Lebanon and the Arabs: Amending Relations Achieves Joint Interests

Lebanon's Central Bank facade is defaced by protesters. (Reuters file photo)
Lebanon's Central Bank facade is defaced by protesters. (Reuters file photo)
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Lebanon and the Arabs: Amending Relations Achieves Joint Interests

Lebanon's Central Bank facade is defaced by protesters. (Reuters file photo)
Lebanon's Central Bank facade is defaced by protesters. (Reuters file photo)

Lebanon has long enjoyed unique political, economic and social relations with its Arab environment. These ties often overcame political disputes related to Lebanon’s identity and role. These disputes date back to the time of its independence from French mandate in 1943 and persist to this day. Lebanon has managed to withstand all the turbulence of the past decades, even its 1975-90 civil war, but now finds itself confronted with its worst crisis since its inception.

The clash that had erupted between Lebanon’s Muslims and Christians over the country’s Arabism soon disappeared with the discovery of oil in the Gulf, which reshaped the politics and relations in the region. When Lebanon was caught in the dispute between Muslim demands that it merge with Syria and the Arab world and Christian ones that it follow France and the West a reconciliation, known as the national pact, was struck. The pact was forged in the typical Lebanese way that appeases all sides and left no one with a sense of defeat. It retained Lebanon’s borders that were declared in the 1920s and cemented the nation as an independent Arab country.

Politically, debates continued to rage for decades over Lebanon’s identity and Arabism. They peaked during the times of unrest and Arab-Israeli military conflicts. Those conflicts would reverberate inside Lebanon, which was divided over its political, cultural and sectarian identities. These divisions were exemplified in the 1958 “revolt” against an attempt to drag Lebanon towards foreign axes with the aim of altering its identity and role.

Decades later, the 1989 Taif Accord, which helped end the civil war, would completely settle the issue of Lebanon’s Arab identity. The pact would amend the introduction of the Lebanese constitution, which now stipulates that “Lebanon is Arab in identity” and a founding member of the Arab League, whose charter it is committed to.

1950s and 60s prosperity
The occupation of Palestine and declaration of the formation of Israel in 1948 led to a widespread Arab boycott of the new country. This led to a boycott of Palestinian ports, which came under occupation, shifting the attention to Lebanon’s Beirut and Tripoli ports. Trade consequently flourished between Lebanon and the Arab world.

Lebanon’s liberal economy and banking system helped raise trust in it and led to more Arab and Gulf capital to flow in, in the shape of bank deposits, transactions, investments and others. Moreover, the country’s cultural diversity, which had attracted several foreign missions, helped build solid potential in several fields. Graduates of the American University of Beirut, which was founded by missionaries in 1866, and Saint Joseph University, founded in 1872, would land jobs in the Gulf region, which they helped develop.

Needless to say, the Lebanese diaspora also helped bolster Lebanon’s economy and society. Lebanon became a focal point for Gulf students where they could earn an education at its prestigious universities and the Gulf attracted the Lebanese for employment opportunities. Tourism also thrived in Lebanon during the 1950s and 60s, attracting people from all over the globe.

Civil war
All of the above took a massive hit with the eruption of the civil war in 1978. The conflict cost Lebanon its regional standing, even as Arab initiatives to resolve the war poured in. Among them was a proposal by Kuwait’s late Emir Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jaber Al-Sabah, who was then foreign minister. Current President Michel Aoun, who was then army commander, rejected the proposal, as he did the Taif Accord months later.

In the post-war period, Arab support for Lebanon’s reconstruction poured in. Arabs, led by Saudi Arabia, took part in international conferences for its reconstruction, notably the Paris 1, 2 and 3 meetings. Later, friendly Arab governments and funds would finance the rebuilding of infrastructure, roads, bridges, government hospitals and others. They would also play a role in rebuilding what Israel destroyed in its offensives against Lebanon in 1993, 1996 and 2006. To demonstrate the extent of the outpouring of support for Lebanon, an international report some five years ago revealed that between 1990 and 2015 Saudi Arabia alone offered some 50 billion dollars in support for Lebanon in the shape of official aid, private direct investments, loans, foreign transactions by expatriates and others.

