Syria, Türkiye Normalization Takes Shape along Aleppo-Latakia Highway

Children are seen at a refugee camp in Syria's Idlib on January 14. (EPA)
Children are seen at a refugee camp in Syria's Idlib on January 14. (EPA)
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Syria, Türkiye Normalization Takes Shape along Aleppo-Latakia Highway

Children are seen at a refugee camp in Syria's Idlib on January 14. (EPA)
Children are seen at a refugee camp in Syria's Idlib on January 14. (EPA)

Open and secret political and security contacts have expanded in recent days to choose the best path to normalize relations with Damascus.

Syria and Türkiye have held security meetings in the Latakia countryside with the aim of reopening the Aleppo-Latakia highway. A Kurdish delegation from Qamishli even visited the Syrian capital to feel out the limits of the Syrian-Turkish cooperation against them.

The United States has also been mediating between Ankara and the Kurds to deter a new Turkish incursion east of the Euphrates River. Iran, meanwhile, is trying to become involved in the Russian mediation between Damascus and Ankara.

Russia

The latest in the Russian efforts is President Vladimir Putin’s insistence on paving the way for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Syrian counterpart Bashar al-Assad to meet before Turkish presidential and parliamentary elections in May.

Syria’s national security bureau chief Ali Mamlouk and Turkish intelligence chief Hakan Fidan had already held talks. The Syrian, Turkish and Russian defense ministers also met. A meeting between the three countries’ foreign ministers was set to be held in the Russian capital, Moscow.

Moscow sought for the meeting to be held on January 11, but Ankara received “American advice” that it should not agree to attend before Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu visited Washington on January 18.

Damascus, for its part, was not willing to hold the meeting for the sake of holding it, but wanted clear outcomes to come of it.

This led to a series of additional contacts. Russia’s presidential envoy to Syria Alexander Lavrentiev visited Damascus for talks with Assad. Russia reiterated its desire to arrange a meeting between Assad and Erdogan, but the former tied such a meeting to Türkiye’s withdrawal from northern Syria or at least setting a timetable for the pullout.

Clearly, Damascus wants to claim some form of “symbolic achievement” before having Assad and Erdogan meet.

Ankara, for its part, informed mediators that its army will not withdraw from Syria “under any circumstance and even if the Americans pull out.” Such a position stands in contrast to its previous announcements when it used to tie it withdrawal to the political solution and the pullout of all foreign forces that entered Syria after 2011.

At this impasse, attention was shifted to the reopening of the Aleppo-Latakia highway, or M4. The route was included in de-escalation agreements reached between Moscow and Ankara over Aleppo. Talks over the highway included deploying Russian and Turkish patrols and establishing a safe zone on either side of it.

After three years, the patrols have since come to a halt and efforts to reopen the highway have stalled. Moscow is no longer exerting pressure on Ankara because it needs it in several other issues, including the war in Ukraine.

Syrian-Turkish security meetings have been held recently in Latakia’s Kasab area to reopen the highway. Türkiye has shown some flexibility in reopening it on condition that it maintain its control over it, while Syria maintains its sovereignty.

Kurdish concern

As Syria and Türkiye inch closer to normalizing their relations, Damascus again turned to the Kurds. Each side wants to feel out the respective party’s stance on the normalization. Indeed, a Kurdish delegation visited Damascus just days ago.

Russia had previously sponsored negotiations and delegations were formed, but the talks then came to a halt. Damascus now wants to feel out where the Kurds, who are allied to the US, stand, while the Kurds want to know the limits of the normalization between Damascus and Ankara.

The meetings were aimed at studying the implementation of the understanding that was signed between the two parties in wake of the sudden American troop withdrawal approved by former US President Donald Trump in late 2019. The agreement included the deployment of Syrian forces east of the Euphrates.

The Kurds are now eager to cooperate with Damascus if it means preventing a new Turkish offensive against them, while Damascus is more than ready to deal with them in their position of weakness.

American mediation

It is no secret that relations between Deputy Assistant to the US President and White House Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa Brett McGurk and Ankara are very bad. But a Gulf state recently hosted a secret meeting between the US official and Türkiye’s Fidan with aim of clearing the air.

