The Rise and Fall of Rami Makhlouf

A man in Damascus watches a video posted by Rami Makhlouf on his Facebook page. (AFP)
A man in Damascus watches a video posted by Rami Makhlouf on his Facebook page. (AFP)
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The Rise and Fall of Rami Makhlouf

A man in Damascus watches a video posted by Rami Makhlouf on his Facebook page. (AFP)
A man in Damascus watches a video posted by Rami Makhlouf on his Facebook page. (AFP)

Syrian billionaire Rami Makhlouf came out with two Facebook videos on April 30 and May 3, loaded with symbolism on a political, economic and social level. Within Syria and beyond, the 51-year old businessman raised eyebrows in terms of form, content, timing and historical context of what he was saying.

Across a running time of 25 minutes, Makhlouf did not try to deny or underplay the prominent economic role that he played in Syria over the past quarter century. Western media often described him as “the richest man in Syria” while back home in Damascus, but few could put a face to the name as he seldom went out in public. Unlike other sons of prominent figures in the Syrian government, he was always confined to his office, away from the media. When then did Rami Makhlouf change so suddenly to appear in two online videos within less than a week, championing the poor while appealing to the president—his cousin—to right the wrongs of the present system?

The rise

It all began with Mohammad Makhlouf, the father of Rami and brother of Anisa, wife of President Hafez al-Assad. As the president’s in-law for three solid decades, Mohammad Makhlouf played a pivotal role in the Syrian economy from 1970 to 2000. From his position as manager of the state-run Tabac de Regie, he sponsored major deals, especially in the oil sector, throughout the 1980s. While Hafez al-Assad served on the military and political sectors, Makhould took charge of economics, becoming its godfather.

Rami and his generation started their careers as partners with prominent businessmen in the private sector, moving on to lead that sector and take over its main firms.

Rami started with a company called RAMAC, handling duty free shops at Syria’s border crossings and Damascus International Airport. In conjunction with the death of Hafez al-Assad and the transfer of power to his son Bashar in July 2000, Rami turned to the promising telecommunications sector. After extensive negotiations, SyriaTel emerged, along with a rival company called MTN, obtaining a BOT license in 2001. For two entire decades the two companies monopolized the telecommunications sector along with its massive revenue. Those who criticized that monopoly, like ex-parliamentarian Riad Seif were either silenced or jailed, accused of crossing “red-lines.”

From SyriaTel Makhlouf expanded his empire, taking businesses in oil and gas, banking, tourism and trade. That came hand-in-hand with the post-2000 period of economic openness. Experts argued that this policy reduced the size of the Syrian middle class, concentrating wealth in the hands of a tiny minority. That monopoly seems to have caused the regime’s grassroots support to erode, snapping the social contract that had existed since Hafez al-Assad came to power in 1970. Some believe that among the many reasons who Syrians rose in 2011 was to protest the increase in Makhlouf’s wealth.

The first test

Some called him the “exclusive agent for Syria.” Others envied him, wanting shares in the cake that he was devouring. Opponents were highly critical, demanding a different future for Syria, on both a political and economic level. When the chance arose to reform the economy, through the signing of a partnership agreement with the EU, Makhlouf stood as a prime opponent, fearing that it would break his monopoly and diminish his influence.

This was his first test and in light of the mounting criticism, he left for the United Arab Emirates in 2004. Subsequently, and according to former economic official who spoke to me: “That year was the best for Syria in terms of foreign investment.” With Makhlouf gone, many were willing to step in.

He met the test silently and sought invest in the UAE without any fuss. He eventually returned to Syria after the wave of political pressure that mounted after the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. New realities made it mandatory for him to return to Damascus and ward off the international pressure that was being exerted to blame Syria for the murder. Makhlouf’s comeback coincided with what was described back then as the “Beirutization of Damascus” or opening up a series of banks, universities and retail shops that would create a Lebanon in Syria, compensating for what was lost in the economic crisis.

After the Syrian army’s withdrawal from Lebanon, Makhlouf and his partners set up “Sham Holding Co” with the aim of institutionalizing his massive expansionism in Syria. By 2006, Makhlouf was controlling around 7% of Syria’s GDP, said the former official, “but his role in economic decision-making was much greater than that.”

