Memoirs of Abdel-Halim Khaddam: I Told Arafat He Was Lying, Plotting Against Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria

Episode Eight

An archive photo of the late President Hafez al-Assad and his deputy, Abdel-Halim Khaddam, at a meeting (Asharq Al-Awsat).
An archive photo of the late President Hafez al-Assad and his deputy, Abdel-Halim Khaddam, at a meeting (Asharq Al-Awsat).
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Memoirs of Abdel-Halim Khaddam: I Told Arafat He Was Lying, Plotting Against Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria

An archive photo of the late President Hafez al-Assad and his deputy, Abdel-Halim Khaddam, at a meeting (Asharq Al-Awsat).
An archive photo of the late President Hafez al-Assad and his deputy, Abdel-Halim Khaddam, at a meeting (Asharq Al-Awsat).

In this eighth episode of the memoirs of Abdel-Halim Khaddam, published by Asharq Al-Awsat, the late Syrian vice-president narrates the decisive moments of the military intervention in Lebanon in 1976, the parallel contacts that took place between Syria and the Arab countries to form an Arab deterrent force, in addition to the role of the Syrian forces.

He says: “In light of the insistence of the Palestinian leadership and the allied Lebanese parties on continuing the fighting and the refusal to lift the siege on Zahle and the Christian villages in the north of Lebanon, and in the face of all the damage inflicted on the Lebanese people… the Syrian military intervention became urgent to stop this dirty war, so our forces crossed the Lebanese borders on June 1, 1976, on the day Alexei Kosygin, Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, arrived in Damascus.”

Khaddam devotes a large part of his account to the conflict with the head of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Yasser Arafat (Abu Ammar), in the diplomatic corridors, especially during a meeting that coincided with the entry of the Syrian forces into Lebanon.

“On June 1, 1976, the Coordination Office of the Non-Aligned Movement convened in the city of Algiers, in the presence of Arafat, who gave a theatrical speech and talked about an American-French-Israeli plot against the Palestinian revolution and the national forces in Lebanon, and that he feared it would be implemented by Arab hands”, in reference to Syria.”

Khaddam added that he responded to Arafat loudly so that everyone could hear him, saying: “You lied, Yasser, as is your habit, and did wrong to Syria and the Palestinian cause… You are tearing Lebanon apart, tearing the Palestinians apart, and serving Israel.”

Arafat replied, saying: “You entered Lebanon and hit us.” Khaddam answered: “We will strike everyone who tries to divide, and we will hold accountable everyone who sheds blood. Lebanon is not Palestine. You will pay a dear price for your conspiracy against Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria.”

The late Syrian vice-president recounts: “During the discussions to amend the Lebanese constitution to elect a new president, it was agreed that President Sleiman Franjieh would submit his resignation, so that the new president, Elias Sarkis, would exercise his powers, work to end the war and achieve reconciliation. Despite the election, tension remained and the shooting continued. The national movement campaign escalated under the leadership of Kamal Jumblatt, and the Palestinian leadership continued to play with fire to prevent a serious cessation of fighting and the start of a national dialogue to end the crisis, according to the constitutional document.”

In May 1976, Khaddam received Karim Pakradouni, who conveyed a message from President Sarkis, saying: “[Sarkis] believes that his first contact should be with Syria to explain his perception. He is confident that the first step they should take is political dialogue with the conflicting parties. This must take place in two stages: The first is to ask the parties to end the fighting, while the second is to have a round-table meeting.”

Despite the efforts made to calm the situation in preparation for the presidential transition from Franjieh to Sarkis, the political atmosphere witnessed further tension after an alliance was forged between Raymond Edde, Kamal Jumblatt, and Saeb Salam, in addition to the forces of the national and progressive parties, and the efforts made by Arafat to continue the fighting.

Khaddam says: “The military pressure of the Palestinian forces and their Lebanese allies intensified in Mount Lebanon and Beirut, and some Christian forces were attacked in the south. The siege also intensified around Zahle and Christian villages in Akkar, including Qobayat and Andaqt. Lebanon was threatened by the widening of the circle of sectarian massacres, which provided the best opportunities for Israel to intervene and find an ally in the Lebanese arena.

The late Syrian official said that with the escalation of the fighting, Jumblatt made proposals, including: “A serious ceasefire without the withdrawal of fighters from their positions, engaging into round table negotiations without preconditions, the gradual withdrawal of the Syrian army, and defining the agenda of the dialogue: political reform, amendment of some articles of the constitution and the political system… and the re-arrangement of institutions in a national, non-sectarian order.”

