The Syrian Oil: Time for New Approach?

US - Russian Struggle Opens Opportunity for 'War lords'

US forces conduct training with the "Syrian Democratic Forces" in Hasaka countryside on September 7 (EPA)
US forces conduct training with the "Syrian Democratic Forces" in Hasaka countryside on September 7 (EPA)
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The Syrian Oil: Time for New Approach?

US forces conduct training with the "Syrian Democratic Forces" in Hasaka countryside on September 7 (EPA)
US forces conduct training with the "Syrian Democratic Forces" in Hasaka countryside on September 7 (EPA)

With the war in Syria now in its twelfth year and with the US-Russian conflict still ongoing to control the oil sector and its potential, local belligerents and regional opponents have found in oil a rare point of consensus to cooperate and pick clean the country’s wealth and revenues.

Oil production from fields and facilities mainly located in north-eastern Syria was about 400,000 barrels per day prior to the conflict. After the eruption of the conflict in 2011, various warring forces, including opposition factions and ISIS, successively seized control of much of this invaluable oil wealth. Western sanctions placed on the oil sector have caused foreign oil companies to leave the country.

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a US-backed coalition, currently controls one-quarter of Syria’s territory, including the area east of the Euphrates. This means that the SDF now dominates 90 percent of the oil and over 50 percent of the gas fields, as well as the infrastructure owned by foreign companies, according to legitimate contracts signed with the Damascus government, including Gulfsands Petroleum, Total, and Shell. Oil wells and facilities were cordoned off and “protected” by the US-led coalition forces and SDF.

On the other hand, Damascus announced that the oil sector’s losses since the beginning of the crisis amounted to USD 91.5 billion. Oil Minister Bassam Tohme revealed that the daily oil production is 89,000 barrels, mainly in Kurdish-controlled areas. Tohme describes this oil as being “stolen” from the Syrian people.

International Conflict

After the Russian military intervention in late 2015, Damascus signed contracts with Russian companies to invest in the oil and gas sectors in Syria and its territorial waters. It also contracted with Evro Polis, the Yevgeny Prigozhin-linked company financing Wagner mercenaries, to protect oil and gas facilities and liberate them from ISIS in exchange for 25 percent of their proceeds. This included Evro Polis taking control of Suncor’s large Ebla gas development near Palmyra – an operation that led to many casualties.

This agreement was the cover under which the Wagner paramilitary group operated. Wagner was estimated to have as many as 2,500 men in Syria in 2018. They participated in the fighting in Syria or took part in training and preparation camps in Russia. Some of them have been relocated to Libya and now to Ukraine.

In reality, the agreement between Evro Polis and Damascus only covered areas under Damascus control. In early 2018, Wagner mercenaries launched an assault on the Conoco gas plant in the eastern Euphrates, a position of the SDF, but they were hammered by US artillery and airstrikes that killed about 200 mercenaries.

In late 2019, former US President Donald Trump made a shock announcement that American troops would withdraw from the area around Syria’s border with Turkiye, east of the Euphrates, giving Turkiye the green light to invade northern Syria and putting the SDF, Washington’s allies, under new pressure. On October 6, 2019, Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, together with some US and European officials, persuaded President Trump to keep 900 members of the US military there to protect the oil. Trump later said that "a small number of soldiers will remain in the areas that contain oil," stressing that "we have ensured the security and protection of oil."

In July 2020, Washington announced that SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi informed the Trump administration of the signing of an agreement with the American company Delta Crescent Energy to invest in oil after obtaining a waiver from the Treasury Department from the sanctions placed on Syria. Then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said the deal was intended to "modernize oil.”

The situation embarrassed the US Department of Defense which issued conflicting statements. It initially stated that "Syrian oil is for the Syrian people and we remain committed to the unity and territorial integrity of Syria.” It further emphasized that “the US government does not own, control, or manage the oil resources in Syria. The populations in areas liberated from ISIS make their own decisions on local governance.” Former US Defense Secretary Mark Esper announced that "we are now taking measures to strengthen our position in Deir el-Zour to deny ISIS access to the oil fields.” The Pentagon confirmed sending troops and armored vehicles to protect oil fields.

The US-Russian conflict is still ongoing. An opposition leader said that high-ranking Russian officers had repeatedly informed the SDF leaders to allow Russian companies that signed contracts with Damascus to work in the oil fields east of the Euphrates, but the Kurdish officials responded that this required the approval of the US allies that co-control the oil fields.

