Zebari to Asharq Al-Awsat: We Heard Tehran’s Frank Explanation on Militia Roles

Former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad receiving Former Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari in Tehran in April 2007 (Getty)
Former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad receiving Former Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari in Tehran in April 2007 (Getty)
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Zebari to Asharq Al-Awsat: We Heard Tehran’s Frank Explanation on Militia Roles

Former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad receiving Former Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari in Tehran in April 2007 (Getty)
Former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad receiving Former Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari in Tehran in April 2007 (Getty)

Former Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari doesn't believe that Iraqi-US relations will completely fall apart, but he’s worried about security and economic consequences.

Zebari, who served as foreign minister for 11 years, also expressed concern about interference, monopolistic policies, and attempts to undermine the Kurdistan region of Iraq, which was established based on the current constitution.

Additionally, Zebari revealed that key Iranian leaders had invited Iraq to join the so-called Axis of Resistance, an informal Iran-led political and militant coalition in West Asia and North Africa.

Below is a summary of Zebrari’s thoughts on some questions posed by Asharq Al-Awsat:

Are you worried about Iraq's future?

Yes, I'm concerned. Sadly, despite our efforts, Iraq hasn't stabilized since Saddam Hussein’s regime fell. It lacks the needed stability in politics, security, and society to rebuild after years of war. I'm worried because we still don't have a good government in place.

Is what we’re witnessing now a battle to kick US soldiers out of Iraq?

It's a power struggle between regional players, like Iran, and the US due to conflicts in Gaza and the Middle East. Removing US troops has become a focus, but they’re still needed for regional security.

I was involved in negotiating agreements to withdraw US troops. While there's still some Iraqi security need for them, the issue has become politicized.

The parliament's attempt to expel them on Feb. 10 failed due to lack of support. This issue is up to the government, not just lawmakers.

The exit or stay of US forces is related to Iraqi international obligations, which in turn are related to the Iraqi national economy.

Therefore, this issue cannot be viewed unilaterally.

Many countries in the region host foreign military bases, including those of Britain and France, not just the US.

However, this happened with the consent of these governments. These governments are still sovereign, and the relationship is organized.

We in Iraq also have a regulation for this relationship. But the issue is primarily politicized.

Is Iraq able to handle a breakup with the US?

It's very tough because the US-Iraq relationship is tied to international, regional, and economic issues.

So, breaking away is hard. Every country needs support.

In the strategic framework agreement we negotiated with them, they offered many opportunities to help Iraq’s economy, security, and capabilities. But unfortunately, Iraqi governments haven’t taken full advantage of these opportunities.

You were Iraq’s top diplomat for 11 years. Did the US ask for permanent military bases in Iraq?

The discussion happened during the transition between the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations.

The main question was: What’s the future of these forces?

The idea was that Washington completed its mission, toppled the regime, and laid the groundwork for a new system. It helped Iraq have a constitution, so let Iraqis handle their own issues.

But the US saw the need to keep a limited presence, which was the basis of negotiation.

We started talks in 2007 and finalized the agreement for their withdrawal in 2011 under the Obama administration.

At the same time, Iraq signed a Strategic Framework Agreement for Friendship, Development, and Economic Cooperation with the US.

There was heated debate among military leaders who had served in Iraq, with many of the current US military leaders having experience there. They feared that a sudden withdrawal without leaving some forces for assistance would endanger US interests, whether against terrorism or other aspiring powers in Iraq.

However, Obama chose to withdraw without heeding this advice. I spoke with him for about 45 minutes.

What did you discuss?

He was in the midst of his election campaign, and Iraq was a major issue then. John McCain was the Republican candidate, and both camps were deeply concerned about Iraq.

Obama called me while campaigning in one of the states. I told him that we believed Iraq hadn’t fully recovered; it wasn’t stable yet due to terrorist threats and security challenges. So, we didn't support a sudden full withdrawal of forces.

We needed their assistance and help in training our military, but Obama took it as a no, and stressed that he came to end America’s involvement in foreign wars.

There was also a financial crisis in the global market at that time.

During that period, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki saw the withdrawal as inevitable. He began leaning towards more dominance and control, straying from the constitution, democracy, and freedoms, and targeting Sunni leaders.

This led to significant discontent among the Sunni community. Meanwhile, ISIS was growing in Syria and then moved into Iraq.

At a time when the government claimed it had sufficient forces and didn’t need foreign help, we saw their collapse when ISIS seized Mosul and advanced towards other cities.

This prompted us to seek assistance from the US, which also helped in Erbil and Samarra.

The presence of US forces, along with the formation of an international coalition against terrorism, was based on our agreement.

