Zebari to Asharq Al-Awsat: We Heard Tehran’s Frank Explanation on Militia Roles

Former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad receiving Former Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari in Tehran in April 2007 (Getty)
Former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad receiving Former Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari in Tehran in April 2007 (Getty)
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Zebari to Asharq Al-Awsat: We Heard Tehran’s Frank Explanation on Militia Roles

Former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad receiving Former Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari in Tehran in April 2007 (Getty)
Former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad receiving Former Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari in Tehran in April 2007 (Getty)

Former Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari doesn't believe that Iraqi-US relations will completely fall apart, but he’s worried about security and economic consequences.

Zebari, who served as foreign minister for 11 years, also expressed concern about interference, monopolistic policies, and attempts to undermine the Kurdistan region of Iraq, which was established based on the current constitution.

Additionally, Zebari revealed that key Iranian leaders had invited Iraq to join the so-called Axis of Resistance, an informal Iran-led political and militant coalition in West Asia and North Africa.

Below is a summary of Zebrari’s thoughts on some questions posed by Asharq Al-Awsat:

Are you worried about Iraq's future?

Yes, I'm concerned. Sadly, despite our efforts, Iraq hasn't stabilized since Saddam Hussein’s regime fell. It lacks the needed stability in politics, security, and society to rebuild after years of war. I'm worried because we still don't have a good government in place.

Is what we’re witnessing now a battle to kick US soldiers out of Iraq?

It's a power struggle between regional players, like Iran, and the US due to conflicts in Gaza and the Middle East. Removing US troops has become a focus, but they’re still needed for regional security.

I was involved in negotiating agreements to withdraw US troops. While there's still some Iraqi security need for them, the issue has become politicized.

The parliament's attempt to expel them on Feb. 10 failed due to lack of support. This issue is up to the government, not just lawmakers.

The exit or stay of US forces is related to Iraqi international obligations, which in turn are related to the Iraqi national economy.

Therefore, this issue cannot be viewed unilaterally.

Many countries in the region host foreign military bases, including those of Britain and France, not just the US.

However, this happened with the consent of these governments. These governments are still sovereign, and the relationship is organized.

We in Iraq also have a regulation for this relationship. But the issue is primarily politicized.

Is Iraq able to handle a breakup with the US?

It's very tough because the US-Iraq relationship is tied to international, regional, and economic issues.

So, breaking away is hard. Every country needs support.

In the strategic framework agreement we negotiated with them, they offered many opportunities to help Iraq’s economy, security, and capabilities. But unfortunately, Iraqi governments haven’t taken full advantage of these opportunities.

You were Iraq’s top diplomat for 11 years. Did the US ask for permanent military bases in Iraq?

The discussion happened during the transition between the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations.

The main question was: What’s the future of these forces?

The idea was that Washington completed its mission, toppled the regime, and laid the groundwork for a new system. It helped Iraq have a constitution, so let Iraqis handle their own issues.

But the US saw the need to keep a limited presence, which was the basis of negotiation.

We started talks in 2007 and finalized the agreement for their withdrawal in 2011 under the Obama administration.

At the same time, Iraq signed a Strategic Framework Agreement for Friendship, Development, and Economic Cooperation with the US.

There was heated debate among military leaders who had served in Iraq, with many of the current US military leaders having experience there. They feared that a sudden withdrawal without leaving some forces for assistance would endanger US interests, whether against terrorism or other aspiring powers in Iraq.

However, Obama chose to withdraw without heeding this advice. I spoke with him for about 45 minutes.

What did you discuss?

He was in the midst of his election campaign, and Iraq was a major issue then. John McCain was the Republican candidate, and both camps were deeply concerned about Iraq.

Obama called me while campaigning in one of the states. I told him that we believed Iraq hadn’t fully recovered; it wasn’t stable yet due to terrorist threats and security challenges. So, we didn't support a sudden full withdrawal of forces.

We needed their assistance and help in training our military, but Obama took it as a no, and stressed that he came to end America’s involvement in foreign wars.

There was also a financial crisis in the global market at that time.

During that period, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki saw the withdrawal as inevitable. He began leaning towards more dominance and control, straying from the constitution, democracy, and freedoms, and targeting Sunni leaders.

This led to significant discontent among the Sunni community. Meanwhile, ISIS was growing in Syria and then moved into Iraq.

