Amr Moussa: Current Developments in Lebanon Tied to Rafik Hariri’s Assassination

Asharq Al-Awsat releases excerpts of the former Arab League secretary-general’s new biography.

Amr Moussa and Rafik Hariri during one of their meetings. (Getty Images)
Amr Moussa and Rafik Hariri during one of their meetings. (Getty Images)
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Amr Moussa: Current Developments in Lebanon Tied to Rafik Hariri’s Assassination

Amr Moussa and Rafik Hariri during one of their meetings. (Getty Images)
Amr Moussa and Rafik Hariri during one of their meetings. (Getty Images)

Three years after former Secretary-General of the Arab League Amr Moussa published the first part of his biography, his second book entitled, “The Years of the Arab League”, will soon be released by Dar El-Shorouk.

The 574-page book consists of 19 chapters in which Moussa reveals the secrets of his 10-year tenure at the Arab League (2001-2011), which was marked with major events in the Arab world.

Starting Saturday, Asharq Al-Awsat will publish seven episodes of Moussa’s memoirs. The first part focuses on the political crisis in Lebanon, which began with the call by Hezbollah and its Maronite ally – the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) – for the resignation of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora’s government, leading to the Doha Agreement in 2008.

Moussa recounts: “On February 14, 2005, I was in my office at the Arab League preparing to travel to Aden to attend the first meeting of the Economic and Social Council of the Arab League outside its headquarters, which was to be inaugurated by Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. I was watching Al-Jazeera, which suddenly announced a huge explosion in Beirut, in which Prime Minister Rafik Hariri might have been targeted. I surfed satellite stations until I saw on Al-Arabiya channel the news of Rafik Hariri’s death along with 21 other people.

I asked my office director to arrange my travel to Lebanon immediately, and I called the Yemeni Foreign Minister, Abu Bakr al-Qirbi, and told him that I would not be able to attend because of what happened, and that I would go to Lebanon.

President Ali Abdullah Saleh contacted me shortly after, stressing the need for me to come to Yemen; but I apologized, saying that the assassination of Rafik Hariri was an Arab calamity and a very dangerous development.

On the same day, I traveled to Beirut. At Hariri’s palace, I found his two sons Saadeddine and Bahaa. I offered them condolences, and the place was teeming with mourners. I was the first official to arrive from abroad and I stayed in the palace until late at night. The first Arab foreign minister to land in Beirut was Dr. Abu Bakr al-Qirbi, who also did not attend the Aden meeting!

The funeral took place on the second day. Given the deteriorating security situation in Beirut at this time, my dear friend, Speaker Nabih Berri, placed me under the protection of the Parliament’s security guards. It was clear that some leaders of the Sunni community, some Maronite parties and others were blaming Syria for the assassination.

Some of them pointed at Hezbollah, but basically, all accusations were directed at Damascus. I found that the best thing that the secretary-general of the Arab League could do was to travel to Syria and talk to President Bashar al-Assad.

On the third day, I requested to visit Syria. I went under a very tight protection by the Lebanese government until I reached the Syrian border, where the Syrian guards escorted me directly to the presidential palace. President Bashar received me and we had a very frank conversation.

I told him: Mr. President, I came from Lebanon where feelings are raging after what happened. The death of Rafik Hariri will not pass easily, and the Syrian presence [in Lebanon] has now become under deep scrutiny… Demands are growing for the withdrawal of the Syrian forces…

He told me: I am the first Syrian president to withdraw forces from Lebanon. There were more than 60,000 Syrian soldiers when I came to power. I reduced the number to 35,000, and I am ready to withdraw additional troops… I have no objection to removing all the forces. I asked him: Can I, Mr. President, announce that you have decided to withdraw the Syrian army from Lebanon? He said: Yes, you can announce that, because I told you that I will withdraw the army.

