Beirut Clash Fires Up Sectarian Anger in Echo of Civil War

FILE - In this Oct. 14, 2021, file photo, Lebanese teachers react to the sounds from nearby armed clashes as they flee their school under the protection of Lebanese soldiers after a clashes erupted along a former 1975-90 civil war front-line between Muslim Shiite and Christian areas at Ain el-Rumaneh neighborhood, in Beirut, Lebanon. (AP Photo/Hussein Malla, File)
FILE - In this Oct. 14, 2021, file photo, Lebanese teachers react to the sounds from nearby armed clashes as they flee their school under the protection of Lebanese soldiers after a clashes erupted along a former 1975-90 civil war front-line between Muslim Shiite and Christian areas at Ain el-Rumaneh neighborhood, in Beirut, Lebanon. (AP Photo/Hussein Malla, File)
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Beirut Clash Fires Up Sectarian Anger in Echo of Civil War

FILE - In this Oct. 14, 2021, file photo, Lebanese teachers react to the sounds from nearby armed clashes as they flee their school under the protection of Lebanese soldiers after a clashes erupted along a former 1975-90 civil war front-line between Muslim Shiite and Christian areas at Ain el-Rumaneh neighborhood, in Beirut, Lebanon. (AP Photo/Hussein Malla, File)
FILE - In this Oct. 14, 2021, file photo, Lebanese teachers react to the sounds from nearby armed clashes as they flee their school under the protection of Lebanese soldiers after a clashes erupted along a former 1975-90 civil war front-line between Muslim Shiite and Christian areas at Ain el-Rumaneh neighborhood, in Beirut, Lebanon. (AP Photo/Hussein Malla, File)

He was only a year old when his panicked father picked him up and they fled with his mother from the gunfire rattling their neighborhood. It was the day Lebanon’s civil war started 46 years ago. His family’s apartment building in Beirut was on the frontline.

Now 47, Bahij Dana did the same thing last week. He evacuated his wife and two of his kids as gun battles raged for hours outside the same building. Civil defense rescuers came to help his father and mother, stuck in the lower floors.

“History is repeating itself,” Dana said.

The battle Thursday went on for five hours between supporters of Lebanon’s two powerful Shiite factions and gunmen believed to be supporters of a Christian party. It took place on the line between Beirut’s Chiyah and Ain el-Rumaneh neighborhoods, the same notorious frontline that bisected the capital into warring sections during the country’s dark civil war era, The Associated Press said.

It was not just memories of the war that were triggered by the scenes of gunmen in streets and schoolchildren ducking under desks. The battles, which left seven dead, also fired up the sectarian passions from that violent past, which Lebanese had learned to brush aside without ever dealing with the causes.

Add to that a bankrupt government, hyperinflation and mounting poverty, and the country of six million is turning into a powder keg on the Mediterranean.

The clashes erupted over the probe into last year’s massive port blast, as the political elite closed ranks in their efforts to block it.

Despite calls for calm, leaders of Shiite Hezbollah and the rival right-wing Christian Lebanese Forces kept up their heated rhetoric. They brought back civil war jargon, talking about “frontlines” and “neighborhood defenses,” deepening the sense that the pact that kept the social peace since the war has come undone.

“We made up, and now they want to pit us against one another again,” said Camille Hobeika, a 51-year-old mechanic and Christian resident of Ain el-Rumaneh.
Since the war, the sectarian-based warlords who fought it have divvied up political power, signing a pact in 1989 and issuing an amnesty for themselves. Though rivals, they have had a common interest in maintaining the system, rife with patronage and corruption, and so generally keep a shaky peace.

The new fighting highlighted a generational divide that stands at the heart of how Lebanese deal with that legacy.

For those who lived through the atrocities of the communal fighting between 1975 and 1990, the country is fated to that system, even with occasional bouts of violence whenever the entrenched political leadership looks to recalibrate the balance of power.

Dana sees the burst of violence as a tried tactic by the leaders: When they face trouble, they stoke fear of civil war, so each sect’s followers rally around their chief, seeing him as their only protection.

For him, this is how things work, rooted in the “zaim,” Arabic for leader, who provides his community with jobs and services in return for his supporters’ unquestioning loyalty.

“We are used to it. We were brought up in a war environment,” Dana said. “We are not accepting war. But I accept my country, my cedar tree, my family and friends. Where else can I find that?”

But many in the younger generation say they refuse to be pawns of the political elite. They tried protesting, with nationwide rallies in 2019, but hardly shook the foundations of the ruling class.

Dana’s 22-year-old daughter, Vanda, a university student, sees nothing to gain from the leadership and no point in staying in Lebanon.

In the last three years, Lebanon has lost its status as a middle-income country, with over 70% of the population sinking into poverty, and many skilled professionals leaving. Her father’s 25-year-old printing business has gone to ruins and the family money is locked in the bank, inaccessible because of restrictions imposed during the financial meltdown.

Now, her bedroom windows are riddled with bullets.