When the protests erupted in 2011, banners and slogans were raised mentioning Makhlouf by name, asking Bashar al-Assad to restrict his role and hold him accountable for amassing wealth at the state’s expense. Opponents claimed that Makhlouf lobbied his cousin to strike with an iron fist, even influencing the content of his speech in parliament that March.

Makhlouf also met with several western officials, including US ambassador Robert Ford and French ambassador Eric Chevalier. Relations with the west were not new, given that the Makhlouf family, Rami and his brother Mohammad, had even hosted John Kerry during one of his visits to Damascus when serving as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in Congress.

In mid-2011, Rami did the most unusual thing. First, he gave an interview to Anthony Shadid of The New York Times, saying: “There will be no stability in Israel if there is no stability in Syria.” Secondly, he called for a press conference in Damascus, saying that he was going to retire and donate all his property to charity. Many saw that PR stunt as a last-minute effort to contain the peaceful demonstrations, saying that Makhlouf never really retired. On the contrary, he set up his own militia, called al-Boustan, tasked with fighting alongside Iranian, Russian and Hezbollah forces.

Little brother

Rami's younger brother, Colonel Hafez Makhlouf was then serving as a senior security official and played an important role in crushing the protests offering “security advice” to Bashar.

Yet by 2014, Colonel Makhlouf was suddenly removed from his post. He subsequently left for Russia where he remained briefly before receiving permission to return to Syria, albeit as a private citizen with no role in the security services. He continues to divide his time between Damascus, Moscow and Kiev. The exact reasons for his dismissal are not known, although some believe that it carries a connection to Yevgeny Prigozhin, founder of the Wagner Group that has sent mercenaries to fight along the Syrian Army.

They suspect that Makhlouf was trying to carve out a greater security role for himself in coordination with the Russians. He reportedly also accepted a reshuffle of sectarian quotes in the political system, thus expanding the powers of the Sunni prime minister and reducing those of the Alawite president. What is confirmed is that the regime believed “he was in contact with foreign powers without having permission from the president”.

New players

In 2015, Makhlouf transferred the SyriaTel license into an official contract with the state-run Telecommunications Authority, instead of a BOT as it had been since 2001. Days earlier Russia Today quoted a Syrian economist as saying that amending the contract both with SyriaTel and MTN had resulted in a loss of $482 billion USD, which ought to have gone to the state treasury.

Between 201-2020 new factors emerged. On the one hand, Makhlouf continued to play his backdoor role in the Syrian economy. He did not end his financial support for al-Boustan, bankrolling families of martyrs and the wounded with monthly salaries, especially in the coastal villages. He also provided support for the so-called “poverty belts” around Damascus, in addition to supporting the army, security apparatus and other state institutions. Among his beneficiaries was the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, an old political party in which the Makhlouf family had taken great pride and to which Makhlouf himself was affiliated.

Yet new business figures were emerging—fast, marking the steady decline of Makhlouf’s influence and visibility. Among them were the Qaterji brothers, Wassim Qattan and Samer al-Foz, who bought Makhlouf’s shares at the Four Seasons Hotel. Their work focused on importing oil derivatives from Iran and concluding deals for oil transport from areas under control of the US and its Kurdish allies, east of the Euphrates River.

A new generation of younger businessmen started to take on all important contracts, like Muhiddine Muhannad Dabbagh and Yasar Ibrahim, the most important of which was for a third GSM operator, affiliated with an Iranian firm that is connected to the Revolutionary Guard Corps. And there was the “Smart Card” that controls the daily purchases of all citizens, ranging from oil and gasoline to bread.

Most of the new businessmen were Sunnis. In his second online appearance Makhlouf spoke about “others” controlling the scene in Syria, a reference that might be to the abovementioned names. Accused of being warlords, the EU and US placed many of them on its sanction list, which already included Makhlouf.

Dismantling of networks

In August 2019, Assad started a crackdown on Makhlouf’s network of companies. He started with al-Boustan, which was disbanded although the monthly salary of its militiamen stood at an impressive $350 USD, double that of a regular soldier in the Syrian army.

Then came dissolving of Makhlouf’s “Syrian Social Nationalist Party”. And in late 2019, Makhlouf was accused of failing to support the local currency, which was depreciating fast against the US dollar. The Central Bank of Syria asked big businesspeople to pitch in flooding the market with American dollars in order to depreciate its value and increase that of the Syrian pound. But even then, they were unable to raise more than $500 million USD—less than what was needed to save the lira.