At a time when the government claimed it had sufficient forces and didn’t need foreign help, we saw their collapse when ISIS seized Mosul and advanced towards other cities.

This prompted us to seek assistance from the US, which also helped in Erbil and Samarra.

The presence of US forces, along with the formation of an international coalition against terrorism, was based on our agreement.

Any change to this understanding requires the agreement of signatories and a notice period of at least a year. With the upcoming US elections and regional instability, it’s unlikely Iraq can end this relationship now.

Iran’s Narrative of Proxy Making

Can we say that the wars in the Red Sea, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon after the Oct.7 Al-Aqsa Flood attack confirm Iranian control over this part of the Arab world?

Iran holds significant influence in our region, from Yemen to Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. They openly support the Axis of Resistance.

I’ve had discussions with Qassem Soleimani, the late commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards' Quds Force, as well as with Ali Larijani, former Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, and Ali Akbar Velayati, former Foreign Minister.

We visited Tehran and discussed matters with the President and Prime Minister there.

One of their requests was: “Since Kurds and Shiites have overcome dictatorship, you shouldn’t trust the global powers or the Americans. You should join the Axis of Resistance.”

Who said this?

These were the words of the three leaders I mentioned. I replied that we don’t want to join new conflicts or wars. We’re tired of fighting and want to rebuild our country. They want us to resist those who liberated us, which doesn’t make sense.

But when ISIS expanded, Grand Ayatollah Sistani called for defending Iraq, leading to the formation of the Popular Mobilization Forces.

However, the Iranians intervened, forming militias aligned with them. Now, these forces are a reality, possibly even stronger than the army.

The discussion delved into the Axis of Resistance narrative. They argued that Iran’s system faced threats from global powers and insisted on the need to defend it by fighting external enemies and forming unconventional forces.

Soleimani proposed relying on locally trained forces for unconventional warfare. This approach is evident in the region, with Iran and its allied non-state groups playing a significant role.

There are differing views on how to handle these groups, with some advocating for targeting the leadership while others suggest containing their activities. This debate persists.

In my view, recent events may reshape the political landscape of the Middle East, similar to how the 9/11 attacks transformed international politics.

I anticipated that conflicts would spread beyond Gaza and the West Bank, and indeed, they have, extending across various regions from the Red Sea to northeastern Syria.

Concerns for the Future of Iraqi Kurdistan

Are you worried about Iraqi Kurdistan’s future?

Yes, very worried. Kurdistan has been built with sacrifice, but now faces major threats from Iraqi Federal Court rulings. These decisions challenge the region’s constitutional recognition and its autonomy.

There’s a serious onslaught from various angles. Security-wise, we see threats through attacks on refineries, air traffic, and foreign companies. Also, the halt in oil exports has cost Iraq billions, including Kurdistan’s share.

Interference is pervasive, affecting elections and the region’s budget. While Kurdistan can make its own decisions, our independence means we can say no. This may not sit well with those used to obedience.

Kurdistan faces internal issues, but our goal is to restore legitimacy through regional elections. Originally set for February, they’ve been pushed to May due to court decisions. We’re pushing to hold these elections soon.



Fakhri Karim: I Conveyed Talabani’s Advice to Assad on Terrorists

Fakhri Karim (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Fakhri Karim (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Fakhri Karim: I Conveyed Talabani’s Advice to Assad on Terrorists

Fakhri Karim (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Fakhri Karim (Asharq Al-Awsat)

The late Iraqi President, Jalal Talabani, excelled at delivering messages subtly. In private meetings, he spoke more freely than in public statements or interviews. His chief advisor, Fakhri Karim, often joined these discussions.

Luncheons were lavish, showing Talabani's respect for different opinions, though he rarely followed doctors’ advice.

Talabani believed that Iranian leaders were smart and hoped they wouldn’t try to control Baghdad from Tehran, citing the failed attempt to manage Beirut from Damascus.

He noted that Iraq’s independent spirit makes it hard for the country to follow the US, Iran, or Türkiye. Talabani also admitted giving refuge to 80 Iraqi officers who had fought against Iran, after they were targeted by certain groups.

Talabani praised Syria’s late President Hafez al-Assad for his invaluable support, providing accommodation and passports.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Karim revealed he had warned President Bashar al-Assad, on behalf of Talabani, that militants allowed into Iraq to fight US forces might later turn against Syria.

This, Karim noted, did happen.

