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Congress Demands Biden’s Administration Clarify US Strategy on Syria

Displaced Syrians in the countryside of Idlib, in northwest Syria(AFP)
Displaced Syrians in the countryside of Idlib, in northwest Syria(AFP)
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Congress Demands Biden’s Administration Clarify US Strategy on Syria

Displaced Syrians in the countryside of Idlib, in northwest Syria(AFP)
Displaced Syrians in the countryside of Idlib, in northwest Syria(AFP)

The US House of Representatives has passed a law on disclosing the sources of the wealth of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, his family and his inner circle, and requested that US federal agencies submit a detailed report.

It also requested the Biden administration to announce its strategy for Syria.

This came during the Congressional approval of the US Department of Defense budget for the year 2022 and now awaits the support of the Senate for the law to take effect. Many see the law’s passing as a legislative victory for the US against the Assad regime in Syria. It plays to the benefit of the Syrian revolution and popular opposition, which have long pressed the US to take stricter measures against the regime in Syria.

The initial draft of the bill included an interagency strategy to disrupt the Assad regime’s illicit drug networks in Syria. However, that part was excluded from the bill, which maintained the law on presenting a report on the wealth of Assad and his family members, including his cousins, such as the Makhloufs and others.

Among the amendments that were discussed, but did not succeed in obtaining enough votes to pass, is an amendment that requires a strategy for Syria and for making the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) self-sufficient enough to let go of the help of the US forces eventually.

According to the final version that was voted on and approved by submitting the law to the Senate, which is what Democratic Congresswoman Claudia Tenny had submitted, orders a report from the State Department on the net wealth of Assad and his family members, including his wife, children, siblings, as well as paternal and maternal cousins.

The approved amendment, No. 6507, included disclosure of “income from corrupt or illegal activities practiced by the Syrian regime.”
The legal amendment stressed the need for interagency coordination to apply US sanctions against Assad in Syria and the importance of “monitoring rampant corruption to ensure that no funds are directed to terrorist groups and malicious activities.”

The House bill also included a provision requiring the Secretary of Defense to report on the estimated cost savings from the complete withdrawal of US personnel and local contractors from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, compared to the actual costs in the fiscal year 2021.

It also requested presenting the estimated cost of redirecting US personnel and materials and “increasing the budgetary power of ships, aircraft, nuclear weapons, key personnel, and operational costs, to actively participate in great power competition with Russia and China, and to effectively restrain and deter Russia and China militarily in all regions.”

In amendment No. 1222, legislators requested the submitting of a detailed report explaining the US military and political strategy in Syria in no more than 90 days, starting from the entry into force of the budget of the US Government, Fiscal Year 2022.

The amendment stipulated that after the date of enactment of this law, the US president, acting through the Secretary of State and in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, “shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing a description of the US strategy on defense and diplomacy toward Syria.”

For his part, Representative French Hill of Arkansas issued a statement voicing his disappointment that his provision to go after the multi-billion-dollar drug trade in Syria was not included.

“While I was disappointed my provision to go after the multi-billion-dollar drug trade in Syria was not included because of a disjointed process, I was pleased to see the note in the Conference Committee Report that indicated support for an interagency strategy to disrupt and dismantle the Assad regime’s illicit production and trafficking of Captagon in Syria. I look forward to pursuing other legislative avenues to move these important provisions forward,” said Hill.

Hill had previously released a video clip saying that the Biden administration must do everything in its power to stop the systematic drug smuggling operations in Syria, describing the Assad regime as a narcostate.

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Arab World

Watchdog Chief Says Urgent to Find Remaining Assad-Era Chemical Weapons

Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani (R) and OPCW Director General Dallafior (L) attend a joint press conference at the Tishreen Palace in Damascus, Syria, 13 October 2026. (EPA)
Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani (R) and OPCW Director General Dallafior (L) attend a joint press conference at the Tishreen Palace in Damascus, Syria, 13 October 2026. (EPA)
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Watchdog Chief Says Urgent to Find Remaining Assad-Era Chemical Weapons

Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani (R) and OPCW Director General Dallafior (L) attend a joint press conference at the Tishreen Palace in Damascus, Syria, 13 October 2026. (EPA)
Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani (R) and OPCW Director General Dallafior (L) attend a joint press conference at the Tishreen Palace in Damascus, Syria, 13 October 2026. (EPA)

The head of the world's chemical weapons watchdog on a visit Tuesday to Syrian capital Damascus said the remaining chemical weapons from the era of ousted president Bashar al-Assad must be urgently identified and destroyed.

