Memoirs of Abdel-Halim Khaddam: Syrian Attack on Hezbollah Barracks and Tehran’s Reactionhttps://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2945971/memoirs-abdel-halim-khaddam-syrian-attack-hezbollah-barracks-and-tehran%E2%80%99s
Memoirs of Abdel-Halim Khaddam: Syrian Attack on Hezbollah Barracks and Tehran’s Reaction
Memoirs of Abdel-Halim Khaddam: Syrian Attack on Hezbollah Barracks and Tehran’s Reaction
In mid-February 1986, a delegation of Lebanese Islamic leaders arrived in Damascus and met with Vice President Abdel-Halim Khaddam, requesting the intervention of Syrian forces to impose security in Beirut, after the eruption of clashes.
President Hafez al-Assad decided to dispatch a military unit to impose order across the Lebanese capital, including Hezbollah’s Fathallah Barracks.
In this episode of the memoirs of the late Syrian vice president published by Asharq Al-Awsat, Khaddam narrates the dialogue that took place in March 1987 between him and the Iranian ambassador to Damascus, Hassan Akhtari, who was seeking a mediation for Hezbollah.
“In 1986 and early 1987, the security situation collapsed in Beirut. Gangs and militias carried out looting, robbery and murder, while clashes erupted between different armed groups.
“In mid-February 1986, an Islamic delegation arrived in Damascus, including leaders of various sects, who described the dire conditions of Beirut residents, and requested the intervention of Syria through a security force. I discussed the issue with President al-Assad, who decided to send a military unit to Beirut, in response to the request of the Islamic leaders, and gave his instructions to the army command to carry out the mission. Based on a security plan, the Syrian forces closed down militia headquarters and confiscated weapons they found there.
“During that operation, Syrian soldiers headed to a Hezbollah base in Beirut, known as the Fathallah barracks, and asked party members to evacuate the premises and hand over their weapons. A dispute erupted and the Syrians were surprised by heavy gunfire, which led to the killing of some soldiers. The forces responded, killing 22 people and taking over the barracks.”
Khaddam recounts that on March 3, 1987, he received the Iranian ambassador in Damascus, Hassan Akhtari, who requested the meeting to discuss some matters.
“According to the minutes of the meeting, the first topic that we tackled was the developments in Beirut, the Fathallah barracks in particular, and the successive events that took place in West Beirut,” he says.
The Iranian ambassador conveyed Iran’s view on the execution of the Syrian security plan, saying: “Brigadier General Ghazi Kanaan (then-Syrian intelligence official in Lebanon) stated that the Syrian forces would enter the southern suburbs, and then he went back on his claim. The brothers in Tehran want to know the extent of the dimensions of the security plan, and whether it will include the southern suburbs?”
He continued: “There is another point: the confiscation of weapons from Muslim homes in West Beirut. I remember that in my meeting with President Hafez al-Assad, while presenting my credentials, I spoke about this issue, and he said: This topic is not on our table. We will not take their weapons, but rather we will give them arms to fight and resist. Now, you take weapons from people’s homes. I don’t know how that happens.”
The diplomat went on saying: “We really want Hezbollah to be an effective and strong element in confronting Israel. We want it to be a strong supporter in the hands of Syria to face Israel. But now we see a ruthless propaganda campaign that wants to disturb the relations between Syria and the party. The enemies are working on that to suggest that there are contradictions between us… Officials in Iran have all described the West Beirut incident as an irresponsible act, and that the Syrian leadership was Hezbollah’s support system, because it realizes that the party is the arm to fight Israel.”
“Such events can arise the people’s emotions to an extent that makes it difficult for us, for you and for Hezbollah to control,” the ambassador emphasized.
Khaddam says that after hearing Akhtari’s briefing, he mentioned two points that reflect Damascus’ stance.
“The first point: Syria has been keen on the strong and fraternal relations with Iran, and has always been working to strengthen them. I confirm this keenness, despite some irresponsible statements by Tehran…
“A series of statements have been issued in Iran, some of which referred to the existing fraternal relations between the two countries, while others forgot about Syria to only focus on an incident that took place in Lebanon. We express our regret at the release of such statements… The importance of the relations between Syria and Iran and their common struggle are much greater than an incident occurring here or there.
