Exclusive – 20 Years after Hafez Assad’s Death, Syria is an Open Arena for Foreign Players

Hafez Assad's funeral in June 2000.
Hafez Assad's funeral in June 2000.
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Exclusive – 20 Years after Hafez Assad’s Death, Syria is an Open Arena for Foreign Players

Hafez Assad's funeral in June 2000.
Hafez Assad's funeral in June 2000.

Russian President Vladimir Putin did not take part in late Syrian President Hafez Assad’s funeral two decades ago, but Russian forces have since then deployed in Syria and are boosted by military bases. Putin aspires to expand and bolster these bases by establishing a “soft” economic, social and political presence in Syria.

Then Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer attended Assad’s funeral. Now, Turkish forces are deployed in vast areas in northwestern, northern and northeastern Syria. The same goes to then Iranian President Mohammad Khatami. Now, Iranian Revolutionary Guards members are establishing a “shadow” state in Syria and setting up and training Syrian and non-Syrian militias. The American military is also present east of the Euphrates River. Twenty years prior, then Secretary of State Madelaine Albright had attended Assad’s funeral.

When then French President Jacques Chirac and British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook flew to Damascus for the funeral, they would have never predicted that their countries would now be part of the international coalition that controls northeastern Syria and bars any Syrian jets from those skies.

The coalition backs the Syrian Democratic Forces on the ground. The SDF includes the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) that receive some training from the Kurdistan Workers' Party, led by Abdullah Ocalan. Ocalan was jailed by Turkey soon after Assad allowed him to leave Syria to avert a war with Turkey in mid-1998.

Then Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, who was the last official to speak with Assad before his death, was the first to arrive in Damascus for the funeral. Lahoud would have never predicted that his ally, Hezbollah, would have intervened in the Syrian conflict in 2012 to held “save” the regime. He would have never predicted that it would now be deploying its fighters in different parts of Syria and that it would have the final say in Lebanon, effectively marginalizing “Syria’s role in Lebanon.” The shift in roles began with party chief Hassan Nasrallah’s attendance of Assad’s burial in al-Qardahah 20 years ago.

The list of dignitaries who attended Assad’s funeral after his death on June 10, 2000 underscored the regional and international role it played at the time and reflects the extent of the change that has taken place in Syria since then. Syria used to be a regional and international player with wide connections. Now, it has turned into an open arena where regional and international players tussle. Its “proxies”, military officers and intelligence agents used to operate in countries near and far, but now, the “proxies”, armies and agents of other nations play on its territories.

‘Correction’
Assad joined the ruling Baath party’s military council and was eventually appointed defense minister. In November 1970, he staged a military coup in what was known as the “Corrective Movement.” He ousted and jailed President Nureddin al-Atassi and was declared president in March 1971. On October 6, 1973, he joined Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in waging the October War against Israel. A year later, he signed the Agreement on Disengagement with Israel over the Golan Heights. In June, US President Richard Nixon visited Damascus to restore diplomatic relations that were frozen after the “June 1967 setback.”

Syria’s first foray in foreign intervention took place in 1976 when, with American and Soviet blessings, its military was sent to Lebanon during its civil war. A year later, its troops were deployed throughout nearly all Lebanese territories. Syrian troops and intelligence agents remained in Lebanon until April 2005 when they were forced to withdraw, in line with United Nations Security Council resolution 1559, after coming under massive international pressure in wake of the assassination of Lebanese former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.

Syria’s relations with its eastern neighbor Iraq were just as complicated. In 1979, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein accused Assad of “conspiring” against Baghdad, sparking tensions and conflicts between Iraq and Syria, each of which are ruled by rival branches of the Baath party. Relations during Assad’s final years improved. Trade relations were revived and diplomatic ties, which were severed in 1980 after Damascus backed Tehran in the Iraq-Iran war, were restored.

‘Balance’
A new page of strategic Syrian-Iranian relations was opened with Khomeini’s 1979 revolution. These relations will leave their impact on the Middle East for decades to come. Assad, however, balanced out these relations during the 1990s by remaining in the Arab fold through establishing strong ties with heavyweights, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. This trilateral alliance formed the foundation for Arab work and provided the necessary coordination for addressing developments and taking decisions.