An anti-corruption campaign ensued, along with a pursuit of businessmen with suspicious wealth. Big files were opened both for leading businessmen and current officials. Speaking in an interview in October 2019, Assad said: “Anybody who wasted funds is required to restore them. We want the funds back before people are referred to a judiciary.”

On December 23, the Syrian government seized the property of several top businessmen, Makhlouf included, all charged with tax evasion and illegal profit during the war years.

Wagner messages

This April, harsh winds came blowing from Moscow, where nothing is published by accident and where every word has a meaning. Several articles appeared in mainstream media, including those affiliated with the Wagner Group, criticizing Assad. The campaign came shortly after a visit by Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu, during which he conveyed "harsh messages" from President Vladimir Putin, regarding the need for Damascus to adhere to the military agreements signed between Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Idlib.

The campaign also came amid Russian criticism of Damascus' failure to comply with Russian, Israeli and American understandings over Syria, and Moscow's desire to restrict Iran's role in Syria. Meanwhile, Russian experts and state-run media continued to say that Assad was the only legitimate president of Syria.

Campaign and appearance

In mid-April 2020, Makhlouf’s company Milkman was framed in an illegal operation trying to smuggle hashish into Libya, via Egypt. Makhlouf snapped that this was part of a conspiracy aimed at tarnishing his name, saying that he had nothing to do with the smuggling business.

On April 27, the Telecommunications Authority announced that SyriaTel was under obligation to pay 233 billion SP ($178.5 million) in delayed income tax, with interest, to the Ministry of Finance Ministry by no later than May 5. Makhlouf responded by setting up a Facebook page first coming out with a written statement praising the charitable work of al-Boustan, then with the first 15-minute online video on April 30.

Makhlouf appealed to Assad to save SyriaTel. “We do not evade taxes and nor we mess with this country,” he said. “We pay taxes and share revenue with the government.” Although insisting that the Finance Ministry’s claims were unjust, Makhlouf said that he would pay it, but only in installments, conditioning that the money goes to the poor. “I will abide by what I have been instructed. I respect your order and am obliged to fulfill it. In order for the company and its work to continue, and for its customers not to be affected by a cut of service, I'm hopeful that you issue an order to schedule (payment) in a satisfactory manner, so that the company does not collapse." But he then said: "I am very tired of the existing accusations, which always portray me as a wrongdoer and a bad person."

On May 1, the Telecommunications Authority replied to Makhlouf without mentioning him by name, saying that the amount due was to the government, reminding that there was no tampering whatsoever with government revenue. The very next day, several of Makhlouf’s top managers were taken from their homes by the security services.

One day after the selective arrests, Makhlouf came out with another video on May 3, reflecting a diplomatic approach with much calculation put into it. In the video, he did his best to come across as an ordinary citizen, in terms of what he was wearing and where he was seated in front of a fireplace. He was also very careful about what words he used when addressing Assad, describing him as a “safety vault.” Makhlouf said that he understands that major risks were on the horizon, but that he could no longer remain silent in front of the “injustice” that was being imposed upon him by the security services. “Those services which I had subsidized for years; who can imagine that they would arrest the employees of Rami Makhlouf.”

“Today, the pressures began in an unacceptable manner ... and the security services began arresting the employees working for me. Has anyone expected the security services to storm the company headquarters of Rami Makhlouf which he once supported and sponsored during the war?” he wondered in the ten-minute video.

"Today, I am asked to stay away from companies and obey the orders ... and pressure has begun to arrest employees and managers," said Rami, who is believed to be in Yafour, near Damascus. He pointed out that he had received threats "either to give up or all his employees would be imprisoned."

The “firewood message” he sent in which he spoke in the name of the “poor” and the “loyalists” the regime used against “others were met by an extended arrest campaign that reached coastal areas. Financially, the communications authority responded by adhering to paying the said amount.

On Saturday, military units deployed near his palace in the Yafour area in the Damascus countryside. The next day, Makhlouf posted a very religious message on his Facebook page. He said “the injustice” against him has reached an “intolerable level."



Ethiopia Builds Secret Camp to Train Sudan RSF Fighters 

Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
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Ethiopia Builds Secret Camp to Train Sudan RSF Fighters 

Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

Ethiopia is hosting a secret camp to train thousands of fighters for the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in neighboring Sudan, Reuters reporting has found, in the latest sign that one of the world’s deadliest conflicts is sucking in regional powers from Africa and the Middle East.