“We learned and attended the best universities, only to experience this! Why? Why do I now have to be terrified when a door slams? Why do I have to run to my father crying when there is any sound? I don’t have to live this life,” she said, sobbing.

“My parents say they still have hope. But there is nothing left,” the younger Dana said. “Why should I plan a family here and make them go through this? In 10 or 20 years, the same thing will happen. It will always stay this way.”

Some pin hopes on next spring’s parliamentary elections as a way out of the leadership’s grip. But Lebanon’s politics are mostly sectarian. Parties’ supporters are predominantly from the same sect, and election districts are gerrymandered to fit sectarian lines.

Days after the clashes, many residents of the area have yet to return home. Apartment buildings freshly pockmarked by bullets line the streets.

Army vehicles and barbed wire separate predominantly Christian Ain el-Rumaneh and mainly Shiite Muslim Chiyah — bringing back the image of a West Beirut and an East Beirut, a split Lebanese have shunned since the war.

In Chiyah, the neighborhood is in mourning. All those killed were supporters of the Shiite groups Hezbollah and Amal. Posters for a mother of five killed on her balcony from flying bullets hang between buildings.

“Hezbollah has always been targeted,” said Chiyah resident Ali Haidar, 23.

With the sectarian violence, each sect brings out its stored-up resentments against the other, imagined or real.

Haidar said Hezbollah defended Lebanon against Israel and terrorism only to be met with hostility from internal foes like the Lebanese Forces. When Israel was bombing his neighborhood and other Hezbollah areas in 2006, he said, “life was normal on the other side.”

On the other side in Ain el-Rumaneh, electronics store owner Sami Nakkad blamed the Shiites for Thursday’s violence. Bullets from Chiyah landed in his apartment above the store. He insisted Ain el-Rumaneh residents, defending their area, carried only sticks.

Asked how he explained the deaths on the other side, Nakkad said: “They killed themselves because they want to twist things around.”

During Thursday’s gunbattles, Nakkad, who is in his 70s, hid with his wife and daughter for hours in a stairwell.

His employee, 45-year-old Shadi Nicola, left when the bullets started flying, seeing no use in the fight. He called the clashes “theatrics” by leaders losing popularity amid a crushing economic crisis.

“Elections will bring them back. Those people... came through blood. They will only go with blood,” he said.

Elie, a 28-year-old trainer, has slept at friends’ homes away from the neighborhood since the clashes. He has an upcoming interview for a job abroad and is ready to leave Lebanon.

“This (fighting) is not our decision,” he said. The country is slipping into trouble, and the leaders "are not even making a 1% effort to fix things. They are taking us deeper.



Sudan in 25 Years: One War Begets Another

Fleeing the fighting, people are transported by truck from the border town of Renk in South Sudan to a dock to continue their journey to the next destination (DPA)
Fleeing the fighting, people are transported by truck from the border town of Renk in South Sudan to a dock to continue their journey to the next destination (DPA)
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Sudan in 25 Years: One War Begets Another

Fleeing the fighting, people are transported by truck from the border town of Renk in South Sudan to a dock to continue their journey to the next destination (DPA)
Fleeing the fighting, people are transported by truck from the border town of Renk in South Sudan to a dock to continue their journey to the next destination (DPA)

