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Amr Moussa: Mubarak Rejected Extending Abdel-Meguid’s Time in Office

Former Arab League Chief Amr Moussa with the former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak
Former Arab League Chief Amr Moussa with the former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak
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Amr Moussa: Mubarak Rejected Extending Abdel-Meguid’s Time in Office

Former Arab League Chief Amr Moussa with the former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak
Former Arab League Chief Amr Moussa with the former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak

In the second excerpt extracted from the soon-to-be-published biography of former Secretary-General of the Arab League Amr Moussa, “The Years of the Arab League”, the veteran Egyptian diplomat recounts the details of how he was assigned to succeed Asmat Abdel-Meguid at the regional Arab organization.

Arab countries, at the time, were conflicted about appointing Moussa, who was still serving as Egypt’s foreign minister in 2001.

In his memoirs, which will soon be released by Dar El-Shorouk, Moussa recounts how Abdel-Meguid expressed to him his desire to remain secretary-general of the Arab League even after completing his term.

Nevertheless, the then Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak refused Abdel-Meguid’s request saying that the Arab League was “asleep and dying out.”

Also, Moussa talks about how vital Gulf financial support, especially that given by Saudi Arabia, was to revamping the Arab League and granting the organization a more active role in all issues concerning the Arab world.

Four months into his tenure, Moussa was faced with the challenges and the fallout of the September 11 attacks which affected all Arabs and Muslims. Dealing with negative feelings surfacing towards Arabs and Muslims, Moussa’s efforts to manage the situation included making vigorous calls, releasing official statements, meeting with US officials, and organizing a conference entitled “Dialogue of Civilizations: An Exchange not a Clash.”

In the last days of November 2000, then chief of the Arab League Abdel-Meguid phoned Moussa and asked for a meeting to discuss important issues that included the future of his position at the organization.

Moussa agreed to Abdel-Meguid’s request and said he would see him at his office before the end of the week.

In that meeting, Abdel-Meguid expressed worry towards his term in office ending before he had given all he had to offer and suggested if he could be given an additional year or two.

Abdel-Meguid did not ask for renewing his contract for a third full term because he knew that Arab League member states would oppose the idea.

Moussa carried Abdel-Meguid’s proposal to President Mubarak the very same evening of the meeting but was faced by clear-cut rejection.

The senior diplomat even requested if Abdel-Meguid’s time in office could be renewed for a single year as a form of honoring his journey at the Arab League.

“Tell him enough is enough…there are important countries at the Arab League who told me that the organization is completely sleeping and will die,” Mubarak told Moussa, confirming that there will be no renewal for Abdel-Meguid.

Two days later, Moussa informed Abdel-Meguid of Mubarak’s refusal.

“He was understanding and showed his known calm and never recalled the subject,” Moussa recounts about Abdel-Meguid’s reaction.

Shortly after, Moussa was informed that it was time for Egypt to select its candidate for chief of the Arab League.

“One winter morning at the end of the year 2000, while I was sitting at a round table in my office at the foreign ministry reading a report, enjoying the winter sun, the presidential phone rang,” said Moussa.

“The presidential secretary for information, Ambassador Majed Abdel-Fattah, was the one speaking. He started by saying that the president was requesting that the minister provides him with one or more names of nominees suited for becoming the next secretary-general of the Arab League,” he added.

Mubarak’s Message

Abdel-Fattah went on to express that many, including the president, believed that Moussa was the right man for the job.

“I realized that it (the call) was a message from President Mubarak right away,” Moussa explained, adding that his response was accepting the offer.

“Egypt announced the news of my candidacy to succeed Abdel-Meguid officially on February 15, 2001.”

“This caused a great uproar in Egypt, as well as in a large number of Arab and even international capitals. I think Washington and Tel Aviv were very happy with the news.”

Moussa goes on to say that some Arab countries opposed his candidacy because staying at the helm of Egypt’s Foreign Ministry was more effective and more beneficial in serving higher Arab interests.

Saudi and Gulf Support

Then Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal conveyed the Kingdom’s support for Moussa whether he is Egypt’s foreign minister or the chief of the Arab League.

Moussa was told that he will receive all the needed support.

“I recall discussing with Prince Saud the financial standing of the Arab League which was edging on bankruptcy, and the need to back me as the new chief in a way that enabled me to reform the joint Arab action organization,” Moussa added.

