The Rise and Fall of Rami Makhlouf

A man in Damascus watches a video posted by Rami Makhlouf on his Facebook page. (AFP)
A man in Damascus watches a video posted by Rami Makhlouf on his Facebook page. (AFP)
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The Rise and Fall of Rami Makhlouf

A man in Damascus watches a video posted by Rami Makhlouf on his Facebook page. (AFP)
A man in Damascus watches a video posted by Rami Makhlouf on his Facebook page. (AFP)

Syrian billionaire Rami Makhlouf came out with two Facebook videos on April 30 and May 3, loaded with symbolism on a political, economic and social level. Within Syria and beyond, the 51-year old businessman raised eyebrows in terms of form, content, timing and historical context of what he was saying.

Across a running time of 25 minutes, Makhlouf did not try to deny or underplay the prominent economic role that he played in Syria over the past quarter century. Western media often described him as “the richest man in Syria” while back home in Damascus, but few could put a face to the name as he seldom went out in public. Unlike other sons of prominent figures in the Syrian government, he was always confined to his office, away from the media. When then did Rami Makhlouf change so suddenly to appear in two online videos within less than a week, championing the poor while appealing to the president—his cousin—to right the wrongs of the present system?

The rise

It all began with Mohammad Makhlouf, the father of Rami and brother of Anisa, wife of President Hafez al-Assad. As the president’s in-law for three solid decades, Mohammad Makhlouf played a pivotal role in the Syrian economy from 1970 to 2000. From his position as manager of the state-run Tabac de Regie, he sponsored major deals, especially in the oil sector, throughout the 1980s. While Hafez al-Assad served on the military and political sectors, Makhould took charge of economics, becoming its godfather.

Rami and his generation started their careers as partners with prominent businessmen in the private sector, moving on to lead that sector and take over its main firms.

Rami started with a company called RAMAC, handling duty free shops at Syria’s border crossings and Damascus International Airport. In conjunction with the death of Hafez al-Assad and the transfer of power to his son Bashar in July 2000, Rami turned to the promising telecommunications sector. After extensive negotiations, SyriaTel emerged, along with a rival company called MTN, obtaining a BOT license in 2001. For two entire decades the two companies monopolized the telecommunications sector along with its massive revenue. Those who criticized that monopoly, like ex-parliamentarian Riad Seif were either silenced or jailed, accused of crossing “red-lines.”

From SyriaTel Makhlouf expanded his empire, taking businesses in oil and gas, banking, tourism and trade. That came hand-in-hand with the post-2000 period of economic openness. Experts argued that this policy reduced the size of the Syrian middle class, concentrating wealth in the hands of a tiny minority. That monopoly seems to have caused the regime’s grassroots support to erode, snapping the social contract that had existed since Hafez al-Assad came to power in 1970. Some believe that among the many reasons who Syrians rose in 2011 was to protest the increase in Makhlouf’s wealth.

The first test

Some called him the “exclusive agent for Syria.” Others envied him, wanting shares in the cake that he was devouring. Opponents were highly critical, demanding a different future for Syria, on both a political and economic level. When the chance arose to reform the economy, through the signing of a partnership agreement with the EU, Makhlouf stood as a prime opponent, fearing that it would break his monopoly and diminish his influence.

This was his first test and in light of the mounting criticism, he left for the United Arab Emirates in 2004. Subsequently, and according to former economic official who spoke to me: “That year was the best for Syria in terms of foreign investment.” With Makhlouf gone, many were willing to step in.

He met the test silently and sought invest in the UAE without any fuss. He eventually returned to Syria after the wave of political pressure that mounted after the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. New realities made it mandatory for him to return to Damascus and ward off the international pressure that was being exerted to blame Syria for the murder. Makhlouf’s comeback coincided with what was described back then as the “Beirutization of Damascus” or opening up a series of banks, universities and retail shops that would create a Lebanon in Syria, compensating for what was lost in the economic crisis.

