AANES Utilizes Half of Syrian Oil Wells, Traders Sell to Damascus at Symbolic Rates

File photo from the Al-Omar oil field in the eastern countryside of Deir Ezzor. The image was captured after the conclusion of military operations and the expulsion of ISIS elements (Asharq Al-Awsat)
File photo from the Al-Omar oil field in the eastern countryside of Deir Ezzor. The image was captured after the conclusion of military operations and the expulsion of ISIS elements (Asharq Al-Awsat)
TT

AANES Utilizes Half of Syrian Oil Wells, Traders Sell to Damascus at Symbolic Rates

File photo from the Al-Omar oil field in the eastern countryside of Deir Ezzor. The image was captured after the conclusion of military operations and the expulsion of ISIS elements (Asharq Al-Awsat)
File photo from the Al-Omar oil field in the eastern countryside of Deir Ezzor. The image was captured after the conclusion of military operations and the expulsion of ISIS elements (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Over the course of twelve years of ongoing conflict in Syria, the dossier of oil and energy has remained an enigmatic puzzle. Ever since oil and gas fields slipped from the grip of government forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad at the close of 2012, control over these resources has shifted among various entities.

It wasn't until 2016 that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), backed by an international coalition led by Washington, managed to wrest control of the oil-rich and natural gas-abundant towns and settlements of Shaddadi, Al-Hol, and Al-Jabsa, southeast of the city of Al-Hasakah, from the clutches of the terrorist group ISIS.

Later in 2017, ISIS terrorists were expelled by the SDF from oil fields in the eastern countryside of Deir Ezzor, located in eastern Syria. These fields used to yield a daily production of 120,000 barrels of heavy oil prior to the outbreak of the 2011 conflict.

Hassan Kocher, deputy co-chair of the Executive Council of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), revealed to Asharq Al-Awsat that the administration invests in less than half of the wells and fields in its areas of influence, approximately 150,000 barrels per day, noting that production was around 385,000 barrels per day before the 2011 war.

Kocher refuted accusations directed at the AANES and US forces of plundering Syrian oil or monopolizing these resources, citing evidence of a portion of the production being sold to regime-affiliated traders at nominal prices compared to global rates.

Since the onset of the Syrian war, the regions encompassing oil fields and their wells have come under the control of various military factions.

Following 2014, especially in the outskirts of the cities of Deir Ezzor and Al-Hasakah, these fields faced military assaults from armed radical groups and extremist Islamic organizations.

These attacks significantly impacted these fields and wells, with some being destroyed and others subjected to vandalism, leading to a decline in production.

With limited resources, the AANES managed to harness a portion equivalent to less than half of the pre-2011 production from these wells to meet the energy and fuel needs of the region’s inhabitants, disclosed Kocher.

When asked about the status of oil and gas fields post their liberation of ISIS, Kocher said: “After SDF forces liberated fields in the outskirts of Deir Ezzor (2019) and Al-Hasakah (2016), they encountered logistical obstacles that hindered the production of many wells.”

“Some of the equipment was stolen, and another portion was deliberately vandalized, aiming to undermine the region’s economy,” added Kocher.

According to the deputy co-chair, remaining wells require maintenance, restoration, experts, technicians, and significant resources that the AANES does not possess.

“Additionally, the siege imposed on our areas from all sides has significantly contributed to the decline of the oil sector,” added Kocher.

As for revenues collected from oil and gas production under the AANES, Kocher said they flow back to the structures of the administration and local councils that oversee the regions, aimed at covering the expenses of the military and security forces safeguarding their geographical borders.

“These revenues also contribute to the overall budget, enabling the provision of essential services for the region’s residents and supporting the payment of salaries for workers and employees,” clarified Kocher.

Talking about the buying and selling operations conducted with Damascus and other areas of influence, Kocher said there are “no official contracts or established methods due to the fact that all borders are besieged and closed.”

“There is also no agreement for the sale and purchase of crude oil, neither with the Syrian government nor with other entities,” added Kocher.

