Zebari to Asharq Al-Awsat: We Heard Tehran’s Frank Explanation on Militia Roles

Former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad receiving Former Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari in Tehran in April 2007 (Getty)
Former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad receiving Former Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari in Tehran in April 2007 (Getty)
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Zebari to Asharq Al-Awsat: We Heard Tehran’s Frank Explanation on Militia Roles

Former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad receiving Former Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari in Tehran in April 2007 (Getty)
Former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad receiving Former Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari in Tehran in April 2007 (Getty)

Former Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari doesn't believe that Iraqi-US relations will completely fall apart, but he’s worried about security and economic consequences.

Zebari, who served as foreign minister for 11 years, also expressed concern about interference, monopolistic policies, and attempts to undermine the Kurdistan region of Iraq, which was established based on the current constitution.

Additionally, Zebari revealed that key Iranian leaders had invited Iraq to join the so-called Axis of Resistance, an informal Iran-led political and militant coalition in West Asia and North Africa.

Below is a summary of Zebrari’s thoughts on some questions posed by Asharq Al-Awsat:

Are you worried about Iraq's future?

Yes, I'm concerned. Sadly, despite our efforts, Iraq hasn't stabilized since Saddam Hussein’s regime fell. It lacks the needed stability in politics, security, and society to rebuild after years of war. I'm worried because we still don't have a good government in place.

Is what we’re witnessing now a battle to kick US soldiers out of Iraq?

It's a power struggle between regional players, like Iran, and the US due to conflicts in Gaza and the Middle East. Removing US troops has become a focus, but they’re still needed for regional security.

I was involved in negotiating agreements to withdraw US troops. While there's still some Iraqi security need for them, the issue has become politicized.

The parliament's attempt to expel them on Feb. 10 failed due to lack of support. This issue is up to the government, not just lawmakers.

The exit or stay of US forces is related to Iraqi international obligations, which in turn are related to the Iraqi national economy.

Therefore, this issue cannot be viewed unilaterally.

Many countries in the region host foreign military bases, including those of Britain and France, not just the US.

However, this happened with the consent of these governments. These governments are still sovereign, and the relationship is organized.

We in Iraq also have a regulation for this relationship. But the issue is primarily politicized.

Is Iraq able to handle a breakup with the US?

It's very tough because the US-Iraq relationship is tied to international, regional, and economic issues.

So, breaking away is hard. Every country needs support.

In the strategic framework agreement we negotiated with them, they offered many opportunities to help Iraq’s economy, security, and capabilities. But unfortunately, Iraqi governments haven’t taken full advantage of these opportunities.

You were Iraq’s top diplomat for 11 years. Did the US ask for permanent military bases in Iraq?

The discussion happened during the transition between the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations.

The main question was: What’s the future of these forces?

The idea was that Washington completed its mission, toppled the regime, and laid the groundwork for a new system. It helped Iraq have a constitution, so let Iraqis handle their own issues.

But the US saw the need to keep a limited presence, which was the basis of negotiation.

We started talks in 2007 and finalized the agreement for their withdrawal in 2011 under the Obama administration.

At the same time, Iraq signed a Strategic Framework Agreement for Friendship, Development, and Economic Cooperation with the US.

There was heated debate among military leaders who had served in Iraq, with many of the current US military leaders having experience there. They feared that a sudden withdrawal without leaving some forces for assistance would endanger US interests, whether against terrorism or other aspiring powers in Iraq.

However, Obama chose to withdraw without heeding this advice. I spoke with him for about 45 minutes.

What did you discuss?

He was in the midst of his election campaign, and Iraq was a major issue then. John McCain was the Republican candidate, and both camps were deeply concerned about Iraq.

Obama called me while campaigning in one of the states. I told him that we believed Iraq hadn’t fully recovered; it wasn’t stable yet due to terrorist threats and security challenges. So, we didn't support a sudden full withdrawal of forces.

We needed their assistance and help in training our military, but Obama took it as a no, and stressed that he came to end America’s involvement in foreign wars.

There was also a financial crisis in the global market at that time.

During that period, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki saw the withdrawal as inevitable. He began leaning towards more dominance and control, straying from the constitution, democracy, and freedoms, and targeting Sunni leaders.

This led to significant discontent among the Sunni community. Meanwhile, ISIS was growing in Syria and then moved into Iraq.

At a time when the government claimed it had sufficient forces and didn’t need foreign help, we saw their collapse when ISIS seized Mosul and advanced towards other cities.

This prompted us to seek assistance from the US, which also helped in Erbil and Samarra.

The presence of US forces, along with the formation of an international coalition against terrorism, was based on our agreement.

Any change to this understanding requires the agreement of signatories and a notice period of at least a year. With the upcoming US elections and regional instability, it’s unlikely Iraq can end this relationship now.

Iran’s Narrative of Proxy Making

Can we say that the wars in the Red Sea, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon after the Oct.7 Al-Aqsa Flood attack confirm Iranian control over this part of the Arab world?

Iran holds significant influence in our region, from Yemen to Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. They openly support the Axis of Resistance.