Prince Saud, for his part, voiced his support and promised to take the matter to then Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz.

“In my view, I believed that the Arab League can be reformed if it was run by a modern administration and if sufficient funds were made available to give the organization’s employees a sense of security,” Moussa said about his strategy to reinvigorate the organization’s work.

“Indeed, I toured Gulf countries and received promises from high-level officials that the necessary funds will be made available in the form of special support for the Arab League,” he added, noting that he was ensured full-control over how the incoming money was to be spent.

“They trusted the new administration at the Arab League and its ability to move joint Arab action forward,” Moussa noted.

Day One at the Arab League Headquarters

“At 9:30 am on May 16, 2001, I left my house to find the Arab League’s secretary-general designated car waiting for me. The vehicle was old and worn out. What caught my eye was that the Arab League flag was raised over the car,” Moussa recalled.

“I asked the guard to remove the flag; there was no need to roam the streets of Cairo in a car with the Arab League flag fluttering over it. Close to 10:00 am I arrived at the Arab League’s headquarters.”

Accompanied by Ambassador Samir Saif el-Yazal, a “good” executive figure that was hand-picked by Moussa to help in supervising financial and administrative affairs at the Arab League, Moussa headed to the office of the Arab League secretary-general on the first floor.

“First I sat in the office salon, appalled by the lights on the whole floor being dimmed and the paintwork on the walls being outdated! I told el-Yazal that this sight must change immediately.”

Moussa then ordered el-Yazal to open windows, paint the walls with light colors, and make the lighting bright so as not to encourage sleep.

Outraged by the cluttered job done on connecting phone cables at the office, Moussa summoned the manager of the administrative affairs and demanded that an overhaul takes place before the end of the week.

Slowly but surely, things began changing.

In terms of developing Arab League headquarters, the Kingdom of Morocco offered to develop one of the rundown halls, and China developed a second hall as a gift to Moussa.

Moussa also ordered a dramatic shift in the arrangement of how delegations are seated, introducing a fresh environment to representatives.

Arab League Teams

“My conviction was firm that there would be no development for the system of joint Arab action without first improving the human cadre working at the Arab League and its affiliated institutions. I started meeting with workers in groups, each group consisting of five or six members, to sort out those I could count on,” Moussa said about his early efforts to reform the Arab League.

During the first two months of meetings with employees, Moussa chose about 30 individuals from whom the Arab League can invest and rely on.

“I began assigning them tasks and found that their education was superior and that they were ready to develop and work. They were no less qualified than the workers of any other organization ... they just needed guidance and confidence,” said Moussa.

Published in special agreement with Dar Al Shorouk - all rights reserved.

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Iranians Have Long Sought Work and Relative Stability in Türkiye. The War Could Force Some to Return

Iranian Serdar Taghizade speaks to a customer inside his currency exchange business in Istanbul on Monday, April 13, 2026. (AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)
Iranian Serdar Taghizade speaks to a customer inside his currency exchange business in Istanbul on Monday, April 13, 2026. (AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)
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Iranians Have Long Sought Work and Relative Stability in Türkiye. The War Could Force Some to Return

Iranian Serdar Taghizade speaks to a customer inside his currency exchange business in Istanbul on Monday, April 13, 2026. (AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)
Iranian Serdar Taghizade speaks to a customer inside his currency exchange business in Istanbul on Monday, April 13, 2026. (AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)

Sadri Haghshenas spends her days selling borek — a layered, savory pastry — at a shop in Istanbul, but her mind is on her daughter in Tehran.

The family had to send her home to Iran after they ran into difficulties renewing her visa, despite fears that a shaky ceasefire could soon collapse.

For years, short-term residency permits have allowed tens of thousands of Iranians to pursue economic opportunities and enjoy relative stability in neighboring Türkiye. But it's a precarious situation, and the war has raised the stakes.

“I swear, I cry every day,” Haghshenas said, raising her hands from behind the counter of the pastry shop. “There is no life in my country, there is no life here, what shall I do?”

Haghshenas and her husband moved to Türkiye five years ago with their then-teenage daughters and have been living on tourist visas renewable every six months to two years.

They could not afford a lawyer this year, because her husband is out of work due to health problems. As a result, they missed the deadline to apply for a new visa for their 20-year-old daughter, Asal, who is still in her final year of high school.