What can be done to avert a new Turkish incursion east of the Euphrates? What can be done to meet some Turkish demands? What can be done to avert a catastrophe in the counter-terrorism efforts that are being carried out by the US-led anti-ISIS coalition that is partnered with the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)?

In wake of the secret meeting, US State Department Special Envoy to Syria Nicholas Granger carried out a series of secret visits to Ankara and Qamishli. Talks focused on the withdrawal of the Kurdish police, Asayish, 30 kilometers deep into Syrian territory away from the Turkish border or that they lay down their arms. They also tackled the re-formation of a local councils and return of Syrian refugees.

Meanwhile, Turkish FM Cavusoglu was keen on meeting United Nations envoy to Syria Geir Pedersen ahead of his trip to Washington to imply that he was interested in reaching a political solution in Syria.

At any rate, a breakthrough, if reached, has yet to be declared.

Türkiye has repeatedly said it had reached the limit of its patience and that it would take unilateral measures. The US has warned against any measure that would impact the SDF and the war on terror.

Iranian annoyance

Amid all these developments, Iran has expressed its annoyance with the Russian mediation between Damascus and Ankara for a number of reasons.

First, the mediation took place behind its back. In fact, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian complained of this in Damascus just days ago, revealing that he had learned of the Syrian-Turkish meetings through the media.

Second, Tehran believes that any progress in Syrian-Turkish ties may take place at the expense of Iran’s military and non-military role in Syria.

Third, the United Arab Emirates has joined efforts in Syria and offered to host or take part in the Syrian-Turkish-Russian meetings, including the upcoming trilateral summit.

Add to the above obstacles that led to the postponement of a visit by Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi to Damascus that was planned for late 2022.

Meanwhile, Damascus, which wants to stand on equal footing with its allies Moscow and Tehran, has expressed its disappointment with the continued Iranian arms shipments to Damascus International Airport that has been the target of a number of Israeli strikes.

It is also upset with the delay in the arrival of three Iranian oil shipments and with draft agreements that include “sovereign concessions” related to the economy and granting Iranians in Syria the same privileges as the Syrians themselves.

These issues were discussed during Abdollahian’s visit to Damascus and some breakthroughs were reached. Tehran pledged to send oil shipments and Damascus pledged to coordinate its normalization with Ankara with Iran. Preparations to arrange for Raisi’s visit to Damascus have resumed. Amid all this, pro-Iran factions shelled the positions of “America’s allies” in the region east of the Euphrates.

The outcomes of the above-mentioned secret and open meetings will emerge on the Aleppo-Latakia highway, the battlefields in northern and eastern Syria and in air raids. Meanwhile, the Syrian people, huddled in their homes and camps, are hoping for an improvement in their living and economic conditions.



Saudi Flag Narrative Centers on Justice, Security

Saudi flag’s profound symbolism reflects unity, justice, strength and prosperity (SPA)
Saudi flag’s profound symbolism reflects unity, justice, strength and prosperity (SPA)
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Saudi Flag Narrative Centers on Justice, Security

Saudi flag’s profound symbolism reflects unity, justice, strength and prosperity (SPA)
Saudi flag’s profound symbolism reflects unity, justice, strength and prosperity (SPA)

Ensuring a certain level of security is not difficult for any state, regardless of its system of governance. Security, understood here as the preservation of order, can exist under many political systems. History shows that numerous authoritarian governments have succeeded in imposing strict security on their societies.

The real question, however, lies not in the existence of security but in its nature and its source. The issue is whether the desired security is that of authority imposed by force, or that of justice arising from a system of values and a fair legal order.

Security under authoritarian systems is often superficial, enforced through mechanisms of control, surveillance and punishment. It is inherently fragile because it relies on fear rather than consent, and deterrence rather than justice. Such security remains vulnerable to disruption at the first shift in the balance of power or legitimacy, as many historical examples demonstrate.

By contrast, another form of security is more stable and enduring, the security that stems from justice. This emerges when society believes that the rule governing it is fair and that the authority enforcing it is subject to a higher reference rather than an unchecked will.

National flags often reflect a country’s identity, principles and values, as well as the orientation of its political or intellectual systems. They may also contain symbols carrying religious, historical or cultural significance.