Assad was repeatedly accused of using chemical weapons during Syria's 13-year civil war, and there has been widespread concern about the fate of Syria's stocks since his 2024 ousting.

Sabrina Dallafior, the head of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), hailed cooperation with the new authorities over chemical weapons which Assad allegedly used in mass attacks against his own citizens during the war.

"The most urgent priority now is to assess those sites of most concern from a proliferation perspective," Dallafior said during a joint press conference with Syria's foreign minister.

"That means identifying and securing any remnants of the Assad-era chemical weapons program," she said.

She said that "the OPCW verified the destruction by Syria of 42 chemical aerial bombs for the first time. Verified destruction in cooperation with the new government. This is a milestone."

Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani meanwhile said that eliminating chemical weapons was "a responsibility towards the victims and a commitment to ensuring that future generations never experience such atrocities again".

He said he had discussed with Dallafior "a roadmap to build on the progress made and move towards the final closure of the file".

The top diplomat said Syria had handed over more than 100,000 official documents to the OPCW and granted the watchdog access to records and witnesses.

Izumi Nakamitsu, head of the UN disarmament office, said an OPCW team in August "verified the irreversible destruction of 42 aerial bombs" by Syrian authorities.

"This significant development means that, for the first time since 2014, the OPCW has verified the destruction of chemical munitions from the Syrian Arab Republic," she said.

The OPCW reinstated Syria in July, following an unprecedented move in 2021 of stripping Syria of its voting rights after finding its air force had used nerve agent sarin and chlorine gas on its own people.

In 2013, Syria agreed to join the OPCW and disclose and hand over its toxic stockpile under Russian and US pressure, and to avert the threat of air strikes by Washington and its allies.

This came after a suspected chemical attack on the Eastern Ghouta suburb of Damascus that killed more than 1,000 people, according to US intelligence, and was attributed to the Syrian government, which denied involvement and blamed opposition forces.

Arab World

Move to Repeal Syria’s Anti-Brotherhood Law Raises Questions over Group’s Political Return

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and several ministers attend a military parade in Damascus. (Syrian Defense Ministry)
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and several ministers attend a military parade in Damascus. (Syrian Defense Ministry)
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Move to Repeal Syria’s Anti-Brotherhood Law Raises Questions over Group’s Political Return

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and several ministers attend a military parade in Damascus. (Syrian Defense Ministry)
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and several ministers attend a military parade in Damascus. (Syrian Defense Ministry)

Syrian lawmakers are gathering signatures to propose repealing a law that makes membership in the Muslim Brotherhood punishable by death, as the group signals it wants to return to politics after decades of prohibition.

The parallel moves have raised questions about whether Syria’s transitional authorities will allow the Brotherhood back into political life, and how much room they will give political parties.

Abdel Nasser Houshan, chairman of the People’s Assembly’s Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the proposal to repeal Law No. 49 of 1980 was still at the signature-gathering stage and had not been submitted to the assembly.

Under the assembly’s rules, 17 members must first approve the proposal before a bill can be drafted and submitted for referral to the relevant committee, he said.

The legacy of Law 49

Media leaks had suggested lawmakers could discuss the proposal at their next session, expected in the middle of this month. Houshan’s comments indicate that the steps needed to bring it before the assembly remain incomplete.

Enacted in July 1980 under former President Hafez al-Assad, Law 49 classified every member of the Muslim Brotherhood as a criminal punishable by death. It became a key weapon in the former government’s confrontation with the group, whose members and supporters faced decades of arrests and persecution.

Hussam Jazmati, a researcher on Islamist organizations and groups, expects “broad support inside and outside the assembly” for repealing the law, given the abuses associated with it under the former government.

Repealing the “strange” law matters regardless of whom it targeted, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He called it “one of the instruments of state terror under the Assad regime,” saying security agencies used it to pursue people merely suspected of belonging to the Brotherhood.