Any change to this understanding requires the agreement of signatories and a notice period of at least a year. With the upcoming US elections and regional instability, it’s unlikely Iraq can end this relationship now.

Iran’s Narrative of Proxy Making

Can we say that the wars in the Red Sea, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon after the Oct.7 Al-Aqsa Flood attack confirm Iranian control over this part of the Arab world?

Iran holds significant influence in our region, from Yemen to Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. They openly support the Axis of Resistance.

I’ve had discussions with Qassem Soleimani, the late commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards' Quds Force, as well as with Ali Larijani, former Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, and Ali Akbar Velayati, former Foreign Minister.

We visited Tehran and discussed matters with the President and Prime Minister there.

One of their requests was: “Since Kurds and Shiites have overcome dictatorship, you shouldn’t trust the global powers or the Americans. You should join the Axis of Resistance.”

Who said this?

These were the words of the three leaders I mentioned. I replied that we don’t want to join new conflicts or wars. We’re tired of fighting and want to rebuild our country. They want us to resist those who liberated us, which doesn’t make sense.

But when ISIS expanded, Grand Ayatollah Sistani called for defending Iraq, leading to the formation of the Popular Mobilization Forces.

However, the Iranians intervened, forming militias aligned with them. Now, these forces are a reality, possibly even stronger than the army.

The discussion delved into the Axis of Resistance narrative. They argued that Iran’s system faced threats from global powers and insisted on the need to defend it by fighting external enemies and forming unconventional forces.

Soleimani proposed relying on locally trained forces for unconventional warfare. This approach is evident in the region, with Iran and its allied non-state groups playing a significant role.

There are differing views on how to handle these groups, with some advocating for targeting the leadership while others suggest containing their activities. This debate persists.

In my view, recent events may reshape the political landscape of the Middle East, similar to how the 9/11 attacks transformed international politics.

I anticipated that conflicts would spread beyond Gaza and the West Bank, and indeed, they have, extending across various regions from the Red Sea to northeastern Syria.

Concerns for the Future of Iraqi Kurdistan

Are you worried about Iraqi Kurdistan’s future?

Yes, very worried. Kurdistan has been built with sacrifice, but now faces major threats from Iraqi Federal Court rulings. These decisions challenge the region’s constitutional recognition and its autonomy.

There’s a serious onslaught from various angles. Security-wise, we see threats through attacks on refineries, air traffic, and foreign companies. Also, the halt in oil exports has cost Iraq billions, including Kurdistan’s share.

Interference is pervasive, affecting elections and the region’s budget. While Kurdistan can make its own decisions, our independence means we can say no. This may not sit well with those used to obedience.

Kurdistan faces internal issues, but our goal is to restore legitimacy through regional elections. Originally set for February, they’ve been pushed to May due to court decisions. We’re pushing to hold these elections soon.



Fakhri Karim: My Complaint to Sistani on Corruption Spurred Suggestion of Saddam-Era Minister

Fakhri Karim, senior adviser to late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Fakhri Karim, senior adviser to late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Fakhri Karim: My Complaint to Sistani on Corruption Spurred Suggestion of Saddam-Era Minister

Fakhri Karim, senior adviser to late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Fakhri Karim, senior adviser to late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

In post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, the prime minister's office gained significant power. It became customary for the prime minister to be Shiite, the president Kurdish, and the speaker of Parliament Sunni.

This power-sharing arrangement, focusing on sectarian representation over institutional structure, has remained strong.

Attempts to break this norm have failed, including when former US President Barack Obama and his Vice President Joe Biden tried to support Ayad Allawi, a Shiite politician, for the presidency. The aim was to keep Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in power with support from both Washington and Tehran.

Despite Allawi’s parliamentary majority win, he didn’t become president.

Arab states were slow to react to changes in Iraq, allowing Iran to step in. Iran supported the US-created Iraqi Governing Council and sought to bring together Shiite factions to join the political process.

Its influence grew due to its backing of groups that opposed Saddam Hussein. Iran gained a key role in Iraq, effectively having veto power over decisions and a say in forming governments, while also expecting an eventual US military withdrawal.

Fakhri Karim, senior adviser to late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, said Iran stepped in to fill a vacuum in Iraq, solidifying its role and protecting its interests.

This made Iran’s Quds Force commander Gen. Qassem Soleimani a key figure in Iraq, shaping everything from the reduction of US military presence to the formation of governments.

A foreign power’s influence in a neighboring country grows only if locals accept its role.

Soleimani and deputy leader of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis were killed in a US strike near Baghdad airport in January 2020.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Karim noted that Soleimani “was dedicated to serving his country’s interests, and the other side should have defended its own role and interests.”

He recalled Soleimani as being “skilled, effective, and able to earn trust, shifting from flexibility to rigidity when needed.”

