Amr Moussa: Garang Wanted to Be President of Entire Sudan

Amr Moussa with the leader of the SPLM, John Garang
Amr Moussa with the leader of the SPLM, John Garang
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Amr Moussa: Garang Wanted to Be President of Entire Sudan

Amr Moussa with the leader of the SPLM, John Garang
Amr Moussa with the leader of the SPLM, John Garang

In this fifth episode of excerpts from the new book by former Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa, “The Years of the Arab League,” Asharq Al-Awsat reviews the efforts deployed to solve the crisis in Sudan.

Moussa’s biography, which will soon be published by Dar El-Shorouk, dedicates two chapters of 44 pages to the Sudanese crisis. The first chapter talks about the dispute between northern and southern Sudan that ended with the secession of the South, while the second is devoted to the political and humanitarian crisis that the Darfur region experienced as of March 2003.

Amr Moussa reveals that the leader of the SPLM, John Garang, told him that he wanted to be the president of all of Sudan, asking: “What is the value of being the leader of a poor, weak and closed country in southern Sudan?”

He explains that he asked the leaders of Sudan to “work to entice southerners into unity, but they considered separation an inevitable fate.” He also considered that the peace agreement with the SPLM was an inspiration for all the rebel movements across all Sudanese regions.

Moussa narrates: “Sudan, and its merciless issues and conflicts, was one of my most important concerns since the beginning of my career in Egyptian diplomacy. This exceptional interest in Sudan was reinforced during my ten years as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt…”

The South Sudan Case

Moussa says that several factors have combined to create and fuel the conflict between the south and the north: ethnic and religious pluralism, the struggle over resources, and the distribution of shares.

Other factors include the policy of marginalization, which the central Sudanese governments have adopted towards all parties, and the failure of these successive governments to promote the values of citizenship.

Moussa also points to the role of the British colonialism in nurturing separatism and entrenching it among the people of southern Sudan, by strengthening the role of missionaries and the policy of weakening Arab culture, replacing northern employees, and preventing northern merchants from reaching the south.

The Arab League secretary-general recounts: “On July 20, 2002, the Sudanese government and the SPLM signed the Machakos Protocol in Kenya, which the Arab League accepted at the time after the Sudanese government signed it… The agreement included two documents: the first provides for the extension of the existing armistice until the end of March 2003, and the second covers a number of points that the two sides have accepted in principle, and they relate to the sharing of power and wealth, but without acknowledging any decisive position regarding them. The two parties agreed to abolish the application of Islamic law in areas inhabited by non-Muslims and to hold a referendum in the south on secession or unity after a six-year transitional period.”

Moussa says that after consulting with the concerned Arab governments, he specified the efforts of the Arab League regarding the conflict between North and South Sudan. Those were divided into two segments: advancing the peace process and the negotiations between the Sudanese government and the SPLM and supporting development and reconstruction in war-stricken areas.

“I had earlier received at the League’s headquarters in Cairo in March 2002, the leader of the popular movement, John Garang, who expressed unitary tendencies and demanded the Arab League’s support. I built on that fruitful meeting and sent an Arab mission headed by Ambassador Samir Hosni, Director of the Africa Department of the Arab League, in April 2003 to the southern city of Rumbek, the headquarters of the Popular Movement in Southern Sudan. It was the first Arab mission to visit that region, to affirm the commitment of the Arab League and its institutions to actively contribute to the development of South Sudan and the areas affected by war, and to make unity an attractive voluntary option.”

Moussa stops to describe his relationship with Garang, with whom he had a “special agreement.”

“I met with him several times after his first visit to Egypt in 1997. His position has evolved gradually… from the struggle to achieve the secession of the South to the fight for equal rights among all Sudanese in all parts of the country, within the framework of the slogan he raised, which is the “New Sudan” that embraces all ethnicities and religions. Perhaps this development in the position of the SPLM leader was one of the reasons that contributed to his unfortunate disappearance from the Sudanese political scene.”

The former Arab League secretary-general continues: “Garang used to tell me in every meeting that brought us together: “What is the value of being the leader or president of the poor, weak, small and closed country of Southern Sudan?”

I applauded and supported that approach, but his vision was not welcomed by any of the Sudanese political actors, whether Africans, Arabs or Westerners, and even the leaders of the (northern) Sudan. But I think that if Garang could achieve a new beginning on the basis of the “New Sudan” with the opportunity to run for the presidency, events may have taken a completely different course, as this would have shaped different dynamics that none of the parties wanted to create.”

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement

“At the invitation of the Kenyan government, on January 9, 2005, I participated with many Arab and African leaders in the signing ceremony of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Nairobi. The agreement provided for a permanent ceasefire and the establishment of a 6-year transitional period during which the North and South would cooperate in governing the country. Garang was assigned the responsibilities of the Sudanese First Vice President. The agreement also stipulated the sharing of oil revenues, and the right of the SPLM and its southern allies to form a government for the south to fully manage its affairs for a period of 6 years, which ends with the votes of the people of the south and the oil-rich Abyei region in a referendum on January 9, 2011 on the secession or unity.”