A stand-off has ensued, with undesirable consequences.

Illegal but all Too Comfortable

The ongoing Russian-US conflict has been aggravated as a result of the war in Ukraine and the stagnation of the military situation in Syria, especially with the absence of a prospect for a political solution while economic and humanitarian needs of the Syrian people escalate. This means that oil has emerged as a factor of tacit cooperation between illegitimate Syrian and foreign belligerents to share the revenues of about 89,000 barrels per day.

According to expert estimates, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) receives around USD 16 per barrel and a further USD 15 goes to the Syrian government. The remaining amount, which could amount up to USD 50 per barrel, is ‘lost’ and ends up in the hands of these war profiteers. The AANES uses part of the production locally, while the mediators and the war profiteers transport another part to government areas (constituting two-thirds of Syria’s territory) for refining or keeping. It is well reported that oil is also smuggled into Iraqi Kurdistan, either for local use or for smuggling into Turkiye. Oil is sold at very low prices and the fields and surrounding environment now suffer considerable damage.

Officials talk about networks operating in the shadows to smuggle oil and its derivatives between the east of the Euphrates, controlled by the SDF whose linchpin is the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), and the Euphrates Shield areas or other enclaves controlled by the Syrian opposition factions and the Turkish army. It is noteworthy that the military forces in these two regions are involved in daily fighting, strikes, and raids, and exchange accusations of disloyalty, treason, and terrorism.

The same applies to the path crossed by oil tanks from the eastern Euphrates to oil refineries in the areas controlled by the Syrian government. The latter accuses the dominant forces in the east of the country of being traitors and agents of the American occupation. In the same vein, an informed source said that officials in the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) advised leaders of the SDF to coordinate with Damascus regarding the sale of oil internally and regionally.

The cooperation between the belligerents extends beyond the borders. Reports indicate that oil is smuggled into Iraqi Kurdistan and some Turkish regions, with the involvement of mediators and individuals close to the decision-makers there, although political and military differences are ongoing between the decision-makers in Qamishli and Erbil. In this regard, an informed Western official said, "most likely, the decision-makers in these areas are not in a hurry to reach a political solution that would impede the flow of money into their pockets. It is most likely that the war profiteers in the local areas of influence and the neighboring countries do not want the war to end.”

An Alternative Approach -

When President Joe Biden assumed office, his administration announced sanction exemptions that allowed some targeted investments, (although this excluded the oil industry), in Eastern Euphrates. However, it decided not to extend the sanction waiver granted to Delta Crescent Energy for many reasons, mainly the objection of foreign companies holding sovereignty rights in the oil fields. For instance, Gulfsands Petroleum (“Gulfsands”) signed a contract with Damascus in 2003 to invest in and develop Block 26 east of the Euphrates. According to its 2021 annual report, unauthorized production from Block 26 since early 2017 has reached about 20,000 barrels per day, meaning that around 35 million barrels have been produced from the block since then.

Meanwhile, London-based Gulfsands is calling for a "win-win" humanitarian initiative that would enable it and other international oil companies to regain control of their assets. Rather than flow to the sanctioned entities and other unauthorized intermediaries , the Gulfsands initiative would see revenues from oil sales transferred to a UN-controlled fund. John Bell, the managing director of Gulfsands, said a new approach was needed to alleviate the enormous suffering in Syria. He added, "Syria needs billions of dollars that can only be generated with oil and gas,” and described the plans as "a gain for the Kurds, Damascus, and the Syrian people." He also posited that a share of oil proceeds would go to a UN-controlled humanitarian account whose payments are fully in line with the international sanctions placed on Syria.

That might seem simple, but analysts have linked the initiative with the Oil-for-Food program enforced in Iraq before the US invasion in 2003. Bell acknowledges that lessons need to be learned from that ill-fated program as he proposes the initiative to the international stakeholders. This is a particularly timely initiative as discussions continue regarding the extension of providing international aid across borders, including the amendment to include the financing of early recovery projects and other humanitarian and health affairs.



Ethiopia Builds Secret Camp to Train Sudan RSF Fighters 

Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
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Ethiopia Builds Secret Camp to Train Sudan RSF Fighters 

Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

Ethiopia is hosting a secret camp to train thousands of fighters for the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in neighboring Sudan, Reuters reporting has found, in the latest sign that one of the world’s deadliest conflicts is sucking in regional powers from Africa and the Middle East.