Four factors

- Lebanese-Gulf economic ties are based on economic and trade exchange, whereby Lebanon’s imports outweigh its exports.

- They are based on Gulf deposits in Lebanese banks, many of which have since been withdrawn after the 2019 anti-government protests and the beginning of Lebanon’s economic collapse.

- Lebanese expatriates working in the Gulf and their financial remittances to Lebanon. These remittances are continuing and are a main factor in propping up the economy amid the collapse and severe shortage of dollars in the country.

- Gulf investments in Lebanon: They were focused primarily in the real estate sector, but have since waned when Lebanon’s ties with the Arabs deteriorated with the eruption of the Syrian conflict in 2011. Reports have said that more and more Gulf nationals are selling their properties in Lebanon.

Road to collapse
Lebanon has for years been suffering from a major deficit in its public budget. Its spending always outweighed its revenues due to massive waste and corruption. The electricity sector is the greatest source of losses, estimated at 2 billion dollars annually, which is massive compared to Lebanon’s small size.

The eruption of anti-government protests in October 2019 compounded the situation and deepened mistrust with the banking system and the country’s largely corrupt rulers. With the passing months, the deposits were withdrawn from Lebanon and transferred abroad, a move that contrasted sharply to they heyday when the banking sector used to attract billions of dollars from abroad. The move of deposits led to the severe shortage in foreign currencies, pushing Lebanon to stop pegging the pound to the dollar, leading it to slump to unprecedented lows, as much as 9,000 pounds to the dollar. To stem the flow of deposits, banks have imposed severe restrictions on withdrawals, depriving people of their savings.

The decline in the currency led to a drop in the people’s purchasing power, coupled with an astronomical rise in the prices of goods, and poverty that has climbed to 45 percent of the population. The country is also faced with a shortage in goods caused by the lack of dollars, which the state uses to import products. The dire reality naturally led to a brain drain with many people leaving Lebanon for much better living conditions abroad, dealing the country a blow to its once lofty standing in the region.

Future cooperation
Lebanese- Arab and -Gulf relations have never witnessed such lows.

During previous times of tumult, the readiness by both sides to resolve any dispute was always very high. It was unheard of that relations could reach such a low point. Gulf policies towards Lebanon had long been based on maintaining communication with all Lebanese political components without discrimination. Gulf countries were also always very firm in supporting the Lebanese state and containing foreign meddling, especially by influential non-Arab regional powers.

Of course, the attacks and criticism by some Lebanese parties against Gulf countries and their policies have had a major impact on the overall collapse of the historic ties. And this is deliberate. Lebanon is being forced to join axes - which are hostile to the Arab identity - that contradict its structure and natural position in the Arab world. This inevitably demands a review of the political boycott and resumption of natural relations, because this alone will help achieve the desired balance, especially when confronted with the possibility that a new Arab territory could be lost to foreign meddling.

Lebanon and the Gulf are demanded to restore their historic bonds. This starts with rebuilding political ties, which in turn will pave the way for rebuilding economic and social ones and eventually the restoration of investments and businesses. Lebanon cannot breathe without its Arab and Gulf lungs. This is its natural position and it must be restored because the political cost of its loss is much higher than the cost of regaining it.



Ethiopia Builds Secret Camp to Train Sudan RSF Fighters 

Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
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Ethiopia Builds Secret Camp to Train Sudan RSF Fighters 

Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

Ethiopia is hosting a secret camp to train thousands of fighters for the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in neighboring Sudan, Reuters reporting has found, in the latest sign that one of the world’s deadliest conflicts is sucking in regional powers from Africa and the Middle East.

The camp is the first direct evidence of Ethiopia’s involvement in Sudan’s civil war, marking a potentially dangerous development that provides the RSF a substantial supply of fresh soldiers as fighting escalates in Sudan’s south.

Eight sources, including a senior Ethiopian government official, said the United Arab Emirates financed the camp’s construction and provided military trainers and logistical support to the site, a view also shared in an internal note by Ethiopia’s security services and in a diplomatic cable, reviewed by Reuters.