Asal was detained at a checkpoint earlier this month and spent a night at an immigration facility. Her mother found a friend to take her back to Tehran rather than face deportation proceedings that could complicate her ability to return to Türkiye. They hope she can come back on a student visa.

Haghshenas has been unable to talk to her daughter since she left because of a monthslong internet blackout in Iran.

A man walks past an Iranian grocery shop in Istanbul on Tuesday, April 14, 2026. (AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)

Türkiye has not seen an influx of refugees, as most Iranians have sought safety within their country. Many who have crossed the land border were transiting to other countries where they have citizenship or residency.

Nearly 100,000 Iranians lived in Türkiye in 2025, according to the Turkish Statistical Institute. Around 89,000 have entered Türkiye since the start of the war, while around 72,000 have departed, according to the United Nations' refugee agency.

Some Iranians have used short-term visa-free stays to wait out the war, but there are few options for those who want to stay longer.

Sedat Albayrak, of the Istanbul Bar Association’s Refugee and Migrant Rights Center, said that getting international protection status can be difficult, and the system encourages Iranians to apply for short-term permits instead.

“There are people who have lived on them for over 10 years," The Associated Press quoted him as saying.

Nadr Rahim, right, sits with a friend at an Iranian coffee shop in Istanbul on Tuesday, April 14, 2026. (AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)

If the war continues, more may have to return Nadr Rahim came to Türkiye for his children’s education 11 years ago. Now, the war may force him to go home.

Because of the difficulty of getting a permit to start a business or work legally in Türkiye, he lived off the profits of his motorcycle salesroom in Iran. But there have been no sales since the war started, and international sanctions — and the internet outage — make it extremely difficult to transfer funds.

His family only has enough money to stay in Türkiye a few more months. His children grew up in Türkiye and don't read Farsi or speak it fluently. He worries about how they would adapt to living in Iran, but said “if the war continues, we will have no choice but to return.”

In the meantime, he spends most of his days scrolling on his phone, waiting for news from his parents in Tehran or discussing the war over waterpipes with Iranian friends.

A 42-year-old Iranian woman came to Türkiye eight months ago, hoping to make money to support her family. She and her daughter registered as university students to get study visas.

She attends classes in the morning to keep her legal status before rushing to service jobs, sometimes working until 3 a.m.

They share a room with six other people at a women's boarding house, she said, speaking on condition of anonymity out of fear for her security should she return to Iran.

“I truly love Iran. If necessary, I would even go and defend it in war,” she says. But she sees no future there, while in Türkiye, she’s barely scraping by and only able to send small amounts of money to her parents.

“I have a bad life in Türkiye, and my parents have a bad life in Iran,” she said. “I came to Türkiye with so much hope, to support my parents and build a future. But now I feel hopeless.”

A 33-year-old freelance architect from Tehran traveled to Türkiye during Iran's violent crackdown on mass protests in January. She had planned to return after the situation calmed down, but then the United States and Israel went to war with Iran at the end of February.

“I started to believe that it’s a very bad situation, worse than I expected,” she said, speaking on condition of anonymity for fear of persecution if she returns to Iran.

She has been unable to work for her usual clients back in Iran because of the internet blackout. With the end of her 90-day visa-free window approaching, she can't afford to apply for a longer stay in Türkiye.

Instead, she has decided to go to Malaysia, where she will get free accommodation in return for building shelters during a month of visa-free stay.

She has no plan for what comes next.

Features

Strait of Hormuz Blockade Step by Step: What Do We Know?

A view of Iranian-flagged cargo ship M/V Touska as the US Navy Arleigh Burke-class Aegis guided missile destroyer USS Spruance conducts its interception in a location given as the north Arabian Sea, in this screen capture from a video released April 19, 2026. (CENTCOM/Handout via Reuters)
A view of Iranian-flagged cargo ship M/V Touska as the US Navy Arleigh Burke-class Aegis guided missile destroyer USS Spruance conducts its interception in a location given as the north Arabian Sea, in this screen capture from a video released April 19, 2026. (CENTCOM/Handout via Reuters)
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Strait of Hormuz Blockade Step by Step: What Do We Know?

