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Conflict Rages over ‘Weapons and Heart’ of Tribes in Northeastern Syria

SDF commander Abdi Mazloum, wearing a traditional Arab dress, meets tribal leaders in Syria.
SDF commander Abdi Mazloum, wearing a traditional Arab dress, meets tribal leaders in Syria.
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Conflict Rages over ‘Weapons and Heart’ of Tribes in Northeastern Syria

SDF commander Abdi Mazloum, wearing a traditional Arab dress, meets tribal leaders in Syria.
SDF commander Abdi Mazloum, wearing a traditional Arab dress, meets tribal leaders in Syria.

The conflict that kicked off in mid-2019 between international and regional powers to win over the tribes of northeastern Syria intensified in recent days after the assassination of a senior figure in the Al-Uqaydat tribe, one of the largest in the Deir Ezzour province.

A look at the past
Backed by the US-led international coalition, the Kurdish-Arab Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) liberated the town of Baghouz, in Deir Ezzour, from ISIS in March 2019. Weeks later, protests erupted in the region east of the Euphrates, demanding an improvement in services and a halt to the “export” of oil to regions held by the Damascus regime. The SDF controls about 185 square kilometers, or nearly a third of Syria, 90 percent of the country’s oilfields, half of its gas fields, its three largest dams and most agricultural territories.

The majority of influential players in Syria have tried to win these tribes over to their side. These efforts have led to the tribes striking alliances with various forces: One alliance was struck with the SDF, another with Ankara and the third with Damascus. Tehran, meanwhile, attempted to offer “attractive packages” to Syrian youths to recruit them to its militias.

The Arab Council in Al Jazeera and Al Furat, which was formed in 2017, supported the Deir Ezzour protests that erupted against SDF. Ankara, meanwhile, supported the establishment of the Supreme Council of Syrian Tribes and Clans in December 2018. These clans and tribes voiced their support for the Turkish operations against the SDF.

On the other end, figures close to Damascus, including Hussam Qaterji, sponsored a conference for the Deir Ezzour tribes. The event was held in the Aleppo countryside and vowed to provide 5,000 fighters at a time when Iran was present militarily in Deir Ezzour. The al-Baqir brigade announced the formation of “resistance tribal units” aimed at expelling foreign forces from Syria.

New factors
A number of major and minor developments had taken place in recent months, which shifted attention to northeastern Syria. The first was US President Donald Trump’s announcement that he will keep a number of American forces in the region east of the Euphrates River after he had initially announced that he was pulling out the troops from the country. The second was the continuation of Israeli raids against “Iranian positions” in the Deir Ezzour and Albukamal regions. The third was Russia testing just how committed Washington was to maintaining its forces by its repeated attempts to reach the Iraqi border.

On the internal scene, and after months of secret American and French-sponsored negotiations, the two most prominent Kurdish parties in northeastern Syria succeeded in reaching preliminary agreements that guarantee the commitment to the Hewler (Erbil) pact. Deep differences between the Kurdish National Council and Democratic Union alliance had thwarted the implementation of the pact.

Another development was the declaration by Syria's Tomorrow Movement, headed by Ahmed al-Jarba, of the formation of the new Peace and Freedom Front. The front includes the Arab Council in Al Jazeera and Al Furat, Assyrian Democratic Organization and Kurdish National Council. Leaders of the front said it includes Kurdish, Arab and Assyrian forces on the ground in order to underscore the ties and cooperation between them. They acknowledged the role of the SDF, but said that it alone cannot rule the region.

A delegation from the Peace and Freedom Front recently met with American officials in the region east of the Euphrates. One of its leaders told Asharq Al-Awsat that the delegation received positive responses from the US, which was keen on establishing a partnership that the Syrian people deserve.

Commander of the SDF, Mazloum Abdi, had on his end held a number of meetings with tribal leaders from Deir Ezzour to listen to their demands.

Another significant development was US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Senator Lindsey Graham’s announcement of a partnership deal between the US Delta Crescent Energy company and SDF to invest in oil in the region east of the Euphrates with the possibility of exporting it. Observers interpreted the move as American recognition of the Kurdish autonomous administration, significantly since the agreement, which deals with national Syrian resources, does not involve Damascus.