In February 1982, Assad repelled an uprising by the Muslim Brotherhood in Hama city, which left tens of thousands of people dead. In late 1983, Assad suffered a heart attack. His brother, Rifaat attempted to seize the president’s incapacity to stage a coup, but failed. A year later, the younger Assad was exiled from Syria and still resides in Europe despite his attempts to return to his homeland after his brother’s death in 2000.

Without ‘cover’
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, with which Syria had signed a friendship and cooperation agreement in 1980, Assad shifted his attention to the West to improve his relations with the United States. He had deliberately avoided signing a strategic agreement with the Soviets or granting them permanent military bases, except in the small port of Tartus, in order to keep his options open with the West. He reaped the benefit of such foresight after he visited Moscow shortly before the Soviet collapse. He realized that the demise of his greatest ally was imminent and so he shifted his gaze to the West for a new “cover.” In the early 1990s, Syria joined the US-led multination alliance against Saddam after Iraq invaded Kuwait. In late 1991, Syria took part in the opening of the Madrid conference aimed at launching Arab-Israeli negotiations.

In October 1994, Assad met with American President Bill Clinton in Damascus, which had been the destination of dozens of visits by US secretaries of state in order to develop bilateral relations and push forward peace negotiations with Israel. Four years later, Assad traveled to Paris in his first visit to a western nation in 22 years. He was warmly received by Chirac, who had played an integral role in opening European doors to Assad.

Five ministers, five armies
Before Assad’s death, Syria’s troops were deployed in Lebanon, where Damascus held all the strings. Before his death, Syria was part of a trilateral front that included Turkey and Iran in deterring the establishment of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. At the same time, it was part of the Damascus Declaration group that included Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Arab countries. It was also part of the tripartite alliance with Riyadh and Cairo. It had restored relations with Saddam, while also harboring his opponents.

Syria used to host organizations opposed to Israel, while also negotiating with Israel through American channels. In late March 2000, Assad and Clinton held a summit in Geneva in a last-ditch effort to reach peace.

In spring 1996, the foreign ministers of four nations, the US, Russia, France and Iran and European Union, each with rival interests, were in Damascus to reach the “April understanding” in wake of Israel’s Grapes of Wrath operation in southern Lebanon.

Today, Syria finds itself out of the Arab League. It is isolated and under the mercy of American and European sanctions. The American, Russian, Iranian, Turkish and Israeli air force are active on its territories and in its airspace. After the 2011 protests, half of the Syrian people have become displaced and 690,000 lives have been claimed by the war. Economic losses have topped 530 billion dollars, while the country still struggles with protests and shortages in food, medicine and water.

Syria, which used to vie for power beyond its border, is now an arena for the conflicts of others. From player to playground.



Ethiopia Builds Secret Camp to Train Sudan RSF Fighters 

Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
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Ethiopia Builds Secret Camp to Train Sudan RSF Fighters 

Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

Ethiopia is hosting a secret camp to train thousands of fighters for the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in neighboring Sudan, Reuters reporting has found, in the latest sign that one of the world’s deadliest conflicts is sucking in regional powers from Africa and the Middle East.

The camp is the first direct evidence of Ethiopia’s involvement in Sudan’s civil war, marking a potentially dangerous development that provides the RSF a substantial supply of fresh soldiers as fighting escalates in Sudan’s south.

Eight sources, including a senior Ethiopian government official, said the United Arab Emirates financed the camp’s construction and provided military trainers and logistical support to the site, a view also shared in an internal note by Ethiopia’s security services and in a diplomatic cable, reviewed by Reuters.

The news agency could not independently verify UAE involvement in the project or the purpose of the camp. In response to a request for comment, the UAE foreign ministry said it was not a party to the conflict or “in any way” involved in the hostilities.