The flag of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia stands apart not only for its color and symbols but also for its meanings and implications. It reflects the state’s deep-rooted history, embodies its identity and represents the values and principles on which it was founded.

Saudi Flag Day, observed annually on March 11, highlights the close bond between Saudis and their national banner and reflects their pride in their identity.

Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman bin Abdulaziz has said that celebrating Flag Day affirms pride in national identity and in the flag’s historical symbolism and deep meanings that embody the country’s constants and represent a source of pride in its history.

He has also said that the Saudi state was founded by its forefathers on the principles of monotheism, justice and unity under one banner, a foundation that brought security and prosperity.

Saudi researcher and historian Dr. Abdullah Al-Munif said the Saudi flag is not merely a sovereign symbol of the state but also an expression that carries deep significance for the state’s philosophy and vision for life and society.

“The green color, which symbolizes Islam and prosperity, reflects support for a state founded on an Islamic approach with a commitment to justice and to spreading security in its comprehensive sense,” he said.

“The phrase ‘There is no god but God, Muhammad is the Messenger of God’, inscribed in Arabic, highlights the enduring foundation upon which the state stands and affirms its commitment to an approach that does not deviate from this reference as a basic guide for governance and politics.”

He added that the sword, which symbolizes strength and the pursuit of justice, reflects the state’s effort to protect the path it believes is right, with the aim of spreading justice and establishing security across the country.

“These three elements are not merely formal components but form a precise equation linking justice and security in a cause-and-effect relationship,” he said.

“The Islamic approach represents the spiritual and social foundations of the state that seeks to achieve justice and stability, ensure security and provide an environment suitable for promoting what is right.”

In this sense, the Saudi flag becomes a symbol of the dynamic interaction among the components of the state. The state seeks to achieve security as a necessity for establishing and spreading what is right, while also pursuing justice and stability as the basis for comprehensive security and sustainable prosperity.

The Saudi flag can therefore be read historically as more than a sovereign symbol. It symbolizes the state’s vision. The three elements that compose it, the green color, the inscription and the sword, reflect a precise equation between justice and security in a cause-and-effect relationship.

Legal expert Dr. Fahd Al-Tarisi said the phrase at the center of the flag represents the system’s supreme reference.

“It is a clear declaration that the justice on which governance is based is not the product of a temporary political will but rests on a fixed religious reference,” he said.

“The presence of this phrase at the center of the flag therefore means that law and justice derive their source from a higher system of values rather than from political authority alone.”

He added that the sword placed beneath the phrase does not symbolize violence or domination but rather the authority to enforce justice.

“Every legal system needs power to protect it and ensure respect for it, otherwise it remains merely text,” he said. “The sword therefore symbolizes the power that protects the principle, not the power that replaces it.”

He said the placement of the sword beneath the phrase reflects a symbolic order in which power serves justice rather than replacing it.

The green color that fills the flag, historically associated in Islamic culture with calm, stability and reassurance, can symbolize the social security that emerges when justice prevails in political and legal systems.

In this reading, the symbolism of the Saudi flag presents a clear equation: the reference establishes justice, power protects that justice, and from this arises the security and stability of society.

This distinction highlights two types of security: the security of authority, imposed by force and often present in authoritarian systems, and the security of justice, which arises naturally when the rules governing society are fair and enjoy moral and legal legitimacy.

Within this framework, the symbolic structure of the Saudi flag presents a clear vision of the state. Security is not the starting point but the result. The cause that leads to it is justice protected by legitimate power within a stable reference.

In that sense, the flag becomes more than a national emblem. It becomes a visual expression of a philosophy of governance that sees true stability not as something built on fear but as the outcome of justice that produces security.

For Saudis, the flag reflects the needs and aspirations of the Saudi citizen, summarized in the values of justice, stability, security and prosperity.

In celebrating Flag Day, Saudis celebrate a nation that sees its strength in unity, a leadership that places service to its people among its top priorities, and a banner under which people and leadership have stood together for centuries.