The news agency could not independently verify UAE involvement in the project or the purpose of the camp. In response to a request for comment, the UAE foreign ministry said it was not a party to the conflict or “in any way” involved in the hostilities.

Reuters spoke to 15 sources familiar with the camp's construction and operations, including Ethiopian officials and diplomats, and analyzed satellite imagery of the area. Two Ethiopian intelligence officials and the satellite images provided information that corroborated details contained in the security memo and cable.

The location and scale of the camp and the detailed allegations of the UAE’s involvement have not been previously reported. The images show the extent of the new development, as recently as in the past few weeks, along with construction for a drone ground control station at a nearby airport.

Satellite imagery shows a camp with hundreds of tents in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 22, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

Activity picked up in October at the camp, which is located in the remote western region of Benishangul-Gumuz, near the border with Sudan, satellite images show.

Ethiopia’s government spokesperson, its army and the RSF did not respond to detailed requests for comment about the findings of this story.

On January 6, UAE and Ethiopia issued a joint statement that included a call for a ceasefire in Sudan, as well as celebrating ties they said served the defense of each other’s security.

The Sudanese Armed Forces did not respond to a request for comment.

As of early January, 4,300 RSF fighters were undergoing military training at the site and “their logistical and military supplies are being provided by the UAE,” the note by Ethiopia’s security services seen by Reuters read.

Sudan's army has previously accused the UAE of supplying the RSF with weapons, a claim UN experts and US lawmakers have found credible.

The camp’s recruits are mainly Ethiopians, but citizens from South Sudan and Sudan, including from the SPLM-N, a Sudanese rebel group that controls territory in Sudan’s neighboring Blue Nile state, are also present, six officials said.

Reuters was unable to independently establish who was at the camp or the terms or conditions of recruitment.

A senior leader of the SPLM-N, who declined to be named, denied his forces had a presence in Ethiopia.

The six officials said the recruits are expected to join the RSF battling Sudanese soldiers in Blue Nile, which has emerged as a front in the struggle for control of Sudan. Two of the officials said hundreds had already crossed in recent weeks to support the paramilitaries in Blue Nile.

The internal security note said General Getachew Gudina, the Chief of the Defense Intelligence Department of the Ethiopian National Defense Force, was responsible for setting up the camp. A senior Ethiopian government official as well as four diplomatic and security sources confirmed Getachew’s role in launching the project.

Getachew did not respond to a request for comment.

The camp was carved out of forested land in a district called Menge, about 32 km from the border and strategically located at the intersection of the two countries and South Sudan, according to the satellite imagery and the diplomatic cable.

The first sign of activity in the area began in April, with forest clearing and the construction of metal-roofed buildings in a small area to the north of what is now the area of the camp with tents, where work began in the second half of October.

Satellite imagery shows a forested area where, ten months later, a camp with hundreds of tents was built in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, December 15, 2024. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

The diplomatic cable, dated November, described the camp as having a capacity of up to 10,000 fighters, saying activity began in October with the arrival of dozens of Land Cruisers, heavy trucks, RSF units and UAE trainers. Reuters is not revealing the country that wrote the cable, to protect the source.

Two of the officials described seeing trucks with the logo of the Emirati logistics company Gorica Group heading through the town of Asosa and towards the camp in October. Gorica did not respond to a request for comment.

The news agency was able to match elements of the timeframe specified in the diplomatic cable with satellite imagery. Images from Airbus Defense and Space show that after the initial clearing work, tents began filling the area from early November. Multiple diggers are visible in the imagery.

An image taken by US space technology firm Vantor on November 24 shows more than 640 tents at the camp, approximately four meters square. Each tent could comfortably house four people with some individual equipment, so the camp could accommodate at least 2,500 people, according to an analysis of the satellite imagery by defense intelligence company Janes.

Janes said it could not confirm the site was military based on their analysis of the imagery.

New recruits were spotted travelling to the camp in mid-November, two senior military officials said.

Satellite imagery shows an area where trucks come and go at a camp in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 22, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

On November 17, a column of 56 trucks packed with trainees rumbled through dirt roads of the remote region, the officials, who witnessed the convoys, told Reuters, with each truck holding between 50 and 60 fighters, the officials estimated.

