Khaddam’s Memoirs: Damascus Received Rafik Hariri Upon Jumblatt’s Request, Hafez al-Assad ‘Tested Him’

Late Syrian Vice President Abdel-Halim Khaddam and Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri (center) sit next to former President Amin Gemayel at the funeral of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in Beirut on February 16, 2005 (Getty Images - AFP)
Late Syrian Vice President Abdel-Halim Khaddam and Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri (center) sit next to former President Amin Gemayel at the funeral of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in Beirut on February 16, 2005 (Getty Images - AFP)
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Khaddam’s Memoirs: Damascus Received Rafik Hariri Upon Jumblatt’s Request, Hafez al-Assad ‘Tested Him’

Late Syrian Vice President Abdel-Halim Khaddam and Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri (center) sit next to former President Amin Gemayel at the funeral of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in Beirut on February 16, 2005 (Getty Images - AFP)
Late Syrian Vice President Abdel-Halim Khaddam and Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri (center) sit next to former President Amin Gemayel at the funeral of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in Beirut on February 16, 2005 (Getty Images - AFP)

The third episode of the memoirs of late Syrian Vice President Abdel-Halim Khaddam - published by Asharq Al-Awsat – talks about the relationship between Damascus and late Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri since its beginning in 1982 and up to the latter’s assassination in February 2005.

Khaddam says that in April 1982, Hariri was introduced to Damascus upon Druze leader Walid Jumblatt’s request.

“In April 1982, I received Mr. Rafik Hariri at the request of Mr. Walid Jumblatt. It was the first time that I met with him. All I knew is that he was a Saudi businessman of Lebanese origin.

“The session focused on knowing his orientation, his aspirations, and his relation with the Lebanese internal arena. Hariri was cautious, speaking vaguely and I felt that he was seeking to understand our approach to the Lebanese issue. At the end of the session, he asked to visit me again, and I welcomed him.

“The second meeting was held two weeks later. We engaged into a lengthy discussion about the Lebanese file that lasted for five hours. We had lunch at my house, where Hariri spoke frankly about his upbringing and the circumstances he went through, his affiliation with the Arab Nationalist Movement, and his participation in the smuggling of George Habash (Secretary General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) out of the Syrian prison.

“He also talked about his work in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, starting from his first job to the major projects he undertook. On Lebanon, he said: “Lebanon is my homeland, where I grew up and where my family lives. It is part of my life, so allow me to come to Syria more often in order to reach a solution to the Lebanese crisis.”

“A detailed discussion took place about the Lebanese crisis, its causes and circumstances. In my opinion, the crisis was due to two reasons: The first, Lebanon’s sectarian system, which prevented the unity of the Lebanese components, while the second reason relates to the conditions of the Palestinian resistance, which found itself in conflict with political formations of a Christian character.

“We agreed on the analysis and reviewed the means to reach a solution. Hariri promised to present a written draft for us to discuss.”

Khaddam recounts that Hariri submitted his proposal to Damascus during their following encounter. He notes that he had some objections, as the project maintained the sectarian character of the state’s constitutional institutions and the distribution of seats.

Hariri asserted that these issues would be gradually resolved, so the Syrian vice president replied: “The Lebanese constitution, which was drafted in the 1920s includes a text that stipulates the abolishment of political sectarianism following a certain period; this period has lasted from 1920 until now. Consequently, if there is no specific and decisive time for the transitional phase, sectarianism will remain and the conflict that the Lebanese people have witnessed for many years will persist.”

Khaddam says that an agreement was reached to set a specific period for the transitional phase. When Hariri presented his project to the other Lebanese leaders, he was met with consent by some and objection by others, including those who wanted to adhere to the sectarian formula.

Hariri used to visit Damascus every week, to discuss the Lebanese national issue or to convey messages from the late King Fahd bin Abdulaziz to President Hafez al-Assad.

Following the Lebanese elections of 1992, Khaddam says that Damascus discussed all the names of well-known political figures, who could assume the premiership of the new government.

He recounts how Assad “tested” Hariri before agreeing to assign him to the post.

“Suddenly, the president [Hazez al-Assad] asked him: “If you were the head of the Lebanese government and we disagreed with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, how would you act?” Rafik replied: “Mr. President, I am Lebanese and love my country, and I am also Saudi.... Consequently, I cannot give up on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia because I am not ungrateful. I am an Arab nationalist. I consider Syria the incubator of the Arabs, and I can only be with Syria. Consequently: If there is a disagreement, I will work on solving it and if I fail, I will retire.” President Hafez replied: “If you had said anything other than this, I would not have believed you, and you would have lost my confidence. I will ask Abu Jamal (Khaddam) to inform the Lebanese President that we support Rafik Hariri’s nomination.”

“This is how Rafik Hariri became prime minister of Lebanon. He committed to every word he said to me and to President Hafez, and offered great services to Syria through his foreign relations,” Khaddam says.