This was clear in a letter Soleimani sent to Talabani when he considered supporting a no-confidence motion against Maliki’s government.

Karim also mentioned that al-Muhandis was deeply trusted by the Iranian general.

Talabani assigned his senior adviser various missions in Iran, focusing on forming Iraqi governments and relations with Kurdistan.

During a visit to Tehran, Adil Abdul Mahdi, who would later become prime minister, informed Talabani and Karim that “Soleimani’s claim that Iran supports Nouri al-Maliki for prime minister is false.”

“I was told that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei supports me,” argued Abdul Mahdi at the time.

Talabani felt awkward despite being close to Abdul Mahdi. He asked Karim to visit Tehran, where he met Soleimani and al-Muhandis. Soleimani denied Abdul Mahdi’s claims, saying he could take Karim to the Supreme Leader to hear the truth.

For his part, Karim said the Supreme Council didn’t support al-Maliki and that influential cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s stance was hardening. Soleimani assured that the Iranians were in contact with al-Sadr and would handle the issue of the Supreme Council.

When Karim returned, he informed Talabani and Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani that the Badr Organization, led by Hadi al-Amiri, had left the Supreme Council to join Maliki, shifting the balance and allowing the formation of a government without the Council’s interference.

Karim remembered that Iran initially supported Ibrahim al-Jaafari for prime minister (2005-2006). However, Jaafari quickly became a burden on the political process and Shiite leaders then signaled the need for change.

The US Ambassador advised Jaafari to resign, threatening him if he didn't comply.

Maliki’s name wasn’t initially considered; Ali al-Adib from the “Dawa” party, of which Maliki was a member, was the favored choice. But Maliki didn’t support Adib, so after deliberations, the party settled on Maliki instead.

Breakfast with Soleimani

Karim remembers a breakfast meeting with Soleimani and al-Muhandis. He brought up Maliki’s performance during his second term and the widespread corruption in Iraq.

Soleimani suggested discussing it further, but Karim insisted the issue was urgent.

He questioned why, if all major Shiite forces agreed, change couldn’t happen. Soleimani indicated that decisions within the Shiite alliance were made by those who remained in it, prompting Karim to ask if Soleimani was implying it was him. Soleimani then replied : “Think what you wish.”

Sadr’s misstep

In the post-Saddam Hussein era, Sadr emerged as a major political force in Iraq. He led a large popular and armed movement.

Dealing with Sadr was challenging for political factions, especially among Shiites. Some disputes even culminated in armed conflicts. Managing Sadr’s influence was difficult both internally and for external interests, especially given his unpredictability.

When asked about Sadr’s decision to quit politics in 2022, Karim called it a major mistake.

He believed Iraq suffered greatly from this move, as it left parliament without any influential Shiite force capable of standing up against decisions not aligned with common goals.

Karim highlighted that filling seats with losing candidates seemed odd and turned the minority into the majority, undermining the constitutional process. He also noted the Shiite community’s fragmentation, with many Shiites not participating in recent elections due to their disenchantment with the political parties.

Karim warned against underestimating the potential for renewed protests and uprisings among the marginalized against the government and ruling powers.

Sistani’s unexpected proposal

When discussing top Shiite Religious Authority in Iraq, Ali al-Sistani, Karim highlighted his political astuteness, surpassing the majority of other Shiite leaders. Sistani’s Friday sermons, delivered by his representatives, reflect this forward-thinking approach.

Karim noted a key observation about Sistani’s mindset. Despite corruption concerns, Sistani surprised Karim by suggesting bringing back the former Minister of Trade for his effectiveness in managing the ration card distribution.

He even proposed considering a Christian minister if they were honest and prioritized the people’s interests.

Furthermore, Sistani emphasized the importance of inclusivity in the new Iraq, advocating for the rights of Sunni and Kurdish components. He rejected marginalization and insisted on their participation and rights.

Sistani’s fatwa and the PMF

Karim believes that Sistani issued a fatwa on “jihad” to rally people against the significant threat posed by ISIS in 2014. He didn’t specifically mention the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) or any other organization but referred to volunteers.

“Many responded to Sistani’s call and made significant sacrifices alongside the armed forces and Peshmerga. Volunteers participated in liberating areas once occupied by the terror group,” said Karim.

Karim further noted that there was a belief that those who made sacrifices had the right to be part of the armed forces and receive state support.

“The idea of integrating militias or military entities into the armed forces is not new,” explained Karim.

“US diplomat Paul Bremer [the first post-invasion governor of Iraq] proposed something similar to factions and organizations under the banner of integration into the army, and steps were taken in this direction,” he added.

“The goal was to eliminate the threat of ISIS, not to create a parallel army or establish another institution.”