“For us, if a citizen utters one word against Iran, we put him in prison, and if a group of people criticize Tehran, we deal with them severely. This is how we understand the concern for relations between the two countries. The responsibility for Lebanese affairs rests with Syria, because Lebanon has special relations with us. We are one people. In addition, what is happening in Lebanon is directly reflected on Syria’s security and policy in the region… This strategy is supposed to be supported by our friends in the Iranian Republic, because it is consistent with its anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist policies.”
Khaddam continued, saying: “Nevertheless, and despite all these statements, Syria will remain loyal to its relations with Iran, although we are saddened by such reactions, which should have been preceded by seeking clarification from Syria about what happened. If you had asked us about the events and we provided you with the facts… we would have avoided giving our enemies the opportunity to take advantage of the situation…”
The Syrian vice-president moves to touch on his country’s position towards Hezbollah.
“When Hezbollah was established, we considered it a friendly party and we provided it with assistance and support. We absorbed all the bad operations that some of its members had carried out against friends of Syria in Lebanon and against Syrian soldiers. We refrained from issuing public reactions; on the contrary, we were acting on the basis of friendly relations with this organization which confronts Israel.
“But you remember that we have warned several times against infiltrations from three sides: Yasser Arafat, the Iraq group, and the second Lebanese intelligence office. We were warning of the dangers of such penetrations because we feared that they would push Hezbollah to commit actions that would harm its role in Lebanon and its relations with Syria. Unfortunately, these warnings were not given the necessary importance from the party’s leadership…”
The Iranian ambassador, trying to clarify the infiltration of Hezbollah, said: “I do not deny that. Arafat can influence some elements. However, if we look at this party and its stated goals, it cannot agree with Arafat.” Khaddam replied: “I distinguished between Hezbollah as a leadership and some elements.”
Responding to Iranian concerns about the Shiite community in Lebanon and Syria’s intervention in Beirut’s southern suburbs, Hezbollah’s stronghold, Khaddam said: “For the Shiite Muslims in Lebanon, they are part of the Islamic component and the Lebanese nation that we are keen on... Of course, Syria cannot take any action that would disturb the internal balance. What we are doing is for the benefit of the oppressed and affected people in Lebanon. The issue of the Southern Suburbs is not subject to discussion. In addition, we know very well the interests of Muslims, whether they were Shiites, Druze, or Sunnis.”
The Syrian vice president went on to say: “Officials in Iran know Syria’s stances towards the Islamic Republic, and we hope that our friends will realize the importance of Syria’s success in ending the Lebanese crisis. I assure you that Damascus does not intend to strike Hezbollah, but it cannot accept its refusal to abide by the security plan.”
The ambassador thanked Khaddam for receiving him and left.
Mojtaba Khamenei: Iran’s New Supreme Leader Lurking in the Shadowshttps://english.aawsat.com/features/5280656-mojtaba-khamenei-iran%E2%80%99s-new-supreme-leader-lurking-shadows
A woman holds up an Iranian flag in front of a banner showing a portrait of Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei during a religious festival in Tehran, Iran, Thursday, June 4, 2026. (AP)
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Mojtaba Khamenei: Iran’s New Supreme Leader Lurking in the Shadows
A woman holds up an Iranian flag in front of a banner showing a portrait of Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei during a religious festival in Tehran, Iran, Thursday, June 4, 2026. (AP)
Iranian supreme leader Mojtaba Khamenei, appointed after a career entirely out of the spotlight as a behind-the-scenes figure, faces the challenge of occupying a role incarnated by his father for most of the regime’s existence.
Mojtaba Khamenei was barely known to Iranians when he was named shortly after the killing of his father and longstanding supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, who had been in the post-for-life since 1989, in a US-Israeli airstrike at the start of the Middle East war.
Unseen in public since being named and said to have been wounded in a US-Israeli strike, Mojtaba Khamenei has issued a dozen written messages as leader that have reprised the confrontational ideology of his father.
In a statement read out on Thursday taking aim at Israel and the United States, Mojtaba Khamenei said "the malicious enemy" was seeking to "plant the seeds of doubt, despair, fear, mistrust and division".
Unlike his father, a prominent opponent of the shah who was president in the first decade of the republic from 1981-1989 before becoming leader, Mojtaba Khamenei has until now held no government position.
But he was believed by observers to be the second-in-command at the office of the supreme leader under the longstanding chief gatekeeper Mohammad Golpayegani.
He is also seen as close to the leadership of the powerful Revolutionary Guards, a connection that may have proved crucial in his selection by the Assembly of Experts clerical body.