I went out and announced the news, saying that it will be carried out within a specific time frame. My meeting with the president was attended by Foreign Minister Farouk Al-Sharaa, with whom I had lunch. Whenever the withdrawal was raised, Sharaa changed the subject, as if he wanted to ignore the topic. He was not comfortable with the announcement by Syrian journalists that the president had decided to start the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon.

I left Syria by land to Beirut and returned by plane to Cairo. There, I turned on the radio in the car and heard the BBC: “Syrian officials have denied what the secretary-general of the League of Arab States had said about President Bashar al-Assad’s decision to withdraw his troops from Lebanon.”

I got angry, and immediately called Al-Sharaa. He asked me: What do you want us to do?

I told him to confirm my statement as secretary-general of the League after my encounter with the president, and avoid us getting into a war of statements because I will of course insist on what I mentioned following the meeting.

The Syrian side consented and the president started reducing the forces until their complete withdrawal.

Motives of the assassination
In my interpretation of the motives for Hariri’s assassination, I say: He was a leader capable of exercising power, as he was of a special prestige, whether among the Lebanese Sunnis or among the political, economic and societal circles in Lebanon in general. The presence of a man of Hariri’s stature at the top of the Sunni community cannot be ignored in the face of Hezbollah.

The removal of Hariri from the scene was based on long-term regional calculations, and an important part of what we see in Lebanon today is connected to it.

Between March and June 2006, the Lebanese National Dialogue Conference, with the participation of leaders and influential figures, reached consensus on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Syria, the demarcation of the borders and the possession of weapons outside the Palestinian camps. A serious discussion took place over Hezbollah’s arms, but without being completed.

The national dialogue made us believe that things were heading towards a quiet Lebanese summer, especially on the southern borders with Israel. But on June 12, 2006, a force affiliated with Hezbollah attacked an Israeli military post on the border, resulting in the capture of two Israeli soldiers and the killing of eight others. Israel responded by launching an extensive attack.

The Arab views varied over the escalating steps that Hezbollah had taken against Israel. Egypt and Saudi Arabia considered this an adventure by the party. Here, I must say that managing Arab politics, especially when it comes to a crisis that has far-reaching roots, is always linked to global policies and contradictory interests of major countries, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict.

From this standpoint, the Arab League’s stance was formulated at that time without prejudice to the organization’s firm position regarding one of the origins of the problem, namely the Israeli occupation and its practices that can neither be accepted nor tolerated.

War of statements
Immediately after the outbreak of the aggression, Kuwait, in coordination with me, called for an urgent meeting of the Arab foreign ministers at the headquarters of the Arab League in Cairo, which took place on July 15, 2006.

The second closed session of the meeting witnessed severe arguments between Prince Saud Al-Faisal, the Saudi foreign minister, and his Syrian counterpart Walid Al-Muallem.

Al-Muallem addressed the participants, saying: “I want to share with you some of my crazy dreams, I say crazy because they don’t match the current Arab or international situations... I dreamed that our meeting would begin with a minute of silence for the souls of the martyrs of Gaza and Lebanon, and that the secretary-general will call for our meeting in Gaza… In all frankness and sincerity... we will not adopt any word that comes out of here that is beneficial to Israel in its aggression against Lebanon, whether in the name of rationality or in the name of emotion…”

Prince Saud asked to respond to Al-Muallem, saying: “I did not know that the policy of brother Walid was driven by dreams… Why is it permitted to use the Lebanese borders to attack Israel and not to use the Golan? Did Israel attack because we issued a statement? Israel attacked because of what Hezbollah had done in the region. What kind of a dream is it when a person believes that rationality and logic were a fatal mistake? These are demonic dreams.”

I observed in silence what was happening, hoping to find an opportunity to interject. At the same time, it was difficult to change the convictions of a large group of Arab League members that Hezbollah’s actions were not motivated by resisting Israeli occupation, but rather part of a political game led by Iran and its regional role that opposes Arabs and their interests.

Arab foreign ministers meeting
During the last week of July 2006, I felt that we needed to block the American-French draft resolution in the Security Council, because it would be unjust to Lebanon.