Reuters spoke to 15 sources familiar with the camp's construction and operations, including Ethiopian officials and diplomats, and analyzed satellite imagery of the area. Two Ethiopian intelligence officials and the satellite images provided information that corroborated details contained in the security memo and cable.

The location and scale of the camp and the detailed allegations of the UAE’s involvement have not been previously reported. The images show the extent of the new development, as recently as in the past few weeks, along with construction for a drone ground control station at a nearby airport.

Satellite imagery shows a camp with hundreds of tents in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 22, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

Activity picked up in October at the camp, which is located in the remote western region of Benishangul-Gumuz, near the border with Sudan, satellite images show.

Ethiopia’s government spokesperson, its army and the RSF did not respond to detailed requests for comment about the findings of this story.

On January 6, UAE and Ethiopia issued a joint statement that included a call for a ceasefire in Sudan, as well as celebrating ties they said served the defense of each other’s security.

The Sudanese Armed Forces did not respond to a request for comment.

As of early January, 4,300 RSF fighters were undergoing military training at the site and “their logistical and military supplies are being provided by the UAE,” the note by Ethiopia’s security services seen by Reuters read.

Sudan's army has previously accused the UAE of supplying the RSF with weapons, a claim UN experts and US lawmakers have found credible.

The camp’s recruits are mainly Ethiopians, but citizens from South Sudan and Sudan, including from the SPLM-N, a Sudanese rebel group that controls territory in Sudan’s neighboring Blue Nile state, are also present, six officials said.

Reuters was unable to independently establish who was at the camp or the terms or conditions of recruitment.

A senior leader of the SPLM-N, who declined to be named, denied his forces had a presence in Ethiopia.

The six officials said the recruits are expected to join the RSF battling Sudanese soldiers in Blue Nile, which has emerged as a front in the struggle for control of Sudan. Two of the officials said hundreds had already crossed in recent weeks to support the paramilitaries in Blue Nile.

The internal security note said General Getachew Gudina, the Chief of the Defense Intelligence Department of the Ethiopian National Defense Force, was responsible for setting up the camp. A senior Ethiopian government official as well as four diplomatic and security sources confirmed Getachew’s role in launching the project.

Getachew did not respond to a request for comment.

The camp was carved out of forested land in a district called Menge, about 32 km from the border and strategically located at the intersection of the two countries and South Sudan, according to the satellite imagery and the diplomatic cable.

The first sign of activity in the area began in April, with forest clearing and the construction of metal-roofed buildings in a small area to the north of what is now the area of the camp with tents, where work began in the second half of October.

Satellite imagery shows a forested area where, ten months later, a camp with hundreds of tents was built in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, December 15, 2024. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

The diplomatic cable, dated November, described the camp as having a capacity of up to 10,000 fighters, saying activity began in October with the arrival of dozens of Land Cruisers, heavy trucks, RSF units and UAE trainers. Reuters is not revealing the country that wrote the cable, to protect the source.

Two of the officials described seeing trucks with the logo of the Emirati logistics company Gorica Group heading through the town of Asosa and towards the camp in October. Gorica did not respond to a request for comment.

The news agency was able to match elements of the timeframe specified in the diplomatic cable with satellite imagery. Images from Airbus Defense and Space show that after the initial clearing work, tents began filling the area from early November. Multiple diggers are visible in the imagery.

An image taken by US space technology firm Vantor on November 24 shows more than 640 tents at the camp, approximately four meters square. Each tent could comfortably house four people with some individual equipment, so the camp could accommodate at least 2,500 people, according to an analysis of the satellite imagery by defense intelligence company Janes.

Janes said it could not confirm the site was military based on their analysis of the imagery.

New recruits were spotted travelling to the camp in mid-November, two senior military officials said.

Satellite imagery shows an area where trucks come and go at a camp in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 22, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

On November 17, a column of 56 trucks packed with trainees rumbled through dirt roads of the remote region, the officials, who witnessed the convoys, told Reuters, with each truck holding between 50 and 60 fighters, the officials estimated.

Two days later, both officials saw another convoy of 70 trucks carrying soldiers driving in the same direction, they said.