- Sanctioned by US -
One of the few official insights into the importance of Mojtaba Khamenei came in November 2019 when the US Treasury announced sanctions against him and other senior Iranian officials, including Golpayegani, on the grounds they were pushing Iran's "radical" agenda around the world.
It said he was designated for representing Ali Khamenei "in an official capacity despite never being elected or appointed to a government position aside from work in the office of his father".
It added: "The Supreme Leader has delegated a part of his leadership responsibilities to Mojtaba Khamenei."
It said Mojtaba Khamenei had "worked closely" with the commanders of the Quds Force -- the branch of the Revolutionary Guards ideological army responsible for operations outside Iran -- and the Basij militia "to advance his father's destabilizing regional ambitions and oppressive domestic objectives".
A sign of his potential behind-the-scenes sway came in 2005 presidential elections, when former parliament speaker Mehdi Karroubi wrote a letter to the supreme leader complaining that Mojtaba Khamenei had been intervening on behalf of his ultra-conservative rival Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Ahmadinejad went on to cause a sensation by defeating former president Hashemi Rafsanjani. Mojtaba was again seen by some commentators as coordinating the crackdown on protests that followed Ahmadinejad's disputed 2009 election victory.
Leaked US diplomatic cables published by Wikileaks said in 2011 that Mojtaba was "seen by many second only to Golpayegani within the office of the supreme leader".
According to an investigation by Bloomberg, which cited anonymous sources and Western intelligence agency reports, Mojtaba Khamenei has amassed wealth estimated at more than $100 million.
It reported he has earned money from oil sales channeled into investments in luxury British real estate, hotels in Europe and property in Dubai through shell companies in tax havens.
Born in his father's home city of Mashhad in northeastern Iran, Mojtaba Khamenei studied theology in the clerical hub of Qom where he also taught.
Mojtaba Khamenei's wife, Zahra Haddad Adel, the daughter of former parliament speaker Gholam Ali Haddad Adel, died in the US-Israeli strikes that killed ex-supreme leader Khamenei, according to the Iranian authorities.
Three Precious Gifts to Tehran from Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden, and George W. Bushhttps://english.aawsat.com/features/5280397-three-precious-gifts-tehran-saddam-hussein-osama-bin-laden-and-george-w-bush
(FILES) Photo taken 01 February 1979 at Tehran airport of Ruhollah Khomeini (C) leaving the Air France Boeing 747 jumbo that flew him back from exile in France to Tehran. Getty Images
Three Precious Gifts to Tehran from Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden, and George W. Bush
(FILES) Photo taken 01 February 1979 at Tehran airport of Ruhollah Khomeini (C) leaving the Air France Boeing 747 jumbo that flew him back from exile in France to Tehran. Getty Images
Most people in today’s Middle East were born after 1979. Yet they often overlook how profoundly that year shaped their countries, their stability, and their daily lives. It unleashed storms, wars, and leaders whose ambitions and dangers far exceeded the borders from which they emerged. Some observers even see a direct link between that pivotal year and what is unfolding today around the Strait of Hormuz following the recent US-Israeli war against Iran and its military arsenal.
Few years in modern history can rival 1979 in significance or consequence.
That year, Khomeini returned to Tehran from exile in Paris. The reactor of the Iranian Revolution quickly began emitting its political radiation, especially after the institutionalization of the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih, the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist.
The same year, Iraq’s presidential palace effectively fell into the hands of the country’s strongman, Saddam Hussein, who eased President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr into retirement under the burdens of age—and perhaps regret.
In 1979, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat also signed the Camp David Accords with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin in Washington under the sponsorship of President Jimmy Carter.
These developments soon intersected with a major international event. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev committed what many would later regard as the grave error of invading Afghanistan. The Kremlin walked into a trap. From among the fighters who flocked to that battlefield would emerge Osama bin Laden, the man who would inaugurate the new century with the attacks on New York and Washington, unintentionally paving the way for the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime.
On January 16, 1979, amid mounting protests and demonstrations, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi left Iran, entrusting the country to the government of Shapour Bakhtiar. Those around him tried to portray the departure as a temporary vacation. In reality, it was a one-way journey. America had abandoned its ally.
