5 ISIS Enclaves Remain in Central, Eastern Syria

Suspected ISIS members who fled the village of Baghouz, the last stronghold of the organization in northeastern Syria, in February 2019. (AFP)
Suspected ISIS members who fled the village of Baghouz, the last stronghold of the organization in northeastern Syria, in February 2019. (AFP)
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5 ISIS Enclaves Remain in Central, Eastern Syria

Suspected ISIS members who fled the village of Baghouz, the last stronghold of the organization in northeastern Syria, in February 2019. (AFP)
Suspected ISIS members who fled the village of Baghouz, the last stronghold of the organization in northeastern Syria, in February 2019. (AFP)

To this day, ISIS controls five isolated pockets in Syria, the largest of which is located near the Ithria village in Hama province. The other four enclaves are situated south of Raqqa province, in Palmyra’s countryside, near borders with Iraq and south of the eastern city of Deir Ezzor.

Since the beginning of 2021, ISIS staged 66 military operations against areas controlled by the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northern and eastern Syria, said a report published by North Press.

The campaigns included eight operations in Raqqa and its countryside, six operations in the Hasakah countryside, 41 operations in the eastern countryside of Deir Ezzor, and 11 operations in the western and northern countryside of Deir Ezzor.

50 people were killed and about 16 survived the attacks, with some suffering injuries that caused them physical disabilities.

East of Hasakah province, al-Hol camp’s administration accused ISIS off committing 29 murders since the beginning of 2021. Most of the victims were Iraqi refugees.

Also in Hasakah, the US-led International Coalition has launched a dramatic expansion of a large detention facility for ISIS fighters.

The effort will double in size the current facility, a series of three converted school buildings that holds roughly 5,000 prisoners from 50 different Arab and Western nationalities. Iraqis make up the majority of those detained.

Operated the SDF, the makeshift prison’s expansion will help in redistributing thousands of ISIS inmates in a way that meets Red Cross standards, Fener al-Kait, co-head of foreign affairs at the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, also known as Rojava, told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The goal of the expansion is to enhance security and prevent a mass breakout at the SDF-run facility, added al-Kait, explaining that overcrowding presents a serious challenge for officers guarding the prison.

Al-Kait also revealed that the UK will oversee the expansion and provide logistical support.

“We are cooperating with the British government to establish detention facilities that meet international standards,” he said, stressing that ISIS inmates pose a great danger.

“We need international support to secure these detention centers,” added al-Kait, but argued that shoring up the facility in Hasakah is not enough to resolve the status of ISIS prisoners and their families.

In 2019, Rojava handed over 170 ISIS wives and 177 of their children to governments in their home countries. The Kurdish administration also extradited 246 ISIS wives and 246 children in 2020.

Deeming the figures low, al-Kait urged the international community to provide radical solutions.

He warned that terrorist attacks and murders are on the rise in camps holding the families of ISIS fighters in northeastern Syria.

“ISIS has started rebuilding its ranks inside and outside camps,” said al-Kait.

Al-Kaait revealed that Rojava, alongside European governments, is studying the formation of a special international court to try ISIS prisoners and women involved in combat operations.

He said that EU countries with nationals detained in SDF-prisons are being approached to back the establishment of such a court.



What Do We Know About the 1968 Pact on ‘Hormuz’ Shipping Routes that Iran is Rejecting?

A boy balances on a tire at the water's edge as ships are seen in the Strait of Hormuz off Bandar Abbas, Iran, Tuesday, June 30, 2026 (AP) 
A boy balances on a tire at the water's edge as ships are seen in the Strait of Hormuz off Bandar Abbas, Iran, Tuesday, June 30, 2026 (AP) 
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What Do We Know About the 1968 Pact on ‘Hormuz’ Shipping Routes that Iran is Rejecting?