A view of Iranian-flagged cargo ship M/V Touska as the US Navy Arleigh Burke-class Aegis guided missile destroyer USS Spruance conducts its interception in a location given as the north Arabian Sea, in this screen capture from a video released April 19, 2026. (CENTCOM/Handout via Reuters)
A view of Iranian-flagged cargo ship M/V Touska as the US Navy Arleigh Burke-class Aegis guided missile destroyer USS Spruance conducts its interception in a location given as the north Arabian Sea, in this screen capture from a video released April 19, 2026. (CENTCOM/Handout via Reuters)

Shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remained mostly at a standstill on Monday, with just three vessels crossing the vital waterway, according to Kpler, a maritime data firm.

On Sunday, a US Navy destroyer attacked and seized an Iranian-flagged cargo ship that US President Donald Trump said had tried to evade the US blockade on ships traveling to and from Iranian ports.

In a separate incident, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations center, which is administered by Britain’s Royal Navy, said that two vessels had been hit while trying to cross the Strait of Hormuz, according to a notice published on Saturday.

In one instance, gun ships operated by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps fired at a tanker without radio warning, the British organization said. In the second incident, a container ship was hit by “an unknown projectile” that damaged some of the containers.

On Tuesday, the US military said it had seized an Iran-linked tanker in international waters, in what appears to be the latest move to enforce a blockade as the ceasefire deadline looms.

The US military said it had boarded the tanker Tifani “without incident.”

The ship, capable of carrying 2 million barrels of crude, last reported its position on Tuesday morning near Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean, according to MarineTraffic tracking data. It was close to fully loaded and had signaled Singapore as its destination.

A two-week ceasefire between the US and Iran is set to expire early Wednesday.

Latest developments

The US Navy has turned back 27 ships trying to enter or exit Iranian ports since an American blockade outside the contested Strait of Hormuz began about a week ago, the military’s Central Command said on Monday.

On Sunday, a Navy destroyer disabled and seized the Touska, an Iranian cargo ship, in the Gulf of Oman after it tried to evade the blockade. It was the first time a vessel was reported to have tried to evade the US-imposed blockade on any ship entering or exiting Iranian ports since it took effect last week.

The guided-missile destroyer Spruance, one of more than a dozen Navy warships enforcing the US blockade, ordered the vessel’s crew to evacuate its engine room.

The Spruance then fired several rounds from its Mk-45 gun into the ship’s propulsion system as it steamed toward the port of Bandar Abbas in Iran, Central Command said in a statement that included a video of the firing.

American officials will determine what to do with the disabled vessel once the search is completed, a US military official said on Monday, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss operational matters, according to the New York Times. One option would be to tow the stricken ship to Oman, independent specialists said. An alternative would be to let the Touska steam to an Iranian port, if it can.

A spokesman for Iran’s military reiterated a threat on Monday to “take the necessary action against the US military” in response to the ship’s seizure, Iran’s state broadcaster reported.

How is the US imposing the blockade?

According to CENTCOM, more than 10,000 US personnel, including sailors, marines, and airmen, are participating in the operation, supported by over a dozen warships and dozens of aircraft. The effort spans key waterways surrounding Iran, including the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.

The US blockade on Iranian ports does not have a defined geographic boundary, and the United States can interdict vessels almost anywhere in international waters until they arrive at their final port.

Analysts say modern technology allows blockade enforcement at great distances.

Can ships evade the blockade?

Maritime intelligence experts say that more ships in and around the Strait of Hormuz seem to be adopting “spoofing” tactics to avoid detection.

Under international maritime law, most large commercial vessels travel with a transponder that automatically transmits the ship’s name, location, route and other identifying information. That includes a nine-digit number with a country code, which serves as a digital fingerprint for a ship.

The tactics were used by Russian “shadow fleet” vessels evading sanctions related to the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

When a ship is engaged in spoofing, its captain can type in a false origin or destination or can pretend to be piloting another ship altogether. Vessels can also temporarily turn off their transponders, seeming to disappear in one place and reappear in another.

The strait is “a contested information environment,” said Erik Bethel, a partner at Mare Liberum, a maritime technology venture capital fund.

Still, whatever ruses they employ, vessels going to and from Iran may get only so far. It is difficult to pass between the open ocean and a waterway as narrow as the Strait of Hormuz without being detected.

“My expectation is that the US Navy can sit out in the Gulf of Oman,” said Ami Daniel, the chief executive of Windward, a maritime intelligence data provider. “I don’t think there’s a way to breach the blockade.”