He notes, however, that when Bashar al-Assad assumed power following the death of his father, he initiated a campaign against Hariri and was incited by a group of Lebanese, who were previously associated with his brother Bassel and had personal ambitions. This prompted Bashar’s friends in Lebanon to further attack Hariri.

According to Khaddam, these campaigns have increased the Syrian president’s isolation at the Arab and international levels. The man found himself in front of one option: falling into Iran’s arms.

During that period, presidential elections were supposed to be held in Lebanon, but Bashar insisted on the extension of President Emile Lahoud’s tenure. The Muslim circle, some national forces and political currents, stood against the extension.

Signs of a fresh Syrian campaign emerged against Hariri. This was clearly evident in a meeting of the National Progressive Front (a coalition of parties led by the Baath), during which Foreign Minister Farouk Al-Sharaa talked about the political situation and was asked about relations with Hariri. He replied: “He is conspiring against Syria, and he is involved with the United States and France against our country.”

As Syria insisted on extending Lahoud’s term, Hariri announced he would resign from the government. Consequently, the Syrian presidential palace summoned the Lebanese premier to a meeting with Bashar.

Looking for advice, Hariri contacted Khaddam, asking: “What should I do? I do not want to stay in power.” The Syrian official replied: “Keep insisting on your resignation, and if he presses you, present him with the proposal of Lebanese national reconciliation between all parties.”

During the meeting, Rafik hardened his stance. Al-Assad asked him: “What are your conditions for going back on your resignation?”

He replied: “A national reconciliation meeting, a government of national unity in which everyone participates without exception, freedom to decide, and President Lahoud’s non-interference in governance affairs.”

Days and weeks passed, and the government was not formed. In early October, Minister Marwan Hamadeh escaped an assassination attempt, which increased tension in Lebanon.

Khaddam recounts that in mid-January 2005, the regional leadership of the Baath party held a meeting to discuss some partisan issues. Assad said: “I will talk about Lebanon. There is an American-French conspiracy against us, in which Hariri is involved. This poses a danger to Syria.”

The Syrian vice-president says that the next day, he received Mohsen Dalloul, who had a strong relationship with Hariri.

“I briefed him on Bashar’s talk and asked him to inform Rafik that he should leave Lebanon immediately, because the hatred for him is great.

“On February 14, we had a meeting at the Regional Command. After the meeting, I entered the room of Dr. Ahmed Dergham, a member of the leadership and the TV was on. I was shocked at the news of a large bomb explosion in front of Hariri’s convoy, on its way from Parliament. A member of the leadership was next to me and said: “He executed what he talked about in that meeting.

“I returned home sad, because I lost a friend who was serving Syria and Lebanon…I remembered President Hafez’s position on Hariri, and how he protected him from the campaigns of the Syrian security services…

“On the day Hariri was assassinated, I went to Lebanon and found large crowds in front of his house. When I got out of the car, I heard someone say: “What is he doing here?” Then another answered him: “This is Abou Baha’s friend, not from those who hate him.”



Iran's Revolutionary Guards Extend Control over Tehran's Oil Exports

Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH
Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH
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Iran's Revolutionary Guards Extend Control over Tehran's Oil Exports

Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH
Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH

Iran's Revolutionary Guards have tightened their grip on the country's oil industry and control up to half the exports that generate most of Tehran's revenue and fund its proxies across the Middle East, according to Western officials, security sources and Iranian insiders.

All aspects of the oil business have come under the growing influence of the Guards, from the shadow fleet of tankers that secretively ship sanctioned crude, to logistics and the front companies selling the oil, mostly to China, according to more than a dozen people interviewed by Reuters.
The extent of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) control over oil exports has not previously been reported.

Despite tough Western sanctions designed to choke Iran's energy industry, reimposed by former US President Donald Trump in 2018, Iran generates more than $50 billion a year in oil revenue, by far its largest source of foreign currency and its principal connection to the global economy.

Six specialists - Western officials and security experts as well as Iranian and trading sources - said the Guards control up to 50% of Iran's oil exports, a sharp increase from about 20% three years ago. The sources declined to be identified due to the sensitivity of the matter.

Three of the estimates were based on intelligence documents about Iranian shipping while others derived their figures from monitoring shipping activity by tankers and companies linked to the IRGC. Reuters was unable to determine the exact extent of the IRGC's control.

The IRGC's growing domination of the oil industry adds to its influence in all areas of Iran's economy and also makes it harder for Western sanctions to hit home - given the Guards are already designated as a terrorist organization by Washington.

Trump's return to the White House in January, however, could mean tougher enforcement of sanctions on Iran's oil industry. The country's oil minister said Tehran is putting measures in place to deal with any restrictions, without giving details.

As part of their expansion in the industry, the Guards have muscled in on the territory of state institutions such as the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and its NICO oil trading subsidiary, according to four of the sources.

When sanctions hit Iran's oil exports years ago, the people running NIOC and the wider industry were specialized in oil rather than how to evade sanctions, added Richard Nephew, a former deputy special envoy for Iran at the US State Department.