Hence, I called for a meeting of the Arab foreign ministers at the Grand Serail in Beirut, to be held on August 7. Following speeches in solidarity with Lebanon, the meeting turned into a bitter and long debate between Al-Muallem, who insisted on saluting Hezbollah in the decision of the Arab League Council, and Siniora, who responded by saying: “Arab foreign ministers came here to support a unified Lebanese position.”

The Council reached a set of decisions, including the assignment of the UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Qatari Minister of Foreign Affairs of Qatar to present the Arab viewpoint on the situation in Lebanon.

The meetings in New York ended with the Security Council issuing Resolution 1701 on August 11, 2006. Through a legal reading of the resolution, I say that it is largely biased towards Israel, but it can be considered as better than the previous draft resolutions that were rejected by both Hezbollah and the Lebanese government. According to Hassan Nasrallah, this decision was the least harmful of all the other draft-resolutions.

Published in special agreement with Dar Al Shorouk - all rights reserved.



What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
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What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)

In unusually blunt language, and following a visit by Sudan’s Sovereignty Council Chairman and army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to Cairo, the Egyptian presidency issued a statement on the war in Sudan outlining three points it described as red lines.

It said Egypt would not allow any of them to be crossed or compromised, as they directly affect Egypt’s national security, which it said is inseparable from Sudan’s national security.

The reference to activating the joint defense agreement between the two countries was seen as a signal that Egypt could bring its military, political, and diplomatic weight to bear in support of the Sudanese army.

Joint defense agreement

In March 2021, Egypt signed a military cooperation agreement with Sudan that covers training, border security, and the confrontation of shared threats. That agreement followed a joint defense pact signed in 1976 during the presidencies of Sudan’s Gaafar Nimeiry and Egypt’s Anwar Sadat.

Articles One and Two of the pact stipulate that any attack on one party is considered an attack on the other, and require immediate consultation, including the use of armed force to repel aggression. The agreement also commits both sides to coordinating their defense and military policies on matters related to their national security.

After the fall of Nimeiry’s regime in the 1985 popular uprising, then Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi informed the Egyptian leadership of his desire to cancel the joint defense agreement. Instead, the two sides signed what became known as the Brotherhood Charter in 1987. While it did not explicitly cancel the 1976 agreement, its mechanisms have not been discussed or activated since then.

Regional and international messages

Sudanese journalist Osman Mirghani, editor-in-chief of Al-Tayar newspaper, said the Egyptian statements amounted to regional and international messages linked to recent developments and what he described as serious security threats facing Sudan.

He pointed to the expansion of the Rapid Support Forces in the Darfur and Kordofan regions in a way that threatens shared Sudanese and Egyptian national security, warning of risks of geographic fragmentation that could endanger Sudan’s unity.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Mirghani said Egypt was, for the first time, using direct and tough language and signaling the possibility of intervention under international law in Sudan’s conflict. He said this reflected the level of Egyptian concern over the situation in Sudan.

Mirghani added that the reference to red lines was a message directed at all parties, noting that there are many influential players in Sudan.

The red lines

The first red line cited by Cairo was the preservation of Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity, preventing any tampering with its resources or those of the Sudanese people, and rejecting the secession of any part of the country. Egypt reiterated its categorical refusal to the establishment or recognition of any parallel entities, saying such moves would undermine Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity.

The statement also stressed the need to preserve Sudanese state institutions and prevent any harm to them. Egypt affirmed its full right to take all necessary measures permitted under international law, including activating the joint defense agreement between the two brotherly countries, to ensure these red lines are not crossed.

Timing of the visit

Former Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Youssef noted the timing of Burhan’s visit to Cairo, stating that it occurred after his trip to Saudi Arabia earlier this week and following a visit by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to the United States.

Youssef said the trip was part of efforts to end the war in Sudan through the Quartet mechanism, which includes Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and the United States.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Youssef said Burhan briefed Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the outcomes of his Saudi visit and the latest developments in Sudan.

