Memoirs of Abdel-Halim Khaddam: Syrian Attack on Hezbollah Barracks and Tehran’s Reactionhttps://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2945971/memoirs-abdel-halim-khaddam-syrian-attack-hezbollah-barracks-and-tehran%E2%80%99s
Memoirs of Abdel-Halim Khaddam: Syrian Attack on Hezbollah Barracks and Tehran’s Reaction
Memoirs of Abdel-Halim Khaddam: Syrian Attack on Hezbollah Barracks and Tehran’s Reaction
In mid-February 1986, a delegation of Lebanese Islamic leaders arrived in Damascus and met with Vice President Abdel-Halim Khaddam, requesting the intervention of Syrian forces to impose security in Beirut, after the eruption of clashes.
President Hafez al-Assad decided to dispatch a military unit to impose order across the Lebanese capital, including Hezbollah’s Fathallah Barracks.
In this episode of the memoirs of the late Syrian vice president published by Asharq Al-Awsat, Khaddam narrates the dialogue that took place in March 1987 between him and the Iranian ambassador to Damascus, Hassan Akhtari, who was seeking a mediation for Hezbollah.
“In 1986 and early 1987, the security situation collapsed in Beirut. Gangs and militias carried out looting, robbery and murder, while clashes erupted between different armed groups.
“In mid-February 1986, an Islamic delegation arrived in Damascus, including leaders of various sects, who described the dire conditions of Beirut residents, and requested the intervention of Syria through a security force. I discussed the issue with President al-Assad, who decided to send a military unit to Beirut, in response to the request of the Islamic leaders, and gave his instructions to the army command to carry out the mission. Based on a security plan, the Syrian forces closed down militia headquarters and confiscated weapons they found there.
“During that operation, Syrian soldiers headed to a Hezbollah base in Beirut, known as the Fathallah barracks, and asked party members to evacuate the premises and hand over their weapons. A dispute erupted and the Syrians were surprised by heavy gunfire, which led to the killing of some soldiers. The forces responded, killing 22 people and taking over the barracks.”
Khaddam recounts that on March 3, 1987, he received the Iranian ambassador in Damascus, Hassan Akhtari, who requested the meeting to discuss some matters.
“According to the minutes of the meeting, the first topic that we tackled was the developments in Beirut, the Fathallah barracks in particular, and the successive events that took place in West Beirut,” he says.
The Iranian ambassador conveyed Iran’s view on the execution of the Syrian security plan, saying: “Brigadier General Ghazi Kanaan (then-Syrian intelligence official in Lebanon) stated that the Syrian forces would enter the southern suburbs, and then he went back on his claim. The brothers in Tehran want to know the extent of the dimensions of the security plan, and whether it will include the southern suburbs?”
He continued: “There is another point: the confiscation of weapons from Muslim homes in West Beirut. I remember that in my meeting with President Hafez al-Assad, while presenting my credentials, I spoke about this issue, and he said: This topic is not on our table. We will not take their weapons, but rather we will give them arms to fight and resist. Now, you take weapons from people’s homes. I don’t know how that happens.”
The diplomat went on saying: “We really want Hezbollah to be an effective and strong element in confronting Israel. We want it to be a strong supporter in the hands of Syria to face Israel. But now we see a ruthless propaganda campaign that wants to disturb the relations between Syria and the party. The enemies are working on that to suggest that there are contradictions between us… Officials in Iran have all described the West Beirut incident as an irresponsible act, and that the Syrian leadership was Hezbollah’s support system, because it realizes that the party is the arm to fight Israel.”
“Such events can arise the people’s emotions to an extent that makes it difficult for us, for you and for Hezbollah to control,” the ambassador emphasized.
Khaddam says that after hearing Akhtari’s briefing, he mentioned two points that reflect Damascus’ stance.
“The first point: Syria has been keen on the strong and fraternal relations with Iran, and has always been working to strengthen them. I confirm this keenness, despite some irresponsible statements by Tehran…
“A series of statements have been issued in Iran, some of which referred to the existing fraternal relations between the two countries, while others forgot about Syria to only focus on an incident that took place in Lebanon. We express our regret at the release of such statements… The importance of the relations between Syria and Iran and their common struggle are much greater than an incident occurring here or there.
“For us, if a citizen utters one word against Iran, we put him in prison, and if a group of people criticize Tehran, we deal with them severely. This is how we understand the concern for relations between the two countries. The responsibility for Lebanese affairs rests with Syria, because Lebanon has special relations with us. We are one people. In addition, what is happening in Lebanon is directly reflected on Syria’s security and policy in the region… This strategy is supposed to be supported by our friends in the Iranian Republic, because it is consistent with its anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist policies.”