The camp is the first direct evidence of Ethiopia’s involvement in Sudan’s civil war, marking a potentially dangerous development that provides the RSF a substantial supply of fresh soldiers as fighting escalates in Sudan’s south.

Eight sources, including a senior Ethiopian government official, said the United Arab Emirates financed the camp’s construction and provided military trainers and logistical support to the site, a view also shared in an internal note by Ethiopia’s security services and in a diplomatic cable, reviewed by Reuters.

The news agency could not independently verify UAE involvement in the project or the purpose of the camp. In response to a request for comment, the UAE foreign ministry said it was not a party to the conflict or “in any way” involved in the hostilities.

Reuters spoke to 15 sources familiar with the camp's construction and operations, including Ethiopian officials and diplomats, and analyzed satellite imagery of the area. Two Ethiopian intelligence officials and the satellite images provided information that corroborated details contained in the security memo and cable.

The location and scale of the camp and the detailed allegations of the UAE’s involvement have not been previously reported. The images show the extent of the new development, as recently as in the past few weeks, along with construction for a drone ground control station at a nearby airport.

Satellite imagery shows a camp with hundreds of tents in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 22, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

Activity picked up in October at the camp, which is located in the remote western region of Benishangul-Gumuz, near the border with Sudan, satellite images show.

Ethiopia’s government spokesperson, its army and the RSF did not respond to detailed requests for comment about the findings of this story.

On January 6, UAE and Ethiopia issued a joint statement that included a call for a ceasefire in Sudan, as well as celebrating ties they said served the defense of each other’s security.

The Sudanese Armed Forces did not respond to a request for comment.

As of early January, 4,300 RSF fighters were undergoing military training at the site and “their logistical and military supplies are being provided by the UAE,” the note by Ethiopia’s security services seen by Reuters read.

Sudan's army has previously accused the UAE of supplying the RSF with weapons, a claim UN experts and US lawmakers have found credible.

The camp’s recruits are mainly Ethiopians, but citizens from South Sudan and Sudan, including from the SPLM-N, a Sudanese rebel group that controls territory in Sudan’s neighboring Blue Nile state, are also present, six officials said.

Reuters was unable to independently establish who was at the camp or the terms or conditions of recruitment.

A senior leader of the SPLM-N, who declined to be named, denied his forces had a presence in Ethiopia.

The six officials said the recruits are expected to join the RSF battling Sudanese soldiers in Blue Nile, which has emerged as a front in the struggle for control of Sudan. Two of the officials said hundreds had already crossed in recent weeks to support the paramilitaries in Blue Nile.

The internal security note said General Getachew Gudina, the Chief of the Defense Intelligence Department of the Ethiopian National Defense Force, was responsible for setting up the camp. A senior Ethiopian government official as well as four diplomatic and security sources confirmed Getachew’s role in launching the project.

Getachew did not respond to a request for comment.

The camp was carved out of forested land in a district called Menge, about 32 km from the border and strategically located at the intersection of the two countries and South Sudan, according to the satellite imagery and the diplomatic cable.

The first sign of activity in the area began in April, with forest clearing and the construction of metal-roofed buildings in a small area to the north of what is now the area of the camp with tents, where work began in the second half of October.

Satellite imagery shows a forested area where, ten months later, a camp with hundreds of tents was built in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, December 15, 2024. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

The diplomatic cable, dated November, described the camp as having a capacity of up to 10,000 fighters, saying activity began in October with the arrival of dozens of Land Cruisers, heavy trucks, RSF units and UAE trainers. Reuters is not revealing the country that wrote the cable, to protect the source.

Two of the officials described seeing trucks with the logo of the Emirati logistics company Gorica Group heading through the town of Asosa and towards the camp in October. Gorica did not respond to a request for comment.

The news agency was able to match elements of the timeframe specified in the diplomatic cable with satellite imagery. Images from Airbus Defense and Space show that after the initial clearing work, tents began filling the area from early November. Multiple diggers are visible in the imagery.

An image taken by US space technology firm Vantor on November 24 shows more than 640 tents at the camp, approximately four meters square. Each tent could comfortably house four people with some individual equipment, so the camp could accommodate at least 2,500 people, according to an analysis of the satellite imagery by defense intelligence company Janes.

