 2022, Karim called it a major mistake.

He believed Iraq suffered greatly from this move, as it left parliament without any influential Shiite force capable of standing up against decisions not aligned with common goals.

Karim highlighted that filling seats with losing candidates seemed odd and turned the minority into the majority, undermining the constitutional process. He also noted the Shiite community’s fragmentation, with many Shiites not participating in recent elections due to their disenchantment with the political parties.

Karim warned against underestimating the potential for renewed protests and uprisings among the marginalized against the government and ruling powers.

Sistani’s unexpected proposal

When discussing top Shiite Religious Authority in Iraq, Ali al-Sistani, Karim highlighted his political astuteness, surpassing the majority of other Shiite leaders. Sistani’s Friday sermons, delivered by his representatives, reflect this forward-thinking approach.

Karim noted a key observation about Sistani’s mindset. Despite corruption concerns, Sistani surprised Karim by suggesting bringing back the former Minister of Trade for his effectiveness in managing the ration card distribution.

He even proposed considering a Christian minister if they were honest and prioritized the people’s interests.

Furthermore, Sistani emphasized the importance of inclusivity in the new Iraq, advocating for the rights of Sunni and Kurdish components. He rejected marginalization and insisted on their participation and rights.

Sistani’s fatwa and the PMF

Karim believes that Sistani issued a fatwa on “jihad” to rally people against the significant threat posed by ISIS in 2014. He didn’t specifically mention the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) or any other organization but referred to volunteers.

“Many responded to Sistani’s call and made significant sacrifices alongside the armed forces and Peshmerga. Volunteers participated in liberating areas once occupied by the terror group,” said Karim.

Karim further noted that there was a belief that those who made sacrifices had the right to be part of the armed forces and receive state support.

“The idea of integrating militias or military entities into the armed forces is not new,” explained Karim.

“US diplomat Paul Bremer [the first post-invasion governor of Iraq] proposed something similar to factions and organizations under the banner of integration into the army, and steps were taken in this direction,” he added.

“The goal was to eliminate the threat of ISIS, not to create a parallel army or establish another institution.”