The camp is the first direct evidence of Ethiopia’s involvement in Sudan’s civil war, marking a potentially dangerous development that provides the RSF a substantial supply of fresh soldiers as fighting escalates in Sudan’s south.

Eight sources, including a senior Ethiopian government official, said the United Arab Emirates financed the camp’s construction and provided military trainers and logistical support to the site, a view also shared in an internal note by Ethiopia’s security services and in a diplomatic cable, reviewed by Reuters.

The news agency could not independently verify UAE involvement in the project or the purpose of the camp. In response to a request for comment, the UAE foreign ministry said it was not a party to the conflict or “in any way” involved in the hostilities.

Reuters spoke to 15 sources familiar with the camp's construction and operations, including Ethiopian officials and diplomats, and analyzed satellite imagery of the area. Two Ethiopian intelligence officials and the satellite images provided information that corroborated details contained in the security memo and cable.

The location and scale of the camp and the detailed allegations of the UAE’s involvement have not been previously reported. The images show the extent of the new development, as recently as in the past few weeks, along with construction for a drone ground control station at a nearby airport.

Satellite imagery shows a camp with hundreds of tents in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 22, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

Activity picked up in October at the camp, which is located in the remote western region of Benishangul-Gumuz, near the border with Sudan, satellite images show.

Ethiopia’s government spokesperson, its army and the RSF did not respond to detailed requests for comment about the findings of this story.

On January 6, UAE and Ethiopia issued a joint statement that included a call for a ceasefire in Sudan, as well as celebrating ties they said served the defense of each other’s security.

The Sudanese Armed Forces did not respond to a request for comment.

As of early January, 4,300 RSF fighters were undergoing military training at the site and “their logistical and military supplies are being provided by the UAE,” the note by Ethiopia’s security services seen by Reuters read.

Sudan's army has previously accused the UAE of supplying the RSF with weapons, a claim UN experts and US lawmakers have found credible.

The camp’s recruits are mainly Ethiopians, but citizens from South Sudan and Sudan, including from the SPLM-N, a Sudanese rebel group that controls territory in Sudan’s neighboring Blue Nile state, are also present, six officials said.

Reuters was unable to independently establish who was at the camp or the terms or conditions of recruitment.

A senior leader of the SPLM-N, who declined to be named, denied his forces had a presence in Ethiopia.

The six officials said the recruits are expected to join the RSF battling Sudanese soldiers in Blue Nile, which has emerged as a front in the struggle for control of Sudan. Two of the officials said hundreds had already crossed in recent weeks to support the paramilitaries in Blue Nile.

The internal security note said General Getachew Gudina, the Chief of the Defense Intelligence Department of the Ethiopian National Defense Force, was responsible for setting up the camp. A senior Ethiopian government official as well as four diplomatic and security sources confirmed Getachew’s role in launching the project.

Getachew did not respond to a request for comment.

The camp was carved out of forested land in a district called Menge, about 32 km from the border and strategically located at the intersection of the two countries and South Sudan, according to the satellite imagery and the diplomatic cable.

The first sign of activity in the area began in April, with forest clearing and the construction of metal-roofed buildings in a small area to the north of what is now the area of the camp with tents, where work began in the second half of October.

Satellite imagery shows a forested area where, ten months later, a camp with hundreds of tents was built in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, December 15, 2024. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

The diplomatic cable, dated November, described the camp as having a capacity of up to 10,000 fighters, saying activity began in October with the arrival of dozens of Land Cruisers, heavy trucks, RSF units and UAE trainers. Reuters is not revealing the country that wrote the cable, to protect the source.

Two of the officials described seeing trucks with the logo of the Emirati logistics company Gorica Group heading through the town of Asosa and towards the camp in October. Gorica did not respond to a request for comment.

The news agency was able to match elements of the timeframe specified in the diplomatic cable with satellite imagery. Images from Airbus Defense and Space show that after the initial clearing work, tents began filling the area from early November. Multiple diggers are visible in the imagery.

An image taken by US space technology firm Vantor on November 24 shows more than 640 tents at the camp, approximately four meters square. Each tent could comfortably house four people with some individual equipment, so the camp could accommodate at least 2,500 people, according to an analysis of the satellite imagery by defense intelligence company Janes.

