US, Russian, Turkish Agreements in Syria Await Military ‘Interpretation’

Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan shake hands during a meeting in Ankara. (Reuters file photo)
Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan shake hands during a meeting in Ankara. (Reuters file photo)
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US, Russian, Turkish Agreements in Syria Await Military ‘Interpretation’

Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan shake hands during a meeting in Ankara. (Reuters file photo)
Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan shake hands during a meeting in Ankara. (Reuters file photo)

Iran has become involved, through military means and services provided, in northeastern Syria where American, Russian and Turkish forces are deployed.

The three militaries have become deployed there through a series of agreements that military officials are seeking to implement on the ground in a way that averts a clash between the rivals.

On Friday, Tehran emerged in the picture where an Iranian firm has been tasked with tackling a water crisis in predominantly Kurdish al-Hasakeh where Kurds have accused Ankara of manipulating water supplies.

In the Deir Ezzor countryside, Iran has kicked off a training for its allied factions on the use of drones. The move took place days after US officials accused Iran of attacking the American al-Tanf military base.

Iran’s involvement complicates an already complex picture. Russia on Thursday deployed a fighter jet at Qamishli airport, while Turkey has for weeks been threatening to launch a new offensive against Kurdish factions near its border.

Washington, Moscow and Ankara have struck numerous agreements that manage the deployment of their respective forces in northern Syria. American, Russia and Turkish officials have repeatedly stressed the need for full compliance to these agreements that have effectively divided Syria into three zones of influence, overseen by three armies and in partnership or alliance with various Syrian parties and rivals.

What sort of agreements have been struck? Do the three concerned parties have an explanation for them? Is there a difference between the military’s “interpretation” of these agreements and how diplomats have phrased them?

From Astana to Idlib
Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s agreements over the Idlib province go back to the “de-escalation” deal that was struck in Astana on May 4, 2017. That day, Russia, Iran and Turkey agreed on a document that among many other points, calls for their “solid commitment to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Syrian territories” in line with UN Security Council resolution 2254.

On September 17, 2018, Russia, Iran and Turkey reached an agreement on Idlib during a meeting in Sochi. It called for setting up an arms-free zone that is 15-20 kilometers deep. They agreed to deploy military observers and set up checkpoints, paving the way for thousands of Turkish soldiers, Iranian groups and Russian observers to enter the region.

Observation points without observation
Indeed, observation points were set up and the Hama-Aleppo highway was reopened, but several articles of the agreement were not implemented. In early 2020, Syrian forces, backed by Russia, kicked off a military operation in Idlib. They seized vast territories, forcing the displacement of tens of thousands of people.

Turkey soon entered the picture, but a military clash was averted. On March 5, 2020, Putin and Erdogan held a long meeting in Moscow where they reached a new agreement on Idlib that acts as a follow up to the one struck in Sochi.

They agreed to halt combat operations and set up a secure corridor north and south of the Aleppo-Latakia highway. They agreed to deploy joint Russian and Turkish patrols along the highway on March 15.

The patrols were deployed, but the highway was not reopened. Damascus also did not withdraw to the agreed border of the de-escalation zone.

The frontlines there stood in place for 18 months until September when Moscow and Damascus began to escalate their operations in Idlib. On September 26, Russian jets struck a Turkey-backed factions in northern Aleppo. They also struck areas in the Idlib countryside that had not been targeted since the signing of the March 2020 agreement.

The escalation continued until Putin and Erdogan met in Sochi on September 29. They did not hold a press conference after their talks and did not issue a joint statement to summarize their discussions.

Available information saidPutin and Erdogan signed a follow up deal to the military agreement, giving Turkey until the end of the year to fulfill its pledges to provide a secure zone alongside the Aleppo-Latakia highway and fight extremists. For its part, Russia pledged to cease its comprehensive military operations and prevent the displacement of more civilians and refugees towards the Turkish border.

Daraa to Qamishli
In parallel to the agreements between Russia, Turkey and Iran, Moscow was striking deals with the Americans. The first covered southwestern Syria and the other covered its northeast.

In the northwest, the US agreed to abandon opposition factions in Daraa and allow the return of government forces in July 2018. This agreement was continued in September when remaining opposition members laid down their light weapons, regime forces were allowed to fully return to the area and the border with Jordan was reopened. In the northeast, the American and Russian militaries reached a non-collision agreement.

In October 2019, then US President Donald Trump ordered the withdrawal of American troops from the border with Turkey. This allowed Turkish forces to carry out an incursion in Ras al-Ain and Tal Abyad east of the Euphrates and reshuffle military cards there.

On October 22, Putin and Erdogan reached another agreement in Sochi, this time over northeastern Syria. They agreed to commit to the regional and political unity of Syria and protect Turkey’s national security. They expressed their determination to combat all forms of terrorism and separatist projects in Syria – a reference to the Kurds, who are allied to Washington.

