Years-Long Struggle Threatens to Split Iraq’s PMF

A photo of Iraq's top Shiite cleric, Ali Sistani, in Karbala, Iraq. AFP file photo
A photo of Iraq's top Shiite cleric, Ali Sistani, in Karbala, Iraq. AFP file photo
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Years-Long Struggle Threatens to Split Iraq’s PMF

A photo of Iraq's top Shiite cleric, Ali Sistani, in Karbala, Iraq. AFP file photo
A photo of Iraq's top Shiite cleric, Ali Sistani, in Karbala, Iraq. AFP file photo

Around the corner from Iraq's holiest shrines, a years-long struggle over allegiances and resources is coming to a head -- threatening a dangerous schism within a powerful state-sponsored security force.

The growing fissure pits the vast Iran-aligned wing of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) network against four factions linked to the shrines of Iraq's twin holy cities, Karbala and Najaf.

Those factions, dubbed "the Shrine Mobilization" and comprising around 20,000 active fighters, held their first strategic planning meeting earlier this month.

Throughout the packed three days, spokesmen for the shrine groups leaned on two sources of legitimacy: a patriotic, "Iraq-only" discourse, and the blessing of the "marjaiyah," Iraq's Shiite spiritual leadership.

"The Shrine Mobilization are the origin of the broader PMF," Hazem Sakhr, a spokesman for the four factions, told AFP.

"We are committed to Iraqi law and the marjaiyah's orders."

Maytham al-Zaidi, the prominent commander of the largest shrine group known as the Abbas Combat Division, struck a nationalistic, reformist tone.

"The main reasons for establishing the Shrine Mobilization is to serve our country, and to correct both its track record and trajectory," he said.

Ali al-Hamdani, who heads the 3,000-member Ali al-Akbar Brigade, said the meeting -- held in Najaf and Karbala -- was "exclusively" for the Shrine Mobilization, setting their future apart from the rest.

Hamdi Malik, a London-based expert on Shiite factions, said the shrine groups were now publicly insisting on a separation.

"They are escalating with this new conference, and want to accelerate that process," Malik told AFP.

The PMF network was formed in 2014 when Iraq's top Shiite cleric, Ali Sistani, issued an edict urging citizens to fight the advancing extremists of ISIS.

His call brought together already-existing paramilitary factions and new formations, including the Shrine Mobilization.

But internal disputes emerged as early as 2016, with Malik pointing to three main fault lines.

Shrine factions began complaining that they were being starved of resources by Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the umbrella group's deputy head.

Muhandis died in a US strike in January this year that also killed his friend, top Iranian general, Qasem Soleimani.

The Shrine Mobilization had accused Muhandis of prioritizing factions closer to Tehran in the distribution of military equipment and state-allocated salaries.

Malik said the tug-of-war was linked to a second, more profound split: a "real ideological divide" over ties to neighboring Iran, which had long provided support to armed groups in Iraq.

Those factions are even dubbed "the loyalist Mobilization" for their perceived allegiance to Tehran over Baghdad.

At the meeting, spokesmen were careful not to specifically criticize Iran but repeatedly rejected what they characterized as external meddling.

"Foreign intervention is dangerous. The Shrine Mobilization rejects all shapes and sizes it may come in," Sakhr said.

The 90-year-old Sistani, known to be wary of Iran's influence, has not commented publicly on the meeting -- but it would not have gone ahead without his tacit approval, said Malik.

"It's important for Sistani, while he is alive and capable, that he puts his house in order," said Sajad Jiyad, a fellow at US think tank The Century Foundation.

Thirdly, shrine-linked groups have looked disdainfully at the PMF's dabbling in politics.

"Sistani had given clear instructions that no PMF member should participate in politics. But pro-Iran factions in the PMF created the Fatah alliance and took part in the 2018 parliamentary elections," Malik said.

Fatah won the second-largest number of seats and wields significant influence in both parliament and several government ministries.

With new elections set to be held in June 2021, shrine factions have said they will stick to Sistani's orders.

"Our members are free to participate as voters but not as candidates," said Mushtaq Abbas Maan, the media head for Karbala's Abbas shrine, which sponsors the factions.

While The Century Foundation's Jiyad said he doubted armed conflict would erupt between the two wings, he said a divorce would likely be messy.

The Shrine Mobilization still lack a legal or administrative framework to govern their forces outside the broader network's by-laws, and government decrees linking them to the prime minister's office have been slow to take hold.

At the conference, Maan appealed to the premier, who is Iraq's commander-in-chief, to "urgently" bring shrine factions under his wing, thereby finalizing their split from the wider network.

But shrine factions also fear that if they peel away, "loyalist" groups could monopolize the PMF's budget, fighting force and political influence, Malik said.

Their moves have already irked the Iran-linked PMF, whose commanders declined AFP's requests for comment.