Janes said it could not confirm the site was military based on their analysis of the imagery.

New recruits were spotted travelling to the camp in mid-November, two senior military officials said.

Satellite imagery shows an area where trucks come and go at a camp in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 22, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

On November 17, a column of 56 trucks packed with trainees rumbled through dirt roads of the remote region, the officials, who witnessed the convoys, told Reuters, with each truck holding between 50 and 60 fighters, the officials estimated.

Two days later, both officials saw another convoy of 70 trucks carrying soldiers driving in the same direction, they said.

The November 24 image shows at least 18 large trucks at the site. The vehicles’ size, shape and design match those of models frequently used by the Ethiopian military and its allies to transport soldiers, according to Reuters analysis.

Development continued in late January, the Vantor images show, including new clearing and digging in the riverbed just north of the main camp and dozens of shipping containers lined around the camp visible in a January 22 image. A senior Ethiopian government official said construction on the camp was ongoing but did not elaborate on future building plans.

Sudan’s civil war erupted in 2023 after a power struggle between the Sudanese army and the RSF ahead of a planned transition to civilian rule.


Gaza Girls Take Up Boxing to Heal War’s Scars

Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
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Gaza Girls Take Up Boxing to Heal War’s Scars

Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)

In a makeshift boxing ring etched into the sand between the tens of displaced Palestinians in southern Gaza, a dozen young girls warmed up before delivering fierce blows at their coach's command.

Osama Ayub once ran a boxing club in Gaza City, in the north of the Palestinian territory, until it was destroyed in a strike along with his home during the war between Israel and Hamas.

After finding shelter in the southern city of Khan Younis, he opted to put his sporting skills at the service of displaced Gazans, crammed by the tens of thousands in tents and makeshift shelters.

"We decided to work inside the camp to offer the girls some psychological relief from the war", Ayub told AFP.

Behind him, some of the young athletes faced each other in the ring surrounded by cheering gymmates, while others trained on a punching bag.

"The girls have been affected by the war and the bombardments; some have lost their families or loved ones. They feel pain and want to release it, so they have found in boxing a way to express their emotions," said Ayub.

Ayub now runs these free training sessions for 45 boxers aged between 8 and 19 three times a week, with positive feedback from his students as well as from the community.

One of the youngsters, Ghazal Radwan, aged 14, hopes to become a champion and represent her country.

"I practice boxing to develop my character, release pent-up energy and to become a champion in the future, compete against world champions in other countries, and raise the Palestinian flag around the world", she told AFP.

- Call for aid -

One after the other, the girls trained with Ayub, shifting from right to left jabs, hooks and uppercuts at his command.

In war-devastated Gaza, where construction materials are scarce, Ayub had to improvise to build his small training facility.

"We brought wood and built a square boxing ring, but there are no mats or safety measures," he said.

He called on the international community to support the boxers and help them travel abroad to train, "to strengthen their confidence and offer them psychological support".

The strict blockade that Israel imposed on the Gaza Strip makes the reconstruction of sports facilities particularly complicated, as building materials are routinely rejected by Israeli officials.

The official Palestinian news agency Wafa reported in January that a shipment of artificial turf donated by China to Gaza's youth and sports council was not allowed in by Israel.

With medicine, food and fuel all in short supply, sports equipment comes much lower on the list of items entering the Palestinian territory.

Rimas, a 16-year-old boxer, said she and her friends continued "to practice boxing despite the war, the bombardments and the destruction".

"We, the girls who box, hope for your support, that you will bring us gloves and shoes. We train on sand and need mats and punching bags," she said in comments addressed to the international community.


Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?

Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
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Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?

Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 

As US military movements intensify in the Middle East and the possibility of strikes on Iran looms, Yemen’s Houthi group has continued military preparations, mobilizing fighters and establishing new weapons sites.

The Houthi mobilization comes at a time when the group is widely viewed as one of Iran’s most important regional arms for retaliation.

Although the Iran-backed group has not issued any official statement declaring its position on a potential US attack on Iran, its leaders have warned Washington against any military action and against bearing full responsibility for any escalation and its consequences.

They have hinted that any response would be handled in accordance with the group’s senior leadership's assessment, after evaluating developments and potential repercussions.