Two days later, both officials saw another convoy of 70 trucks carrying soldiers driving in the same direction, they said.

The November 24 image shows at least 18 large trucks at the site. The vehicles’ size, shape and design match those of models frequently used by the Ethiopian military and its allies to transport soldiers, according to Reuters analysis.

Development continued in late January, the Vantor images show, including new clearing and digging in the riverbed just north of the main camp and dozens of shipping containers lined around the camp visible in a January 22 image. A senior Ethiopian government official said construction on the camp was ongoing but did not elaborate on future building plans.

Sudan’s civil war erupted in 2023 after a power struggle between the Sudanese army and the RSF ahead of a planned transition to civilian rule.


Gaza Girls Take Up Boxing to Heal War’s Scars

Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
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Gaza Girls Take Up Boxing to Heal War’s Scars

Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)

In a makeshift boxing ring etched into the sand between the tens of displaced Palestinians in southern Gaza, a dozen young girls warmed up before delivering fierce blows at their coach's command.

Osama Ayub once ran a boxing club in Gaza City, in the north of the Palestinian territory, until it was destroyed in a strike along with his home during the war between Israel and Hamas.

After finding shelter in the southern city of Khan Younis, he opted to put his sporting skills at the service of displaced Gazans, crammed by the tens of thousands in tents and makeshift shelters.

"We decided to work inside the camp to offer the girls some psychological relief from the war", Ayub told AFP.

Behind him, some of the young athletes faced each other in the ring surrounded by cheering gymmates, while others trained on a punching bag.

"The girls have been affected by the war and the bombardments; some have lost their families or loved ones. They feel pain and want to release it, so they have found in boxing a way to express their emotions," said Ayub.

Ayub now runs these free training sessions for 45 boxers aged between 8 and 19 three times a week, with positive feedback from his students as well as from the community.

One of the youngsters, Ghazal Radwan, aged 14, hopes to become a champion and represent her country.

"I practice boxing to develop my character, release pent-up energy and to become a champion in the future, compete against world champions in other countries, and raise the Palestinian flag around the world", she told AFP.

- Call for aid -

One after the other, the girls trained with Ayub, shifting from right to left jabs, hooks and uppercuts at his command.

In war-devastated Gaza, where construction materials are scarce, Ayub had to improvise to build his small training facility.

"We brought wood and built a square boxing ring, but there are no mats or safety measures," he said.

He called on the international community to support the boxers and help them travel abroad to train, "to strengthen their confidence and offer them psychological support".

The strict blockade that Israel imposed on the Gaza Strip makes the reconstruction of sports facilities particularly complicated, as building materials are routinely rejected by Israeli officials.

The official Palestinian news agency Wafa reported in January that a shipment of artificial turf donated by China to Gaza's youth and sports council was not allowed in by Israel.

With medicine, food and fuel all in short supply, sports equipment comes much lower on the list of items entering the Palestinian territory.

Rimas, a 16-year-old boxer, said she and her friends continued "to practice boxing despite the war, the bombardments and the destruction".

"We, the girls who box, hope for your support, that you will bring us gloves and shoes. We train on sand and need mats and punching bags," she said in comments addressed to the international community.


Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?

Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
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Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?

Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 

As US military movements intensify in the Middle East and the possibility of strikes on Iran looms, Yemen’s Houthi group has continued military preparations, mobilizing fighters and establishing new weapons sites.

The Houthi mobilization comes at a time when the group is widely viewed as one of Iran’s most important regional arms for retaliation.

Although the Iran-backed group has not issued any official statement declaring its position on a potential US attack on Iran, its leaders have warned Washington against any military action and against bearing full responsibility for any escalation and its consequences.

They have hinted that any response would be handled in accordance with the group’s senior leadership's assessment, after evaluating developments and potential repercussions.

Despite these signals, some interpret the Houthis’ stance as an attempt to avoid drawing the attention of the current US administration, led by President Donald Trump, to the need for preemptive action in anticipation of a potential Houthi response.