After the Syrian army’s withdrawal from Lebanon, Makhlouf and his partners set up “Sham Holding Co” with the aim of institutionalizing his massive expansionism in Syria. By 2006, Makhlouf was controlling around 7% of Syria’s GDP, said the former official, “but his role in economic decision-making was much greater than that.”

When the protests erupted in 2011, banners and slogans were raised mentioning Makhlouf by name, asking Bashar al-Assad to restrict his role and hold him accountable for amassing wealth at the state’s expense. Opponents claimed that Makhlouf lobbied his cousin to strike with an iron fist, even influencing the content of his speech in parliament that March.

Makhlouf also met with several western officials, including US ambassador Robert Ford and French ambassador Eric Chevalier. Relations with the west were not new, given that the Makhlouf family, Rami and his brother Mohammad, had even hosted John Kerry during one of his visits to Damascus when serving as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in Congress.

In mid-2011, Rami did the most unusual thing. First, he gave an interview to Anthony Shadid of The New York Times, saying: “There will be no stability in Israel if there is no stability in Syria.” Secondly, he called for a press conference in Damascus, saying that he was going to retire and donate all his property to charity. Many saw that PR stunt as a last-minute effort to contain the peaceful demonstrations, saying that Makhlouf never really retired. On the contrary, he set up his own militia, called al-Boustan, tasked with fighting alongside Iranian, Russian and Hezbollah forces.

Little brother

Rami's younger brother, Colonel Hafez Makhlouf was then serving as a senior security official and played an important role in crushing the protests offering “security advice” to Bashar.

Yet by 2014, Colonel Makhlouf was suddenly removed from his post. He subsequently left for Russia where he remained briefly before receiving permission to return to Syria, albeit as a private citizen with no role in the security services. He continues to divide his time between Damascus, Moscow and Kiev. The exact reasons for his dismissal are not known, although some believe that it carries a connection to Yevgeny Prigozhin, founder of the Wagner Group that has sent mercenaries to fight along the Syrian Army.

They suspect that Makhlouf was trying to carve out a greater security role for himself in coordination with the Russians. He reportedly also accepted a reshuffle of sectarian quotes in the political system, thus expanding the powers of the Sunni prime minister and reducing those of the Alawite president. What is confirmed is that the regime believed “he was in contact with foreign powers without having permission from the president”.

New players

In 2015, Makhlouf transferred the SyriaTel license into an official contract with the state-run Telecommunications Authority, instead of a BOT as it had been since 2001. Days earlier Russia Today quoted a Syrian economist as saying that amending the contract both with SyriaTel and MTN had resulted in a loss of $482 billion USD, which ought to have gone to the state treasury.

Between 201-2020 new factors emerged. On the one hand, Makhlouf continued to play his backdoor role in the Syrian economy. He did not end his financial support for al-Boustan, bankrolling families of martyrs and the wounded with monthly salaries, especially in the coastal villages. He also provided support for the so-called “poverty belts” around Damascus, in addition to supporting the army, security apparatus and other state institutions. Among his beneficiaries was the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, an old political party in which the Makhlouf family had taken great pride and to which Makhlouf himself was affiliated.

Yet new business figures were emerging—fast, marking the steady decline of Makhlouf’s influence and visibility. Among them were the Qaterji brothers, Wassim Qattan and Samer al-Foz, who bought Makhlouf’s shares at the Four Seasons Hotel. Their work focused on importing oil derivatives from Iran and concluding deals for oil transport from areas under control of the US and its Kurdish allies, east of the Euphrates River.

A new generation of younger businessmen started to take on all important contracts, like Muhiddine Muhannad Dabbagh and Yasar Ibrahim, the most important of which was for a third GSM operator, affiliated with an Iranian firm that is connected to the Revolutionary Guard Corps. And there was the “Smart Card” that controls the daily purchases of all citizens, ranging from oil and gasoline to bread.

