The Possible Changes in Syria are External

Israeli army soldiers take part in an exercise in the Israeli-annexed Golan Heights near the border with Syria on June 13, 2022. (Photo by JALAA MAREY / AFP)
Israeli army soldiers take part in an exercise in the Israeli-annexed Golan Heights near the border with Syria on June 13, 2022. (Photo by JALAA MAREY / AFP)
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The Possible Changes in Syria are External

Israeli army soldiers take part in an exercise in the Israeli-annexed Golan Heights near the border with Syria on June 13, 2022. (Photo by JALAA MAREY / AFP)
Israeli army soldiers take part in an exercise in the Israeli-annexed Golan Heights near the border with Syria on June 13, 2022. (Photo by JALAA MAREY / AFP)

Eleven years after the start of the protests and the outbreak of the conflict, and following two years of stability along the lines of contact between the three areas of influence, is there a possible change in Syria? Is it external or internal?

The past decade has witnessed many military and political upheavals. Some areas expanded and others contracted. Expectations rose and others declined, until the country was divided into three “states”: One fell under the government control with Russian and Iranian support, the second under the administration of the Kurdish-Arab Syrian Democratic Forces, backed by the US-led international coalition, and the third under the control of militant and Islamist factions and extremist proxies with Turkish support.

Stalemate on the lines of contact between the three “states” lingered for more than 27 months - the longest period in which geographical control has stabilized in 11 years. These areas are built on destroyed cities, villages and neighborhoods, demographic changes, displaced people and refugees. More than 12 million people have abandoned their homes, half of the Syrian population. In addition, more than seven million people have left the country, including more than one million to Western states.

The emigration flow did not stop, although its causes became economic, not military or political. What unites the Syrians wherever they are is their severe economic crisis… Even Arab normalization did not solve their economic problem.

The hope represented by the Arab Gas Pipeline dissipated under the shadow of the American “Caesar Act” and Western sanctions, to the extent that the country sank into darkness for hours on Saturday.

The three “states” maintain cooperation, agreements, trade and understandings. Their actors assume that the stalemate continues for a long period, and that “relief will come from others.”

Is there a possible change to this picture?
It is clear that the current equations are based on external bargains. The Syrians are no longer able to make any fundamental change in them. Therefore, any potential modification is external. There are four possibilities that emanate from four foreign military forces:

First, Turkey: Turkish officials frequently talk about the possibility of a military operation in the north of the country. They believe that the Ukrainian war and the resulting Russian-Western clash have strengthened their negotiating cards in Syria and the region. They are trying to invest in this situation, by launching an incursion that weakens any potential Kurdish entity on their southern border in northern Syria. Turkey is focusing on Manbij, which is controlled by America’s allies, or Tal Rifaat, which is under the supervision of Russia’s partners, in addition to the escalation in the eastern Euphrates, which America controls more deeply.

Any Turkish incursion without understandings from Russia and its partners, America and its allies, will alter the lines of contact and open the door to a new military escalation. What are the limits of change? Will they shuffle the cards?

Second, Iran: With Russia’s preoccupation with the Ukrainian war, Iran and others are trying to fill the void in Syria. Israel is intensifying its military operations against “strategic Iranian targets” in Syria, the latest of which was striking Damascus International Airport and isolating the Syrian capital from the world.

In parallel, the “shadow war” between Tehran and Tel Aviv moved to the heart of Iran with Israeli talk about the “head of the octopus” strategy. To what extent will the Iranian-Israeli escalation in Syria remain controlled by Russia? Will Syria turn into an arena for a direct clash and the possibility of Iran launching “drone” attacks from Syrian territory?

Third, Russia: There has been a “prevention of clash” agreement between the Russian and American armies since mid-2017, with the west of the Euphrates River controlled by Moscow and east of the Euphrates by Washington. There were some skirmishes, but strategically the deal was kept. However, with the escalation between the two parties in Ukraine, Russia has begun to test the Americans militarily in Syria, whether over the Al-Tanf base in the southeast of the country or in the north. To what extent can tension remain controlled between them? Will Syria turn into an arena for revenge, whether from America or Russia?