The Trump administration previously launched a military campaign against the group in the spring of last year, inflicting heavy losses.

Islam al-Mansi, an Egyptian researcher specializing in Iranian affairs, said Iran may avoid burning all its cards unless absolutely necessary, particularly given US threats to raise the level of escalation should any Iranian military proxies intervene or take part in a confrontation.

Iran did not resort to using its military proxies during its confrontation with Israel or during a limited US strike last summer because it did not perceive an existential threat, al-Mansi said.

That calculation could change in the anticipated confrontation, potentially prompting Houthi intervention, including targeting US allies, interests, and military forces, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Al-Mansi added that although Iran previously offered, within a negotiating framework, to abandon its regional proxies, including the Houthis, this makes it more likely that Tehran would use them in retaliation, noting that Iran created these groups to defend its territory from afar.

Many intelligence reports suggest that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has discussed with the Houthis the activation of alternative support arenas in a potential US-Iran confrontation, including the use of cells and weapons not previously deployed.

Visible readiness

In recent days, Chinese media outlets cited an unnamed Houthi military commander as saying the group had raised its alert level and carried out inspections of missile launch platforms in several areas across Yemen, including the strategically important Red Sea region.

In this context, Yemeni political researcher Salah Ali Salah said the Houthis would participate in defending Iran against any US attacks, citing the group’s media rhetoric accompanying mass rallies, which openly supports Iran’s right to defend itself.

While this rhetoric maintains some ambiguity regarding Iran, it repeatedly invokes the war in Gaza and renews Houthi pledges to resume military escalation in defense of the besieged enclave’s population, Salah told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He noted that Iran would not have shared advanced and sophisticated military technologies with the Houthis without a high degree of trust in their ability to use them in Iran’s interest.

In recent months, following Israeli strikes on the unrecognized Houthi government and several of its leaders, hardline Houthi figures demonstrating strong loyalty to Iran have become more prominent.

On the ground, the group has established new military sites and moved equipment and weapons to new locations along and near the coast, alongside the potential use of security cells beyond Yemen’s borders.

Salah said that if the threat of a military strike on Iran escalates, the Iranian response could take a more advanced form, potentially including efforts to close strategic waterways, placing the Bab al-Mandab Strait within the Houthis’ target range.

Many observers have expressed concern that the Houthis may have transferred fighters and intelligence cells outside Yemen over recent years to target US and Western interests in the region.

Open options

After a ceasefire was declared in Gaza, the Houthis lost one of their key justifications for mobilizing fighters and collecting funds. The group has since faced growing public anger over its practices and worsening humanitarian conditions, responding with media messaging aimed at convincing audiences that the battle is not over and that further rounds lie ahead.

Alongside weekly rallies in areas under their control in support of Gaza, the Houthis have carried out attacks on front lines with Yemen’s internationally recognized government, particularly in Taiz province.

Some military experts describe these incidents as probing attacks, while others see them as attempts to divert attention from other activities.

In this context, Walid al-Abara, head of the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, said the Houthis entered a critical phase after the Gaza war ended, having lost one of the main justifications for their attacks on Red Sea shipping.

As a result, they may seek to manufacture new pretexts, including claims of sanctions imposed against them, to maintain media momentum and their regional role.

Al-Abara told Asharq Al-Awsat that the group has two other options. The first is redirecting its activity inward to strengthen its military and economic leverage, either to impose its conditions in any future settlement or to consolidate power.

The second is yielding to international and regional pressure and entering a negotiation track, particularly if sanctions intensify or its economic and military capacity declines.

According to an assessment by the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, widespread protests in Iran are increasingly pressuring the regime’s ability to manage its regional influence at the same pace as before, without dismantling its network of proxies.

This reality is pushing Tehran toward a more cautious approach, governed by domestic priorities and cost-benefit calculations, while maintaining a minimum level of external influence without broad escalation.

Within this framework, al-Abara said Iran is likely to maintain a controlled continuity in its relationship with the Houthis through selective support that ensures the group remains effective.

However, an expansion of protests or a direct military strike on Iran could open the door to a deeper Houthi repositioning, including broader political and security concessions in exchange for regional guarantees.