The decisive turning point came swiftly. On February 1, a plane from Paris landed at Tehran’s Mehrabad Airport carrying an extraordinary passenger: Ayatollah Khomeini, returning after fourteen years in exile. The massive crowds that greeted him delivered an unmistakable message. The Shah’s regime had fallen. The revolution had triumphed.
Ruhollah Khomeini (L) prays with the Iranian opposition leaders after receiving them at his Pontchartrain mansion, west of Paris, on November 6, 1978. (Photo by Joel ROBINE / AFP via Getty Images)
Decision-makers across the region watched carefully. Few were more alarmed than Saddam Hussein, then the powerful deputy leader of Baathist Iraq. Events in Tehran accelerated rapidly. The Islamic Republic was proclaimed. The doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih was enshrined. The constitution incorporated language committing the new state to “exporting the revolution” under the banner of supporting the oppressed.
Saddam Refuses to Kill Khomeini
History could easily have unfolded differently.
During Khomeini’s years in Najaf, he was a difficult guest. Iraqi authorities frequently complained that he sought to evade the restrictions attached to his residency. After the Algiers Agreement of March 6, 1975, signed by the Shah and Saddam Hussein under the auspices of Algerian President Houari Boumédiène, both sides pledged to cease supporting each other’s opponents.
Iraqi officials repeatedly reminded Khomeini of the understanding. He effectively refused to commit himself to ending political activity against the Shah.
According to former Iraqi officials, Iraqi intelligence one day proposed arranging Khomeini’s assassination and blaming the Shah’s security services. Saddam’s response surprised them. He reportedly asked: “Do the people making this proposal not understand that Iraq does not betray its guests?”
Thus Khomeini remained alive.
Once the Iran-Iraq War began, however, eliminating him became an obsession for Saddam’s half-brother Barzan al-Tikriti, the head of Iraqi intelligence. Reaching Khomeini was difficult, though Iran in 1981 had not yet fully consolidated its security institutions.
Iraqi intelligence developed ties with the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran and with the Mujahedin-e Khalq. It helped coordinate operations that culminated in the devastating bombing of Iran’s parliament complex, killing dozens of senior figures. Soon afterward, Ali Khamenei was targeted by a bomb hidden inside a tape recorder, leaving him permanently injured in one arm.
Barzan remained determined to reach Khomeini himself. According to accounts from former Iraqi intelligence officials, Baghdad eventually recruited a cleric close to the Iranian leader and managed to plant a small explosive device inside Khomeini’s wool pillow. The bomb detonated when he was away from it. The attempt failed.
The Paris Interlude
Chance played an important role in Khomeini’s journey to power.
Forced to leave Iraq, he searched for a new place of exile. Years later in Paris, former Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam recalled that Khomeini’s associates discreetly explored the possibility of relocating to Syria. President Hafez al-Assad was not interested.
Khaddam said Assad feared that hosting Khomeini could trigger not merely a political crisis with Iraq but perhaps even war between the two Baathist rivals. Khaddam advised Khomeini’s entourage to consider Algeria instead. They dismissed the idea, believing Algeria was too distant and likely to impose strict restrictions.
What surprised Khaddam was France’s willingness to receive Khomeini and provide him with a global platform.
During his stay in Neauphle-le-Château outside Paris, visitors streamed in from around the world.
Iraqi authorities sought to gauge his intentions. Khomeini had already demonstrated his ability to move Iranian public opinion through audio recordings that supporters distributed secretly inside Iran.
The Iraqi intelligence officer responsible for liaising with Khomeini during his years in Najaf was Ali Baweh, who had often facilitated his activities. Baghdad decided to send him to Paris. Former intelligence officials claim Baweh traveled with another man wearing a watch capable of recording conversations. Khomeini received them politely but showed no flexibility.
Asked about his plans after the Shah’s fall, he delivered an answer that landed like a bomb. After overthrowing the Shah, he said, the next objective would be “the overthrow of the infidel Baath regime.”
Saddam’s Obsession with Wilayat al-Faqih
When Khomeini appeared in Tehran surrounded by unprecedented crowds, Saddam understood that the storm would soon reach Iraq.
According to former presidential aides, the issue that troubled him most was not the revolution itself but the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih. Saddam believed it implied that a non-Iraqi cleric could demand the allegiance of Iraqi Shiites. To him, this represented a direct threat to Iraq’s sovereignty and cohesion.