Researcher Owns 100 Rare Flags From Saudi State Eras

Saudi researcher Adnan Al-Tarif poses with two Saudi state flags (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Saudi researcher Adnan Al-Tarif poses with two Saudi state flags (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Researcher Owns 100 Rare Flags From Saudi State Eras

Saudi researcher Adnan Al-Tarif poses with two Saudi state flags (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Saudi researcher Adnan Al-Tarif poses with two Saudi state flags (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Saudi Arabia marked Flag Day on March 11 for the fourth consecutive year, following a royal order issued on March 1, 2023, designating the date as an annual celebration of the national flag, whose current form was approved in 1937 by King Abdulaziz.

Saudi researcher Adnan Al-Tarif, who owns around 100 flags, says one of the most notable pieces in his collection is the original banner of the First Saudi State, along with dozens of other flags used during later phases of the Saudi state across its three historical eras.

According to historical sources, the banner that Al-Tarif proudly owns — and keeps in a bank vault to protect it from damage, loss, or theft — was “a green banner made of khazz and ibraism (the finest types of silk), bearing the phrase ‘There is no god but Allah, Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah’ in Arabic, and attached to a simple pole.”

The banner remained in that form during the reigns of Imam Muhammad bin Saud, founder of the First Saudi State, followed by his son, Imam Abdulaziz bin Muhammad, his son, Imam Saud bin Abdulaziz, and his son, Imam Abdullah bin Saud.

A banner that was never defeated

Al-Tarif said the first Saudi banner was raised in 1727 by the founding imam Muhammad bin Saud, whose rule lasted 40 years. The banner was either carried by him or entrusted to one of his sons.

Citing the historian Ibn Bishr, Al-Tarif said that Imam Abdulaziz bin Muhammad, the second ruler of the First Saudi State, and his son, Imam Saud, would send messengers to tribal leaders specifying a date and meeting point at a particular water source. The banner would be raised there in advance, and no tribal chief would fail to attend.

Ibn Bishr also wrote that Imam Saud “was granted success in his campaigns, and no banner of his was ever defeated.”

When Ibn Bishr described the life of Imam Turki bin Abdullah, founder of the Second Saudi State, he said that, when preparing for a campaign, Turki would write to the princes of towns and tribal leaders, specifying a time and place for assembly.

Military equipment, army supplies, and horse fodder would be sent out 15 days before departure. The banner would then be raised near the palace gate a day or two before the campaign began.

Imam Turki ordered the banner to be carried ahead of him, and his son Faisal later followed the same system of presenting or raising the banner before the palace.

Three centuries of development

Al-Tarif said the Saudi flag — also referred to as the banner or bayraq — has flown in green for three centuries, passing through several stages before settling into its final form in the later years of King Abdulaziz’s reign.

He also cited accounts from travelers and Orientalists who wrote about the Saudi banner.

During the height of the British-French rivalry, Domingo Badía y Leblich, a Spanish traveler later revealed to be a spy, pretended to convert to Islam and traveled under the name Ali Bey al-Abbasi to study the Saudi state.

He arrived in Makkah in January 1807, traveling from Morocco through North Africa, and witnessed the entry of Imam Saud’s army into the city.

He recorded that 45,000 followers of Saud, dressed in the garments of pilgrimage, entered to perform the rites, led by a green flag embroidered with large white letters reading “There is no god but Allah, Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah.”

Meanwhile, Swiss traveler Johann Ludwig Burckhardt, who adopted the name Ibrahim Abdullah after converting to Islam, wrote in observations from his travels in the East around 1810 about the military affairs of Imam Saud bin Abdulaziz bin Muhammad bin Saud and his authority across the Arabian Peninsula.

He noted that each prince had his own banner, and that Saud had several.

A new form of the flag

Al-Tarif said King Abdulaziz initially used the same banner employed during the first and second Saudi states before introducing modifications.

Writer Amin Al-Rihani recorded that the banner carried by King Abdulaziz early in his reign had a white section near the pole and a green section, and was square in shape, bearing the phrase “There is no god but Allah, Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah” in Arabic, with two crossed swords above it.

Its design later changed to include one sword beneath the inscription.

In 1925, King Abdulaziz ordered the creation of a new flag design. In 1937, the Shura Council approved official dimensions of 150 centimeters in length and 100 centimeters in width.

In the same year, decisions were issued concerning official flags, including those of the king, crown prince, army, air force, internal flag, royal naval flag, and merchant naval flag.