After the Israeli invasion of Beirut in 1982, Karim relocated to Damascus. There, he expanded his Al-Mada organization, focusing on publishing, translation, and organizing book fairs, alongside his political activities.

This allowed him to build relationships with top civilian and military officials.

In 2000, after Bashar al-Assad came to power, he met with Karim.

“I felt Assad was eager to listen, especially given my connections with many intellectuals,” recalled Karim.

“I told him dissenting voices exist but are mostly positive. You talk about modernization and renewal; this is a chance for some openness, even in elections,” Karim said he told Assad.

“Do you think anyone could really compete with you, given your position as the Baath Party's leader with all its resources?” Karim questioned.

Karim then discussed the situation of Syrian Kurds with Assad, noting that many lack identification papers, even basic travel documents. He also mentioned seeing historic Kurdish areas in the Khabur region with their names changed to Arabic, which causes sensitivities.

“I am not satisfied with this situation. Rest assured, this issue is on my agenda, and you will hear positive news about it,” Karim cited Assad as saying at the time.

In a later meeting, after the change in Iraq, Karim met Assad several times.

On one occasion, Karim recalls conveying Talabani’s greetings and concerns about armed fighters moving into Iraq and the dangers this posed to both Iraq and possibly Syria.

“We have deployed large forces to secure the borders, but what can we do? There are tribes and smugglers,” Assad complained about the situation.

“I told President Assad that as Fakhri Karim, I couldn’t share with the Americans what I know. I assured him that terrorists enter Iraq from a specific location I’m familiar with, not from all borders,” Karim recounted to Asharq Al-Awsat.

“I also noted that Syria tightly controls its airspace, shooting down any foreign aircraft,” he added.

Assad then responded to Karim and said: “We’re prepared, let us know what we can do.”

In reality, Damascus was worried because there were reports suggesting that Syria’s Baath regime could be the next target for the US army at its borders. Additionally, Damascus was concerned about the sectarian divisions—Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish—in dealing with Iraq and the potential impact on Syria.

Repairing Kurdish Relations

Karim has spent years working on repairing the relationship between Kurdish leaders Talabani and Masoud Barzani.

This history began with the split that gave rise to the ‘Patriotic Union of Kurdistan’ from the ‘Kurdistan Democratic Party.’

Despite bloody conflicts and external meddling, Karim believes Kurdish leaders unify in the face of danger to their people and region, a pattern he expects to continue.

Karim believes that the Kurdish leadership, symbolized by Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, made a big mistake at the beginning by focusing only on regional issues, ignoring Baghdad’s affairs.

He thinks they should have aimed for a federal democratic system that respects citizenship rights.

Karim pointed out that without a unified Iraq, the region’s rights would be uncertain. He also criticized the Shiite-Kurdish alliance, which he sees as odd.

Additionally, he mentioned mistakes in failing to unify regional institutions and increasing corruption, with party interests often trumping competence in appointments.

Asked about the personal bond between Talabani and Barzani, Karim said: “Both have moved past their tough history, but they haven’t done enough for the future.”

“I want to highlight an act by Barzani that shows his character. When Talabani was sick, Barzani made it clear to anyone thinking of harming Talabani or his family that there would be consequences,” he revealed.

“This isn’t hearsay, it’s firsthand,” affirmed Karim.

“Barzani also refused to discuss the presidency or a successor during Talabani’s illness. I personally organized a gathering for Talabani’s family, where Barzani reassured them, ‘I’m here for you, I’m family.’ His words moved everyone, showing a strong emotional connection,” he added.

When asked about Barzani’s character, Karim said: “He's been a long-time friend, and our relationship has been politically aligned and personally warm from the start.”

“I see him as a loyal friend, and he's shown that loyalty on multiple occasions. He’s smart, decisive, and listens carefully, often changing his mind after thorough consideration,” he noted.

“Once Barzani commits to something, he finds it hard to go back on his word. There was a moment during negotiations with Saddam Hussein when he stood firm despite my advice to reconsider,” recalled Karim.

Regarding the aftermath of the independence referendum, Karim believes that the negative turn in the political landscape began during Nouri al-Maliki’s tenure.

Al-Maliki’s attempts to shift alliances and his refusal to compromise exacerbated tensions.

The referendum itself wasn’t the problem; rather, it was exploited by some to punish the Kurdistan Region.

However, Karim emphasized that holding referendums is a citizen’s right, and the purpose of the Kurdistan referendum was to affirm this right, not to declare independence.