Moussa recounts: “Ahmed Aboul Gheit, Egypt’s foreign minister at the time, was sitting next to me during the loud signing ceremony at Naivasha Stadium in Nairobi. During the ceremony, I drifted away. I thought that things were definitely moving towards the secession of the south. Aboul Gheit seemed to have the same thoughts. He cut short my distraction by telling me: I can tell you that by signing this agreement, the matter will end up in division.”

Moussa asserts that great work was achieved through the coordination meetings held by the Arab League to promote a joint Arab action to make the unity of Sudan an attractive option. Arab funds, specialized Arab organizations, and unions of Arab ministerial councils participated in these meetings.

“The Arab League has made concrete efforts and played active roles to help reach a comprehensive peaceful solution to the Sudanese crisis. However, the performance of the Arab system has suffered and still suffers from a clear gap between decision-making and implementation. The Beirut summit decided to establish the Arab Fund for the Development of South Sudan with financial contributions from Arab countries, but this fund did not receive any significant contributions. The League Council also adopted a resolution calling on the member-states to address Sudan’s Arab debts in order to enable the country to face the challenges of building peace and unity, but this did not happen either.”

The referendum on secession

“A referendum took place in southern Sudan and the people chose the secession. In fact, in my Egyptian capacity, and as Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, I was against the division of Sudan. I spoke at length about this with (former President Omar) Al-Bashir, Sadiq Al-Mahdi, Othman Al-Mirghani, and others, encouraging the rejection of partition and calling for non-tolerance to the plans of separation.”

The political and humanitarian crisis in Darfur

“My assumptions on the signing of the Machakos Agreement between the Sudanese government and the separatist Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) on July 20, 2002… proved to be true. This agreement was an inspiration for the rebel movements in Darfur, which saw that fighting alone is what brings the Bashir regime to the negotiating table.”

Moussa says that the conflict in Darfur began to heat up until the situation reached the point that led to a great human tragedy. That was in March 2003, when rebels revolted against al-Bashir, claiming they were marginalized. Two armed groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement, declared their rebellion and attacked the city of Al-Fashir, the center of North Darfur State, destroying 7 aircraft at the city’s airport.

The former Arab League secretary-general recounts that the government has responded with the same strategy that the successive governments have adopted since the era of Sadiq al-Mahdi in the 1980s: mobilizing Arab militias known as the Janjaweed, who are known for their ferocity, to combat the rebels.

“Talking about the Darfur crisis and the factors that lead to it, it is necessary to point to the marginalization of the entire region by the central government and the lack of development projects and basic services such as education, health, etc.,” Moussa says.

The escalating developments in Darfur as of March 2003 attracted global interest. Criticism against the Sudanese government began to increase. On March 4, 2004, the High Commissioner for Refugees announced that atrocities were being committed in the Darfur region and demanded the government to urgently open the door to dialogue with the rebels.

A fact-finding mission dispatched by the Arab League

Moussa recounts that he assigned Ambassador Samir Hosni, Director of the Africa Department at the Arab League, to preside over a fact-finding mission that would investigate the reality of the situation in the region. It was the first international mission of its kind to go to Darfur, and its mission included a visit to Sudan, from April 29 to May 15, 2004.

According to the senior Arab official, the mission was able to prove massive violations of human rights on both sides of the conflict, but completely ruled out genocide or ethnic cleansing. The same position was expressed by Alpha Oumar Konare, then-President of the African Union.

“The truth is that these moves on the part of the Arab League were able to open doors for discussion and then for an understanding with the government of Sudan on the importance of the role of the League and the wide scope of its movement,” he asserts.

“This has allowed freedom of movement on the part of the League, further coordination with the African Union, and more movement on the ground in Darfur, starting with an official visit, the first by the Secretary-General of the Arab League to the region.”

With a special agreement with Dar El-Shorouk. All rights reserved.



Iran After Trump’s Win: Calls for New Approach, Challenge to Soleimani’s ‘Killer’

An Iranian holds a copy of the Hamshahri newspaper in a street in downtown Tehran (EPA)
An Iranian holds a copy of the Hamshahri newspaper in a street in downtown Tehran (EPA)
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Iran After Trump’s Win: Calls for New Approach, Challenge to Soleimani’s ‘Killer’

An Iranian holds a copy of the Hamshahri newspaper in a street in downtown Tehran (EPA)
An Iranian holds a copy of the Hamshahri newspaper in a street in downtown Tehran (EPA)

The Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson has said that Donald Trump’s victory in the US presidential election offers an opportunity for the US to reassess its “misguided policies.”

“What matters for Iran is the performance of the US administration,” said Ismail Baghai on Thursday, noting that Tehran had “bitter experiences” with past US policies.

He added that Trump’s win is a “chance to reconsider the previous wrong directions” of the US, according to the official IRNA news agency.

Iranian newspapers were divided, with some calling for Tehran to adopt a new approach, while others opposed the policies of the “architect of maximum pressure” and the “killer” of Gen. Qasem Soleimani.