He reportedly kept a booklet explaining the powers of the Supreme Jurist as understood by Khomeini and studied it carefully. By September 1980, Saddam had concluded that war was inevitable. He believed Khomeini intended to penetrate the Arab world by first bringing down Iraq. Waiting, in his view, meant eventually fighting Iran in the streets of Baghdad. Better to fight on the border.
Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein visits soldiers in northern Iraq. (Photo by Jacques Pavlovsky/Sygma via Getty Images)
Many who knew him believe this conviction also strengthened his determination to remove Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and assume full power. Since the Baath Party’s return to government in 1968, Saddam had chosen to remain formally second in command, benefiting from Bakr’s legitimacy while gradually reshaping the military and state institutions around himself.
On July 16, 1979, Bakr finally departed. The age of Saddam had begun.
Former Foreign Minister Hamed al-Jubouri later recounted a revealing conversation with Bakr. When Jubouri once attempted to resign, Bakr reportedly pointed to the presidential chair and declared: “I would urinate on the presidency if it cannot even preserve the dignity of the president.”
Then, with tears in his eyes, he added: “Forget resignation. I cannot accept yours. Who can accept mine? We are prisoners. We do not possess the right to resign.”
“We Will Smash the Iranians’ Heads”
Saddam’s decision to go to war preceded his formal assumption of the presidency.
Salah Omar al-Ali, one of the veteran Baathist leaders who helped bring the party to power in 1968, recalled a revealing conversation during the Non-Aligned Movement summit in Havana in September 1979.
Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and Saddam met Iranian Foreign Minister Ebrahim Yazdi. Despite tensions along the border, the atmosphere was constructive.
Hoping to reinforce that mood, Salah Omar al-Ali later spoke privately with Saddam and stressed the importance of peaceful solutions and economic development.
IRAQ - JANUARY 01: Iranian POW's waiting in line for food at the Ramadt detention camp under a smiling portrait of Iraq leader Saddam Hussein during the war between Iran Iraq. (Photo by Bill Foley/Getty Images)
Saddam listened attentively before responding.
“Pay attention, Salah,” he said. “This opportunity may come only once every hundred years. The opportunity exists today. We will smash the Iranians’ heads. We will recover every inch they occupied. We will restore the Shatt al-Arab.”
Then he added sharply: “I never want to hear you speak again about peaceful solutions, humanitarian solutions, or settling problems with Iran. Listen carefully. I will smash the Iranians’ heads and recover every inch from Khorramshahr to the Shatt al-Arab.”
A year later, he launched the war.
Saddam believed several factors worked in his favor. Khomeini’s revolution had turned America into Iran’s enemy. The Soviet Union feared revolutionary contagion among its Muslim republics. The Gulf monarchies felt threatened by Tehran’s ambitions.
He convinced himself that Iraq alone could break the revolutionary wave threatening regional stability. He miscalculated.
He assumed Iran’s post-revolutionary chaos would guarantee a quick victory. He failed to understand how rapidly Iranian nationalism would fuse with religious fervor once Iraqi troops crossed the border.
The war did not destroy the Islamic Republic. Instead, it strengthened it. Khomeini ruthlessly consolidated power and entrenched the rule of the Supreme Jurist. Saddam’s greatest achievement after eight years of war was a ceasefire. Iran survived. Iraq was exhausted.
The Kuwait Gift
In the years that followed, Tehran received another unexpected gift.
General Nizar al-Khazraji, Iraq’s chief of staff at the time, later described how he learned of the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.
“I was asleep at home,” he recalled. “Early in the morning I received a call summoning me to General Headquarters. When I arrived, I was told: ‘We have completed the occupation of Kuwait.’”
Khazraji was stunned. Defense Minister Abdul Jabbar Shanshal was informed in exactly the same way.
Imagine, Khazraji said, an army being pushed into such an adventure without the knowledge of either its defense minister or its chief of staff.
A few days later Saddam explained that secrecy had been necessary to preserve surprise. He added that Kuwait had been liberated by forces reporting directly to him rather than to the regular chain of command.
Khazraji saw the decision as the product of arrogance born from Saddam’s belief that he had emerged victorious from the war with Iran.
The consequences were enormous.
The world’s attention shifted decisively from the “Iranian threat” to the “Iraqi threat.” Operation Desert Storm expelled Saddam from Kuwait and left Iraq wounded, isolated, and under sanctions.
Meanwhile, Iran caught its breath and resumed its long-term regional project.
