Fakhri Karim: Nouri al-Maliki Saw Mosul as ‘Dagger in the Side’

Last February, Iraqi politician and publisher Fakhri Karim narrowly escaped an assassination attempt in Baghdad, sparking many questions about the motive behind the attack.

Some speculate Karim was targeted for his role as a senior advisor to the late President Jalal Talabani between 2006 and 2014. Others think it might have been due to his efforts in managing the relationship between Talabani and Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani.

There is also speculation that the attack could have been a reaction to his newspaper, Al-Mada. Known for supporting the Iraqi uprising, Al-Mada has strongly campaigned against widespread assassinations and the uncontrolled spread of weapons.

The recent attempt on Karim's life recalls a similar incident in Lebanon in 1982. During the Israeli siege of Beirut, while the city was seeing off Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) fighters, Karim was injured in the face in an assassination attempt.

Karim had a close relationship with then PLO chairman Yasser Arafat, who supported thousands of communists escaping Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq.

Born in 1942 in Baghdad to a Shiite Kurdish family, Karim joined the Communist Party in 1959. His activism led to multiple imprisonments, escapes, and living under aliases, including Ali Abdul Khaliq.

Karim worked in the party’s media and was once the deputy head of the journalists’ syndicate.

In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Karim recounted a significant episode from 1970.

The Communist Party, through leader Makram Talabani, informed President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr about a coup plot orchestrated by outspoken Iraqi officer and politician Abdel Ghani al-Rawi, with support from Iran.

Al-Bakr appreciated the intelligence and reportedly said: “We will not forget this for the party.”

Karim also mentioned that al-Bakr had previously proposed that the Communist Party join the Baath Party in the coup that brought the Baathists back to power on July 17, 1968, but the party declined.

Karim disclosed that he personally received a call from US officials urging President Jalal Talabani not to run for a second term, labeling him as “Iran’s man.”

Karim then revealed that President Barack Obama was involved in a scheme to persuade Talabani to step down in favor of former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi. The aim was to keep Nouri al-Maliki as Prime Minister to appease Iran.

Karim admitted that supporting al-Maliki for the position of prime minister over Allawi, who had won the majority in parliament, was a blunder.

He stated that al-Maliki ignored Barzani’s warnings about extremist activity near Mosul that eventually culminated in ISIS’s capture of the city.

Before Mosul fell, al-Maliki reportedly said in front of President Talabani: “We need to cooperate and bring Mosul closer to the Kurdistan region because it is a hub for terrorists, nationalists, and Baathists, a dagger in our side.” Talabani reportedly found the comment inappropriate.

Karim spoke about missions assigned to him by Talabani in Tehran and Damascus, including meetings with Iranian Gen. Qasem Soleimani and Iraqi deputy commander of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who were both killed in a US airstrike in early 2020.

He expressed concerns about the future of Iraq and Kurdistan amidst political instability.

Moreover, Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s exit from politics has emboldened minorities to challenge the constitution and institutions, according to Karim.

Some Iraqis now see the Federal Court as straying from its original role, comparing it to the Revolutionary Command Council.

Moment of decline for Iraq’s political process

Karim responded to comments by Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari to Asharq Al-Awsat previously, where Zebari stated that Talabani was prepared to support the no confidence of al-Maliki’s government, but he changed course after receiving a threatening message from Qassem Soleimani.

Karim noted that months into al-Maliki’s second term, he started to act independently, even from Shiite factions. This trend worried the highest religious authority in the country.

A meeting in Erbil gathered opposition forces, including the Iraqi List and Kurdish factions, later joined by al-Sadr. Talabani proposed withdrawing confidence from al-Maliki's government. Karim expressed concerns, but Talabani seemed unbothered. Karim also worried about potential resistance from Soleimani, prompting Talabani to suggest contacting him in Tehran.

As the plane prepared to depart, Soleimani indicated a messenger would deliver a message. The severe message demanded Talabani’s resignation if he wasn't up to the task and that he follow Soleimani’s approach. This led to a change of course and very dangerous consequences. Karim believed this marked the beginning of the decline in the political process in Iraq, leading to current events.