The November 24 image shows at least 18 large trucks at the site. The vehicles’ size, shape and design match those of models frequently used by the Ethiopian military and its allies to transport soldiers, according to Reuters analysis.

Development continued in late January, the Vantor images show, including new clearing and digging in the riverbed just north of the main camp and dozens of shipping containers lined around the camp visible in a January 22 image. A senior Ethiopian government official said construction on the camp was ongoing but did not elaborate on future building plans.

Sudan’s civil war erupted in 2023 after a power struggle between the Sudanese army and the RSF ahead of a planned transition to civilian rule.


Gaza Girls Take Up Boxing to Heal War’s Scars

Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
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Gaza Girls Take Up Boxing to Heal War’s Scars

Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)

In a makeshift boxing ring etched into the sand between the tens of displaced Palestinians in southern Gaza, a dozen young girls warmed up before delivering fierce blows at their coach's command.

Osama Ayub once ran a boxing club in Gaza City, in the north of the Palestinian territory, until it was destroyed in a strike along with his home during the war between Israel and Hamas.

After finding shelter in the southern city of Khan Younis, he opted to put his sporting skills at the service of displaced Gazans, crammed by the tens of thousands in tents and makeshift shelters.

"We decided to work inside the camp to offer the girls some psychological relief from the war", Ayub told AFP.

Behind him, some of the young athletes faced each other in the ring surrounded by cheering gymmates, while others trained on a punching bag.

"The girls have been affected by the war and the bombardments; some have lost their families or loved ones. They feel pain and want to release it, so they have found in boxing a way to express their emotions," said Ayub.

Ayub now runs these free training sessions for 45 boxers aged between 8 and 19 three times a week, with positive feedback from his students as well as from the community.

One of the youngsters, Ghazal Radwan, aged 14, hopes to become a champion and represent her country.

"I practice boxing to develop my character, release pent-up energy and to become a champion in the future, compete against world champions in other countries, and raise the Palestinian flag around the world", she told AFP.

- Call for aid -

One after the other, the girls trained with Ayub, shifting from right to left jabs, hooks and uppercuts at his command.

In war-devastated Gaza, where construction materials are scarce, Ayub had to improvise to build his small training facility.

"We brought wood and built a square boxing ring, but there are no mats or safety measures," he said.

He called on the international community to support the boxers and help them travel abroad to train, "to strengthen their confidence and offer them psychological support".

The strict blockade that Israel imposed on the Gaza Strip makes the reconstruction of sports facilities particularly complicated, as building materials are routinely rejected by Israeli officials.

The official Palestinian news agency Wafa reported in January that a shipment of artificial turf donated by China to Gaza's youth and sports council was not allowed in by Israel.

With medicine, food and fuel all in short supply, sports equipment comes much lower on the list of items entering the Palestinian territory.

Rimas, a 16-year-old boxer, said she and her friends continued "to practice boxing despite the war, the bombardments and the destruction".

"We, the girls who box, hope for your support, that you will bring us gloves and shoes. We train on sand and need mats and punching bags," she said in comments addressed to the international community.


Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?

Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
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Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?

Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 

As US military movements intensify in the Middle East and the possibility of strikes on Iran looms, Yemen’s Houthi group has continued military preparations, mobilizing fighters and establishing new weapons sites.

The Houthi mobilization comes at a time when the group is widely viewed as one of Iran’s most important regional arms for retaliation.

Although the Iran-backed group has not issued any official statement declaring its position on a potential US attack on Iran, its leaders have warned Washington against any military action and against bearing full responsibility for any escalation and its consequences.

They have hinted that any response would be handled in accordance with the group’s senior leadership's assessment, after evaluating developments and potential repercussions.

Despite these signals, some interpret the Houthis’ stance as an attempt to avoid drawing the attention of the current US administration, led by President Donald Trump, to the need for preemptive action in anticipation of a potential Houthi response.

The Trump administration previously launched a military campaign against the group in the spring of last year, inflicting heavy losses.