Most of the new businessmen were Sunnis. In his second online appearance Makhlouf spoke about “others” controlling the scene in Syria, a reference that might be to the abovementioned names. Accused of being warlords, the EU and US placed many of them on its sanction list, which already included Makhlouf.

Dismantling of networks

In August 2019, Assad started a crackdown on Makhlouf’s network of companies. He started with al-Boustan, which was disbanded although the monthly salary of its militiamen stood at an impressive $350 USD, double that of a regular soldier in the Syrian army.

Then came dissolving of Makhlouf’s “Syrian Social Nationalist Party”. And in late 2019, Makhlouf was accused of failing to support the local currency, which was depreciating fast against the US dollar. The Central Bank of Syria asked big businesspeople to pitch in flooding the market with American dollars in order to depreciate its value and increase that of the Syrian pound. But even then, they were unable to raise more than $500 million USD—less than what was needed to save the lira.

An anti-corruption campaign ensued, along with a pursuit of businessmen with suspicious wealth. Big files were opened both for leading businessmen and current officials. Speaking in an interview in October 2019, Assad said: “Anybody who wasted funds is required to restore them. We want the funds back before people are referred to a judiciary.”

On December 23, the Syrian government seized the property of several top businessmen, Makhlouf included, all charged with tax evasion and illegal profit during the war years.

Wagner messages

This April, harsh winds came blowing from Moscow, where nothing is published by accident and where every word has a meaning. Several articles appeared in mainstream media, including those affiliated with the Wagner Group, criticizing Assad. The campaign came shortly after a visit by Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu, during which he conveyed "harsh messages" from President Vladimir Putin, regarding the need for Damascus to adhere to the military agreements signed between Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Idlib.

The campaign also came amid Russian criticism of Damascus' failure to comply with Russian, Israeli and American understandings over Syria, and Moscow's desire to restrict Iran's role in Syria. Meanwhile, Russian experts and state-run media continued to say that Assad was the only legitimate president of Syria.

Campaign and appearance

In mid-April 2020, Makhlouf’s company Milkman was framed in an illegal operation trying to smuggle hashish into Libya, via Egypt. Makhlouf snapped that this was part of a conspiracy aimed at tarnishing his name, saying that he had nothing to do with the smuggling business.

On April 27, the Telecommunications Authority announced that SyriaTel was under obligation to pay 233 billion SP ($178.5 million) in delayed income tax, with interest, to the Ministry of Finance Ministry by no later than May 5. Makhlouf responded by setting up a Facebook page first coming out with a written statement praising the charitable work of al-Boustan, then with the first 15-minute online video on April 30.

Makhlouf appealed to Assad to save SyriaTel. “We do not evade taxes and nor we mess with this country,” he said. “We pay taxes and share revenue with the government.” Although insisting that the Finance Ministry’s claims were unjust, Makhlouf said that he would pay it, but only in installments, conditioning that the money goes to the poor. “I will abide by what I have been instructed. I respect your order and am obliged to fulfill it. In order for the company and its work to continue, and for its customers not to be affected by a cut of service, I'm hopeful that you issue an order to schedule (payment) in a satisfactory manner, so that the company does not collapse." But he then said: "I am very tired of the existing accusations, which always portray me as a wrongdoer and a bad person."

On May 1, the Telecommunications Authority replied to Makhlouf without mentioning him by name, saying that the amount due was to the government, reminding that there was no tampering whatsoever with government revenue. The very next day, several of Makhlouf’s top managers were taken from their homes by the security services.

One day after the selective arrests, Makhlouf came out with another video on May 3, reflecting a diplomatic approach with much calculation put into it. In the video, he did his best to come across as an ordinary citizen, in terms of what he was wearing and where he was seated in front of a fireplace. He was also very careful about what words he used when addressing Assad, describing him as a “safety vault.” Makhlouf said that he understands that major risks were on the horizon, but that he could no longer remain silent in front of the “injustice” that was being imposed upon him by the security services. “Those services which I had subsidized for years; who can imagine that they would arrest the employees of Rami Makhlouf.”