Khaddam continued, saying: “Nevertheless, and despite all these statements, Syria will remain loyal to its relations with Iran, although we are saddened by such reactions, which should have been preceded by seeking clarification from Syria about what happened. If you had asked us about the events and we provided you with the facts… we would have avoided giving our enemies the opportunity to take advantage of the situation…”
The Syrian vice-president moves to touch on his country’s position towards Hezbollah.
“When Hezbollah was established, we considered it a friendly party and we provided it with assistance and support. We absorbed all the bad operations that some of its members had carried out against friends of Syria in Lebanon and against Syrian soldiers. We refrained from issuing public reactions; on the contrary, we were acting on the basis of friendly relations with this organization which confronts Israel.
“But you remember that we have warned several times against infiltrations from three sides: Yasser Arafat, the Iraq group, and the second Lebanese intelligence office. We were warning of the dangers of such penetrations because we feared that they would push Hezbollah to commit actions that would harm its role in Lebanon and its relations with Syria. Unfortunately, these warnings were not given the necessary importance from the party’s leadership…”
The Iranian ambassador, trying to clarify the infiltration of Hezbollah, said: “I do not deny that. Arafat can influence some elements. However, if we look at this party and its stated goals, it cannot agree with Arafat.” Khaddam replied: “I distinguished between Hezbollah as a leadership and some elements.”
Responding to Iranian concerns about the Shiite community in Lebanon and Syria’s intervention in Beirut’s southern suburbs, Hezbollah’s stronghold, Khaddam said: “For the Shiite Muslims in Lebanon, they are part of the Islamic component and the Lebanese nation that we are keen on... Of course, Syria cannot take any action that would disturb the internal balance. What we are doing is for the benefit of the oppressed and affected people in Lebanon. The issue of the Southern Suburbs is not subject to discussion. In addition, we know very well the interests of Muslims, whether they were Shiites, Druze, or Sunnis.”
The Syrian vice president went on to say: “Officials in Iran know Syria’s stances towards the Islamic Republic, and we hope that our friends will realize the importance of Syria’s success in ending the Lebanese crisis. I assure you that Damascus does not intend to strike Hezbollah, but it cannot accept its refusal to abide by the security plan.”
The ambassador thanked Khaddam for receiving him and left.
Assad in Syria and Lebanon: Quarter of a Century of Dictatorship and Destructionhttps://english.aawsat.com/features/5095045-assad-syria-and-lebanon-quarter-century-dictatorship-and-destruction
People attend a rally to "thank Syria" for its role in Lebanon on March 8, 2005. (Getty Images)
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Assad in Syria and Lebanon: Quarter of a Century of Dictatorship and Destruction
People attend a rally to "thank Syria" for its role in Lebanon on March 8, 2005. (Getty Images)
Hazem Saghieh
The advent of the 21st Century brought with it historic developments. The most significant for Syria and Lebanon took place on June 10, 2000 with the death of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. Many openly mourned his passing. Many having experienced firsthand the cruelty of the ruler. In secret however, they said: “This is the first time Assad does something useful.”
Hafez was in effect the president of two countries. Weeks before his death, he met with US President Bill Clinton in Geneva to discuss resuming negotiations between Syria and Israel. On May 25, 2000, Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in line with an electoral pledge made by Ehud Barak.
The day was a calamity to Assad’s Lebanese and Syrian supporters, who saw in the withdrawal the end of their excuses to carry arms outside state control. So, they described the move as a “conspiracy” and suddenly, like a magician pulling a rabbit out of a hat, they cited Israel’s continued occupation of the long-forgotten Shebaa Farms. Israel had occupied the area from Syria in 1967. Calls for war mounted, demanding that Israel withdraw or suffer the consequences. Soon after, however, tensions eased, and Hezbollah declared the withdrawal a “liberation” achieved with the support of “Syria’s Assad”.
Training Bashar and Lebanese politicians
Syrians recalled the story of a peasant from Daraa who headed to Damascus to attend Hafez’s funeral. On his way, he saw a billboard that read: “The Assad (Arabic for lion) is immortal and does not die.” So the peasant turned back and returned home believing that the news of Hafez’s death were rumors spread by enemies.
The peasant wasn’t completely wrong or so it would seem when Hafez’s son, Bashar, came to power to follow in his father’s footsteps. Despite the changes the new young ruler introduced to the country and his marriage to a “modern” British-born woman, the apple did not fall far from the tree, and he maintained his father’s iron-fisted grip on power.