The Gifts of Osama bin Laden and George W. Bush
Another chain of events that began in 1979 would transform the Middle East.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan triggered alarm throughout the West. Washington resolved to make Moscow pay dearly. Volunteers poured into Afghanistan from across the Arab and Muslim worlds. The United States encouraged the jihad against Soviet forces and supported many of the fighters.
Among them was a wealthy young Saudi named Osama bin Laden.
On Afghan soil, al-Qaeda was born.
ARLINGTON, VA - SEPTEMBER 12: President George W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld survey the damage at the Pentagon building September 12, 2001 in Arlington, VA. (Photo by David Hume Kennerly/Getty Images)
On September 11, 2001, bin Laden carried the conflict to the American mainland. Civilian airliners destroyed the towers of the World Trade Center. Thousands were killed.
America had been struck at the heart of its power and prestige. The world waited for the response.
Under President George W. Bush, encouraged by military and security institutions and by the neoconservative movement, the United States first overthrew the Taliban and then invaded Iraq, toppling Saddam Hussein.
For the generals of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, the scene was almost unbelievable.
The Taliban regime, hostile to Tehran, had fallen at American hands. Saddam’s regime, which Iran had failed to overthrow during eight years of war, met the same fate.
Iran neither obstructed these outcomes nor mourned them. Yet Tehran also saw American forces deployed on both its eastern and western frontiers.
A new phase in US-Iran relations began.
Qassem Soleimani and officers of the Quds Force focused on undermining the American military presence, especially in Iraq, while avoiding direct confrontation with Washington.
Without intending to, bin Laden had delivered Iran another extraordinary gift.
After the attacks on New York and Washington, the world became obsessed with al-Qaeda. Soon afterward, attention shifted toward Saddam Hussein, whose danger was magnified relentlessly by Western political and media narratives.
The result was that Iran moved out of the center of the international spotlight.
The Bush administration advanced numerous arguments to justify war against Iraq: alleged weapons of mass destruction, obstruction of international inspectors, and suspicions that Saddam had never abandoned nuclear ambitions.
Most consequential was the effort to suggest a connection between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda.
No meaningful partnership ever emerged between the Iraqi regime and bin Laden’s organization. Yet Saddam did make the mistake of exploring the possibility.
While bin Laden was living in Khartoum, Iraqi intelligence officer Farouq Hijazi met him through the mediation of Sudanese Islamist leader Hassan al-Turabi. The discussion was lengthy and difficult. After returning to Baghdad, Hijazi advised Saddam to close the file. Contacts ended.
But the allegation lingered—and helped justify the invasion.
Syria, Soleimani, and the Iraqi Prize
Another event left a lasting mark on the region’s future. Days before the American invasion of Iraq, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad flew to Tehran. Anxiety about the coming war dominated his discussions with President Mohammad Khatami and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
Bashar Assad meets with Qassem Soleimani
Both sides agreed that if American forces consolidated their position in Iraq, Syria or Iran could be next.
The answer, they concluded, was to bleed the American presence through resistance movements. Qassem Soleimani participated in some of those discussions.
Syria subsequently facilitated the movement of fighters into Iraq, while Soleimani methodically built resistance networks.
Iran wagered on geography—and won.
It encouraged its Iraqi allies to participate in governing institutions and successive governments, especially after executive power became concentrated in the office of the prime minister, a position conventionally held by a Shiite politician.
When the last American soldier left Iraq in December 2011, Iran had become an indispensable actor in Iraqi affairs.
The fingerprints of Soleimani were visible throughout the Iraqi state. After his death, many of those networks remained under the stewardship of his successor, Esmail Qaani.
Then came another opportunity. In July 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi appeared in Mosul after the dramatic collapse of Iraqi army units. Soleimani moved immediately, dispatching weapons to both Baghdad and Erbil.
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani issued his famous call to arms. Iran later helped transform the resulting mobilization into the Popular Mobilization Forces, which eventually became an official institution under the authority of the Iraqi prime minister.
Iranian influence now extended across parliament, government, the military, and the PMF. From Iraq to Lebanon, from the Palestinian arena to Yemen, Tehran steadily expanded its reach.
The cumulative result is difficult to miss. Khomeini survived. Saddam’s war failed. Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait redirected international attention. Bin Laden’s attacks transformed global priorities. George W. Bush’s invasion removed Iran’s most formidable Arab rival. Each actor pursued his own objectives. Together, however, Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden, and George W. Bush delivered three of the most valuable strategic gifts the Islamic Republic of Iran has ever received.