On the military level, the agreement called for maintaining the situation as it is in Ras al-Ain and Tal Abyad. It voiced its backing to the Adana agreement that allows Turkey to enter five kilometers into northern Syria to pursue terrorists and members of the Kurdistan Workers Party.

Crowded Skies
Operation rooms were set up to coordinate patrols and operations in northeastern Syria – an area that is already crowded by armies on land and in the sky. American, Russian and Turkish bases have been set up on the ground and American and Russian jets and Turkish drones roam the skies.

American, Russian and Turkish officials have repeatedly called on all sides to commit to signed agreements. There is no doubt, however, that each party is more focused on certain agreements over others. Moscow, for example, is more focused on the Idlib agreement, while Ankara has its eyes set on the situation east of the Euphrates. Washington, meanwhile, wants Ankara to hold back from attacking its Kurdish allies. Turkey, for its part, repeatedly reminds the US of the need to keep the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) away from its borders.

Failure to implement this last point has been pushing Turkey towards launching another operation against the Kurds. It is paramount for Ankara to prevent the establishment of a “Kurdish entity” south of its borders and it will view such a development as a national security threat.

Turkey has over the past three years carried out various operations in northern Syria aimed at fragmenting the “Kurdish entity” in the region.

Before receiving Erdogan in September, Putin escalated Russian attacks on Idlib and maintained coordination in the region east of the Euphrates. Before meeting US President Joe Biden on the sidelines of the climate summit in Glasgow in two days, Erdogan mobilized forces east of the Euphrates and in northern Aleppo. Putin also deployed fighter jets in Qamishli, the “capital” of the Kurds, and where pressure has been mounting on the American troops there ever since the US pullout from Afghanistan.

Amid all this, Iran, which is already present in the Alboukamal and al-Mayadeen regions west of the Euphrates, has started to turn to its “soft power” to counter these forces. It kicked off these efforts by addressing the water crisis in al-Hasakeh.

All of these developments demonstrate that the situation in Idlib, Aleppo and east of the Euphrates are connected even as the military has different interpretations of agreements signed by diplomats at the bidding of political leaders.



How Iranians Are Communicating Through Internet Blackout

 People walk past closed shops at the almost empty traditional main bazaar, in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, March 10, 2026. (AP)
People walk past closed shops at the almost empty traditional main bazaar, in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, March 10, 2026. (AP)
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How Iranians Are Communicating Through Internet Blackout

 People walk past closed shops at the almost empty traditional main bazaar, in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, March 10, 2026. (AP)
People walk past closed shops at the almost empty traditional main bazaar, in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, March 10, 2026. (AP)

Iran's latest internet blackout has lasted more than 14 days, connectivity monitor Netblocks said Friday.

The nature of the limits on internet activity shows "this is a government-imposed measure" and not the result of damage from US and Israeli airstrikes, Netblocks research chief Isik Mater told AFP.

"It is a deliberate shutdown imposed by the authorities to suppress the flow of information and prevent further dissent," said Raha Bahreini, Iran researcher at Amnesty International.

Here are some of the ways information is still flowing in and out of Iran.

- Shortwave radio -

Amsterdam-based nonprofit Radio Zamaneh began shortwave broadcasts during the January protests, sending a nightly Farsi news program from 11:00 pm Tehran time.

"It's really difficult for the regime to jam shortwave because it's a long-distance broadcast," executive director Rieneke van Santen told AFP.

"People can just listen on a super cheap, small, simple radio... It's one of those typical emergency fall-back solutions."

Declining to specify where the transmitter is located, she said it is "closer to the Netherlands than to Iran" -- although Tehran "can figure it out" if they choose.

- Phone calls -

Many with ties to Iran are still receiving landline phone calls from inside -- "quite surprising" given the internet blackout, said Mahsa Alimardani of global rights organization Witness.

Fearing the authorities listening in, people often avoid speaking directly about political topics, such as the killing of Ali Khamenei, she added.

"It's not possible to communicate about sensitive issues through these brief phone calls," Amnesty's Bahreini said.

The required prepaid international calling cards are expensive and often fail to provide their face value in minutes.

"You buy a phone card for 60 minutes, but in eight minutes, it's out," van Santen said.

"It's really just phone calls from family members saying, after the bombing, we're still alive."

- VPN or other internet services -

Virtual private networks (VPNs) -- widely-used services that encrypt internet traffic -- can't create an internet connection where none is available.

But even at around one percent of typical levels, Iran's connectivity is "still a large figure in absolute terms", Netblocks' Mater said.

Iranians suspected of using VPNs since the war began have received warning text messages claiming to be from the authorities.

Before the war, millions turned to Toronto-based company Psiphon, which creates specialist tools more capable than typical "off-the-shelf" VPNs.