In 1952, the Shura Council issued decisions introducing other measurements and modifications. In 1973, the Council of Ministers approved the national flag law.

Later, during the reign of King Fahd, the Basic Law of Governance issued in 1991 defined the nature of the flag: green in color, with a width equal to two-thirds of its length, bearing the phrase “There is no god but Allah, Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah” with a sword beneath it.

A unique case

Al-Tarif said the symbolism of the current flag reflects guidance, justice, strength, growth, and prosperity.

The Islamic declaration of faith symbolizes the message of peace and Islam upon which the kingdom was founded. The sword represents strength, unity, wisdom, and security. The green color reflects the banner of Islam and symbolizes peace, generosity, tolerance, and water, while white symbolizes purity associated with Saudi Arabia.

He said the Saudi flag is unique, as it is the only flag that is never lowered to half-mast during mourning or disasters, and it cannot be used for advertising or commercial trademarks.

The flag must not touch the ground or water, be taken into impure places, or be sat upon. It also does not bow to guests during honor-guard ceremonies or mourning periods, according to Article 16 of the flag law, which also sets penalties for violations.

Families who carried the banner

In the First Saudi State, the banner was carried by Ibrahim bin Tuq and Abdullah Abu Nahiyah, who was killed during the siege of Diriyah in 1818.

In the Second Saudi State, it was carried by Al-Humaidi bin Salama, Saleh bin Hadyan, and Ibrahim Al-Dhafiri.

Under King Abdulaziz, the first to carry the banner was Abdul Latif Al-Maashouq during the recapture of Riyadh in 1902. He later took part in subsequent battles and was killed in the Battle of Bukayriyah in 1904.

His son Mansour Al-Maashouq then carried the banner and was killed in the same battle.

Afterward, Abdulrahman bin Mutrif and his sons assumed the role.

To this day, the responsibility of carrying the banner has been entrusted to the Al-Mutrif family, although many individuals and families have been honored to carry the Saudi flag in various battles and locations.

Sewing and calligraphy

Regarding the making of the flag, Al-Tarif cited historian Abdulrahman Al-Ruwaished, who wrote that sewing and writing the flag were entrusted to individuals from well-known families in Riyadh, including Abdullah bin Mohammed bin Shaheen and Saad bin Saeed.

Bin Saeed handled the preparation of the materials used for the flag, though he did not personally sew it.

Some documents indicate that King Abdulaziz tasked Sheikh Abdulrahman Al-Tubaishi with purchasing and securing certain materials for the banner.

Later in his reign, flags were manufactured in several countries using fabric-on-fabric techniques in the United States, Pakistan, and some Arab countries.

Among the earliest calligraphers of the Saudi flag during King Abdulaziz’s era was Sheikh Omar Asim Al-Hasani, from Al-Jumum in Wadi Fatimah near Makkah, who had worked in Kuwait at Al-Mubarakiyah School and later became its director.

He also wrote the script for the old Kuwaiti flag bearing the word “Kuwait.”

He was asked to inscribe the Saudi flag around 1911.

When King Abdulaziz ordered the opening of the Kiswah factory for the Kaaba in 1926, one of the first workers was calligrapher Abdul Rahim Amin Abdullah Bukhari, who was tasked with writing the inscriptions on the Kaaba’s covering and designing the calligraphy for its door.

He was also asked to write the Saudi flag and its decorative elements in Arabic Thuluth script.

Rare collections

Al-Tarif said one of the most notable parts of his collection is Saudi flags.

“I thank God that among my most prominent possessions are Saudi flags. I own more than 100 old and rare flags of different sizes, shapes, materials, and historical periods, including flags from the First and Second Saudi States that were used during campaigns to establish unity and security in this blessed land,” he said.

He said he also collected flags used during events attended by King Abdulaziz, including flags used on the king’s car.

His collection includes flags from the era of King Saud, as well as flags used during King Faisal’s visit to the United States in 1945, and others from the reigns of King Khalid and King Fahd during foreign visits.

Among the most important items he owns is the flag placed between King Fahd and King Salman bin Abdulaziz during a ceremony honoring King Saud when he assumed power in 1953.