“Here, it is crucial to emphasize the necessity of establishing a mechanism to regulate these operations, as it would be a positive development in serving all Syrians, regardless of their geographical location, as we are a part of Syria and these resources belong to all Syrians,” he affirmed.

Buying and selling operations are conducted through traders affiliated with the regime, and the quantities extracted nowadays barely suffice for the region’s population needs.

“Despite this, a portion of the extracted oil is sold through these traders to Damascus, while another portion is bought by traders for resale to other areas,” said Kocher, asserting that the AANES does not monopolize these resources, contrary to the claims of both the government and opposing factions.

“It has become widely known that the administration’s own regions are grappling with severe crises in the distribution of household gas and diesel fuel,” noted Kocher.

As for accusations of plundering Syrian oil leveled by the Syrian regime and international parties against the SDF and US forces, Kocher asserted that those allegations are utterly false.

“These claims are entirely baseless, both in their entirety and in their details,” said Kocher.

“The international coalition and US forces have not intervened in the oil issue.”

“Officially, they state that their tasks are limited to combating and defeating the terrorist organization ISIS and eliminating its sleeper cells in eastern Syria.”

Regarding the AANES presenting the US-led international coalition with a project for building an oil refinery, Kocher admits the administration had submitted such a proposal.

“Given that our regions are surrounded on all sides and lack official crossings, these efforts have not succeeded in establishing such a facility,” revealed Kocher.

“To this day, oil refining continues to be carried out using primitive methods that negatively impact environmental safety, as well as the overall economic cycle of northeastern Syria due to the absence of oil investments,” he added.



Fakhri Karim: My Complaint to Sistani on Corruption Spurred Suggestion of Saddam-Era Minister

Fakhri Karim, senior adviser to late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Fakhri Karim, senior adviser to late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
TT

Fakhri Karim: My Complaint to Sistani on Corruption Spurred Suggestion of Saddam-Era Minister

Fakhri Karim, senior adviser to late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Fakhri Karim, senior adviser to late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

In post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, the prime minister's office gained significant power. It became customary for the prime minister to be Shiite, the president Kurdish, and the speaker of Parliament Sunni.

This power-sharing arrangement, focusing on sectarian representation over institutional structure, has remained strong.

Attempts to break this norm have failed, including when former US President Barack Obama and his Vice President Joe Biden tried to support Ayad Allawi, a Shiite politician, for the presidency. The aim was to keep Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in power with support from both Washington and Tehran.

Despite Allawi’s parliamentary majority win, he didn’t become president.

Arab states were slow to react to changes in Iraq, allowing Iran to step in. Iran supported the US-created Iraqi Governing Council and sought to bring together Shiite factions to join the political process.

Its influence grew due to its backing of groups that opposed Saddam Hussein. Iran gained a key role in Iraq, effectively having veto power over decisions and a say in forming governments, while also expecting an eventual US military withdrawal.

Fakhri Karim, senior adviser to late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, said Iran stepped in to fill a vacuum in Iraq, solidifying its role and protecting its interests.

This made Iran’s Quds Force commander Gen. Qassem Soleimani a key figure in Iraq, shaping everything from the reduction of US military presence to the formation of governments.

A foreign power’s influence in a neighboring country grows only if locals accept its role.

Soleimani and deputy leader of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis were killed in a US strike near Baghdad airport in January 2020.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Karim noted that Soleimani “was dedicated to serving his country’s interests, and the other side should have defended its own role and interests.”

He recalled Soleimani as being “skilled, effective, and able to earn trust, shifting from flexibility to rigidity when needed.”

This was clear in a letter Soleimani sent to Talabani when he considered supporting a no-confidence motion against Maliki’s government.

Karim also mentioned that al-Muhandis was deeply trusted by the Iranian general.

Talabani assigned his senior adviser various missions in Iran, focusing on forming Iraqi governments and relations with Kurdistan.

During a visit to Tehran, Adil Abdul Mahdi, who would later become prime minister, informed Talabani and Karim that “Soleimani’s claim that Iran supports Nouri al-Maliki for prime minister is false.”

“I was told that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei supports me,” argued Abdul Mahdi at the time.