I’ve had discussions with Qassem Soleimani, the late commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards' Quds Force, as well as with Ali Larijani, former Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, and Ali Akbar Velayati, former Foreign Minister.

We visited Tehran and discussed matters with the President and Prime Minister there.

One of their requests was: “Since Kurds and Shiites have overcome dictatorship, you shouldn’t trust the global powers or the Americans. You should join the Axis of Resistance.”

Who said this?

These were the words of the three leaders I mentioned. I replied that we don’t want to join new conflicts or wars. We’re tired of fighting and want to rebuild our country. They want us to resist those who liberated us, which doesn’t make sense.

But when ISIS expanded, Grand Ayatollah Sistani called for defending Iraq, leading to the formation of the Popular Mobilization Forces.

However, the Iranians intervened, forming militias aligned with them. Now, these forces are a reality, possibly even stronger than the army.

The discussion delved into the Axis of Resistance narrative. They argued that Iran’s system faced threats from global powers and insisted on the need to defend it by fighting external enemies and forming unconventional forces.

Soleimani proposed relying on locally trained forces for unconventional warfare. This approach is evident in the region, with Iran and its allied non-state groups playing a significant role.

There are differing views on how to handle these groups, with some advocating for targeting the leadership while others suggest containing their activities. This debate persists.

In my view, recent events may reshape the political landscape of the Middle East, similar to how the 9/11 attacks transformed international politics.

I anticipated that conflicts would spread beyond Gaza and the West Bank, and indeed, they have, extending across various regions from the Red Sea to northeastern Syria.

Concerns for the Future of Iraqi Kurdistan

Are you worried about Iraqi Kurdistan’s future?

Yes, very worried. Kurdistan has been built with sacrifice, but now faces major threats from Iraqi Federal Court rulings. These decisions challenge the region’s constitutional recognition and its autonomy.

There’s a serious onslaught from various angles. Security-wise, we see threats through attacks on refineries, air traffic, and foreign companies. Also, the halt in oil exports has cost Iraq billions, including Kurdistan’s share.

Interference is pervasive, affecting elections and the region’s budget. While Kurdistan can make its own decisions, our independence means we can say no. This may not sit well with those used to obedience.

Kurdistan faces internal issues, but our goal is to restore legitimacy through regional elections. Originally set for February, they’ve been pushed to May due to court decisions. We’re pushing to hold these elections soon.



Fakhri Karim: Nouri al-Maliki Saw Mosul as ‘Dagger in the Side’

Fakhri Karim during his interview with Editor-in-Chief of Asharq Al-Awsat Ghassan Charbel. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Fakhri Karim during his interview with Editor-in-Chief of Asharq Al-Awsat Ghassan Charbel. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Fakhri Karim: Nouri al-Maliki Saw Mosul as ‘Dagger in the Side’

Fakhri Karim during his interview with Editor-in-Chief of Asharq Al-Awsat Ghassan Charbel. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Fakhri Karim during his interview with Editor-in-Chief of Asharq Al-Awsat Ghassan Charbel. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Last February, Iraqi politician and publisher Fakhri Karim narrowly escaped an assassination attempt in Baghdad, sparking many questions about the motive behind the attack.

Some speculate Karim was targeted for his role as a senior advisor to the late President Jalal Talabani between 2006 and 2014. Others think it might have been due to his efforts in managing the relationship between Talabani and Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani.

There is also speculation that the attack could have been a reaction to his newspaper, Al-Mada. Known for supporting the Iraqi uprising, Al-Mada has strongly campaigned against widespread assassinations and the uncontrolled spread of weapons.

The recent attempt on Karim's life recalls a similar incident in Lebanon in 1982. During the Israeli siege of Beirut, while the city was seeing off Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) fighters, Karim was injured in the face in an assassination attempt.

Karim had a close relationship with then PLO chairman Yasser Arafat, who supported thousands of communists escaping Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq.

Born in 1942 in Baghdad to a Shiite Kurdish family, Karim joined the Communist Party in 1959. His activism led to multiple imprisonments, escapes, and living under aliases, including Ali Abdul Khaliq.

Karim worked in the party’s media and was once the deputy head of the journalists’ syndicate.

In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Karim recounted a significant episode from 1970.

The Communist Party, through leader Makram Talabani, informed President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr about a coup plot orchestrated by outspoken Iraqi officer and politician Abdel Ghani al-Rawi, with support from Iran.

Al-Bakr appreciated the intelligence and reportedly said: “We will not forget this for the party.”

Karim also mentioned that al-Bakr had previously proposed that the Communist Party join the Baath Party in the coup that brought the Baathists back to power on July 17, 1968, but the party declined.

Karim disclosed that he personally received a call from US officials urging President Jalal Talabani not to run for a second term, labeling him as “Iran’s man.”

Karim then revealed that President Barack Obama was involved in a scheme to persuade Talabani to step down in favor of former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi. The aim was to keep Nouri al-Maliki as Prime Minister to appease Iran.

Karim admitted that supporting al-Maliki for the position of prime minister over Allawi, who had won the majority in parliament, was a blunder.