Janes said it could not confirm the site was military based on their analysis of the imagery.

New recruits were spotted travelling to the camp in mid-November, two senior military officials said.

Satellite imagery shows an area where trucks come and go at a camp in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 22, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

On November 17, a column of 56 trucks packed with trainees rumbled through dirt roads of the remote region, the officials, who witnessed the convoys, told Reuters, with each truck holding between 50 and 60 fighters, the officials estimated.

Two days later, both officials saw another convoy of 70 trucks carrying soldiers driving in the same direction, they said.

The November 24 image shows at least 18 large trucks at the site. The vehicles’ size, shape and design match those of models frequently used by the Ethiopian military and its allies to transport soldiers, according to Reuters analysis.

Development continued in late January, the Vantor images show, including new clearing and digging in the riverbed just north of the main camp and dozens of shipping containers lined around the camp visible in a January 22 image. A senior Ethiopian government official said construction on the camp was ongoing but did not elaborate on future building plans.

Sudan’s civil war erupted in 2023 after a power struggle between the Sudanese army and the RSF ahead of a planned transition to civilian rule.


Gaza Girls Take Up Boxing to Heal War’s Scars

Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
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Gaza Girls Take Up Boxing to Heal War’s Scars

Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)

In a makeshift boxing ring etched into the sand between the tens of displaced Palestinians in southern Gaza, a dozen young girls warmed up before delivering fierce blows at their coach's command.

Osama Ayub once ran a boxing club in Gaza City, in the north of the Palestinian territory, until it was destroyed in a strike along with his home during the war between Israel and Hamas.

After finding shelter in the southern city of Khan Younis, he opted to put his sporting skills at the service of displaced Gazans, crammed by the tens of thousands in tents and makeshift shelters.

"We decided to work inside the camp to offer the girls some psychological relief from the war", Ayub told AFP.

Behind him, some of the young athletes faced each other in the ring surrounded by cheering gymmates, while others trained on a punching bag.

"The girls have been affected by the war and the bombardments; some have lost their families or loved ones. They feel pain and want to release it, so they have found in boxing a way to express their emotions," said Ayub.

Ayub now runs these free training sessions for 45 boxers aged between 8 and 19 three times a week, with positive feedback from his students as well as from the community.

One of the youngsters, Ghazal Radwan, aged 14, hopes to become a champion and represent her country.

"I practice boxing to develop my character, release pent-up energy and to become a champion in the future, compete against world champions in other countries, and raise the Palestinian flag around the world", she told AFP.

- Call for aid -

One after the other, the girls trained with Ayub, shifting from right to left jabs, hooks and uppercuts at his command.

In war-devastated Gaza, where construction materials are scarce, Ayub had to improvise to build his small training facility.

"We brought wood and built a square boxing ring, but there are no mats or safety measures," he said.

He called on the international community to support the boxers and help them travel abroad to train, "to strengthen their confidence and offer them psychological support".

The strict blockade that Israel imposed on the Gaza Strip makes the reconstruction of sports facilities particularly complicated, as building materials are routinely rejected by Israeli officials.

The official Palestinian news agency Wafa reported in January that a shipment of artificial turf donated by China to Gaza's youth and sports council was not allowed in by Israel.

With medicine, food and fuel all in short supply, sports equipment comes much lower on the list of items entering the Palestinian territory.

Rimas, a 16-year-old boxer, said she and her friends continued "to practice boxing despite the war, the bombardments and the destruction".

"We, the girls who box, hope for your support, that you will bring us gloves and shoes. We train on sand and need mats and punching bags," she said in comments addressed to the international community.


Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?

Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
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Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?

Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 

As US military movements intensify in the Middle East and the possibility of strikes on Iran looms, Yemen’s Houthi group has continued military preparations, mobilizing fighters and establishing new weapons sites.

The Houthi mobilization comes at a time when the group is widely viewed as one of Iran’s most important regional arms for retaliation.

Although the Iran-backed group has not issued any official statement declaring its position on a potential US attack on Iran, its leaders have warned Washington against any military action and against bearing full responsibility for any escalation and its consequences.

They have hinted that any response would be handled in accordance with the group’s senior leadership's assessment, after evaluating developments and potential repercussions.