Despite these signals, some interpret the Houthis’ stance as an attempt to avoid drawing the attention of the current US administration, led by President Donald Trump, to the need for preemptive action in anticipation of a potential Houthi response.

The Trump administration previously launched a military campaign against the group in the spring of last year, inflicting heavy losses.

Islam al-Mansi, an Egyptian researcher specializing in Iranian affairs, said Iran may avoid burning all its cards unless absolutely necessary, particularly given US threats to raise the level of escalation should any Iranian military proxies intervene or take part in a confrontation.

Iran did not resort to using its military proxies during its confrontation with Israel or during a limited US strike last summer because it did not perceive an existential threat, al-Mansi said.

That calculation could change in the anticipated confrontation, potentially prompting Houthi intervention, including targeting US allies, interests, and military forces, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Al-Mansi added that although Iran previously offered, within a negotiating framework, to abandon its regional proxies, including the Houthis, this makes it more likely that Tehran would use them in retaliation, noting that Iran created these groups to defend its territory from afar.

Many intelligence reports suggest that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has discussed with the Houthis the activation of alternative support arenas in a potential US-Iran confrontation, including the use of cells and weapons not previously deployed.

Visible readiness

In recent days, Chinese media outlets cited an unnamed Houthi military commander as saying the group had raised its alert level and carried out inspections of missile launch platforms in several areas across Yemen, including the strategically important Red Sea region.

In this context, Yemeni political researcher Salah Ali Salah said the Houthis would participate in defending Iran against any US attacks, citing the group’s media rhetoric accompanying mass rallies, which openly supports Iran’s right to defend itself.

While this rhetoric maintains some ambiguity regarding Iran, it repeatedly invokes the war in Gaza and renews Houthi pledges to resume military escalation in defense of the besieged enclave’s population, Salah told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He noted that Iran would not have shared advanced and sophisticated military technologies with the Houthis without a high degree of trust in their ability to use them in Iran’s interest.

In recent months, following Israeli strikes on the unrecognized Houthi government and several of its leaders, hardline Houthi figures demonstrating strong loyalty to Iran have become more prominent.

On the ground, the group has established new military sites and moved equipment and weapons to new locations along and near the coast, alongside the potential use of security cells beyond Yemen’s borders.

Salah said that if the threat of a military strike on Iran escalates, the Iranian response could take a more advanced form, potentially including efforts to close strategic waterways, placing the Bab al-Mandab Strait within the Houthis’ target range.

Many observers have expressed concern that the Houthis may have transferred fighters and intelligence cells outside Yemen over recent years to target US and Western interests in the region.

Open options

After a ceasefire was declared in Gaza, the Houthis lost one of their key justifications for mobilizing fighters and collecting funds. The group has since faced growing public anger over its practices and worsening humanitarian conditions, responding with media messaging aimed at convincing audiences that the battle is not over and that further rounds lie ahead.

Alongside weekly rallies in areas under their control in support of Gaza, the Houthis have carried out attacks on front lines with Yemen’s internationally recognized government, particularly in Taiz province.

Some military experts describe these incidents as probing attacks, while others see them as attempts to divert attention from other activities.

In this context, Walid al-Abara, head of the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, said the Houthis entered a critical phase after the Gaza war ended, having lost one of the main justifications for their attacks on Red Sea shipping.

As a result, they may seek to manufacture new pretexts, including claims of sanctions imposed against them, to maintain media momentum and their regional role.

Al-Abara told Asharq Al-Awsat that the group has two other options. The first is redirecting its activity inward to strengthen its military and economic leverage, either to impose its conditions in any future settlement or to consolidate power.

The second is yielding to international and regional pressure and entering a negotiation track, particularly if sanctions intensify or its economic and military capacity declines.

According to an assessment by the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, widespread protests in Iran are increasingly pressuring the regime’s ability to manage its regional influence at the same pace as before, without dismantling its network of proxies.

This reality is pushing Tehran toward a more cautious approach, governed by domestic priorities and cost-benefit calculations, while maintaining a minimum level of external influence without broad escalation.

Within this framework, al-Abara said Iran is likely to maintain a controlled continuity in its relationship with the Houthis through selective support that ensures the group remains effective.

However, an expansion of protests or a direct military strike on Iran could open the door to a deeper Houthi repositioning, including broader political and security concessions in exchange for regional guarantees.