Amid all of these developments, Sheikh Muttshar al-Hifl, a senior Al-Uqaydat tribe member, was assassinated in Deir Ezzour in early August.

Raging conflict
The autonomous administration and SDF did not comment on the oil deal, but Ankara, Damascus, Tehran and Moscow were quick to denounce it as a “violation of Syria’s sovereignty” and “theft” of its resources. The deal and Hifl’s assassination have added fuel to the raging conflict between local, regional and international forces over the Deir Ezzour tribes.

The SDF denied its involvement in the murder and instead implied that the regime was involved. It has arrested a number of suspects and investigations are ongoing with them, said a Kurdish official. “The tribes are politically disorganized and the region was liberated from ISIS only a year ago,” he added. “We are tasked with providing security to hold elections and help the tribes organize themselves.”

Meanwhile, the “Al-Uqaydat Zubaid” tribe announced on Monday the formation of a military council aimed at “liberating the region.” It hailed the “heroics of the Syrian Arab Army” and saluted “the friends of Syria and their support of the war against terrorism led by president Bashar Assad.” Another group, called the “Al-Uqaydat tribe” issued a statement “thanking the Turkish command, government and army for what it has offered to the Syrian people.” It thanked them for meeting a series of demands, including having the US cease its support to the SDF, handing over the region to its people and rejecting demographic change.

The Arab Council in Al Jazeera and Al Furat was quick to condemn Hifl’s assassination. But the most significant reaction to the murder came from Ibrahim al-Hifl, Sheikh of the Al-Uqaydat Zubaid tribe, who was wounded in the attack. In a statement on Tuesday, he held the international coalition “fully” responsible for the developments in the region, demanding that it turn it over to the people and that the Arabs play their role “in full” in the area. He gave the coalition a month to meet the demands and hand over the perpetrators.

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Gemayel to Asharq Al-Awsat: Khaddam was Assad’s Stick to Apply Pressure

Relations between Gemayel and Khaddam were highly tense (Getty)
Relations between Gemayel and Khaddam were highly tense (Getty)
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Gemayel to Asharq Al-Awsat: Khaddam was Assad’s Stick to Apply Pressure

Relations between Gemayel and Khaddam were highly tense (Getty)
Relations between Gemayel and Khaddam were highly tense (Getty)

Late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad was a masterful negotiator, fiercely protective of his image and reputation. He was known for exhausting his guests with lengthy detours into history before addressing the substance of any talks.

Assad had an exceptional ability to restrain his anger, circling around an issue before striking again — often with calculated patience.

He avoided coarse language, allowing resentments to speak for themselves, but he never forgave those he believed had tried to derail his vision. Among them, according to accounts, were Yasser Arafat, Kamal Jumblatt, Bashir Gemayel, Amine Gemayel, and Samir Geagea.

In dealing with rivals and pressuring opponents, Assad often relied on a trusted enforcer: Abdel Halim Khaddam, his long-time foreign minister and later vice president. In the second part of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Lebanese President Amine Gemayel said Khaddam was Assad’s “stick,” used to assert control.

Many Lebanese politicians believed Khaddam’s bluntness was not personal, but rather a reflection of an official mandate from his mentor.

Assad rarely issued direct threats. Instead, he preferred subtle intimidation — as when he told Gemayel that his aides had once suggested blowing up President Anwar Sadat’s plane to prevent him from reaching Jerusalem.

Khaddam, the late Syrian strongman’s long-serving envoy, was known for humiliating both allies and foes who dared defy Damascus’ directives. His tactics were often unsettling — deliberately designed to leave visitors unnerved and pliant by the time they reached Assad’s office.

In a conversation in Paris during his retirement, Khaddam defended his hardline methods, saying they were not meant to insult but to prevent potentially dangerous confrontations. “The aim was to avoid escalation that could lead to security agencies taking over, which might have resulted in worse outcomes,” he said.

In the same meeting, Khaddam accused former Lebanese President Amine Gemayel of obstructing a political solution in Lebanon, calling him “hesitant and suspicious.”

He also acknowledged Assad was caught off guard when the Tripartite Agreement collapsed. The Syrian leader, Khaddam said, had not believed anyone in Lebanon would openly defy Syria — or the other Lebanese factions who had signed the accord.