Al-Maliki and the Mosul dilemma

In Karim’s personal opinion, al-Maliki understood the gravity of the situation but likely thought it was a minor breach that could be rectified. Karim doubted that al-Maliki anticipated the situation turning into a major disaster leading to the occupation of a third of the country by ISIS, plunging both the people and the state into a costly predicament, the effects of which they are still grappling with.

The issue of Mosul was raised between Talabani and al-Maliki at the onset of discussions about forming the government. It was discussed in several meetings between the two leaders.

One day, al-Maliki proposed an idea that seemed strange to Karim. He suggested paying attention to the situation in Mosul and seeking a remedy for it.

“I hope we can cooperate and bring Mosul closer to the Kurdistan Region as much as possible because Mosul is a hub for terrorism, nationalists, and Baathists, hence a dagger in our side,” Karim recalled al-Maliki as saying.

Karim then responded: “We are talking about a future where we address the shortcomings we face, and you are talking about a Sunni component that is part of the political process!”

Al-Maliki then replied: “How can you speak to me like this? These are Baathists and nationalists, and, with all due respect, Sunnis.”

Karim then pointed to Talabani and said: “This man in front of you is Sunni.”

At that point, Talabani told al-Maliki that this conversation was inappropriate.

Al-Maliki: Mosul situation is under control

Karim’s words matched what Barzani, the former President of the Kurdistan Region, said at the time when he personally led the confrontation against ISIS.

Barzani said: “Before the fall of Mosul to ISIS, we received information that extremists were establishing bases in the urban area southwest of Mosul, near the Syrian border. I sent messages to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki through Sayyid Ammar al-Hakim, Dr. Roj Shaways, and US Ambassador Stephen Beecroft.”

“I told them: Inform him that he’s preoccupied with Anbar and indifferent to Mosul, which has become an open arena. I proposed a joint operation to prevent the extremists from taking over Mosul and its surroundings,” recounted Barzani.

This was in December 2013, seven months before Mosul fell to ISIS. Barzani added that al-Maliki showed no interest: “I called him at the beginning of 2014 and said, ‘My brother, the situation in Mosul is dangerous. Let’s conduct a joint operation. I cannot send the Peshmerga alone’.”

“The matter is sensitive between Kurds and Arabs, and government forces are present in the area. There's the 2nd Division of the Iraqi Army, Federal Police, and other units. We’re ready to bear the heavier burden, but let it be a joint operation,” argued Barzani.

Al-Maliki then replied: “My brother, you watch over your region, don’t worry about what’s beyond it; the situation is under control.”

Barzani indicated that ISIS had not dreamed of taking control of Mosul, nor had it anticipated its fall into their hands.

The terrorist group wanted to distract army units to release their members detained in the Badush prison west of the city.

“ISIS launched shells towards the Ghazlani camp to cover the prisoners’ escape. The officers sent by al-Maliki (the ground forces commander and deputy chief of staff) fled, and the division commander joined them... This is a big and terrible issue,” said the Kurdish leader.

“The army didn't resist. Senior officers sought refuge with the Peshmerga. We rescued them and sent them to Baghdad at their request,” Barzani recounted.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Ethan Goldrich has told Asharq Al-Awsat that the US does not plan to withdraw its forces from Syria.

The US is committed to “the partnership that we have with the local forces that we work with,” he said.

Here is the full text of the interview.

Question: Mr. Goldrich, thank you so much for taking the time to sit with us today. I know you are leaving your post soon. How do you assess the accomplishments and challenges remaining?

Answer: Thank you very much for the chance to talk with you today. I've been in this position for three years, and so at the end of three years, I can see that there's a lot that we accomplished and a lot that we have left to do. But at the beginning of a time I was here, we had just completed a review of our Syria policy, and we saw that we needed to focus on reducing suffering for the people in Syria. We needed to reduce violence. We needed to hold the regime accountable for things that are done and most importantly, from the US perspective, we needed to keep ISIS from reemerging as a threat to our country and to other countries. At the same time, we also realized that there wouldn't be a solution to the crisis until there was a political process under resolution 2254, so in each of these areas, we've seen both progress and challenges, but of course, on ISIS, we have prevented the reemergence of the threat from northeast Syria, and we've helped deal with people that needed to be repatriated out of the prisons, and we dealt with displaced people in al-Hol to reduce the numbers there. We helped provide for stabilization in those parts of Syria.