Islam al-Mansi, an Egyptian researcher specializing in Iranian affairs, said Iran may avoid burning all its cards unless absolutely necessary, particularly given US threats to raise the level of escalation should any Iranian military proxies intervene or take part in a confrontation.

Iran did not resort to using its military proxies during its confrontation with Israel or during a limited US strike last summer because it did not perceive an existential threat, al-Mansi said.

That calculation could change in the anticipated confrontation, potentially prompting Houthi intervention, including targeting US allies, interests, and military forces, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Al-Mansi added that although Iran previously offered, within a negotiating framework, to abandon its regional proxies, including the Houthis, this makes it more likely that Tehran would use them in retaliation, noting that Iran created these groups to defend its territory from afar.

Many intelligence reports suggest that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has discussed with the Houthis the activation of alternative support arenas in a potential US-Iran confrontation, including the use of cells and weapons not previously deployed.

Visible readiness

In recent days, Chinese media outlets cited an unnamed Houthi military commander as saying the group had raised its alert level and carried out inspections of missile launch platforms in several areas across Yemen, including the strategically important Red Sea region.

In this context, Yemeni political researcher Salah Ali Salah said the Houthis would participate in defending Iran against any US attacks, citing the group’s media rhetoric accompanying mass rallies, which openly supports Iran’s right to defend itself.

While this rhetoric maintains some ambiguity regarding Iran, it repeatedly invokes the war in Gaza and renews Houthi pledges to resume military escalation in defense of the besieged enclave’s population, Salah told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He noted that Iran would not have shared advanced and sophisticated military technologies with the Houthis without a high degree of trust in their ability to use them in Iran’s interest.

In recent months, following Israeli strikes on the unrecognized Houthi government and several of its leaders, hardline Houthi figures demonstrating strong loyalty to Iran have become more prominent.

On the ground, the group has established new military sites and moved equipment and weapons to new locations along and near the coast, alongside the potential use of security cells beyond Yemen’s borders.

Salah said that if the threat of a military strike on Iran escalates, the Iranian response could take a more advanced form, potentially including efforts to close strategic waterways, placing the Bab al-Mandab Strait within the Houthis’ target range.

Many observers have expressed concern that the Houthis may have transferred fighters and intelligence cells outside Yemen over recent years to target US and Western interests in the region.

Open options

After a ceasefire was declared in Gaza, the Houthis lost one of their key justifications for mobilizing fighters and collecting funds. The group has since faced growing public anger over its practices and worsening humanitarian conditions, responding with media messaging aimed at convincing audiences that the battle is not over and that further rounds lie ahead.

Alongside weekly rallies in areas under their control in support of Gaza, the Houthis have carried out attacks on front lines with Yemen’s internationally recognized government, particularly in Taiz province.

Some military experts describe these incidents as probing attacks, while others see them as attempts to divert attention from other activities.

In this context, Walid al-Abara, head of the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, said the Houthis entered a critical phase after the Gaza war ended, having lost one of the main justifications for their attacks on Red Sea shipping.

As a result, they may seek to manufacture new pretexts, including claims of sanctions imposed against them, to maintain media momentum and their regional role.

Al-Abara told Asharq Al-Awsat that the group has two other options. The first is redirecting its activity inward to strengthen its military and economic leverage, either to impose its conditions in any future settlement or to consolidate power.

The second is yielding to international and regional pressure and entering a negotiation track, particularly if sanctions intensify or its economic and military capacity declines.

According to an assessment by the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, widespread protests in Iran are increasingly pressuring the regime’s ability to manage its regional influence at the same pace as before, without dismantling its network of proxies.

This reality is pushing Tehran toward a more cautious approach, governed by domestic priorities and cost-benefit calculations, while maintaining a minimum level of external influence without broad escalation.

Within this framework, al-Abara said Iran is likely to maintain a controlled continuity in its relationship with the Houthis through selective support that ensures the group remains effective.

However, an expansion of protests or a direct military strike on Iran could open the door to a deeper Houthi repositioning, including broader political and security concessions in exchange for regional guarantees.