Bashar forged ahead along his father’s destructive path and where better to gain experience than in Syria’s favorite training ground: Lebanon.
Late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and US President Bill Clinton meet in Geneva in 2000. (Getty Images)
In 1998, two years before he came to power and four years after his older brother Bassel’s death, Bashar was put in charge of the Syrian military presence in “brotherly” Lebanon, where 40,000 Syrian soldiers were deployed. As part of Bashar’s training, he documented his relations with Lebanese politicians, the majority of whom bowed their heads to the lowliest of Syrian officers.
Three Lebanese figures stood out for Bashar. Two had his unabashed admiration and one was an abhorred thorn in his side:
Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah was the leader of the resistance party and enjoyed Bashar’s full support. He was viewed as the man of the 2000 liberation. He represented to Bashar everything that he could not achieve because he inherited power, while Nasrallah earned his way to the top. However, Hafez had the upper hand over Nasrallah when negotiating with Iran; the young inexperienced Bashar did not.
Bashar’s admiration of Nasrallah stemmed from what he could never achieve, while his admiration for Emile Lahoud stemmed from what was possible. The Lebanese army and naval commander was chosen by Damascus to be president in 1998. Lahoud, the commander of the very modest Lebanese navy, was as much a military man as Bashar, the ophthalmologist, was a doctor.
With the very little time needed to run the navy, Lahoud spent his leisure hours oiling himself up to tan under the sun at the Bain Militaire resort in Beirut. In all likelihood, Bashar was drawn to Lahoud because of their shared weakness in articulating words and putting sentences together, following that up with weak laughter, leaving their statements utterly meaningless.
The thorn in Bashar’s side was wealthy businessman and former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, who lavished gifts on Syrian officers hoping for political leniency in return. This was not the type of wealthy man who Bashar was drawn to. Bashar looked up to the wealthy man whose sole ambition was to keep his riches from being seized.
Articles spoke about how Hariri was the one who was building Syria’s relations with the world, and he was the one who proposed to Damascus that it follow the “Chinese model” whereby power remains in the hands of the rulers, while freedom is introduced to the markets. Bashar resented Hariri for this and his sentiment deepened because Hariri was a Sunni leader and Bashar was Alawite. The Sunnis make up the majority in Lebanon and Syria where Alawites are a minority.
Rumors abounded that Hariri not only wanted to be the leader of the Sunnis in Lebanon, but in Syria as well. No wonder Bashar was suspicious. Rumors also spread that Hariri sought regional peace whereby the Palestinians and Israeli would continue where they left off in Oslo in 1993. Perhaps what irked Bashar the most about Hariri was that he was a self-made man.
From left to right: Former Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, slain former PM Rafik al-Hariri and slain Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah (AFP file)
Regional tumult and crimes in Lebanon
The Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon removed the Syrian regime’s excuse for keeping its forces deployed in Lebanon. Hafez’s death encouraged people to speak out. The man of the moment was late Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir, who in September 2000 sponsored a Maronite call on Syria to pull out its troops. Sfeir forged ahead. In April 2001, he blessed the establishment of the Qornet Shewan gathering that marked the beginning of the emergence of an anti-Syria opposition.
The gathering brought together Christian politicians and helped extend bridges to Hariri and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, both of whom were upset with Bashar and his employee in Lebanon, Lahoud. In the summer of 2001, Sfeir sponsored a major reconciliation between the Christians and the Druze. Both sects were seen as the backbone of Lebanon’s national identity.
On August 7, Christian society was rattled by student protests held by supporters of the Lebanese Forces and former army commander Michel Aoun, who was in exile at the time. The protesters were summarily rounded up and imprisoned in shocking scenes. Hundreds were detained without any legal justification and for simply demanding freedom and the withdrawal of Syrian troops.
The region was in store for more tumult. In 2003, the US invaded Iraq and a year later Syria’s Kurds in Qamishli were encouraged to revolt against the regime. Bashar responded to the unrest by shipping terrorists to Iraq where they caused so much death and destruction. Washington soon began to mount its pressure on Bashar to ease meddling in Lebanon.
Bashar responded with a bombshell in Beirut. He remained steadfast in extending Lahoud’s term in office in 2004 despite deep opposition in Lebanon. In September later that year, the UN Security Council issued resolution 1559 that calls for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon and the dismantling of all militias. It was as clear as day that Bashar and Hezbollah were the main targets of the resolution.