Offering techniques including disguising users' data as different types of internet traffic, Psiphon "is able to evade detection more successfully", data and insights director Keith McManamen told AFP.

With up to six million unique daily users in Iran before the latest internet shutdown, connections have now tumbled to fewer than 100,000.

Few but the most tech-savvy users can reach Psiphon's network for now.

Nevertheless, "the situation is extremely dynamic. We're seeing changes not just day to day, but hour by hour," McManamen said.

A similar service, US-based Lantern, is also widely used in Iran.

- Satellite broadcasts -

Created by US-based nonprofit NetFreedom Pioneers, Toosheh is a "filecasting" technology using home satellite TV equipment to broadcast encrypted data to people in Iran.

Users record from the Toosheh satellite TV channel onto a USB stick plugged into their set-top box, which they can then decrypt using a special app installed on their phone or computer.

From that initial download, the data can be copied and shared across multiple households.

The group estimated around three million active users in Iran across 2025, with "thousands to hundreds of thousands... since the (internet) shutdown in January," the group's director of projects Emilia James told AFP.

From its usual educational repertoire ranging from English lessons to news, content these days includes more on "personal safety and digital security... helping people to stay safe," she added.

Since people are tuning in to a broadcast signal, there is no way for the government to track them, she added.

- Starlink -

Elon Musk-owned satellite internet service Starlink was used during this year's protests to get information out, while the government attempted to jam its signals.

At around $2,000 on Iran's black market, the terminals are expensive and very rare in poorer regions like Balochistan or Kurdistan that have suffered the most government repression, Alimardani said.

Meanwhile, Amnesty has received reports of "raids on houses... arrests of people who had Starlink devices," Bahreini said.

Charges for those caught communicating with the outside world range from prison sentences to the death penalty, she added.

Starlink did not respond to AFP's request for comment on usage in Iran.


How Iranians Are Communicating Through Internet Blackout

 People walk past closed shops at the almost empty traditional main bazaar, in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, March 10, 2026. (AP)
People walk past closed shops at the almost empty traditional main bazaar, in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, March 10, 2026. (AP)
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How Iranians Are Communicating Through Internet Blackout

 People walk past closed shops at the almost empty traditional main bazaar, in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, March 10, 2026. (AP)
People walk past closed shops at the almost empty traditional main bazaar, in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, March 10, 2026. (AP)

Iran's latest internet blackout has lasted more than 14 days, connectivity monitor Netblocks said Friday.

The nature of the limits on internet activity shows "this is a government-imposed measure" and not the result of damage from US and Israeli airstrikes, Netblocks research chief Isik Mater told AFP.

"It is a deliberate shutdown imposed by the authorities to suppress the flow of information and prevent further dissent," said Raha Bahreini, Iran researcher at Amnesty International.

Here are some of the ways information is still flowing in and out of Iran.

- Shortwave radio -

Amsterdam-based nonprofit Radio Zamaneh began shortwave broadcasts during the January protests, sending a nightly Farsi news program from 11:00 pm Tehran time.

"It's really difficult for the regime to jam shortwave because it's a long-distance broadcast," executive director Rieneke van Santen told AFP.

"People can just listen on a super cheap, small, simple radio... It's one of those typical emergency fall-back solutions."

Declining to specify where the transmitter is located, she said it is "closer to the Netherlands than to Iran" -- although Tehran "can figure it out" if they choose.

- Phone calls -

Many with ties to Iran are still receiving landline phone calls from inside -- "quite surprising" given the internet blackout, said Mahsa Alimardani of global rights organization Witness.

Fearing the authorities listening in, people often avoid speaking directly about political topics, such as the killing of Ali Khamenei, she added.

"It's not possible to communicate about sensitive issues through these brief phone calls," Amnesty's Bahreini said.

The required prepaid international calling cards are expensive and often fail to provide their face value in minutes.

"You buy a phone card for 60 minutes, but in eight minutes, it's out," van Santen said.

"It's really just phone calls from family members saying, after the bombing, we're still alive."

- VPN or other internet services -

Virtual private networks (VPNs) -- widely-used services that encrypt internet traffic -- can't create an internet connection where none is available.

But even at around one percent of typical levels, Iran's connectivity is "still a large figure in absolute terms", Netblocks' Mater said.

Iranians suspected of using VPNs since the war began have received warning text messages claiming to be from the authorities.

Before the war, millions turned to Toronto-based company Psiphon, which creates specialist tools more capable than typical "off-the-shelf" VPNs.

Offering techniques including disguising users' data as different types of internet traffic, Psiphon "is able to evade detection more successfully", data and insights director Keith McManamen told AFP.

With up to six million unique daily users in Iran before the latest internet shutdown, connections have now tumbled to fewer than 100,000.

Few but the most tech-savvy users can reach Psiphon's network for now.