What are the US and Iranian strategies?

The US blockade sets up a significant test in the Iran war: Which side can endure more economic pain?

Instead of directing missiles and bombs, Trump is trying to choke off Iran’s oil exports, which make up just about all of the government’s revenue.

Some experts questioned whether the US blockade would work.

“Iran is already hurting, and they have shown that they are willing to take more than a couple of hits,” said Ahmet Kasim Han, a professor of international relations at TED University in Ankara, Türkiye.

Iran’s strategy appears to be using its leverage over global energy markets, where Tehran has discovered new powers that can cause pain in the US economy through spikes in the price of gasoline and other staples.

Why is the strait so important?

The Strait of Hormuz is a strategic waterway connecting the Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean. It is the only sea route for moving oil, natural gas and other cargo out of the Gulf. Iran’s coastline runs along the entire route.

At the strait’s narrowest and most vulnerable point — between Iran to the north and the Musandam Peninsula of Oman to the south — the navigable channel is about two miles wide each for inbound and outbound traffic, according to the International Energy Agency.

The legal status of the strait is complex. It lies within the territorial waters of Iran and Oman, but under international law it is treated as an international waterway where ships are generally guaranteed passage.

Iran has signed but not ratified that framework and has disputed the extent of those rights.

Before the war, about 20% of global oil and liquid natural gas passed through the strait. Most of the fossil fuels are bound for Asia, especially China, India, Japan and South Korea.

Other large vessels also use the strait, including car carriers and container ships.

Crucial industrial goods traveling through Hormuz include helium from Qatar, fertilizer from Oman and Saudi Arabia, and plastic feedstocks from Saudi Arabia and Emirati petrochemical plants.

How does Iran control the strait?

Iran’s military can threaten shipping traffic throughout the Strait of Hormuz, even though much of its navy has been destroyed by US and Israeli strikes.

The United States and Israel launched their war against Iran on the argument that if Iran one day got a nuclear weapon, it would have the ultimate deterrent against future attacks.

It turns out that Iran already has a deterrent: geography.

“The Iranians have thought a lot about how to utilize the geography to their benefit,” said Caitlin Talmadge, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who studies Gulf security.

*The New York Times

Features

US-Iran Talks Test Power Balances in Tehran as National Security Council Comes to the Forefront

Qalibaf (L) at a meeting of the regime's Expediency Discernment Council, with Supreme National Security Council secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr. (Qalibaf’s official site)
Qalibaf (L) at a meeting of the regime's Expediency Discernment Council, with Supreme National Security Council secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr. (Qalibaf’s official site)
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US-Iran Talks Test Power Balances in Tehran as National Security Council Comes to the Forefront

Qalibaf (L) at a meeting of the regime's Expediency Discernment Council, with Supreme National Security Council secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr. (Qalibaf’s official site)
Qalibaf (L) at a meeting of the regime's Expediency Discernment Council, with Supreme National Security Council secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr. (Qalibaf’s official site)

After US-Israeli bombardment eliminated Iran’s supreme leader and much of its top echelons, the country’s leadership didn’t fall apart — but negotiations to end the war offer a new test.

For decades, the supreme leader successfully managed several powerful factions, bringing to heel those who challenged his authority while listening to rival opinions. It’s now unclear who wields that kind of authority over the collection of civilian figures and powerful generals from the Revolutionary Guard who appear to be in charge.

They have found unity — for now — by taking a tough line. But disagreements over how much to concede in negotiations with the United States could reveal fault lines, as Pakistani mediators try to host a new round of talks this week, according to The Associated Press.

Who is in charge?

In the past, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was able to impose his will on the country's disparate power centers. After Israeli strikes killed him on the first day of the war, his son Mojtaba Khamenei succeeded him.

But doubts continue to swirl over the younger Khamenei’s role after reports he was wounded in the strikes. Still in hiding, he has not appeared in public since becoming supreme leader and how he gives orders to top leaders is a mystery.

At the center of power now is a politburo-like body known as the Supreme National Security Council, which includes Iran’s top civilian and military officials. Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, the parliament speaker and a veteran insider with strong contacts on all sides, has emerged as its face and the chief negotiator with the US.

The late Khamenei began giving more authority to the council before his death, but the war has consolidated its power.