He stated that the visit did not follow the usual ceremonial protocol and was a result of developments in the war, noting that Egypt’s security is linked to Sudan’s security. He added that Egypt is part of the Quartet, which seeks to end a war that is approaching its third year.

Military implications

Sudanese military expert Al-Muatasim Abdel Qader said activating the joint agreement would imply Egyptian intervention in various forms, including supplying weapons and ammunition or direct military involvement.

He said the provisions of the agreement obligate each army to defend the other, adding that the red lines outlined by the Egyptian presidency represented a significant step and carried major implications for the Sudanese state.

In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, Abdel Qader described mutual protection between the two countries as a historically rooted matter, dating back to wars Egypt fought in the last century in which Sudanese armed forces took part.

Rapid Support Forces response

Basha Tabiq, an adviser to the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, said in posts on X that Egypt’s position amounted to blatant interference, bias toward one party, and a colonial mindset that views Sudan as a backyard.

Another source aligned with the RSF said accusations against Egypt of backing the Sudanese army have persisted since the early days of the war. The source pointed to the presence of Egyptian forces at Merowe air base in northern Sudan at the start of the conflict, when several Egyptian soldiers and officers were captured before later being handed over to Cairo.

The source also cited accusations by RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, who said in October 2024 that the Egyptian army had carried out air strikes against his forces and supplied the Sudanese army with drones and training.

He said Hemedti renewed those accusations last June, alleging that Cairo supported the Sudanese army with aircraft flown by Egyptian pilots that bombed areas under his forces’ control, and supplied weapons and aviation fuel. Hemedti described this as a blatant aggression against the Sudanese people.

The source, who requested anonymity, said Egypt has been intervening in the war from the outset and that activating the joint defense agreement would merely formalize an existing reality.

No time to spare

Sudanese ambassador Al-Sadiq al-Maqli said Egypt is working with Saudi Arabia and the international Quartet, in coordination with the United States, to give fresh momentum to efforts on Sudan.

He said Washington is currently using soft power rather than force, which he described as an option deferred until shuttle diplomacy by US President’s senior adviser Massad Boulos is exhausted.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Maqli said the United States fully understands the influence of Saudi Arabia and Egypt and their ability to persuade and soften the stance of Sudan’s government, which has rejected the latest US initiative.

He said Burhan currently has no time to spare, as what is unfolding in Sudan represents the world’s worst humanitarian disaster, according to the international community.

Maqli noted that Egypt, represented by Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty, has been almost fully dedicated to making the Quartet mechanism succeed, given that the continuation of the current situation in Sudan poses a threat to Egypt’s national security.

He described Burhan’s visits to Riyadh and Cairo as short but necessary steps toward accepting the Quartet initiative, saying the Saudi visit marked a qualitative shift in the Sudanese government’s official position.

He added that Sudan’s foreign ministry later expressed Port Sudan’s readiness to cooperate with President Donald Trump, his secretary of state, and Boulos in efforts to achieve peace in Sudan, predicting imminent developments that could lead to a major breakthrough in the crisis.


Iraq Negotiates New Coalition Under US Pressure

Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)
Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)
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Iraq Negotiates New Coalition Under US Pressure

Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)
Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)

More than a month after Iraq's parliamentary elections, the country's top leaders remain locked in talks to form a government while facing pressure from Washington to exclude Tehran-backed armed groups.

Amid seismic changes in the Middle East, where new alliances are forming and old powers waning, Iraqi leaders face a daunting task: navigating relations with US-blacklisted pro-Iranian factions.

The US has held significant sway over Iraqi politics since leading the 2003 invasion that ousted long-time ruler Saddam Hussein.

But another specter also haunts Iraq's halls of power: Washington's arch-foe, Iran.

Iraq has long been caught between the two, with successive governments negotiating a delicate balance.