Bashar and Nasrallah were determined to retaliate against the resolution and Jumblatt and Hariri were seen as the main targets. Jumblatt had joined the opposition, while Hariri, who openly opposed the extension of Lahoud’s term – in what was seen as a direct insult to Bashar – was suspected of having played a major role in the issuance of resolution 1559.
And so, Beirut would be struck with disaster on February 14, 2005. Hariri was assassinated in major car bombing that would also claim the life of minister Bassil Fleihan and 21 people. A slew of crimes and assassinations would ensue against politicians and journalists who were vocal in their opposition to Bashar and Nasrallah.
Lebanon would soon become divided into two camps: one known as “March 8”, named so after holding a large rally on that day in 2005 to “thank Syria’s Assad” for its role in Lebanon, and “March 14”, also named so after a rally on that day that dwarfed the first and that protested against Hariri’s killing and demanded the withdrawal of the Syrian forces.
The forces would eventually withdraw from Lebanon on April 30, 2005. Nasrallah eagerly gifted the head of the Syrian security apparatus in Lebanon, Rustom Ghazaleh, the “rifle of resistance” because he wanted the Syrian troops to quit Lebanon with their heads held high, not weak and humiliated. Hariri’s “curse” would haunt Ghazaleh and his predecessor Ghazi Kanaan. Their mysterious fate would be added to countless others who died under the Assad rule.
Syrian forces deployed in Lebanon. (AFP file)
Ghazaleh was named to his post in Lebanon in 2002. He followed in Kanaan’s bloody footsteps of killing and torture. They had set up base in the town of Anjar in the Bekaa and the Beau Rivage Hotel in Beirut, both of which became synonymous with the Syrian regime’s oppression. They also sponsored drug and weapons smuggling networks whose revenues they reaped, along with the regime and their allies in the “Axis of Resistance”.
Ghazaleh was known for his utmost loyalty to the regime. Perhaps it was because he was a Sunni and needed to prove himself to his Alawite masters. Kanaan, a Alawite, didn’t need to go that far and years later would go on record and speak proudly of his friendship with Hariri.
At any rate, with Syrian troops out of Lebanon, the regime feared that all of its plotting to kill Hariri would be revealed. So, Ghazaleh, the regime’s secret keeper and owner of the “rifle of the resistance” was killed in 2015. Kanaan was shot and killed in his office in 2005. He was shot with two or three bullets, but the regime famously preferred to call his death a suicide. A few years later, two of his brothers also committed “suicide” - also using two or three bullets.
Tying the brother to the sister
Throughout the hegemony of “sister” Syria over “brother” Lebanon, the latter was under the Baathist theory of “Lebanon’s Arabism”. Describing what the regime did to Arabism is an insult to the word. In reality, it required that Lebanon stand by Syria and non-Arab Iran, through thick and thin, against Egypt, Iraq and Arab Gulf and Maghreb. For the first time in Lebanon’s modern history, it had an official ideology that identified “friend” and “foe”, replacing freedom of expression that was a hallmark of Lebanon’s official stances.
Hafez had also tightened the bond between Damascus and Beirut with the 1991 treaty of “Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination” that tied Lebanon’s foreign policy to Syria’s. Damascus was also granted the final say in administrative and public appointments, especially security and military ones. It was allowed to name judges and ministers and outline media policies of various outlets.
This form of “Arabism” continued under Bashar, who at first attempted to display some openness towards Syria and Lebanon. He gave some breathing room for civil society activists in Syria and Lebanese banks opened branches in Syria. Bashar also approached Christian Lebanese parties that are traditionally opposed to the Assads.
War with Israel
Bashar’s relative “openness” led to the establishment of the “Beirut-Damascus Declaration” in May 2006. It was signed by hundreds of Syrian and Lebanon intellectuals and activists and called on the Syrian government to “correct” relations with Lebanon and respect its sovereignty and independence and end its series of political assassinations. The declaration marked the end of the openness. The Syrian signatories soon found themselves in jail or fired from their jobs.
Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon left Hezbollah and its allies isolated. They were also confronted with a national agenda championed by the March 14 movement. Syrian voices chimed in solidarity with the Lebanese people. Hezbollah and its allies therefore sensed the need to shift attention elsewhere. And as usual, what best way to do that than sparking a war with Israel? Hezbollah abducted two Israeli soldiers in July 2006, leading Israel to declare war on the party.
Hezbollah would declare “divine victory” some 33 days later. Soon after, Iran-backed Hezbollah would assume in Lebanon the role once played by Ghazaleh. Iran’s role in Lebanon would become more pronounced, while Syria still held sway, albeit in back alleys, instead of the rooftops.