Al-Tarif said he documented the flags through photographs and examined them at major international centers to verify their authenticity. They were also verified by individuals historically tasked with carrying the banner, including members of the Al-Mutrif family, as well as through the finials placed atop flagpoles.

He said he owns more than 10 finials made of silver, copper, and other metals used during the reign of King Abdulaziz, along with a rare document stamped by King Abdulaziz seven years after entering Riyadh, related to details about the Saudi flag.

Museums and heritage

Al-Tarif said that during his research career, he also established three private museums dedicated to camels, horses, and falcons, containing rare pieces, some of which are more than 300 years old.

He has also collected postage stamps related to these subjects from countries around the world, as well as newspaper articles published since 1850, photographs dating back more than 100 years, and museum artifacts, including utensils, incense burners, coffee pots, clocks, and license plates from the reigns of King Abdulaziz, King Saud, King Faisal, and King Khalid.

His collection also includes telephones used in royal palaces from the era of the founding king through later Saudi monarchs.

Diplomatic tensions over the flag

Al-Tarif also recounts an incident involving Saudi Arabia’s refusal to lower its flag following the death of King Faisal I of Iraq, which angered the British.

He said that after Sheikh Ibrahim bin Muammar was appointed Saudi minister plenipotentiary to Iraq in 1923, shortly after the Saudi legation opened in Baghdad, the appointment reflected the Saudi king’s confidence in his abilities.

Large Saudi communities lived in Iraq at the time, and Arab tribes inhabited the border regions between the two countries. Among his duties were caring for Saudi nationals, overseeing the implementation of newly signed border agreements, and managing arrangements for pilgrims traveling to perform the Hajj.


Tracing the US Military’s Learning Curve on Fighting Iran’s Drones: What to Know

A visitor of an exhibition takes a photo of parts of an Iranian made unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) Shahed-131/136, which was launched on Ukrainian territories, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Kyiv, Ukraine June 27, 2025. (Reuters)
A visitor of an exhibition takes a photo of parts of an Iranian made unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) Shahed-131/136, which was launched on Ukrainian territories, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Kyiv, Ukraine June 27, 2025. (Reuters)
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Tracing the US Military’s Learning Curve on Fighting Iran’s Drones: What to Know

A visitor of an exhibition takes a photo of parts of an Iranian made unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) Shahed-131/136, which was launched on Ukrainian territories, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Kyiv, Ukraine June 27, 2025. (Reuters)
A visitor of an exhibition takes a photo of parts of an Iranian made unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) Shahed-131/136, which was launched on Ukrainian territories, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Kyiv, Ukraine June 27, 2025. (Reuters)

The Iran war quickly tested America's ability to combat the swarms of cheap drones that have become a staple of the modern battlefield after Ukraine and Russia demonstrated how effective they could be.

Iran launched so many drones across the region at once that some slipped through the defenses, including a strike that killed six US soldiers at an operations center in Kuwait.

Experts and defense leaders stress that the US military has been able to shoot down the majority of Iran’s drones and take out much of its drone capabilities. But critics said too often missiles that cost millions of dollars were used to down small drones that cost tens of thousands.

The US is bringing an anti-drone system to the Middle East that has been tested in Ukraine, which had proposed a deal with the US last year to offer its drone expertise. Such an agreement is yet to be made, and American forces are facing a steep learning curve as they scramble to deploy more cost-efficient defenses against Iran's Shahed drones, which fly low and buzz like mopeds before smashing into their targets.

“We are crushing them — there’s no doubt about it — but if even one drone gets through our defenses and hurts an American, for me, that is enough to warrant fixing the problem,” said drone warfare expert Brett Velicovich, who operated Predator drones in the US Army and co-founded a drone manufacturing company.

Here’s what to know about Iran's drones and efforts by the US to shoot them down:

US says it's attacking the source of Iran's drones

Gen. Dan Caine, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Tuesday that the number of drones launched by Iran had fallen 83% since the war began on Feb. 28. Iran launched more than 2,000 drones in the days after the initial US and Israeli attacks, other top military officials said.

Caine told reporters that US forces were striking military and industrial targets in Iran “to deny them the ability to continue to generate those one-way attack drones.”