“Today, the pressures began in an unacceptable manner ... and the security services began arresting the employees working for me. Has anyone expected the security services to storm the company headquarters of Rami Makhlouf which he once supported and sponsored during the war?” he wondered in the ten-minute video.

"Today, I am asked to stay away from companies and obey the orders ... and pressure has begun to arrest employees and managers," said Rami, who is believed to be in Yafour, near Damascus. He pointed out that he had received threats "either to give up or all his employees would be imprisoned."

The “firewood message” he sent in which he spoke in the name of the “poor” and the “loyalists” the regime used against “others were met by an extended arrest campaign that reached coastal areas. Financially, the communications authority responded by adhering to paying the said amount.

On Saturday, military units deployed near his palace in the Yafour area in the Damascus countryside. The next day, Makhlouf posted a very religious message on his Facebook page. He said “the injustice” against him has reached an “intolerable level."



Iranians Have Long Sought Work and Relative Stability in Türkiye. The War Could Force Some to Return

Iranian Serdar Taghizade speaks to a customer inside his currency exchange business in Istanbul on Monday, April 13, 2026. (AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)
Iranian Serdar Taghizade speaks to a customer inside his currency exchange business in Istanbul on Monday, April 13, 2026. (AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)
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Iranians Have Long Sought Work and Relative Stability in Türkiye. The War Could Force Some to Return

Iranian Serdar Taghizade speaks to a customer inside his currency exchange business in Istanbul on Monday, April 13, 2026. (AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)
Iranian Serdar Taghizade speaks to a customer inside his currency exchange business in Istanbul on Monday, April 13, 2026. (AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)

Sadri Haghshenas spends her days selling borek — a layered, savory pastry — at a shop in Istanbul, but her mind is on her daughter in Tehran.

The family had to send her home to Iran after they ran into difficulties renewing her visa, despite fears that a shaky ceasefire could soon collapse.

For years, short-term residency permits have allowed tens of thousands of Iranians to pursue economic opportunities and enjoy relative stability in neighboring Türkiye. But it's a precarious situation, and the war has raised the stakes.

“I swear, I cry every day,” Haghshenas said, raising her hands from behind the counter of the pastry shop. “There is no life in my country, there is no life here, what shall I do?”

Haghshenas and her husband moved to Türkiye five years ago with their then-teenage daughters and have been living on tourist visas renewable every six months to two years.

They could not afford a lawyer this year, because her husband is out of work due to health problems. As a result, they missed the deadline to apply for a new visa for their 20-year-old daughter, Asal, who is still in her final year of high school.

Asal was detained at a checkpoint earlier this month and spent a night at an immigration facility. Her mother found a friend to take her back to Tehran rather than face deportation proceedings that could complicate her ability to return to Türkiye. They hope she can come back on a student visa.

Haghshenas has been unable to talk to her daughter since she left because of a monthslong internet blackout in Iran.

A man walks past an Iranian grocery shop in Istanbul on Tuesday, April 14, 2026. (AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)

Türkiye has not seen an influx of refugees, as most Iranians have sought safety within their country. Many who have crossed the land border were transiting to other countries where they have citizenship or residency.

Nearly 100,000 Iranians lived in Türkiye in 2025, according to the Turkish Statistical Institute. Around 89,000 have entered Türkiye since the start of the war, while around 72,000 have departed, according to the United Nations' refugee agency.

Some Iranians have used short-term visa-free stays to wait out the war, but there are few options for those who want to stay longer.

Sedat Albayrak, of the Istanbul Bar Association’s Refugee and Migrant Rights Center, said that getting international protection status can be difficult, and the system encourages Iranians to apply for short-term permits instead.

“There are people who have lived on them for over 10 years," The Associated Press quoted him as saying.

Nadr Rahim, right, sits with a friend at an Iranian coffee shop in Istanbul on Tuesday, April 14, 2026. (AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)

If the war continues, more may have to return Nadr Rahim came to Türkiye for his children’s education 11 years ago. Now, the war may force him to go home.