“President Assad had many cards to play. President Sarkis had none,” recalled former Lebanese Foreign Minister Fouad Boutros, reflecting on the stark imbalance between Syria and Lebanon during Elias Sarkis’s presidency.

Assad, he said, had the power to topple or paralyze the Lebanese government before Sarkis even returned to Beirut. “Sarkis had no leverage over Assad,” Boutros noted. “But while Sarkis often showed flexibility, he would stand firm when asked to compromise Lebanon’s core principles.”

Boutros, who played a key role in Lebanon’s diplomacy during the civil war, said he had to exercise utmost restraint to keep Khaddam — Syria’s often abrasive envoy — from derailing talks with personal attacks or inflammatory language.

The dynamic, he suggested, was not unique to Sarkis. It also echoed the later, uneasy relationship between Gemayel and Assad.

Gemayel recalled a cold and confrontational relationship with Khaddam, describing him as “the stick and the poison” used by Assad to pressure Beirut into submission.

“There was no warmth between us from the beginning,” Gemayel told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“Khaddam used underhanded tactics to undermine the presidency and sow division within my team. While President Assad treated me with respect and politeness, he needed someone to apply pressure — and that was Khaddam,” he added.

Gemayel said Khaddam was behind all the pressure campaigns Syria waged against him — all with Assad’s full knowledge. “Assad played the courteous statesman. Khaddam handled the dirty work. Syria wanted me to sign agreements harmful to Lebanon’s interests, and Khaddam was the one tasked with forcing my hand.”

Despite Khaddam’s harsh demeanor, Gemayel said he never allowed him to overstep.

“I kept him in check. He didn’t dare cross the line with me. We were once in a meeting with President Assad, and Khaddam had been spreading ridiculous rumors beforehand. When he spoke up, I turned to Assad and said: ‘Mr. President, we have a problem with Khaddam. Please ask him to stop acting like a spy when dealing with us.’”

Khaddam, Gemayel said, tried to intimidate many Lebanese politicians — but not him.

“He was rude, even insolent to the point of absurdity. But he knew that if he said anything out of line with me, I would respond immediately.”

Assad’s Subtle Control and the Language of Minorities

Assad understood early on the fragility of Lebanon’s sectarian makeup. To him, the country was a meeting place for minorities — one that always needed an external patron to manage its wars and truces. He allowed for limited victories, but never total defeat, ensuring that no side could do without Syria’s oversight.

Assad sought to rule Syria indefinitely, with Lebanon as a backyard extension of his regime. Yet unlike his brother Rifaat, he avoided openly sectarian rhetoric or calls for partition. Rifaat, according to Gemayel, once suggested dividing both Syria and Lebanon along sectarian lines during a conversation with Lebanese leaders Walid Jumblatt and Marwan Hamadeh.

When asked whether he ever felt his dialogue with Assad was, at its core, a conversation between an Alawite and a Maronite, Gemayel replied: “No — that was Rifaat’s language. He used to say minorities must come together and show solidarity. But that narrative was never pushed by President Assad or his inner circle. It was always tailored to serve their own agenda.”

Assad’s political strategy was built on gathering leverage — and minority groups were central to that plan. His ties with Lebanon’s Druze community, and his clash with Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt, fit squarely within this framework. Assad relied on Syria’s own Druze population, as well as the Christian minority, to tighten his grip on the country’s diverse communities and align them under the banner of his regime.

“Assad had a firm hold on the minorities,” Gemayel said, adding that “he brought them all together to make them part of the Syrian system.”

Tensions between Syria’s Alawite leadership and the country’s Sunni majority were well known, Gemayel added, particularly through the candid rhetoric of Assad’s brother, Rifaat.

“Rifaat was open about the hostility between Alawites and Sunnis,” Gemayel said. “In his conversations with us, it was clear. But with President Assad, there was no visible sign of that. What lay beneath the surface, only God knows — but in our dealings with him, we never felt it.”

Gemayel Dismisses Reports of a Syria-Lebanon Confederation Proposal

Asked about longstanding claims that former Lebanese President Camille Chamoun had once proposed a confederation between Lebanon and Syria to Hafez al-Assad, Gemayel was quick to reject the idea.