Question: I want to talk a little bit about the ISIS situation now that the US troops are still there, do you envision a timeline where they will be withdrawn? Because there were some reports in the press that there is a plan from the Biden administration to withdraw.

Answer: Yeah. So right now, our focus is on the mission that we have there to keep ISIS from reemerging. So I know there have been reports, but I want to make clear that we remain committed to the role that we play in that part of Syria, to the partnership that we have with the local forces that we work with, and to the need to prevent that threat from reemerging.

Question: So you can assure people who are saying that you might withdraw, that you are remaining for the time being?

Answer: Yes, and that we remain committed to this mission which needs to continue to be pursued.

Question: You also mentioned the importance of humanitarian aid. The US has been leading on this. Are you satisfied with where you are today on the humanitarian front in Syria?

Answer: We remain committed to the role that we play to provide for humanitarian assistance in Syria. Of the money that was pledged in Brussels, we pledged $593 million just this past spring, and we overall, since the beginning of the conflict, have provided $18 billion both to help the Syrians who are inside of Syria and to help the refugees who are in surrounding countries. And so we remain committed to providing that assistance, and we remain keenly aware that 90% of Syrians are living in poverty right now, and that there's been suffering there. We're doing everything we can to reduce the suffering, but I think where we would really like to be is where there's a larger solution to the whole crisis, so Syrian people someday will be able to provide again for themselves and not need this assistance.

Question: And that's a perfect key to my next question. Solution in Syria. you are aware that the countries in the region are opening up to Assad again, and you also have the EU signaling overture to the Syrian regime and Assad. How do you deal with that?

Answer: For the United States, our policy continues to be that we will not normalize with the regime in Syria until there's been authentic and enduring progress on the goals of resolution 2254, until the human rights of the Syrian people are respected and until they have the civil and human rights that they deserve. We know other countries have engaged with the regime. When those engagements happen, we don't support them, but we remind the countries that are engaged that they should be using their engagements to push forward on the shared international goals under 2254, and that whatever it is that they're doing should be for the sake of improving the situation of the Syrian people.

Question: Let's say that all of the countries decided to talk to Assad, aren’t you worried that the US will be alienated in the process?

Answer: The US will remain true to our own principles and our own policies and our own laws, and the path for the regime in Syria to change its relationship with us is very clear, if they change the behaviors that led to the laws that we have and to the policies that we have, if those behaviors change and the circumstances inside of Syria change, then it's possible to have a different kind of relationship, but that's where it has to start.

Question: My last question to you before you leave, if you have to pick one thing that you need to do in Syria today, what is it that you would like to see happening today?

Answer: So there are a number of things, I think that will always be left and that there are things that we will try to do, to try to make them happen. We want to hold people accountable in Syria for things that have happened. So even today, we observed something called the International Day for victims of enforced disappearances, there are people that are missing, and we're trying to draw attention to the need to account for the missing people. So our step today was to sanction a number of officials who were responsible for enforced disappearances, but we also created something called the independent institution for missing persons, and that helps the families, in the non-political way, get information on what's happened. So I'd like to see some peace for the families of the missing people. I'd like to see the beginning of a political process, there hasn't been a meeting of the constitutional committee in two years, and I think that's because the regime has not been cooperating in political process steps. So we need to change that situation. And I would, of course, like it's important to see the continuation of the things that we were talking about, so keeping ISIS from reemerging and maintaining assistance as necessary in the humanitarian sphere. So all these things, some of them are ongoing, and some of them remain to be achieved. But the Syrian people deserve all aspects of our policy to be fulfilled and for them to be able to return to a normal life.

Fakhri Karim: Nouri al-Maliki Saw Mosul as ‘Dagger in the Side’