Now, after November's election, Washington has demanded the eventual government must exclude Iran-backed armed groups and instead move to dismantle them, Iraqi officials and diplomats told AFP.

A State Department spokesperson, speaking on condition of anonymity, said: "Iraqi leaders well know what is and is not compatible with a strong US-Iraq partnership".

Washington, the spokesperson said, "will continue to speak plainly to the urgency of dismantling Iran-backed militias".

But some of these groups have increased their presence in the new chamber and have joined the Coordination Framework, an alliance of Shiite parties with varying ties to Iran and which holds the majority.

For weeks, the Coordination Framework has been embroiled in talks to nominate the next prime minister.

"The US has put conditions that armed factions should not be part of the new government," a senior Iraqi official said. The factions must disarm and "sever ties with Iran's Revolutionary Guard," he added.

In recent tweets, the US special envoy to Iraq, Mark Savaya said that Iraqi leaders are at a "crossroads".

Their decision "will send a clear and unmistakable signal to the United States... that Iraq is ready to claim its rightful place as a stable and respected nation in the new Middle East.

"The alternative is equally clear: economic deterioration, political confusion, and international isolation," Savaya said.

The US has blacklisted as "terrorist organizations" several armed groups from within the pro-Iran Popular Mobilization Forces, a former paramilitary alliance now integrated into the armed forces.

They are also part of the Iran-backed so-called "Axis of Resistance" and have called for the withdrawal of US troops -- deployed in Iraq as part of an anti-ISIS coalition -- and launched attacks against them.

Most of these groups hold seats in parliament and have seen their political and financial clout increase.

The Asaib Ahl al-Haq faction, led by Qais al-Khazali, who is a key figure in the Coordination Framework, won 27 seats in the latest election, making it harder to exclude it from the government.

A potential compromise is to deny it a key portfolio, as in the current government.

"The US has turned a blind eye before, so they might after all engage with the government as a whole but not with ministries held by armed groups," a former Iraqi official said.

Other blacklisted groups are:

+ Kataeb Hezbollah, one of the most powerful armed groups, supports a parliamentary bloc (six seats).

+ Kataeb Sayyid al-Shuhada, Kataeb Imam Ali and Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya.

+ The al-Nujaba movement is the only group that has steered clear of elections.

Iraq has its economic growth to worry about.

After decades of turmoil, it has only begun to regain a sense of normalcy in recent years.

Washington has already imposed sanctions on several Iraqi entities and banks, accusing them of helping Tehran evade sanctions.

But Iraqi leaders hope for greater foreign investments and support partnerships with US companies.

The most striking endorsement came from Khazali, an opponent of the US military presence who now argues that it would be in Baghdad's interest for major US companies to invest.

Since the Israel's war with Hamas in Gaza began in October 2023, Iraq has remained relatively unscathed by the turmoil engulfing the Middle East.

Iraqi armed groups did launch attacks on US troops and largely unsuccessful ones on Israel. Washington responded with heavy strikes, and the attacks have long since halted.

Iraq remained the only close regional ally of Iran to stay out of Israel's crosshairs.

So far, the US has acted as a buffer, helping to prevent an Israeli attack, but Iraqis have been warned of strikes against the armed groups, multiple sources said.

But as the presence of American forces dwindles, fears are growing.


Bethlehem Camp's 'Lifeline' Football Field Faces Israeli Demolition

 Displaced Palestinian youths take part in a training session at the Aida Refugee Camp's football pitch, next to the separation wall outside Bethlehem in the occupied West Bank, on December 16, 2025, a few weeks after an Israeli military decision to demolish the field. (AFP)
Displaced Palestinian youths take part in a training session at the Aida Refugee Camp's football pitch, next to the separation wall outside Bethlehem in the occupied West Bank, on December 16, 2025, a few weeks after an Israeli military decision to demolish the field. (AFP)
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Bethlehem Camp's 'Lifeline' Football Field Faces Israeli Demolition