According to Khaddam, it was clear that Jumblatt had a vision to build a new regime in Lebanon that would free the people from the sectarian system, and that would constitute a guarantee for some segments of Lebanese society, and end the Maronite domination of the country’s leadership.

“On June 2, 1976, the Palestinian coalition, along with some Lebanese forces, called for a general strike to protest the entry of the Syrian forces into Lebanon. The Palestinian militias and their allied forces (the Communist Party, the Communist Action Organization, the Syrian Nationalist Party, Al-Mourabitoun, and other organizations imposed by Arafat from Fatah) forced shop owners to close their stores under death threats.

“It is evident that the strike only took place in areas controlled by the Palestinian forces and their allies. As for the other regions, they were in a different situation, as the entry of the Syrian forces, which was carried out at the request of President Franjieh, lifted the siege on the threatened Christian areas and dispelled their fears.

“On June 3, the Lebanese National Movement held a meeting headed by Jumblatt, and issued a statement declaring the sweeping success of the general strike that included all Lebanese regions in rejection of the Syrian military occupation and of every foreign intervention… In parallel, the commander of the Arab Lebanon Army, Lieutenant Ahmed Al-Khatib, a Lebanese Army dissident, made an appeal to confront the Syrian army.

“Despite this media propaganda, the militias of the Palestinian factions and their allies from the Lebanese parties were fleeing our forces. As usual, Arafat started shouting and crying out. He called for a meeting of the Arab League, which was scheduled for June 9.

Khaddam continues: “On the morning of June 9, I headed to Cairo, and was met at the airport by Mamoun Al-Atassi, our embassy’s Chargé d'Affairs. As the plane landed, he came up to me and informed me that a meeting took place the day before, on June 8, and a delegation was formed (to go to Damascus), headed by Bahrain’s Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Mubarak bin Hamad Al Khalifa, head of the session, and the foreign ministers of Algeria (Bouteflika) and Libya (Ali Triki) and Secretary-General of the Arab League (Mahmoud Riad). I asked the pilots to prepare an immediate departure plan for Damascus to meet with President Assad, and I asked Atassi to contact Damascus, to inform him that he would not receive the delegation before my arrival.

“Atassi had informed me of the text of the ministerial meeting’s decision, which included several items, including, “requesting all parties to stop the fighting immediately” and “establishing symbolic Arab security forces, under the supervision of the League’s Secretary-General, to maintain security and stability in Lebanon… to replace the Syrian forces, while the Arab security mission ends at the request of the elected President of the Lebanese Republic…

“I immediately returned to Damascus. The director of Damascus airport kept the plane of the Arab ministers in the air until after my arrival, so I called Assad and told him about the latest developments. Assad refused to discuss any issue [with the Arab ministers] before the holding of a new Arab League meeting, in which I would present Syria’s stance.

“We agreed to hold a meeting the next day, that is, on June 10. Indeed, I went to the headquarters of the Arab League in Cairo, entered the hall, where the atmosphere was tense…

“I said in the session: “Oh Yasser, I came from Damascus with two handkerchiefs to wipe my tears because of the massacres that took place against you, which you were talking about with our brothers in the previous sessions... Yasser, your place is not here, but at the Rihani Theater (in Beirut) because you are an actor.” He interrupted me, saying: “I represent the Palestinian people.” I replied: “You are on a stage, and you are the enemy of the Palestinian people. Yasser, I advise you… your methods will destroy the Palestinian cause.”

“Then I turned to the ministers (...) and requested that the decision be taken without my presence to be reconsidered, so that any reference to the Syrian forces be deleted, emphasizing that the work of these forces comes within the framework of Lebanese sovereignty. After discussion, the council responded to my request.”



What to Know about the Tensions between Iran and the US before Their Third Round of Talks

The flags of US and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. Iran and US will hold third round of nuclear talks on 26 April 2025, in Muscat. (EPA)
The flags of US and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. Iran and US will hold third round of nuclear talks on 26 April 2025, in Muscat. (EPA)
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What to Know about the Tensions between Iran and the US before Their Third Round of Talks

The flags of US and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. Iran and US will hold third round of nuclear talks on 26 April 2025, in Muscat. (EPA)
The flags of US and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. Iran and US will hold third round of nuclear talks on 26 April 2025, in Muscat. (EPA)

Iran and the United States will hold talks Saturday in Oman, their third round of negotiations over Tehran’s rapidly advancing nuclear program.