A boy balances on a tire at the water's edge as ships are seen in the Strait of Hormuz off Bandar Abbas, Iran, Tuesday, June 30, 2026 (AP) 
A boy balances on a tire at the water's edge as ships are seen in the Strait of Hormuz off Bandar Abbas, Iran, Tuesday, June 30, 2026 (AP) 

By John Yoon

One of Iran’s negotiators in talks with the United States, Kazem Gharibabadi, reasserted claims this week of permanent Iranian control over shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and rejected internationally recognized shipping routes established in 1968.

Tensions over the strait, a crucial path for oil and gas shipments, have threatened a fragile ceasefire between the United States and Iran. Iran has insisted it has authority over the strait and threatened ships that don’t travel on its mandated routes.

Here’s a closer look at the decades-old agreement that established the shipping routes and why Iran is opposed to it.

What was the agreement?

Nearly six decades ago, Omani and Iranian officials negotiated an agreement, ratified by the UN International Maritime Organization, that established the official way to transit the Strait of Hormuz, a crucial waterway for global energy supplies.

The framework, called the Traffic Separation Scheme, was largely a technical solution to prevent collisions between supertankers passing through the waterway, which is just 24 miles wide. It was also a legal solution to the fact that there are no neutral international waters in the middle of the strait where ships transit because the sovereign waters of Iran and Oman overlap.

Why is Iran rejecting it?

At the time, Iran was a dominant military power in the region and did not need to use its geography as leverage, Ali Vaez, the Iran project director at the International Crisis Group, said.

Today, in Iranian officials’ view, the traditional transit routes have allowed warships to pass through the strait, threatening Iran’s security, Vaez said.

Gharibabadi, the deputy foreign minister, noted on Monday that the agreement predated the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which overthrew the shah and brought an authoritarian clerical regime to power.

“Today we told the Omani side that those routes must definitely change,” he said. “We decided that we would also begin expert and technical talks on changing the routes.”

What does Iran want?

Gharibabadi’s remarks solidified Iran’s intention to move away from that framework in favor of negotiating a new system that gives them more control over the waters. Iran has already placed naval mines in the strait, effectively blocking those established 1968 routes.

“They are refining their argument to sound more legalistic,” said Jennifer Parker, a former naval officer now at the University of Western Australia’s Defense and Security Institute. She said the argument was designed to maximize Tehran’s leverage at the negotiating table.

To bypass Iran’s territorial waters, the United States and Oman recently attempted to establish an alternative corridor along the strait’s southern side in Omani waters under a US military escort mission. Gharibabadi reiterated on Monday that Iran would refuse to recognize any such parallel routes.

*The New York Times


Lebanon-Israel Deal May Entrench Stalemate Rather Than End War, Analysts Say

An Israeli helicopter flies on patrol near the Israel-Lebanon border, 23 June 2026, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. (EPA)
An Israeli helicopter flies on patrol near the Israel-Lebanon border, 23 June 2026, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. (EPA)
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Lebanon-Israel Deal May Entrench Stalemate Rather Than End War, Analysts Say

An Israeli helicopter flies on patrol near the Israel-Lebanon border, 23 June 2026, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. (EPA)
An Israeli helicopter flies on patrol near the Israel-Lebanon border, 23 June 2026, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. (EPA)

A security deal between Lebanon and Israel risks entrenching a stalemate rather than resolving Israel's underlying conflict with Hezbollah by tying Israel's pullout from southern Lebanon to the Iran-aligned group's disarmament, a condition regional analysts and politicians say is unattainable.

At its core is a bargain few see as workable: Hezbollah has flatly rejected disarmament, and no Lebanese government has the power to enforce it.

With Hezbollah unlikely to disarm, analysts say Israel has political cover to keep an open-ended military presence in southern Lebanon, which it invaded after Hezbollah fired at Israel on March 2 in solidarity with Tehran over the war in Iran.

The deal leaves the Lebanese state trapped between obligations it cannot meet and sovereignty it cannot fully reclaim, the analysts say.