Despite these signals, some interpret the Houthis’ stance as an attempt to avoid drawing the attention of the current US administration, led by President Donald Trump, to the need for preemptive action in anticipation of a potential Houthi response.

The Trump administration previously launched a military campaign against the group in the spring of last year, inflicting heavy losses.

Islam al-Mansi, an Egyptian researcher specializing in Iranian affairs, said Iran may avoid burning all its cards unless absolutely necessary, particularly given US threats to raise the level of escalation should any Iranian military proxies intervene or take part in a confrontation.

Iran did not resort to using its military proxies during its confrontation with Israel or during a limited US strike last summer because it did not perceive an existential threat, al-Mansi said.

That calculation could change in the anticipated confrontation, potentially prompting Houthi intervention, including targeting US allies, interests, and military forces, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Al-Mansi added that although Iran previously offered, within a negotiating framework, to abandon its regional proxies, including the Houthis, this makes it more likely that Tehran would use them in retaliation, noting that Iran created these groups to defend its territory from afar.

Many intelligence reports suggest that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has discussed with the Houthis the activation of alternative support arenas in a potential US-Iran confrontation, including the use of cells and weapons not previously deployed.

Visible readiness

In recent days, Chinese media outlets cited an unnamed Houthi military commander as saying the group had raised its alert level and carried out inspections of missile launch platforms in several areas across Yemen, including the strategically important Red Sea region.

In this context, Yemeni political researcher Salah Ali Salah said the Houthis would participate in defending Iran against any US attacks, citing the group’s media rhetoric accompanying mass rallies, which openly supports Iran’s right to defend itself.

While this rhetoric maintains some ambiguity regarding Iran, it repeatedly invokes the war in Gaza and renews Houthi pledges to resume military escalation in defense of the besieged enclave’s population, Salah told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He noted that Iran would not have shared advanced and sophisticated military technologies with the Houthis without a high degree of trust in their ability to use them in Iran’s interest.

In recent months, following Israeli strikes on the unrecognized Houthi government and several of its leaders, hardline Houthi figures demonstrating strong loyalty to Iran have become more prominent.

On the ground, the group has established new military sites and moved equipment and weapons to new locations along and near the coast, alongside the potential use of security cells beyond Yemen’s borders.

Salah said that if the threat of a military strike on Iran escalates, the Iranian response could take a more advanced form, potentially including efforts to close strategic waterways, placing the Bab al-Mandab Strait within the Houthis’ target range.

Many observers have expressed concern that the Houthis may have transferred fighters and intelligence cells outside Yemen over recent years to target US and Western interests in the region.

Open options

After a ceasefire was declared in Gaza, the Houthis lost one of their key justifications for mobilizing fighters and collecting funds. The group has since faced growing public anger over its practices and worsening humanitarian conditions, responding with media messaging aimed at convincing audiences that the battle is not over and that further rounds lie ahead.

Alongside weekly rallies in areas under their control in support of Gaza, the Houthis have carried out attacks on front lines with Yemen’s internationally recognized government, particularly in Taiz province.

Some military experts describe these incidents as probing attacks, while others see them as attempts to divert attention from other activities.

In this context, Walid al-Abara, head of the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, said the Houthis entered a critical phase after the Gaza war ended, having lost one of the main justifications for their attacks on Red Sea shipping.

As a result, they may seek to manufacture new pretexts, including claims of sanctions imposed against them, to maintain media momentum and their regional role.

Al-Abara told Asharq Al-Awsat that the group has two other options. The first is redirecting its activity inward to strengthen its military and economic leverage, either to impose its conditions in any future settlement or to consolidate power.

The second is yielding to international and regional pressure and entering a negotiation track, particularly if sanctions intensify or its economic and military capacity declines.

According to an assessment by the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, widespread protests in Iran are increasingly pressuring the regime’s ability to manage its regional influence at the same pace as before, without dismantling its network of proxies.

This reality is pushing Tehran toward a more cautious approach, governed by domestic priorities and cost-benefit calculations, while maintaining a minimum level of external influence without broad escalation.

Within this framework, al-Abara said Iran is likely to maintain a controlled continuity in its relationship with the Houthis through selective support that ensures the group remains effective.

However, an expansion of protests or a direct military strike on Iran could open the door to a deeper Houthi repositioning, including broader political and security concessions in exchange for regional guarantees.