Because of the difficulty of getting a permit to start a business or work legally in Türkiye, he lived off the profits of his motorcycle salesroom in Iran. But there have been no sales since the war started, and international sanctions — and the internet outage — make it extremely difficult to transfer funds.

His family only has enough money to stay in Türkiye a few more months. His children grew up in Türkiye and don't read Farsi or speak it fluently. He worries about how they would adapt to living in Iran, but said “if the war continues, we will have no choice but to return.”

In the meantime, he spends most of his days scrolling on his phone, waiting for news from his parents in Tehran or discussing the war over waterpipes with Iranian friends.

A 42-year-old Iranian woman came to Türkiye eight months ago, hoping to make money to support her family. She and her daughter registered as university students to get study visas.

She attends classes in the morning to keep her legal status before rushing to service jobs, sometimes working until 3 a.m.

They share a room with six other people at a women's boarding house, she said, speaking on condition of anonymity out of fear for her security should she return to Iran.

“I truly love Iran. If necessary, I would even go and defend it in war,” she says. But she sees no future there, while in Türkiye, she’s barely scraping by and only able to send small amounts of money to her parents.

“I have a bad life in Türkiye, and my parents have a bad life in Iran,” she said. “I came to Türkiye with so much hope, to support my parents and build a future. But now I feel hopeless.”

A 33-year-old freelance architect from Tehran traveled to Türkiye during Iran's violent crackdown on mass protests in January. She had planned to return after the situation calmed down, but then the United States and Israel went to war with Iran at the end of February.

“I started to believe that it’s a very bad situation, worse than I expected,” she said, speaking on condition of anonymity for fear of persecution if she returns to Iran.

She has been unable to work for her usual clients back in Iran because of the internet blackout. With the end of her 90-day visa-free window approaching, she can't afford to apply for a longer stay in Türkiye.

Instead, she has decided to go to Malaysia, where she will get free accommodation in return for building shelters during a month of visa-free stay.

She has no plan for what comes next.


Strait of Hormuz Blockade Step by Step: What Do We Know?

A view of Iranian-flagged cargo ship M/V Touska as the US Navy Arleigh Burke-class Aegis guided missile destroyer USS Spruance conducts its interception in a location given as the north Arabian Sea, in this screen capture from a video released April 19, 2026. (CENTCOM/Handout via Reuters)
A view of Iranian-flagged cargo ship M/V Touska as the US Navy Arleigh Burke-class Aegis guided missile destroyer USS Spruance conducts its interception in a location given as the north Arabian Sea, in this screen capture from a video released April 19, 2026. (CENTCOM/Handout via Reuters)
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Strait of Hormuz Blockade Step by Step: What Do We Know?

A view of Iranian-flagged cargo ship M/V Touska as the US Navy Arleigh Burke-class Aegis guided missile destroyer USS Spruance conducts its interception in a location given as the north Arabian Sea, in this screen capture from a video released April 19, 2026. (CENTCOM/Handout via Reuters)
A view of Iranian-flagged cargo ship M/V Touska as the US Navy Arleigh Burke-class Aegis guided missile destroyer USS Spruance conducts its interception in a location given as the north Arabian Sea, in this screen capture from a video released April 19, 2026. (CENTCOM/Handout via Reuters)

Shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remained mostly at a standstill on Monday, with just three vessels crossing the vital waterway, according to Kpler, a maritime data firm.

On Sunday, a US Navy destroyer attacked and seized an Iranian-flagged cargo ship that US President Donald Trump said had tried to evade the US blockade on ships traveling to and from Iranian ports.

In a separate incident, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations center, which is administered by Britain’s Royal Navy, said that two vessels had been hit while trying to cross the Strait of Hormuz, according to a notice published on Saturday.

In one instance, gun ships operated by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps fired at a tanker without radio warning, the British organization said. In the second incident, a container ship was hit by “an unknown projectile” that damaged some of the containers.