‘If Ebola Comes, We’ll Be Wiped Out’: Fear Grips Camps in DR Congohttps://english.aawsat.com/features/5280009-%E2%80%98if-ebola-comes-we%E2%80%99ll-be-wiped-out%E2%80%99-fear-grips-camps-dr-congo
A staff member hangs up protective equipment to dry after washing them at the Ebola Treatment Center (ETC) in Munigi on June 2, 2026. (AFP)
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‘If Ebola Comes, We’ll Be Wiped Out’: Fear Grips Camps in DR Congo
A staff member hangs up protective equipment to dry after washing them at the Ebola Treatment Center (ETC) in Munigi on June 2, 2026. (AFP)
Dorcas Mapenzi fears the worst if Ebola comes to the Kingonze camp, where she lives alongside more than 25,000 other displaced people in the conflict-hit eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.
"If Ebola comes, we'll be wiped out as we're packed like sardines," the displaced woman told AFP at the sprawl of tarpaulin and tents on the outskirts of Bunia, the capital of the northeastern Ituri province, the epicenter of the latest outbreak.
Spread by close contact, the deadly viral disease has spread like wildfire in the vast central African country's east, where decades of armed conflicts have forced millions of people from their homes and into camps where they live cheek-by-jowl.
Nearly a million of those displaced are in Ituri -- among the provinces of the desperately impoverished DRC most prey to the east's litany of armed groups -- where the prospect of the epidemic spreading throughout the refugee camps has sparked alarm.
The World Health Organization's director general, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus has warned that the eastern DRC "faces a catastrophic collision of disease and conflict", with the fighting hampering efforts to tackle the epidemic.
Visiting Bunia on Saturday, Tedros called for more international help and financial aid to combat the spread of Ebola.
He also said it was essential to assuage fears among affected communities who are deeply distrustful of authorities and halt the spread of false information about the virus.
The current outbreak was officially declared in the DRC and neighboring Uganda on May 15.
As of May 31, the WHO said 321 cases had been confirmed in the DR Congo, including 48 deaths. Thjere are nine confirmed cases in Uganda, including one fatality.
- 'Everyone will die' -
No infection has yet been recorded at the Kingonze displaced persons' camp, where Mapenzi now lives.
But conditions in the camp are ripe for a disease passed on through close physical contact and bodily fluids.
"I've already heard of Ebola and it's a disease that scares me a lot," Mapenzi said as she washed her laundry in a basin on the ground.
"We displaced people here have no hygiene.
"Our children play next to filthy toilets and even relieve themselves on the ground, in the middle of the tarpaulins that serve as our homes," the young woman said.
Deborah Nzale, a widow and head of her family, lives with nine people in a small tarpaulin shelter of barely three square meters (32 square feet).
"Given these conditions, how are we going to protect ourselves against this disease, when everyone tells us we need to distance ourselves to fight Ebola?" she asked.
No vaccine or treatment exists for the Bundibugyo strain of Ebola responsible for the latest outbreak.
So attempts to contain the virus's spread have had to rely mainly on protective measures and rapid contact tracing.
"We sleep piled on top of each other, with everyone's sweat," Nzale said.
"If a single person gets infected here in this camp, everyone will die."
- 'Ebola really kills' -
So far, Kingonze's displaced residents have not received any protective gear.
"Ebola really kills," a poster at the entrance warns.
"People looking to raise awareness come through here with messages but, surprisingly, we don't have the kit we need to protect ourselves," Budjo Amos complained.
"I don't even have soap to wash my hands," said Amos, who fled the province's common communal violence.
"The most urgent thing is to give us clean water," he insisted.
There is just a single borehole in Kigonze. Empty jerrycans pile up in front. Water flows from the tap for just a few hours a day.
"The state has to intervene urgently," Amos pleaded.
Already long absent from swathes of Ituri, the Congolese state has been criticized for its delayed response to the outbreak, which was declared several weeks after the first cases emerged.
Many hospitals in the region still lack essential equipment, especially isolation tents for patients.
According to Ituri's military governor, the province counts around 61 displaced persons camps housing nearly 970,000 people.
"We need to deploy equipment and qualified, specialist medical staff as quickly as possible," Lieutenant General Johnny Luboya Nkashama told AFP on Friday, "to spare this province from disaster".
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