Talabani felt awkward despite being close to Abdul Mahdi. He asked Karim to visit Tehran, where he met Soleimani and al-Muhandis. Soleimani denied Abdul Mahdi’s claims, saying he could take Karim to the Supreme Leader to hear the truth.

For his part, Karim said the Supreme Council didn’t support al-Maliki and that influential cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s stance was hardening. Soleimani assured that the Iranians were in contact with al-Sadr and would handle the issue of the Supreme Council.

When Karim returned, he informed Talabani and Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani that the Badr Organization, led by Hadi al-Amiri, had left the Supreme Council to join Maliki, shifting the balance and allowing the formation of a government without the Council’s interference.

Karim remembered that Iran initially supported Ibrahim al-Jaafari for prime minister (2005-2006). However, Jaafari quickly became a burden on the political process and Shiite leaders then signaled the need for change.

The US Ambassador advised Jaafari to resign, threatening him if he didn't comply.

Maliki’s name wasn’t initially considered; Ali al-Adib from the “Dawa” party, of which Maliki was a member, was the favored choice. But Maliki didn’t support Adib, so after deliberations, the party settled on Maliki instead.

Breakfast with Soleimani

Karim remembers a breakfast meeting with Soleimani and al-Muhandis. He brought up Maliki’s performance during his second term and the widespread corruption in Iraq.

Soleimani suggested discussing it further, but Karim insisted the issue was urgent.

He questioned why, if all major Shiite forces agreed, change couldn’t happen. Soleimani indicated that decisions within the Shiite alliance were made by those who remained in it, prompting Karim to ask if Soleimani was implying it was him. Soleimani then replied : “Think what you wish.”

Sadr’s misstep

In the post-Saddam Hussein era, Sadr emerged as a major political force in Iraq. He led a large popular and armed movement.

Dealing with Sadr was challenging for political factions, especially among Shiites. Some disputes even culminated in armed conflicts. Managing Sadr’s influence was difficult both internally and for external interests, especially given his unpredictability.

When asked about Sadr’s decision to quit politics in 2022, Karim called it a major mistake.

He believed Iraq suffered greatly from this move, as it left parliament without any influential Shiite force capable of standing up against decisions not aligned with common goals.

Karim highlighted that filling seats with losing candidates seemed odd and turned the minority into the majority, undermining the constitutional process. He also noted the Shiite community’s fragmentation, with many Shiites not participating in recent elections due to their disenchantment with the political parties.

Karim warned against underestimating the potential for renewed protests and uprisings among the marginalized against the government and ruling powers.

Sistani’s unexpected proposal

When discussing top Shiite Religious Authority in Iraq, Ali al-Sistani, Karim highlighted his political astuteness, surpassing the majority of other Shiite leaders. Sistani’s Friday sermons, delivered by his representatives, reflect this forward-thinking approach.

Karim noted a key observation about Sistani’s mindset. Despite corruption concerns, Sistani surprised Karim by suggesting bringing back the former Minister of Trade for his effectiveness in managing the ration card distribution.

He even proposed considering a Christian minister if they were honest and prioritized the people’s interests.

Furthermore, Sistani emphasized the importance of inclusivity in the new Iraq, advocating for the rights of Sunni and Kurdish components. He rejected marginalization and insisted on their participation and rights.

Sistani’s fatwa and the PMF

Karim believes that Sistani issued a fatwa on “jihad” to rally people against the significant threat posed by ISIS in 2014. He didn’t specifically mention the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) or any other organization but referred to volunteers.

“Many responded to Sistani’s call and made significant sacrifices alongside the armed forces and Peshmerga. Volunteers participated in liberating areas once occupied by the terror group,” said Karim.

Karim further noted that there was a belief that those who made sacrifices had the right to be part of the armed forces and receive state support.

“The idea of integrating militias or military entities into the armed forces is not new,” explained Karim.

“US diplomat Paul Bremer [the first post-invasion governor of Iraq] proposed something similar to factions and organizations under the banner of integration into the army, and steps were taken in this direction,” he added.

“The goal was to eliminate the threat of ISIS, not to create a parallel army or establish another institution.”