On Tuesday, the US military said it had seized an Iran-linked tanker in international waters, in what appears to be the latest move to enforce a blockade as the ceasefire deadline looms.

The US military said it had boarded the tanker Tifani “without incident.”

The ship, capable of carrying 2 million barrels of crude, last reported its position on Tuesday morning near Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean, according to MarineTraffic tracking data. It was close to fully loaded and had signaled Singapore as its destination.

A two-week ceasefire between the US and Iran is set to expire early Wednesday.

Latest developments

The US Navy has turned back 27 ships trying to enter or exit Iranian ports since an American blockade outside the contested Strait of Hormuz began about a week ago, the military’s Central Command said on Monday.

On Sunday, a Navy destroyer disabled and seized the Touska, an Iranian cargo ship, in the Gulf of Oman after it tried to evade the blockade. It was the first time a vessel was reported to have tried to evade the US-imposed blockade on any ship entering or exiting Iranian ports since it took effect last week.

The guided-missile destroyer Spruance, one of more than a dozen Navy warships enforcing the US blockade, ordered the vessel’s crew to evacuate its engine room.

The Spruance then fired several rounds from its Mk-45 gun into the ship’s propulsion system as it steamed toward the port of Bandar Abbas in Iran, Central Command said in a statement that included a video of the firing.

American officials will determine what to do with the disabled vessel once the search is completed, a US military official said on Monday, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss operational matters, according to the New York Times. One option would be to tow the stricken ship to Oman, independent specialists said. An alternative would be to let the Touska steam to an Iranian port, if it can.

A spokesman for Iran’s military reiterated a threat on Monday to “take the necessary action against the US military” in response to the ship’s seizure, Iran’s state broadcaster reported.

How is the US imposing the blockade?

According to CENTCOM, more than 10,000 US personnel, including sailors, marines, and airmen, are participating in the operation, supported by over a dozen warships and dozens of aircraft. The effort spans key waterways surrounding Iran, including the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.

The US blockade on Iranian ports does not have a defined geographic boundary, and the United States can interdict vessels almost anywhere in international waters until they arrive at their final port.

Analysts say modern technology allows blockade enforcement at great distances.

Can ships evade the blockade?

Maritime intelligence experts say that more ships in and around the Strait of Hormuz seem to be adopting “spoofing” tactics to avoid detection.

Under international maritime law, most large commercial vessels travel with a transponder that automatically transmits the ship’s name, location, route and other identifying information. That includes a nine-digit number with a country code, which serves as a digital fingerprint for a ship.

The tactics were used by Russian “shadow fleet” vessels evading sanctions related to the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

When a ship is engaged in spoofing, its captain can type in a false origin or destination or can pretend to be piloting another ship altogether. Vessels can also temporarily turn off their transponders, seeming to disappear in one place and reappear in another.

The strait is “a contested information environment,” said Erik Bethel, a partner at Mare Liberum, a maritime technology venture capital fund.

Still, whatever ruses they employ, vessels going to and from Iran may get only so far. It is difficult to pass between the open ocean and a waterway as narrow as the Strait of Hormuz without being detected.

“My expectation is that the US Navy can sit out in the Gulf of Oman,” said Ami Daniel, the chief executive of Windward, a maritime intelligence data provider. “I don’t think there’s a way to breach the blockade.”

What are the US and Iranian strategies?

The US blockade sets up a significant test in the Iran war: Which side can endure more economic pain?

Instead of directing missiles and bombs, Trump is trying to choke off Iran’s oil exports, which make up just about all of the government’s revenue.

Some experts questioned whether the US blockade would work.

“Iran is already hurting, and they have shown that they are willing to take more than a couple of hits,” said Ahmet Kasim Han, a professor of international relations at TED University in Ankara, Türkiye.

Iran’s strategy appears to be using its leverage over global energy markets, where Tehran has discovered new powers that can cause pain in the US economy through spikes in the price of gasoline and other staples.

Why is the strait so important?