The sound of gunfire, barrel bombs, and stray bullets is nothing new in Sudan. What’s new is that the violence has moved from the outskirts to the capital, Khartoum. This shift forced the government and military to relocate to a temporary capital in Port Sudan, nearly 1,000 kilometers away on the Red Sea coast.
Past conflicts were seen as rebellions against the state, but they stemmed from a deeper struggle: the “center” holds all the power and resources, while the “margins” are left with nothing.
These wars have always been about demands for rights and equality.
Under Islamist President Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s wars shifted from demands for rights to a “religious war” between the Muslim north and the Christian or secular south. This led to South Sudan’s secession and the creation of a new state that joined the United Nations. But what drives the conflicts that continue to devastate Sudan?
Analysts say the root cause is the lack of a national vision and the failure to recognize Sudan’s ethnic and cultural diversity. Without a unified political and economic framework, this diversity has been ignored.
The current war, though fought between two formal armies, stems from the same issues of marginalization and exclusion. These problems sparked Sudan’s first rebellion in 1955, led by the Anya-Nya 1 forces, named after the cobra snake.
The Naivasha Agreement
Sudan’s first civil war ended with the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement but reignited in 1983 after former President Jaafar Nimeiri imposed Islamic Sharia law. This sparked a rebellion led by John Garang’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).
The conflict escalated into a “jihadist” war as Islamist forces framed it as a battle against “enemies of the faith.” The fighting lasted for years, killing more than two million people.
Unable to secure a military victory, the government signed the Naivasha Agreement in Kenya. The deal granted South Sudan the right to self-determination, with a five-year transitional period to decide between unity or independence.
John Garang briefly became Sudan’s First Vice President during this period but died in a mysterious helicopter crash. His deputy, Salva Kiir, succeeded him and led South Sudan to a 2011 referendum, where the region voted for independence. South Sudan became a new nation, taking a third of Sudan’s land, a quarter of its people, and most of its resources.
Meanwhile, conflict spread to Darfur in 2003, with rebels accusing the government of marginalization. The war turned ethnic when the government armed Arab militias, known as the Janjaweed, to fight African-origin rebel groups. One Janjaweed leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, or Hemedti, later became the head of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
The Darfur war claimed 300,000 lives. Al-Bashir’s government was accused of war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, leading to International Criminal Court arrest warrants for Bashir and three senior officials that remain in effect.
Chasing Peace Across Capitals
In May 2006, Sudan’s government signed a peace deal in Abuja with a faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) led by Minni Arko Minnawi. However, the movement split, and another faction, led by Abdel Wahid al-Nur, rejected the deal and continued fighting from Jebel Marra in central Darfur.
Minnawi briefly joined the government as an assistant to President Omar al-Bashir but later rebelled again, claiming he was treated as a "kitchen helper" rather than a serious political partner.
Efforts to negotiate peace moved between capitals. In 2011, some groups signed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur in Qatar, which promised power and wealth-sharing, but fighting continued.
In 2020, Sudan’s transitional government signed a new peace agreement in Juba with key armed groups, including Minnawi’s faction and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) led by Gibril Ibrahim.
The deal gave Minnawi the role of Darfur governor and Ibrahim the post of finance minister. Despite these accords, true peace remains out of reach.
A New Southern Conflict
War broke out in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, two regions given a right to “popular consultation” under the Naivasha Agreement to decide their future. The SPLM-North, an offshoot of the southern SPLM, took up arms again.
The SPLM-N split into two factions: one led by Malik Agar, now a deputy in Sudan’s Sovereign Council, who signed the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement; the other, led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, controls Kauda in South Kordofan and continues sporadic fighting.
Eastern Sudan also saw conflict in the 1990s, with groups like the Beja Congress and Free Lions opposing Bashir’s regime. These groups later signed the Asmara Peace Agreement, gaining shares of power and wealth.
In April 2019, months of protests forced the military to oust President Omar al-Bashir. But sit-ins continued, and a violent crackdown killed hundreds, drawing condemnation as a horrific crime against civilians.
Under public pressure, the military signed a constitutional declaration in August 2019, agreeing to share power with civilians. This led to a transitional government with Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, and a Sovereign Council headed by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and his deputy, Hemedti.
War of the Generals
On October 25, 2021, Sudan's army leader overthrew Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok’s civilian government in a coup. Under pressure from peaceful protests, the general later agreed to a framework agreement with civilian leaders, promising a return to civilian rule and preventing the return of the Islamist regime.
However, supporters of the former regime undermined the deal, causing tensions between the army and the RSF, leading to war.
On April 15, 2023, gunfire broke out in southern Khartoum, marking the start of the ongoing conflict. The RSF accused the army of attacking its camps, while some claim Islamist cells within the army targeted the RSF, forcing it to choose between surrender or war.
Miscalculations
The war was expected to end quickly due to the army’s stronger military. However, the RSF surprised the army by using urban warfare tactics to take control of key military bases and government buildings, including the presidential palace.
The government moved to Port Sudan, while Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan was trapped for over three months before escaping.
The RSF expanded its control over Darfur, western Sudan, and the central Gezira region, holding about 70% of the country. After nearly two years of fighting, the army regained some areas, but the RSF still controls large parts of Sudan and continues fierce fighting, with the war still ongoing.
The Worst Humanitarian Crisis
The war in Sudan has killed tens of thousands and triggered what the UN calls "the worst humanitarian crisis in history." More than 11 million people are displaced within Sudan, while around 3 million have fled to neighboring countries. Over half of Sudan’s population, about 25 million people, face severe food insecurity.
Negotiations have failed, with both sides refusing to return to talks after the Jeddah Humanitarian Declaration collapsed, largely due to the army’s and its supporters' refusal to engage.
Root Causes
Former Sovereign Council member and deputy head of the Democratic Civil Forces Coordination “Tagadum,” Al-Hadi Idris blames the war on Sudan’s failure to agree on a “national development plan” since independence.
Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, he says the main reasons for the conflict are the failure to implement fair development, achieve justice, and the lack of resolution on key issues like the role of religion in politics, national identity, and military involvement in government.
Idris argues that addressing these issues is crucial to ending the war for good.
Mohamed Abdel-Hakim, a leader in the Unionist Gathering, believes the wars stem from unequal development and citizenship.
He says resolving issues like marginalization, protecting people’s rights, and replacing oppressive regimes with democratic governance is key to stopping Sudan’s long-running conflicts.
Abdel-Hakim also calls for reforming the military to create a professional, national army focused on protecting the constitution and civilian leadership, with strict oversight to prevent the army from becoming politicized.