“That’s absolutely not true,” he said. “President Chamoun would never have made such a proposal. A lot of things were said at the time. There were even reports that US envoy Dean Brown had suggested relocating Lebanon’s Christians to California — all of it nonsense, poetic talk with no grounding in reality.”

Gemayel also addressed one of the most controversial moments in US diplomacy during Lebanon’s 1988 presidential crisis: the phrase reportedly used by US envoy Richard Murphy — “Mikhael Daher or chaos.”

Daher, a Christian MP close to Damascus, had been floated as the only candidate acceptable to both Syria and the United States.

But Washington later distanced itself from the deal. The episode, Gemayel said, underscored a period in which American pressure aligned more with Syrian — and by extension, Israeli — interests, leaving Lebanon’s sovereignty hanging in the balance.

Gemayel confirmed that US envoy Richard Murphy did indeed issue the stark ultimatum in 1988. The phrase, which became emblematic of foreign interference in Lebanon’s presidential crisis, reflected what Gemayel described as Washington’s unwillingness to confront Damascus — despite acknowledging its destabilizing role in Lebanon.

“Yes, Murphy said it,” Gemayel affirmed to Asharq Al-Awsat.

“The Americans had a problem — they wanted Syria, and they didn’t. They knew Syria was playing a destructive role in Lebanon, but they didn’t want to challenge it. They kept trying to find common ground with Syria, not with us.”

According to Gemayel, the US saw Daher — a respected Christian parliamentarian close to Damascus — as a palatable compromise. “They thought Daher was a respectable figure who might be acceptable to the Lebanese, so they went along with Syria’s choice,” he said.

Washington, he added, had consistently prioritized pragmatism over principle in Lebanon, often aligning with whichever side could deliver results — even if it came at Beirut’s expense.

“It was the same with the May 17 Agreement with Israel,” Gemayel said, referring to the short-lived 1983 accord.

“The US couldn't pressure Israel, so Lebanon had to pay. And they couldn’t pressure Syria either — Syria was stubborn, had resources, and they didn’t want a confrontation. So they kept trying to sell us solutions that weren’t in Lebanon’s interest.”

“The Americans were always looking for the quickest deal,” he added. “They wanted to please both Syria and Israel. With Syria, it was clear — they didn’t want to upset Assad, because they knew who held the real power in Lebanon.”

Gemayel said that while he personally held the reins in decision-making and negotiations with Syria during his time in office, several close advisers and intermediaries played essential roles in laying the groundwork for dialogue with Damascus.

“The relationship and final decisions were in my hands,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“I was the one doing the actual negotiating. But when it came to preparation, the late Jean Obeid played a very valuable role. He was intelligent, committed to Lebanon’s interests, and had close ties with the Syrians. He couldn’t get everything done, but he managed to ease certain issues,” said Gemayel.

Gemayel also credited Eli Salem, another aide, for navigating delicate talks with Syrian officials — particularly with Khaddam.

“Salem had a knack for getting through on specific points,” Gemayel said. “He had good chemistry with Khaddam, and that helped, especially since Khaddam and I didn’t get along.”

One figure who unexpectedly played a constructive role, according to Gemayel, was Brigadier General Jamil al-Sayyed, then an intelligence officer stationed in Lebanon’s eastern Bekaa Valley.

“You may be surprised,” he said, “but Jamil al-Sayyed was very helpful. Whenever I was heading to Damascus, I would stop in the Bekaa to meet him. He gave me very precise insights into what was happening at the Syrian presidential palace and the broader picture in Damascus. He was well-informed, sincere, and provided intelligence that wasn’t widely available — information that truly benefited Lebanon.”

Asked whether Syria was uneasy about the role of veteran journalist and diplomat Ghassan Tueni in his administration, Gemayel said the Syrians had little affection for him.

“There was never any warmth toward Ghassan,” he said. “He came with me to Syria just once, and it was clear there was tension. Whenever he was present, things got heated. Ghassan and Khaddam were like a ping-pong match — constantly hitting the ball back and forth.”

The friction, Gemayel explained, stemmed in large part from Tueni’s association with An-Nahar, the Beirut daily he helped lead, which often published sharp criticism of Syria.

“Syria never appreciated An-Nahar,” Gemayel said. “Even if Ghassan tried to distance himself from specific articles, the content was out there for everyone to see — and the Syrians didn’t forget it.”