"The IRGC guys were much, much better at smuggling, just terrible at oil field management, so they began to get a larger control of oil exports," said Nephew, who is now a researcher at Columbia University.
The IRGC, NIOC, NICO and Iran's foreign ministry did not respond to requests for comment.
RISK APPETITE
The IRGC is a powerful political, military and economic force with close ties to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
The Guards exert influence in the Middle East through their overseas operations arm, the Quds Force, by providing money, weapons, technology and training to allies Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, Yemen's Houthis and militias in Iraq.
While Israel has killed a number of senior IRGC commanders over the past year, the oil specialists in its ranks have been able to continue their operations, two Western and two Iranian sources said.
The Iranian government began allotting oil, instead of cash, to the IRGC and Quds Force around 2013, according to Nephew.
The government was under budgetary pressure then because it was struggling to export oil due to Western sanctions imposed over Iran's nuclear program.
The IRGC proved adept at finding ways to sell oil even under sanctions pressure, said Nephew, who was actively involved in tracking Iranian oil activities then.
Iranian oil revenues hit $53 billion in 2023 compared with $54 billion in 2022, $37 billion in 2021 and $16 billion in 2020, according to estimates from the US government's Energy Information Administration.
This year, Tehran's oil output has topped 3.3 million barrels per day, the highest since 2018, according to OPEC figures, despite the Western sanctions.
China is Iran's biggest buyer of oil, with most going to independent refineries, and the IRGC has created front companies to facilitate trade with buyers there, all the sources said.
Oil export revenues are split roughly evenly between the IRGC and NICO, said one source involved in Iranian oil sales to China. The IRGC sells oil at a $1-$2 barrel discount to prices offered by NICO because buyers take a bigger risk buying from the Guards, the person said.
"It depends on a buyer's risk appetite, the higher ones will go for the IRGC, which the US designates as a terrorist group."
Two Western sources estimated that the IRGC offered an even bigger discount, saying it was $5 per barrel on average but could be as much as $8.
The oil is allocated directly by the government to the IRGC and Quds Force. It's then up to them to market and ship the oil - and work out a mechanism for disbursing the revenue, according to the sources and intelligence documents seen by Reuters.
NIOC gets a separate allocation.
CHINESE FRONT
One of the front companies used is China-based Haokun. Operated by former Chinese military officials, it remains an active conduit for IRGC oil sales into China, despite Washington hitting it with sanctions in 2022, two of the sources said.
The US Treasury said China Haokun Energy had bought millions of barrels of oil from the IRGC-Quds Force and was sanctioned for having "materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF".
In one oil transaction dated March 16, 2021 involving Haokun and parties including Turkish company Baslam Nakliyat - which is under US sanctions for its trading links to the IRGC - a payment was processed via US bank JP Morgan and Turkish lender Vakif Katilim, according to the intelligence documents.
The transaction took place before the companies were sanctioned. Reuters has no indication JP Morgan or Vakif Katilim were aware of the Iranian connection - highlighting the risks of companies getting inadvertently caught up in the shadow trade.
JP Morgan declined to comment. Vakif Katilim said in a statement: "Our bank performs its activities within the framework of national and international banking rules."
Haokun declined to comment. Baslam did not respond to a request for comment.
'GHOST FLEET'
Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, who was killed in a US strike in Baghdad in 2020, had set up a clandestine headquarters and inaugurated that year for the unit's oil smuggling activities, initially staffed by former oil minister Rostam Ghasemi, according to the intelligence documents.
Reuters could not determine where all the oil money funneled through the IRGC goes. The IRGC headquarters and day-to-day operations has an annual budget of around $1 billion, according to assessments from two security sources tracking IRGC activities.
They estimated that the IRGC budget for Hezbollah was another $700 million a year.
"Exact figures remain undisclosed, as Hezbollah conceals the funds it receives. However, estimates are that its annual budget is approximately $700 million to $1 billion. Around 70%-80% of this funding comes directly from Iran," Shlomit Wagman, former director general of Israel’s Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Prohibition Authority, said separately.
Hezbollah did not respond to a request for comment.
The former Secretary General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed in an Israeli airstrike, said Iran provided the group's budget, including for salaries and weapons.
Iran's main tanker operator NITC, which previously played a key role in exports, also now provides services to the IRGC.
It executes ship-to-ship transfers of Iranian oil onto vessels operated by the IRGC to ship crude into China, according to sources and ship-tracking data. Such transfers are common practice to help disguise the origin of the oil tankers carry.
NITC did not respond to a request for comment.
In August, Israel's National Bureau for Counter Terror Financing, part of the country's defense ministry, imposed sanctions on 18 tankers it said were involved in transporting oil belonging to the Quds Force.
In October, the US Treasury slapped sanctions on 17 separate tankers it said formed part of Iran's "ghost fleet", outside of NITC vessels. It followed up with sanctions on a further 18 tankers on Dec. 3.