The talks follow a first round held in Muscat, Oman, where the two sides spoke face to face. They then met again in Rome last weekend before this scheduled meeting again in Muscat.

Trump has imposed new sanctions on Iran as part of his “maximum pressure” campaign targeting the country. He has repeatedly suggested military action against Iran remained a possibility, while emphasizing he still believed a new deal could be reached by writing a letter to Iran’s 85-year-old Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to jumpstart these talks.

Khamenei has warned Iran would respond to any attack with an attack of its own.

Here’s what to know about the letter, Iran’s nuclear program and the tensions that have stalked relations between Tehran and Washington since the 1979 revolution.

Why did Trump write the letter? Trump dispatched the letter to Khamenei on March 5, then gave a television interview the next day in which he acknowledged sending it. He said: “I’ve written them a letter saying, ‘I hope you’re going to negotiate because if we have to go in militarily, it’s going to be a terrible thing.’”

Since returning to the White House, the president has been pushing for talks while ratcheting up sanctions and suggesting a military strike by Israel or the US could target Iranian nuclear sites.

A previous letter from Trump during his first term drew an angry retort from the supreme leader.

But Trump’s letters to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in his first term led to face-to-face meetings, though no deals to limit Pyongyang’s atomic bombs and a missile program capable of reaching the continental US.

How did the first round go? Oman, a sultanate on the eastern edge of the Arabian Peninsula, hosted the first round of talks between Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and US Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff. The two men met face to face after indirect talks and immediately agreed to this second round in Rome.

Witkoff later made a television appearance in which he suggested 3.67% enrichment for Iran could be something the countries could agree on. But that’s exactly the terms set by the 2015 nuclear deal struck under US President Barack Obama, from which Trump unilaterally withdrew America.

Witkoff hours later issued a statement underlining something: “A deal with Iran will only be completed if it is a Trump deal.” Araghchi and Iranian officials have latched onto Witkoff’s comments in recent days as a sign that America was sending it mixed signals about the negotiations.

Yet the Rome talks ended up with the two sides agreeing to starting expert-level talks this Saturday. Analysts described that as a positive sign, though much likely remains to be agreed before reaching a tentative deal.

Why does Iran’s nuclear program worry the West? Iran has insisted for decades that its nuclear program is peaceful. However, its officials increasingly threaten to pursue a nuclear weapon. Iran now enriches uranium to near weapons-grade levels of 60%, the only country in the world without a nuclear weapons program to do so.

Under the original 2015 nuclear deal, Iran was allowed to enrich uranium up to 3.67% purity and to maintain a uranium stockpile of 300 kilograms (661 pounds). The last report by the International Atomic Energy Agency on Iran’s program put its stockpile at 8,294.4 kilograms (18,286 pounds) as it enriches a fraction of it to 60% purity.

US intelligence agencies assess that Iran has yet to begin a weapons program, but has “undertaken activities that better position it to produce a nuclear device, if it chooses to do so.”

Ali Larijani, an adviser to Iran’s supreme leader, has warned in a televised interview that his country has the capability to build nuclear weapons, but it is not pursuing it and has no problem with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s inspections. However, he said if the US or Israel were to attack Iran over the issue, the country would have no choice but to move toward nuclear weapon development.

“If you make a mistake regarding Iran’s nuclear issue, you will force Iran to take that path, because it must defend itself,” he said.

Why are relations so bad between Iran and the US? Iran was once one of the US’s top allies in the Middle East under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who purchased American military weapons and allowed CIA technicians to run secret listening posts monitoring the neighboring Soviet Union. The CIA had fomented a 1953 coup that cemented the shah’s rule.

But in January 1979, the shah, fatally ill with cancer, fled Iran as mass demonstrations swelled against his rule. The revolution followed, led by Khomeini, and created Iran’s theocratic government.

Later that year, university students overran the US Embassy in Tehran, seeking the shah’s extradition and sparking the 444-day hostage crisis that saw diplomatic relations between Iran and the US severed. The Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s saw the US back Saddam Hussein. The “Tanker War” during that conflict saw the US launch a one-day assault that crippled Iran at sea, while the US later shot down an Iranian commercial airliner that the American military said it mistook for a warplane.

Iran and the US have see-sawed between enmity and grudging diplomacy in the years since, with relations peaking when Tehran made the 2015 nuclear deal with world powers. But Trump unilaterally withdrew America from the accord in 2018, sparking tensions in the Middle East that persist today.