Fourth, the United States: Since the arrival of President Joe Biden to power, the US military presence in Syria has stabilized, especially after the “Afghan humiliation”, in contrast to the era of President Donald Trump, when the presence of the US army and its allies depended on a tweet. Will Biden’s decision remain steadfast in the face of the adventures of wounded President Vladimir Putin? Will things change in the upcoming presidential elections in two years?

The Syrians know that they cannot control the decision-making in their country. They are aware that Syria has turned from a player into an arena. Each side is betting on a surprise by its foreign military ally, and on a setback that will strike its local opponent with external tools. Between the blow and the blessing, the Syrians suffer in darkness… waiting for relief.



Crops Wither in Sudan as Power Cuts Cripple Irrigation

FILED - 27 August 2024, Sudan, Omdurman: Young people walk along a street marked by destruction in Sudan. Photo: Mudathir Hameed/dpa
FILED - 27 August 2024, Sudan, Omdurman: Young people walk along a street marked by destruction in Sudan. Photo: Mudathir Hameed/dpa
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Crops Wither in Sudan as Power Cuts Cripple Irrigation

FILED - 27 August 2024, Sudan, Omdurman: Young people walk along a street marked by destruction in Sudan. Photo: Mudathir Hameed/dpa
FILED - 27 August 2024, Sudan, Omdurman: Young people walk along a street marked by destruction in Sudan. Photo: Mudathir Hameed/dpa

Hatem Abdelhamid stands amid his once-thriving date palms in northern Sudan, helpless as a prolonged war-driven power outage cripples irrigation, causing devastating crop losses and deepening the country's food crisis.

"I've lost 70 to 75 percent of my crops this year," he said, surveying the dying palms in Tanqasi, a village on the Nile in Sudan's Northern State.

"I'm trying really hard to keep the rest of the crops alive," he told AFP.

Sudan's agricultural sector -- already battered by a two-year conflict and economic crisis -- is now facing another crushing blow from the nationwide power outages.

Since the war between the regular army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces began in April 2023, state-run power plants have been repeatedly targeted, suffering severe damage and ultimately leaving farms without water.

Like most Sudanese farms, Abdelhamid's depends on electric-powered irrigation -- but the system has been down "for over two months" due to the blackouts.

Sudan had barely recovered from the devastating 1985 drought and famine when war erupted again in 2023, delivering a fresh blow to the country's agriculture.

Agriculture remains the main source of food and income for 80 percent of the population, according to the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

Now in its third year, the conflict has plunged more than half the population into acute food insecurity, with famine already taking hold in at least five areas and millions more at risk across conflict-hit regions in the west, center and south.

The war has also devastated infrastructure, killed tens of thousands of people, and displaced 13 million.

A 2024 joint study by the United Nations Development Programme and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) found that nearly a third of rural households have lost irrigation and water access since the war began.

Without electricity to power his irrigation system, Abdelhamid -- like thousands of farmers across the country -- was forced to rely on diesel-powered pumps.

But with fuel scarce and prices now more than 20 times higher than before the war, even that option is out of reach for many.

"I used to spend 10,000 Sudanese pounds (about four euros according to the black market rate) for irrigation each time," said another farmer, Abdelhalim Ahmed.

"Now it costs me 150,000 pounds (around 60 euros) because there is no electricity," he told AFP.

Ahmed said he has lost three consecutive harvests -- including crops like oranges, onions, tomatoes and dates.

With seeds, fertilizers and fuel now barely available, many farmers say they won't be able to replant for the next cycle.

In April, the FAO warned that "below average rainfall" and ongoing instability were closing the window to prevent further deterioration.

A June study by IFPRI also projected Sudan's overall economic output could shrink by as much as 42 percent if the war continues, with the agricultural sector contracting by more than a third.

"Our analysis shows massive income losses across all households and a sharp rise in poverty, especially in rural areas and among women," said Khalid Siddig, a senior research fellow at IFPRI.