But the sharp-tongued Qais al-Khazali, who heads a powerful Mobilization faction known as Asaib Ahl al-Haq, told state media last month that a secession by shrine groups could prompt other wings to strike out on their own, too.

"The PMF will be divided into three. That means the end of the PMF," he warned.



How Hamas Recruited, Trained New Fighters During the War

Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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How Hamas Recruited, Trained New Fighters During the War

Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Hamas said it recruited and trained thousands of fighters during the 15-month Gaza war, a claim supported by former US Secretary of State Antony Blinken.

Abu Obaida, spokesman for Hamas’ military wing, the Al-Qassam Brigades, said in July: “We recruited thousands of new fighters, strengthened key capabilities, set up ambushes, and made explosives and rockets.”

The announcement highlights Hamas’ efforts to expand its military strength during the conflict.

In his final address as US Secretary of State on January 14, Blinken confirmed Hamas recruited new fighters during the war.

“Indeed, we assess that Hamas has recruited almost as many new militants as it has lost,” Blinken revealed. “That is a recipe for an enduring insurgency and perpetual war,” he explained.

The statements from US officials and Hamas have raised questions about how the group managed to recruit and train fighters amid the war.

However, military training manuals belonging to Hamas, discovered by an Asharq Al-Awsat correspondent in the rubble of Jabalia camp in northern Gaza, provided partial insight into the group’s methods for preparing its fighters.

The Jabalia refugee camp was the site of a highly intense Israeli military operation that lasted around 100 days. According to Israeli army statements, the operation resulted in the deaths of dozens of Israeli officers and soldiers.

Hamas, however, has remained silent about its own losses during the battles, leaving questions about the full scale of casualties in the prolonged fighting.

Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces.

The documents include instructions on using light weapons, guided rockets, and other munitions, aiming to train new fighters for operations against Israeli troops.

The manuals detail shooting techniques, effective firing ranges, and guidelines for targeting Israeli armored vehicles, particularly weaknesses in Merkava tanks to maximize damage and ensure destruction.

They also explain the use of various projectiles, including RBG rockets, PG-7V, F-7, BG-7M, Yassin rockets, tandem warheads, and both Chinese and Russian munitions, as well as the TBG rocket system.

According to Hamas sources speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, such manuals have long been part of Al-Qassam Brigades’ military training.

Recruits have been trained practically at military sites using these guides. The sources added that the manuals found in Jabalia, where clashes took place, were intended to help fighters, particularly new recruits, deal with the Israeli assault.

Hamas sources said the training manuals significantly aided fighters in battles across Gaza, particularly in the north, which faced the heaviest and most extensive Israeli assaults.

“The military capabilities were being eroded,” the sources said.

“However, field commanders quickly addressed this by recruiting new fighters and finding alternatives to manage the battle effectively,” they added.

The sources noted that many fighters recruited during the Gaza war had undergone only basic, fast-track training before being sent to the battlefield. After losing many experienced fighters, the group relied on trainees and loyalists with minimal preparation.

“These new recruits fought alongside seasoned fighters,” the sources said. “They received basic instructions and were taught to use advanced weapons like guided rockets but were mostly skilled with light arms like Kalashnikov rifles.”

Despite limited training, the recruits played a vital role in the conflict.

Sources acknowledged that new recruits had limited field experience and faced challenges but found urban and guerrilla warfare easier. Most of these fighters were involved in battles in northern Gaza, especially in Jabalia and Beit Lahia, while a smaller group fought in Beit Hanoun and took part in operations that killed Israeli soldiers.

Hamas emphasized its recruitment abilities during the first hostage exchange after last Sunday’s ceasefire. Al-Qassam Brigades members made a public appearance in Gaza City, which is in northern Gaza.

Hamas reportedly used a “deception” tactic, sending out vehicles resembling those used to transport hostages while also deploying decoy vehicles from different areas.

They also instructed their members to gather in Saraya Square to distract from the vehicle carrying female prisoners.

The exact number of new recruits remains unclear, though they have been called “2024 recruits” after a statement by Abu Obaida. Israeli media estimates the number at around 4,000 fighters, with some accusing Mohammad Sinwar, brother of the late Yahya Sinwar, of leading the recruitment.

Blinken criticized Israel’s approach in Gaza, saying Hamas can’t be defeated by military means alone. He stressed the need for a political solution to prevent the group’s return.

The Wall Street Journal reported that Mohammad Sinwar is focused on rebuilding the group's military strength.

Hamas’ recruitment during the war and its continued resistance have made it a tough challenge for Israel, which has had to return to areas it thought were cleared of militants, only to face renewed fighting.

Before the war, Hamas’ Al-Qassam Brigades had about 30,000 fighters in 24 battalions.

Blinken noted that Hamas had replaced the fighters it lost during the conflict and that militants in northern Gaza continue to regroup after Israeli military operations, showing the ongoing challenge for Israel without a political solution.