Hundreds — if not thousands — of Patriot missiles have been used by the US and its allies across the Middle East to defend against Iranian missiles and drones. But now the US seems to be relying more on attack helicopters and machine guns as a more cost-effective way to shoot down Iranian drones, experts say, and President Donald Trump suggested as much.

“Now we have low-cost interceptors effectively combating Iranian drones,” the Republican president said Monday.

The military also is bringing in an American anti-drone system proven to work in Ukraine against Russian drones, which are similar to Iran's, The Associated Press has reported. Known as Merops, the system flies drones against drones, fits in the back of a pickup truck and uses artificial intelligence to navigate when electronic communications are jammed.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told journalists on Tuesday that his country proposed a deal with the US last year to provide cutting-edge and battle-tested drone technology, including interceptor drones.

“I do not know whether they refused it. I’m not sure, but it was definitely postponed,” Zelenskyy said, adding that Ukraine still hopes to sign such a deal.

Experts say the US military has been slow to overhaul its arsenal and tactics to respond to the new threat from fleets of drones.

“This is going to be a big wake-up call for how the US military defends its citizens and fights wars forever,” Velicovich said. “Because it’s sort of like we’re the best military on the planet, but stuff’s still getting by us.”

Travis Metz, the Pentagon’s drone dominance program manager, told senators last week that the Defense Department has committed $1.1 billion to buy drone systems over the next 18 months, including 30,000 small, one-way attack drones to be delivered to military units over the next five months.

US is leaning on knowledge from Ukraine

Pentagon officials have conceded in classified briefings to Congress that they initially struggled to stop the waves of Iranian drones, leaving US service members and allies vulnerable. High-profile targets like a Dubai skyscraper and airports across the region have been struck.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said last week that “thousands of Iranian missiles and drones have been intercepted and vaporized.” But he conceded, “this does not mean we can stop everything.”

Available in big numbers, the Shahed drones have shown their capability to oversaturate air defenses and inflict painful damage. And while the Shahed flies slowly at 180 kph (just over 110 mph), it can range as far as 2,000 kilometers (1,240 miles) and carry a relatively big load of 40 kilograms (88 pounds) of explosives.

The US military has typically operated complicated reusable drones that fire off missiles and return to base, such as the Predator. But Ukraine has shown that relying on large numbers of cheap drones, which carry their payloads directly into the target and become warheads themselves, can be extremely effective.

“There is going to be a learning curve, but the more that the Ukrainians can provide us in terms of guidance and expertise I think the better off we all are,” said Brandon Blackburn, who is a former CIA targeting officer who conducted counterterrorism operations throughout the Middle East.

Ryan Brobst, a scholar focused on US defense strategy at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a hawkish Washington think tank, said social media posts by the US military and allies have indicated the use of relatively cheaper weapons, like aircraft machine guns or laser-guided rockets, to destroy drones in Iran.

“The United States has made significant strides in counter-UAS warfare over the past few years,” Brobst said, referring to unmanned aerial systems. “But it’s also true that we can still learn more from Ukraine.”

Looking ahead to focusing on the ‘cheap stuff’

Northwestern University professor William Reno, who researches Ukraine’s military training for the Pentagon and visits the country regularly, noted that Ukraine has found cheap ways to shoot down drones with .50-caliber machine guns mounted in the back of a pickup or other fast-moving drones.

“The long-run effect will probably be that it’s going to focus minds wonderfully on thinking more seriously about cheap stuff that comes through the air,” Reno said.

For decades, US military strategy has counted on dominating the airspace above any conflict it got involved in, but the focus was primarily at higher altitudes where fighters and bombers fly. Now drones will force the military to think about what it does to control low-altitude airspace.

“Ukraine was the wake-up call,” Reno said.

The US military already has some programs centered on inexpensive drones, according to Jerry McGinn, a former Defense Department official who was focused on manufacturing and industrial base policy and is now a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

One of those programs is the Low-cost Uncrewed Combat Attack System, or LUCAS, which American forces are using in Iran. The US military said in a post on X that the American-made, one-way attack drones were “modeled after Iran’s Shahed drones.”

“It’s not public on how effective they’ve been or how they were used,” McGinn said. “But there’s very much a focus in the US of learning from the experience in Ukraine.”