The Strait of Hormuz is a strategic waterway connecting the Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean. It is the only sea route for moving oil, natural gas and other cargo out of the Gulf. Iran’s coastline runs along the entire route.

At the strait’s narrowest and most vulnerable point — between Iran to the north and the Musandam Peninsula of Oman to the south — the navigable channel is about two miles wide each for inbound and outbound traffic, according to the International Energy Agency.

The legal status of the strait is complex. It lies within the territorial waters of Iran and Oman, but under international law it is treated as an international waterway where ships are generally guaranteed passage.

Iran has signed but not ratified that framework and has disputed the extent of those rights.

Before the war, about 20% of global oil and liquid natural gas passed through the strait. Most of the fossil fuels are bound for Asia, especially China, India, Japan and South Korea.

Other large vessels also use the strait, including car carriers and container ships.

Crucial industrial goods traveling through Hormuz include helium from Qatar, fertilizer from Oman and Saudi Arabia, and plastic feedstocks from Saudi Arabia and Emirati petrochemical plants.

How does Iran control the strait?

Iran’s military can threaten shipping traffic throughout the Strait of Hormuz, even though much of its navy has been destroyed by US and Israeli strikes.

The United States and Israel launched their war against Iran on the argument that if Iran one day got a nuclear weapon, it would have the ultimate deterrent against future attacks.

It turns out that Iran already has a deterrent: geography.

“The Iranians have thought a lot about how to utilize the geography to their benefit,” said Caitlin Talmadge, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who studies Gulf security.

*The New York Times


US-Iran Talks Test Power Balances in Tehran as National Security Council Comes to the Forefront

Qalibaf (L) at a meeting of the regime's Expediency Discernment Council, with Supreme National Security Council secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr. (Qalibaf’s official site)
Qalibaf (L) at a meeting of the regime's Expediency Discernment Council, with Supreme National Security Council secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr. (Qalibaf’s official site)
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US-Iran Talks Test Power Balances in Tehran as National Security Council Comes to the Forefront

Qalibaf (L) at a meeting of the regime's Expediency Discernment Council, with Supreme National Security Council secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr. (Qalibaf’s official site)
Qalibaf (L) at a meeting of the regime's Expediency Discernment Council, with Supreme National Security Council secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr. (Qalibaf’s official site)

After US-Israeli bombardment eliminated Iran’s supreme leader and much of its top echelons, the country’s leadership didn’t fall apart — but negotiations to end the war offer a new test.

For decades, the supreme leader successfully managed several powerful factions, bringing to heel those who challenged his authority while listening to rival opinions. It’s now unclear who wields that kind of authority over the collection of civilian figures and powerful generals from the Revolutionary Guard who appear to be in charge.

They have found unity — for now — by taking a tough line. But disagreements over how much to concede in negotiations with the United States could reveal fault lines, as Pakistani mediators try to host a new round of talks this week, according to The Associated Press.

Who is in charge?

In the past, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was able to impose his will on the country's disparate power centers. After Israeli strikes killed him on the first day of the war, his son Mojtaba Khamenei succeeded him.

But doubts continue to swirl over the younger Khamenei’s role after reports he was wounded in the strikes. Still in hiding, he has not appeared in public since becoming supreme leader and how he gives orders to top leaders is a mystery.

At the center of power now is a politburo-like body known as the Supreme National Security Council, which includes Iran’s top civilian and military officials. Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, the parliament speaker and a veteran insider with strong contacts on all sides, has emerged as its face and the chief negotiator with the US.

The late Khamenei began giving more authority to the council before his death, but the war has consolidated its power.

The council contains a range of political opinions and often acute rivalries. A political rival of Qalibaf and uncompromising opponent of the US, Saeed Jalili, represents the supreme leader on the council, while the body’s nominal head is reformist President Masoud Pezeshkian.

Hard-liner members include the Guard’s new chief commander, Ahmad Vahidi, and the council’s new secretary, Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, also a commander in the Guard.