Nevertheless, "the situation is extremely dynamic. We're seeing changes not just day to day, but hour by hour," McManamen said.

A similar service, US-based Lantern, is also widely used in Iran.

- Satellite broadcasts -

Created by US-based nonprofit NetFreedom Pioneers, Toosheh is a "filecasting" technology using home satellite TV equipment to broadcast encrypted data to people in Iran.

Users record from the Toosheh satellite TV channel onto a USB stick plugged into their set-top box, which they can then decrypt using a special app installed on their phone or computer.

From that initial download, the data can be copied and shared across multiple households.

The group estimated around three million active users in Iran across 2025, with "thousands to hundreds of thousands... since the (internet) shutdown in January," the group's director of projects Emilia James told AFP.

From its usual educational repertoire ranging from English lessons to news, content these days includes more on "personal safety and digital security... helping people to stay safe," she added.

Since people are tuning in to a broadcast signal, there is no way for the government to track them, she added.

- Starlink -

Elon Musk-owned satellite internet service Starlink was used during this year's protests to get information out, while the government attempted to jam its signals.

At around $2,000 on Iran's black market, the terminals are expensive and very rare in poorer regions like Balochistan or Kurdistan that have suffered the most government repression, Alimardani said.

Meanwhile, Amnesty has received reports of "raids on houses... arrests of people who had Starlink devices," Bahreini said.

Charges for those caught communicating with the outside world range from prison sentences to the death penalty, she added.

Starlink did not respond to AFP's request for comment on usage in Iran.


Will Ahmadinejad Return to the Political Scene in Iran?

Iranian former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (AFP)
Iranian former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (AFP)
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Will Ahmadinejad Return to the Political Scene in Iran?

Iranian former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (AFP)
Iranian former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (AFP)

A report by The Atlantic said the strike that hit a region close to Iranian former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s residence in the first days of the war on Iran has returned to the spotlight a still controversial political figure even though he left office for over a decade ago.

On the first day of the Iran war, the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei overshadowed news of a strike near Ahmadinejad’s home, said the report.

“Many who remembered his term in office - marked by Holocaust denial, atom-bomb fetishism, and shoving revolutionary ideology down the throats of a country already weary of it - celebrated his reported assassination,” it added. He was president from 2005 to 2013.

“Among those who have followed Ahmadinejad’s post-presidential career, however, his targeting was more of an enigma. Since leaving office, Ahmadinejad has harshly criticized the Iranian government, and as a result, Iran’s Guardian Council has formally excluded him from running for president,” said the report.

For more than a decade, he has been known more as a regime opponent than as a supporter. “I don’t understand why Israel would want to kill him in the first place,” Meir Javedanfar, who co-wrote a biography of Ahmadinejad, told The Atlantic. “Perhaps to settle scores? It makes no sense.”

Contrary to early reports, Ahmadinejad is alive, his associates revealed, requesting anonymity. “The circumstances of his survival may prove significant as the war drags on. Whatever the intent, Ahmadinejad’s associates say the strike was in effect a jailbreak operation that freed the former president from regime control.”

“Long before the war, the government had posted a small number of bodyguards near Ahmadinejad, nominally to protect a prominent citizen but also to keep tabs on him. The regime has never been sure what to do with him,” said the report.

About a month ago, after the January protests, his freedom of movement was further reduced, his phones confiscated, and the contingent of bodyguards increased from single digits to about 50. The bodyguards were based a few hundred meters from Ahmadinejad’s residence itself, at the entrance to a cul-de-sac in Narmak, in northeast Tehran. They established a checkpoint to monitor the houses and high school on that street.

“A February 28 strike hit not the residence, but the security forces nearby. In the ensuing mayhem, Ahmadinejad and his family evidently escaped their home and went underground. The government believed he had died, and his death was announced by official channels, as well as the reformist daily Sharq.”

“When rumors arose that Ahmadinejad had escaped, regime elements immediately suspected that he had been spirited away to take part in a coup,” said The Atlantic. “Ahmadinejad’s only public statement since the attack has been a brief eulogy for the supreme leader, calculated to show that Ahmadinejad was alive and to dispel speculation that he had declared himself an enemy of the state. His location is unknown to the government.”

In 2018, former Defense Minister Hussein Dehghan likened Ahmadinejad to “the door of the mosque, which can’t be burned or thrown away” without torching the mosque itself.

“Arresting Ahmadinejad could unsettle the regime,” Javedanfar said. “He knows a hell of a lot about it.”

“Ahmadinejad’s fans say that he has popular support, and that any postwar government will want him around to lend that support. If the current regime survives, it will need all the legitimacy it can get. If it does not, the United States might need someone with intimate - if outdated - knowledge of the Iranian state to be involved with what comes next. Ahmadinejad could still be useful,” the report said.