The council contains a range of political opinions and often acute rivalries. A political rival of Qalibaf and uncompromising opponent of the US, Saeed Jalili, represents the supreme leader on the council, while the body’s nominal head is reformist President Masoud Pezeshkian.

Hard-liner members include the Guard’s new chief commander, Ahmad Vahidi, and the council’s new secretary, Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, also a commander in the Guard.

But Israel’s strategy of eliminating top leaders points to a misreading of how the Iranian regime works, experts say.

Iran’s leadership survived “precisely because there are multiple power centers with overlapping authorities,” said Ali Vaez, Iran director at the International Crisis Group. “Factionalism is just built into the DNA of this system.”

But since the war, the Guard’s growing clout on the council has also stoked speculation that a fundamental change could be coming.

Negotiations with the US will stress test the power structure

The council now faces potentially divisive questions over how far to go to reach a deal with the US, which is demanding Iran make major concessions aimed at ensuring it is never able to develop a nuclear weapon. Iran has long insisted its program is peaceful while saying it has the right to uranium enrichment.

In an interview with Iranian state TV on Sunday, Qalibaf said Iran wants a comprehensive accord that brings “a lasting peace” where the US no longer attacks the country.

“This dangerous loop needs to be cut,” he said. The US has twice launched strikes on Iran during high-level negotiations: once in the 12-day war in June, then again in the current conflict.

Council members have projected confidence that Iran holds the upper hand now, particularly because its grip on the Strait of Hormuz — a crucial passage for the world’s oil — enables it to drive up fuel prices, thus threatening the global economy and exerting political pressure on US President Donald Trump back home.

Senior officials have insisted they can hold out for assurances that Iran won’t be attacked again — even risking the war reigniting — because they believe Iran can endure the pain longer than the United States and its allies.

But ultimately, the leadership’s priority remains its own survival. The war and the US blockade, which is threatening Iran’s oil trade, are tightening the screws on the country’s cratering economy.

Economic hardship has fueled waves of unrest over the past two decades, including protests in January that openly called for the regime’s overthrow. A deal with the West lifting sanctions could help it keep its grip at home.

Signs of disagreement

Events over the weekend surrounding the Strait of Hormuz gave an indication of serious differences over how much to concede in negotiations. Engagement with Washington has long divided Iran’s top ranks, despite a shared deep mistrust of the US.

On Friday, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announced in a posting on X that Iran was opening the strait to commercial traffic as part of the ceasefire agreement with the US. Hours later, Trump proclaimed that the US would continue its blockade to keep pressure on Iran to reach a deal over its nuclear program.

On Saturday morning, Iran’s military announced that it was reclosing the strait in retaliation for the blockade.

Some Iranian media criticized Araghchi, suggesting his post created the impression Iran was showing weakness and revealing the differing positions behind the scenes. A report by the Tasnim news agency, seen as close to the Guard, said the position on the strait should have come from the National Security Council itself.

Araghchi’s office pushed back, saying the Foreign Ministry “does not take any action without coordinating with higher-level institutions.”

In his interview Sunday, Qalibaf tried to paper over any divisions, emphasizing that everyone in the leadership was on the same page on Iran’s strategy in US talks.

A possible bridge builder

The 64-year-old Qalibaf is best positioned to bridge divides among Iran’s factions.

Qalibaf is a former general in the Guard and national police chief and kept close to the Guard throughout his long political career. As Tehran’s mayor from 2005 to 2017, Qalibaf gained a reputation as a pragmatist able to get things done, like overhauling an ailing public transport system, even as he faced major corruption and human rights abuse allegations.

Ali Rabie, a well-known reformist and an assistant to the president, wrote last week in a newspaper editorial that Qalibaf was “the representative of the country and the regime.”

At the same time, Qalibaf is close to the Khamenei family both hailing from the area of the eastern city of Mashhad, said Mohsen Sazegara, one of the founders of the Revolutionary Guard in the 1980s who is now an opposition figure living in the US.

During his father’s rule, Mojtaba Khamenei backed Qalibaf’s several unsuccessful attempts to run for president.

Qalibaf is also close to the senior Guard figures who stepped in to replace those killed by Israel and who are widely seen as holding the key to any future agreement with the US. His cross-factional backing could enable him to ensure support at home for a deal against blowback from ideologues who will resist compromise.