He stated that al-Maliki ignored Barzani’s warnings about extremist activity near Mosul that eventually culminated in ISIS’s capture of the city.

Before Mosul fell, al-Maliki reportedly said in front of President Talabani: “We need to cooperate and bring Mosul closer to the Kurdistan region because it is a hub for terrorists, nationalists, and Baathists, a dagger in our side.” Talabani reportedly found the comment inappropriate.

Karim spoke about missions assigned to him by Talabani in Tehran and Damascus, including meetings with Iranian Gen. Qasem Soleimani and Iraqi deputy commander of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who were both killed in a US airstrike in early 2020.

He expressed concerns about the future of Iraq and Kurdistan amidst political instability.

Moreover, Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s exit from politics has emboldened minorities to challenge the constitution and institutions, according to Karim.

Some Iraqis now see the Federal Court as straying from its original role, comparing it to the Revolutionary Command Council.

Moment of decline for Iraq’s political process

Karim responded to comments by Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari to Asharq Al-Awsat previously, where Zebari stated that Talabani was prepared to support the no confidence of al-Maliki’s government, but he changed course after receiving a threatening message from Qassem Soleimani.

Karim noted that months into al-Maliki’s second term, he started to act independently, even from Shiite factions. This trend worried the highest religious authority in the country.

A meeting in Erbil gathered opposition forces, including the Iraqi List and Kurdish factions, later joined by al-Sadr. Talabani proposed withdrawing confidence from al-Maliki's government. Karim expressed concerns, but Talabani seemed unbothered. Karim also worried about potential resistance from Soleimani, prompting Talabani to suggest contacting him in Tehran.

As the plane prepared to depart, Soleimani indicated a messenger would deliver a message. The severe message demanded Talabani’s resignation if he wasn't up to the task and that he follow Soleimani’s approach. This led to a change of course and very dangerous consequences. Karim believed this marked the beginning of the decline in the political process in Iraq, leading to current events.

Al-Maliki and the Mosul dilemma

In Karim’s personal opinion, al-Maliki understood the gravity of the situation but likely thought it was a minor breach that could be rectified. Karim doubted that al-Maliki anticipated the situation turning into a major disaster leading to the occupation of a third of the country by ISIS, plunging both the people and the state into a costly predicament, the effects of which they are still grappling with.

The issue of Mosul was raised between Talabani and al-Maliki at the onset of discussions about forming the government. It was discussed in several meetings between the two leaders.

One day, al-Maliki proposed an idea that seemed strange to Karim. He suggested paying attention to the situation in Mosul and seeking a remedy for it.

“I hope we can cooperate and bring Mosul closer to the Kurdistan Region as much as possible because Mosul is a hub for terrorism, nationalists, and Baathists, hence a dagger in our side,” Karim recalled al-Maliki as saying.

Karim then responded: “We are talking about a future where we address the shortcomings we face, and you are talking about a Sunni component that is part of the political process!”

Al-Maliki then replied: “How can you speak to me like this? These are Baathists and nationalists, and, with all due respect, Sunnis.”

Karim then pointed to Talabani and said: “This man in front of you is Sunni.”

At that point, Talabani told al-Maliki that this conversation was inappropriate.

Al-Maliki: Mosul situation is under control

Karim’s words matched what Barzani, the former President of the Kurdistan Region, said at the time when he personally led the confrontation against ISIS.

Barzani said: “Before the fall of Mosul to ISIS, we received information that extremists were establishing bases in the urban area southwest of Mosul, near the Syrian border. I sent messages to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki through Sayyid Ammar al-Hakim, Dr. Roj Shaways, and US Ambassador Stephen Beecroft.”

“I told them: Inform him that he’s preoccupied with Anbar and indifferent to Mosul, which has become an open arena. I proposed a joint operation to prevent the extremists from taking over Mosul and its surroundings,” recounted Barzani.

This was in December 2013, seven months before Mosul fell to ISIS. Barzani added that al-Maliki showed no interest: “I called him at the beginning of 2014 and said, ‘My brother, the situation in Mosul is dangerous. Let’s conduct a joint operation. I cannot send the Peshmerga alone’.”

“The matter is sensitive between Kurds and Arabs, and government forces are present in the area. There's the 2nd Division of the Iraqi Army, Federal Police, and other units. We’re ready to bear the heavier burden, but let it be a joint operation,” argued Barzani.

Al-Maliki then replied: “My brother, you watch over your region, don’t worry about what’s beyond it; the situation is under control.”

Barzani indicated that ISIS had not dreamed of taking control of Mosul, nor had it anticipated its fall into their hands.

The terrorist group wanted to distract army units to release their members detained in the Badush prison west of the city.

“ISIS launched shells towards the Ghazlani camp to cover the prisoners’ escape. The officers sent by al-Maliki (the ground forces commander and deputy chief of staff) fled, and the division commander joined them... This is a big and terrible issue,” said the Kurdish leader.

“The army didn't resist. Senior officers sought refuge with the Peshmerga. We rescued them and sent them to Baghdad at their request,” Barzani recounted.