Lebanese mourners hold up a sign during the funeral of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in Beirut, Lebanon, February 16, 2005 (Reuters)
A deadly duality emerged: a popular and parliamentary majority represented by Fuad Siniora’s government on the one hand, and the “divine victory” camp whose weapons and alliances would prevent the establishment of any stable form of rule on the other. The camp obstructed the government functioning and crippled the entire capital with a sit-in in Downtown Beirut that extended for over a year.
In May 2007, members of the so-called Fatah al-Islam group killed 27 Lebanese soldiers in their sleep. Clashes soon ensued in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp between the group and the army. Later, it would be revealed that the leader of the group, Shaker al-Absi, was working for Syrian intelligence. He had been imprisoned in Damascus and later released. He was tasked with sending terrorists to Iraq. After the Nahr al-Bared battle, he fled to Damascus and was later unsurprisingly killed in mysterious circumstances.
With Hezbollah and its allies holding sway in Lebanon, meeting constitutional deadlines became impossible. It took six months to elect Michel Suleiman president and that was only after Hezbollah and its allies turned their weapons against the Lebanese people in May 2008. The Doha conference was held to restore calm and end the political impasse and Suleiman was elected president.
Even after the crisis was resolved, Hezbollah continued to obstruct political life when things did not go in its favor even though the 2009 parliamentary elections, just like the 2005 polls, handed the March 14 camp a majority.
Syrian revolution and Assad’s downfall
The Syrian revolution erupted in 2011 and people in Lebanon hoped that it would positively impact their country and sweep away the rot and corruption that had been eating away at it. Voices of solidarity rose with the Syrian people, this time calling for freedom and dignity, not Arabism and resistance. Thugs affiliated with Damascus loyalists and Hezbollah soon cracked down on people expressing solidarity.
The northern city of Tripoli suffered the brunt of the crackdown. Its close proximity to Syria had always made it a prime target for the regime’s oppressive practices. In 2013, two mosques in the city were bombed, leaving 49 people dead and over 800 wounded. Unsurprisingly, the terrorist group that had claimed responsibility for the attack was actually affiliated with Damascus.
In 2012, scandal shook Lebanon when former minister Michel Samaha was busted for smuggling explosives from Syria to Lebanon where he planned on carrying out bombings. Ali al-Mamlouk, Bashar’s security advisor, was the mastermind behind the plot.
Ousted Syrian President Bashar all-Assad. (SANA file)
In 2019, as the sanctions tightened around the regime, it turned to Lebanon to ease the strain. The regime’s financial ties to Hezbollah were deepened during that phase, especially when it came to smuggling captagon.
While Syria kept a low profile in Lebanon, Hezbollah’s role in Syria grew more prominent. It reached a glaring peak in 2013 when it intervened militarily in Syria to help the regime fight the opposition seeking its ouster.
On the official level, Lebanon had sought to distance itself from the conflict in Syria. The Baabda Declaration was issued in 2012, stressing that Lebanon would keep a distance from the unrest. All parties, including Hezbollah, had agreed to it. Iran, Hezbollah’s backer, had other plans and soon the party scrambled to the aid of its ally, sowing death and destruction in Syria.
On August 4, 2020, Beirut was in store for yet another tragedy. Ammonium nitrate unsafely stored at the Beirut port mysteriously detonated, destroying swathes of the capital and killing over 200 people. The explosion was the third largest non-nuclear explosion in history. A lot was written about how associates of the Assad regime, who were complicit in shady deals and smuggling operations, had been storing the nitrate at the port.
The claims gained ground when Hezbollah thwarted investigations into the explosion. The party had no problem dispatching its enforcer and security official Wafik Safa to threaten the judge in charge of the probe to shut it down. And so it was, and the investigations have been stalled for years.
Much can be said about the Syrian refugees who fled to Lebanon during their country’s conflict. Strong bonds were forged between them and the locals, but they also strained Lebanon’s already fragile economy, fueling resentment and racism against them.
The Syrian regime collapsed on December 8 and Bashar fled to Moscow. The Lebanese people shared the Syrian people’s delirium in seeing the downfall of their oppressor.
However, Lebanon is not out of the woods yet. Members of the regime fled Syria to Lebanon and local authorities are demanded to arrest them, otherwise risk jeopardizing relations with the new rulers in Damascus. But everyone can safely say, that at the moment, the past 25 years of oppression, death and ruin at the hands of the regime are truly over.