 Displaced Palestinian youths take part in a training session at the Aida Refugee Camp's football pitch, next to the separation wall outside Bethlehem in the occupied West Bank, on December 16, 2025, a few weeks after an Israeli military decision to demolish the field. (AFP)
Displaced Palestinian youths take part in a training session at the Aida Refugee Camp's football pitch, next to the separation wall outside Bethlehem in the occupied West Bank, on December 16, 2025, a few weeks after an Israeli military decision to demolish the field. (AFP)

Earlier this month a group of Palestinian boys turned out to train at their local football pitch in the shadow of the wall separating Israel from the West Bank's Aida refugee camp -- and found a note at the gate.

The children took the ominous message from Israeli authorities to Muhannad Abu Srour, sports director at the Aida Youth Center in the camp near Bethlehem, and the news was not good.

"We were shocked to discover that it was a decision to demolish Aida camp's football field," Abu Srour told AFP, adding that more than 500 children regularly train on the field roughly half the size of a regulation soccer pitch.

"The football field is the only open space we have. If the field is taken away, the children's dream is taken away," Abu Srour said.

The planned destruction of the Aida field is one of many points of contention in the occupied West Bank, but it is a particularly painful one for young Palestinians yearning for a better future.

One of the older members, 18-year-old Abdallah al-Ansurur, hopes to make it into the national Palestinian team, and, like many other youth at Aida camp, took his first steps in the game on the pitch flanked by the eight-meter concrete Israeli wall.

"I started when I was about 13 years old. This field gave me a real opportunity to train," said Ansurur, who was born and raised in Aida camp, one of the smallest in the West Bank.

Ansurur, who trains to be a goalkeeper, calls the astroturf-covered piece of land a "lifeline".

"Without this field, I wouldn't have had this chance. If it didn't exist, we'd be playing in the streets -- or not playing at all," he said.

Israel has occupied the West Bank since 1967 and frequently demolishes Palestinian homes or infrastructure, arguing they were built without permits.

AFP was shown the note from COGAT, the Israeli defense ministry body in charge of Palestinian civilian affairs, which says the field was not authorized.

But Anton Salman, who was mayor of adjacent Bethlehem when the field was built in 2021, told AFP the construction was legal.

Salman said his municipality leased the land from the Armenian Church authorities to whom it belongs, before allowing Aida camp's popular committee to manage it for the benefit of residents.

Saeed al-Azzeh, head of the popular committee, confirmed the information, calling the space, "the only breathing space" for camp residents.

"Today, more than 7,000 people live on the same piece of land. Streets are narrow, alleys are cramped -- there is nowhere else," Azzeh said, referring to the camp.

Like other Palestinian refugee camps, Aida was built to accommodate some of the hundreds of thousands of people who either fled their homes or were forced out during the creation of Israel in 1948.

With time, tents gave way to concrete buildings, with the football field representing one of the few open spaces in the camp's dense patchwork.

Abu Srour is proud of what came out of the field, with youth sports delegations able to travel abroad to play, a welcome escape from the West Bank's myriad restrictions.

This is because checkpoints, a fixture of the West Bank since the start of Israel's occupation, have multiplied since the start of the war in Gaza.

Abu Srour mentioned that bringing a local team to Ramallah, a city 20 kilometers (12.5 miles) away as the crow flies, took six hours recently, instead of one hour in the past.

Restricted mobility is a major issue for most Palestinian athletes as it makes it nearly impossible for athletes of similar levels from different cities to train together.

Waseem Abu Sal, who was the first Palestinian boxer to participate in the Olympics, told AFP he frequently sparred with athletes of different levels or weight categories for lack of mobility.

Taking a short break from running a practice for 50 excited five- to 10-year-old boys, coach Mahmud Jandia told AFP he hoped the field would remain.

"Yes, the wall is there -- it feels like a prison -- but despite that, the most important thing is that the field remains and the children keep playing."

"If the field is demolished, all the children's dreams will be demolished with it."