The law left a deep legacy of intimidation in Syrian society, particularly in conservative and religious communities, he said.

“Sympathy for its victims could provide a basis for supporting its repeal, even among groups that do not support the Brotherhood politically.”

Yet the law’s legal status is itself unclear.

The declaration issued at the “Victory Conference” on Jan. 29, 2025, after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government, suspended all exceptional laws. It remains unclear whether that covered Law 49 — or whether the law still requires a legislative repeal.

The declaration also dissolved the Baath Party, the parties of the National Progressive Front and their affiliated organizations, and banned their reconstitution.

It dissolved military factions and revolutionary political and civilian bodies, requiring their integration into state institutions.

But it did not dissolve all political parties without exception, leaving unresolved the legal basis for party activity during the transition.

A test of political will

For Abdel Rahman al-Haj, a researcher specializing in Islamist movements, bringing the repeal before the People’s Assembly would be “a test of the transitional government’s political will.”

An indefinite delay could signal that the authorities do not want to ease the Brotherhood’s return to politics or allow it an active role in the next phase, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“Leaving the law in place without invalidating it in the constitutional declaration, and leaving it to the People’s Assembly, will be understood as additional pressure on the group,” he said.

The Brotherhood had already faced various forms of pressure to dissolve itself, he added.

The Syrian Brotherhood’s Shura Council held its fifth regular session on Sept. 27, 2026, issuing a 16-point statement on political, security and economic developments, as well as regional and international issues.

The statement affirmed the group’s desire to participate in political life and called for pluralism and rules governing party activity. Observers read it as preparation for a return to politics inside Syria.

Al-Haj said its second and sixth points showed that “the group wants to engage in party competition and is preparing for the return of political life as set out in the constitutional declaration.”

The Brotherhood appears to feel it faces “systematic exclusion and marginalization,” he said. At this stage of the transition, he added, it needs to test how serious the government is about establishing a legal framework for political activity ahead of an agreed political transition.

Jazmati sees a more immediate obstacle.

“The return of political life depends on the authorities’ will,” he said, adding that they do not appear to want organized parties, at least during the transition.

Still, he believes the Brotherhood could return to political activity “in one way or another.” Syria has a broad religious current that could find expression in several political parties and organizations, whether or not a new political parties law is enacted.

Sympathy for victims, doubts about the group

Jazmati draws a distinction between sympathy for the Brotherhood’s treatment under Assad and support for the organization today.

“There is widespread sympathy for the victims of arrests, persecution and abuses committed by the former regime, and support for addressing the injustices and providing redress for the harm they suffered,” he said.

That sympathy, however, “does not necessarily mean support for the group’s return in its current organizational form.”

The Brotherhood’s record during the Syrian revolution draws a less favorable assessment, he said, citing accusations that it tried to dominate opposition institutions and bore some responsibility for their failures, along with criticism of its management of political and relief work.

He described that negative view as resting on “a set of facts as well as a set of exaggerations,” stressing the need to distinguish between former detainees and victims of the government and the political organization that exists today.

Early in the revolution, sections of the Brotherhood’s support base welcomed its participation in preparatory conferences to establish the opposition Syrian National Council. Criticism of its performance within opposition institutions later intensified.

“The group’s popularity declined during those years, while other Islamist currents rose, particularly the current from which the leaders of Syria’s present authorities emerged,” Jazmati said.

Could a return spur other groups?

The Brotherhood’s signals have also raised questions about what its return could mean for Islamist organizations and other political forces waiting for rules governing party activity.

Al-Haj sees the prospect of its return encouraging other Islamist organizations as “possible, but unlikely.”

The Brotherhood’s presence rests on “its organizational and political history, rather than solely on its Islamist ideology,” he said. Other currents compete to represent that ideology, including the one from which Hayat Tahrir al-Sham emerged.

He expects the group to attract some Syrians who share its ideological outlook and are dissatisfied with the course of the transition.

Its return could do more to encourage non-Islamist organizations than Islamist ones to prepare for political participation, he said. But the transition’s uncertain contours make the consequences difficult to predict.

With the repeal proposal still at an early stage and the rules for party activity unresolved, the Brotherhood’s return to politics would test more than its own future.