The framework deal also collides with Lebanon’s political realities, asking a fragile sectarian state to confront the most powerful armed faction in the country despite a post–civil war system built on power-sharing rather than coercion.

"This is not an agreement, it is an imposed settlement," said a senior Lebanese politician who ‌declined to be ‌named, according to Reuters.

The Lebanese army, he said, was neither structured nor equipped to disarm Hezbollah, and expecting it ‌to do ⁠so ignored both the ⁠group’s entrenched military capacity and the fragile sectarian balance on which Lebanon's stability rests.

'BURDEN' PLACED ON LEBANON

Political analysts say the imbalance is built into the agreement’s design, with sweeping obligations placed on Lebanon but no reciprocal guarantee of Israeli withdrawal.

"This agreement has put all the burden on Lebanon," said Michael Young, a Beirut-based analyst, adding that it "creates a structure that allows the Israelis to remain (in southern Lebanon) indefinitely."

Fawaz Gerges, a Lebanese scholar at the London School of Economics and Political Science, said the deal was "born dead" and is structurally flawed, hinging on a condition that is impossible to meet in practice.

Gerges said Israel had already occupied a buffer zone in southern Lebanon about eight to 10 km (five to six miles) deep while tying any future withdrawal to Hezbollah’s ⁠disarmament.

The terms of the deal risk the buffer zone becoming long-term and giving it diplomatic legitimacy, he ‌said, describing it as a political "gift" to Israel.

The conflict in Lebanon has been a ‌central part of diplomacy towards ending the wider US-Iran war.

Gerges said Washington’s deliberate decoupling of the conflicts gave Israel greater freedom of action in Lebanon.

FEAR OF ‌CIVIL CONFLICT

The framework agreement signed in Washington affirms that Israel has no claim to Lebanese territory and makes Lebanese army authority in the ‌south contingent on the verified disarmament of non-state armed groups, including Hezbollah.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu portrays the deal as a historic achievement that could lead to broader peace, while Israeli troops remain deployed in a so-called security zone which Israel says is designed to protect its north from potential attack.

"We will continue to hold it (territory in the security zone) until Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations are disarmed, and until no further threat to Israel is posed from Lebanon," Netanyahu said on Saturday.

Three senior Israeli ‌officials said Israel has little faith in Lebanon's ability to disarm Hezbollah but sees the deal as a vital diplomatic step towards building peace with Lebanon in the long run.

About 4,000 people have been ⁠killed in Lebanon and a ⁠million displaced during Israel’s military campaign against Hezbollah.

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun welcomed the agreement as a first step towards restoring Lebanon's sovereignty, saying it should allow Lebanese people to return to fully liberated land.

Parliament Speaker and key Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri said it amounted to an "agreement of dictates, not one that preserves Lebanon's rights" and said it would not be implemented.

Hezbollah chief Naim Qassem declared the deal "null and void" and a "surrender" and said his group would keep fighting until Israel is forced to leave. Hezbollah lawmaker Hassan Fadlallah warned of "internal conflict" in Lebanon.

Any attempt to forcibly disarm Hezbollah would risk deepening sectarian tensions.

Young said the deal "won't lead us anywhere except to civil conflict, and maybe an insurrection by the Shiite community."

DEAL'S IMPLEMENTATION IN QUESTION

Danny Citrinowicz, a regional analyst and former Israeli military intelligence officer, said Hezbollah's dismantlement was "something that would never happen" and the deal in effect legitimized an open-ended Israeli military presence.

"Nothing will happen. Israel won't withdraw, and Hezbollah won't dismantle," he said.

Citrinowicz said no Israeli prime minister has the domestic political space to withdraw while Hezbollah is still armed and northern Israeli communities remain displaced.

A narrower pact focused on Hezbollah's pullout from south of the Litani River, an expanded Lebanese army deployment and an extension of state authority, would have stood a better chance of success, he said.

Pro-Hezbollah analyst Mohammed Obeid also said the deal was unlikely to be implemented, adding that its provisions were "like explosives", capable of detonating Lebanon's internal stability, as they hinge on state action to disarm Hezbollah.