But Israel’s strategy of eliminating top leaders points to a misreading of how the Iranian regime works, experts say.

Iran’s leadership survived “precisely because there are multiple power centers with overlapping authorities,” said Ali Vaez, Iran director at the International Crisis Group. “Factionalism is just built into the DNA of this system.”

But since the war, the Guard’s growing clout on the council has also stoked speculation that a fundamental change could be coming.

Negotiations with the US will stress test the power structure

The council now faces potentially divisive questions over how far to go to reach a deal with the US, which is demanding Iran make major concessions aimed at ensuring it is never able to develop a nuclear weapon. Iran has long insisted its program is peaceful while saying it has the right to uranium enrichment.

In an interview with Iranian state TV on Sunday, Qalibaf said Iran wants a comprehensive accord that brings “a lasting peace” where the US no longer attacks the country.

“This dangerous loop needs to be cut,” he said. The US has twice launched strikes on Iran during high-level negotiations: once in the 12-day war in June, then again in the current conflict.

Council members have projected confidence that Iran holds the upper hand now, particularly because its grip on the Strait of Hormuz — a crucial passage for the world’s oil — enables it to drive up fuel prices, thus threatening the global economy and exerting political pressure on US President Donald Trump back home.

Senior officials have insisted they can hold out for assurances that Iran won’t be attacked again — even risking the war reigniting — because they believe Iran can endure the pain longer than the United States and its allies.

But ultimately, the leadership’s priority remains its own survival. The war and the US blockade, which is threatening Iran’s oil trade, are tightening the screws on the country’s cratering economy.

Economic hardship has fueled waves of unrest over the past two decades, including protests in January that openly called for the regime’s overthrow. A deal with the West lifting sanctions could help it keep its grip at home.

Signs of disagreement

Events over the weekend surrounding the Strait of Hormuz gave an indication of serious differences over how much to concede in negotiations. Engagement with Washington has long divided Iran’s top ranks, despite a shared deep mistrust of the US.

On Friday, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announced in a posting on X that Iran was opening the strait to commercial traffic as part of the ceasefire agreement with the US. Hours later, Trump proclaimed that the US would continue its blockade to keep pressure on Iran to reach a deal over its nuclear program.

On Saturday morning, Iran’s military announced that it was reclosing the strait in retaliation for the blockade.

Some Iranian media criticized Araghchi, suggesting his post created the impression Iran was showing weakness and revealing the differing positions behind the scenes. A report by the Tasnim news agency, seen as close to the Guard, said the position on the strait should have come from the National Security Council itself.

Araghchi’s office pushed back, saying the Foreign Ministry “does not take any action without coordinating with higher-level institutions.”

In his interview Sunday, Qalibaf tried to paper over any divisions, emphasizing that everyone in the leadership was on the same page on Iran’s strategy in US talks.

A possible bridge builder

The 64-year-old Qalibaf is best positioned to bridge divides among Iran’s factions.

Qalibaf is a former general in the Guard and national police chief and kept close to the Guard throughout his long political career. As Tehran’s mayor from 2005 to 2017, Qalibaf gained a reputation as a pragmatist able to get things done, like overhauling an ailing public transport system, even as he faced major corruption and human rights abuse allegations.

Ali Rabie, a well-known reformist and an assistant to the president, wrote last week in a newspaper editorial that Qalibaf was “the representative of the country and the regime.”

At the same time, Qalibaf is close to the Khamenei family both hailing from the area of the eastern city of Mashhad, said Mohsen Sazegara, one of the founders of the Revolutionary Guard in the 1980s who is now an opposition figure living in the US.

During his father’s rule, Mojtaba Khamenei backed Qalibaf’s several unsuccessful attempts to run for president.

Qalibaf is also close to the senior Guard figures who stepped in to replace those killed by Israel and who are widely seen as holding the key to any future agreement with the US. His cross-factional backing could enable him to ensure support at home for a deal against blowback from ideologues who will resist compromise.