It would also test the limits of pluralism Syria’s transitional authorities are prepared to allow.

Arab World

Asharq Al-Awsat Reveals How Hamas Leader in Gaza Survived Israeli Assassination Attempt

Hamas official Ali al-Amoudi (Hamas-affiliated Palestinian Information Center)
Hamas official Ali al-Amoudi (Hamas-affiliated Palestinian Information Center)
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Asharq Al-Awsat Reveals How Hamas Leader in Gaza Survived Israeli Assassination Attempt

Hamas official Ali al-Amoudi (Hamas-affiliated Palestinian Information Center)
Hamas official Ali al-Amoudi (Hamas-affiliated Palestinian Information Center)

Hamas sources have disclosed how an urgent intelligence warning helped Ali al-Amoudi, who oversees the movement’s political bureau in Gaza, escape an Israeli assassination attempt on Oct. 3.

Amoudi survived a strike on a residential building hit by several missiles and suicide drones. Five Palestinians were killed.

An urgent warning

Three sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that an urgent intelligence report reached Amoudi about three hours before the attack, prompting him to leave. It did not, however, confirm that he was the intended target.

In separate, matching accounts, the sources said Amoudi was in the apartment later struck. He took the warning seriously and moved to a safe location.

The warning followed hours of drone surveillance. During daylight on Oct. 2, two members of the air unit of the al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ armed wing, spotted two Israeli reconnaissance drones repeatedly circling the building and the port area west of Gaza City.

The drones were of a type Palestinian security personnel knew for its dangerous capabilities, the sources said. They use artificial intelligence and other technologies to pinpoint targets.

After tracking the drones for hours, the two members suspected preparations for an assassination attempt against a senior figure in the area. They alerted higher-level security officials. Their urgent report reached those responsible for protecting senior Hamas figures, including Amoudi.

The sole person responsible for Amoudi’s security, who knew his location, went to him immediately after receiving the report and briefed him.

Amoudi suspected he was the target and decided to leave without delay. About an hour or more later, powerful guided missiles and one or two suicide drones struck the apartment, confirming his suspicions, the sources said.

A central figure

Amoudi was very close to former Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, both inside and outside Israeli prisons. They were imprisoned together before their release. Amoudi was freed in the prisoner exchange for Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, which Hamas called “Loyalty to the Free.”

In the days and weeks before the assassination attempt, Amoudi contested an internal election to lead Hamas in Gaza against Nizar Awadallah. Neither secured a decisive result. A runoff was halted after it was challenged.

Amoudi is a central figure in Hamas, both in Gaza and beyond.

Reading the drones

Operatives on the ground are becoming more adept at identifying the drones that constantly fly over Gaza and assessing their danger, the sources said. Some conduct reconnaissance; others are suicide drones. Their capabilities vary by model.

Israel deploys several types, some with known military names and others whose names remain unknown, the sources said. Palestinian factions and others in Gaza give some drones their own names, drawing on information about their models and capabilities from websites covering Israeli military affairs.

With drones constantly overhead, the factions’ armed wings monitor the skies to try to avert attacks on potential targets or limit their impact.

Gaza residents call drones of all types “zannana,” or “buzzers.” Many know little about their actual names or differing missions, while Palestinian factions are building their capacity to observe them and learn more.

Similar warnings

Senior Hamas security official Moein al-Arabid received a warning about similar drones before his abduction on Sept. 2, one source said. Other security officials received the warning too, but it was ignored.

No one expected a ground operation to abduct Arabid or anyone else. They anticipated an aerial assassination attempt instead, and some officials took precautions to conceal themselves.

The sources said drones are constantly monitored across Gaza to assess whether Israel is preparing to target a senior figure.

Izz al-Din al-Bayk, commander of the al-Qassam Brigades’ Northern Brigade, received a similar report days before his assassination, one source said. He left one location for another but was killed there, in a residential building in the al-Nasr neighborhood of northwestern Gaza City.

The source suggested that certain technologies had pinpointed Bayk’s new location, citing Israel’s heavy reliance on artificial intelligence and other technologies, alongside collaborators working with its domestic security agency, Shin Bet.

The source said the agency exploited collaborators’ economic circumstances and personal and social vulnerabilities to recruit them.