13 Years Since 'June 30' in Egypt... The Muslim Brotherhood Has Suffered Severe Setbacks

The Muslim Brotherhood headquarters burning in Cairo in summer 2013 (Getty)
The Muslim Brotherhood headquarters burning in Cairo in summer 2013 (Getty)
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13 Years Since 'June 30' in Egypt... The Muslim Brotherhood Has Suffered Severe Setbacks

The Muslim Brotherhood headquarters burning in Cairo in summer 2013 (Getty)
The Muslim Brotherhood headquarters burning in Cairo in summer 2013 (Getty)

Thirteen years after the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood's rule in Egypt during the events of "June 30" 2013, the group has suffered major setbacks locally and internationally.
The group, whose rule lasted for one year since its member Mohamed Morsi ascended to the presidency in 2012, is now experiencing a domestic blow amidst judicial and security prosecutions.

Its international presence has also shrunk due to decisions by Western countries to pursue and label it as terrorist, with observers and analysts predicting that "the organization and its ideology will soon disappear.”

A Pivotal Day

June 30, 2013, is considered a pivotal day in modern Egyptian history. One year after Morsi assumed the presidency, massive demonstrations erupted across Egypt's governorates demanding the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood from power and Morsi's ouster. On July 3 of that year, his removal was announced in response to these demands.

In the same year, Egyptian authorities banned the Muslim Brotherhood and placed it on the list of "terrorist entities." Now, hundreds of its leaders and supporters are imprisoned, headed by its Supreme Guide Mohammed Badie.

Some have received sentences of execution, harsh imprisonment, and life in prison. The group's presence is now only known in cyberspace through platforms abroad, mainly in Türkiye and the United Kingdom.

Disappearance Domestically

Egyptian researcher specializing in extremist groups Munir Adib states that when discussing the disappearance of the Muslim Brotherhood on the thirteenth anniversary of the June 30 events, "it is necessary to differentiate between two things: the disappearance of the organization and the disappearance of the ideology."

"In both cases, the Egyptian state and its security agencies have succeeded over 13 years in dismantling, neutralizing the organization, and refuting many of its ideas to the extent that it no longer has the influence it had before 2013 or even before 2011,” he adds in a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat.

He predicted that the organization would disappear soon, saying: "The organization, which is now 98 years old, has only two more years left, for its hundredth year to be its last... to become merely a line in history books."

Ahmed Ban, an analyst specializing in religious and extremist groups, states that the group has shifted from a tangible existence to a mere presence on media platforms, specifically non-traditional media such as social media platforms, digital platforms, and artificial intelligence technologies to spread messages of frustration and chaos.

International Moves

Internationally, the organization's situation is no different than in Egypt, with official movements in Austria, Germany, France, and the Netherlands witnessing radical shifts in their stances over the past years, moving from a phase of monitoring and caution to prosecution.

In May 2026, the administration of US President Donald Trump unveiled a new national counter-terrorism strategy, which at its core focused on the Muslim Brotherhood as the ideological source of modern "militant terrorism."

This was preceded last January by Washington's designation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, as well as its branches in Jordan and Lebanon, as "terrorist organizations." This was followed in March by placing its Sudanese branch on the same list.

Moreover, a majority in the French Parliament agreed last January to call on the European Commission to add the Brotherhood and its leaders to the list of terrorist organizations. This was followed in March by the Dutch Parliament's approval of a proposal calling for a ban on the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliated organizations, though it has not yet been implemented.

Adib believes that these international moves are "an essential part of the confrontation that will lead to the disappearance of the organization, especially since the international community, Europe, and the United States represented the lifeline it breathed from."

He noted that the situation has now changed with the European move to re-evaluate the presence of the Muslim Brotherhood and its institutions, which has tightened the noose on the group, contributed to its neutralization, and consolidated predictions of its complete disappearance, along with its ideology, within the coming years.