On Wednesday, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said the US election result was of no concern to Iran.

“It doesn't matter to us who won the US election, as our strength lies in our internal power and a great nation,” Pezeshkian said.

“We are not narrow-minded in developing relations with other countries, prioritizing ties with Islamic and neighboring nations,” he added, according to Iranian media. It was unclear if he was referring to the US, with which Iran has no diplomatic ties.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has banned direct talks with the US.

On Wednesday, government spokesperson Fatemeh Mahdiani downplayed the importance of the election.

“The US presidential election won’t affect us. Iran’s policies remain unchanged,” she said.

“It doesn't matter who the US president is. We’ve already planned for various scenarios, given the sanctions on Iran for over 40 years,” she added.

Last Monday, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said: “We don’t place much importance on the US election or who is elected.”

Baghai, speaking at his weekly press conference on Monday, said Iran’s stance on Trump is “clear” when asked how Tehran would respond if Trump offered to negotiate.

Trump’s victory comes amid rising tensions between Israel and Iran, with direct strikes exchanged after years of indirect conflict.

Reuters speculated that Trump’s return to office would mean stricter enforcement of US oil sanctions on Iran, which were imposed in 2018 after the US left the nuclear deal.

Trump criticized President Joe Biden’s policy of not enforcing strict sanctions on Iran’s oil exports, claiming it weakened the US and emboldened Tehran to expand its nuclear program and support armed groups.

In his first term, Trump reimposed sanctions after withdrawing from the 2015 nuclear deal, which had limited Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for economic benefits.

These sanctions hurt Iran’s oil exports, reduced government revenue, and led to unpopular measures like tax hikes, while inflation remained near 40%.

In September, Pezeshkian said Tehran was ready to resolve the nuclear issue with the West, which accuses Iran of seeking nuclear weapons.

Iran insists its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes, but officials have hinted at possibly changing its direction.

Biden tried to revive the nuclear deal but failed to reach a new agreement. It’s unclear if Trump would pursue a similar approach.

Trump’s victory in the US presidential election dominated Iranian newspapers on Thursday morning, with the reformist Sazandegi newspaper, under the headline “Trump’s Return,” saying that no decision-makers in Iran are comfortable with Trump’s win, as it could harm the country in several ways.

The paper, aligned with former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s faction, predicted that Trump might increase uncertainty, tighten sanctions, block Iran’s oil exports, and destabilize the economy, which would hurt ordinary Iranians.

The paper also suggested that the situation could change if the Iranian government adjusts its approach in response to Trump’s win but criticized Iran’s decision-makers for being slow to adapt.

It acknowledged that while Iran’s actions over the past 50 years have led all US administrations to view it as an enemy, the impact of the US president can vary.

The newspaper warned that Trump’s policies could lead to a bigger budget deficit, rising inflation, and a higher exchange rate, all of which would harm various sectors of Iran’s economy.

It noted that the country’s currency stability relies on oil revenues and foreign political relations.

With ongoing regional tensions and sanctions, any drop in oil revenues and difficulty accessing global markets could worsen Iran’s economic challenges, making it harder for the government to manage its budget and financial crises.

Analysts quoted by Sazandegi said Trump’s reelection might not lead to war but could result in harsher sanctions targeting Iran’s nuclear and missile programs without military action.

They also predicted that Russia might increase its pressure on Iran, potentially pushing the country toward a “Look East” strategy.

Reformist politician Mohammad Hashemi Rafsanjani wrote in Arman Emruz that Trump, as a businessman, would likely prefer economic cooperation with Iran over military conflict.

He suggested Trump might push for trade talks with Iran, opening the market to US companies, similar to European firms before the nuclear deal.

Hashemi noted that any conflict could drive up oil and gas prices, and as a businessman, Trump would likely avoid this. Instead, he would seek to strengthen economic ties between Iran and the US.

Hashemi also pointed out that the nuclear deal brought Iran significant economic benefits, including the return of $100 billion in frozen assets.

Arman Emruz warned that Trump’s return could escalate Middle East tensions and complicate relations with China and Russia over issues like Ukraine and Taiwan.

Etemad newspaper said that during his first term, Trump tried to turn Iran from a legitimate player into a pariah state, aiming to restrict and isolate it. It added that Trump’s return now is not in Iran’s interest.

The paper called for a “different policy” toward Trump. Reformist activist and former MP Mahmoud Sadeghi said it’s too early to assess Trump’s performance, especially since he won unexpectedly.

Sadeghi pointed out that for Iranians, the key concern is how Trump’s election will affect domestic issues, recalling his role in the strike that killed Gen. Soleimani five years ago.

He warned against falling into “self-sanctions” and urged Iran to address the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) rules to fight money laundering.

On regional policy, Sadeghi stressed the need for the government to act wisely to avoid being caught in the Netanyahu-Trump rivalry. He emphasized the importance of seizing every opportunity, no matter how small.

Former MP Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh compared Trump’s return to the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan and dismissed the idea that Democrats and Republicans are the same, especially on the nuclear deal.