Quake Pushes Forward Normalization Efforts with Syria as Assad Heads to Oman

15 February 2023, Syria, Damascus: A photo released by the official Syrian Arab news agency (SANA) on 15 February shows Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (R) speaking with Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman al-Safadi. (SANA/dpa)
15 February 2023, Syria, Damascus: A photo released by the official Syrian Arab news agency (SANA) on 15 February shows Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (R) speaking with Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman al-Safadi. (SANA/dpa)
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Quake Pushes Forward Normalization Efforts with Syria as Assad Heads to Oman

15 February 2023, Syria, Damascus: A photo released by the official Syrian Arab news agency (SANA) on 15 February shows Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (R) speaking with Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman al-Safadi. (SANA/dpa)
15 February 2023, Syria, Damascus: A photo released by the official Syrian Arab news agency (SANA) on 15 February shows Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (R) speaking with Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman al-Safadi. (SANA/dpa)

The earthquake that struck Syria and Türkiye two weeks ago, that left tens of thousands of people dead and left devastation in its wake, has raised several questions and critical challenges in Arab and western circles over how to respond to the catastrophe. This includes the possibility of distinguishing between Syria and the its ruling regime. It has also pushed forward efforts to normalize relations between Damascus with the Arab world and West.

The first global reaction to the humanitarian disaster was sympathy with the Syrian and Turkish people. It was nearly impossible for any country to express sympathy with Ankara without sympathizing with Damascus as well. This is a humanitarian, not a political disaster. The earthquake is not a civil war.

The main predicament was that the international recognition of the Turkish government does not extend to the same extent to the Damascus government. Yes, the latter does still represent Syria and Syrian “government” is increasingly replacing “regime” in foreign political rhetoric.

This government, however, remains suspended from the Arab League and continues to be boycotted by influential Arab and western countries. It is also still weighed down by a lengthy list of economic sanctions, accusations and damning reports against state institutions and figures over their handling of the crisis since the eruption of the protests in 2011.

The regions that were most affected by the earthquake lie outside of government control. The quake did also strike some government regions in Aleppo, Hama and Latakia.

Devastated and forgotten Syria

Syria has been abandoned and forgotten since the eruption of the war in Ukraine nearly a year ago. It has dropped from international and regional priorities. The earthquake, however, has again turned attention to the country.

A series of political contacts have been held between concerned Arab and non-Arab countries. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has also received a series of telephone calls that would have been unheard of in recent years. He was contacted by Egyptian President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi and was visited in Damascus by Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman al-Safadi. It was the first visit by a Jordanian FM to Syria in years.

On the diplomatic levels, western countries demanded the adoption of a new United Nations resolution that would reopen land borders between Türkiye and opposition-held Syrian regions. Moscow had initially mulled an exchange that would include its approval of the proposal in return for increasing western funding of “early recovery” projects in Syria.

Arab and international contacts with Damascus, however, yielded a deal: another indirect exchange. Assad continues to underline “Syria’s sovereignty over all its territories” in return for his agreement to reopen two more border crossings between Türkiye and northern Syria for three months. He agreed to the delivery of aid from government-held regions to opposition-held Idlib.

Washington also agreed to suspending some sanctions related to bank transfers for six months so as to facilitate humanitarian aid.

Further official contacts and visits between Arab officials and Assad culminated in more leniency: more aid and planes loaded with relief were allowed in Syria without extensive searches. Official field visits were carried out to quake-stricken regions. Official statements were delivered from those regions. The remarks were written on a prepared document and delivered before the cameras. They spoke of condoling the Syrians. They spoke of dialogue and expressed gratitude to “Arab brothers and friends.”

Absent from the remarks were Idlib, Hama, Aleppo and Latakia that were struck by the quake. Omitted were also mentions of “allies”, meaning Iran and Russia, and “occupation”, meaning the United States and Türkiye.

Normalization

The earthquake had mobilized normalization efforts. Arab countries that have normalized ties or were seeking to have used the disaster to intensify efforts through a series of telephone calls and visits. Assad will visit Oman and then the United Arab Emirates in the coming hours.

Some Arab countries have maintained their position towards Damascus that offers humanitarian aid to the victims and ensuring that conditions for the Syrian refugees’ return home are provided. At the same time, they continue to remind the world of Tehran’s ongoing alliance with Damascus, noting Iranian Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani’s visit to Aleppo in wake of the earthquake. He was the first official on the scene, beating the Syrians.

In Europe, the quake has exposed divisions over how to approach Damascus. Countries, such as Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Austria, that used to call for accepting the “status quo” in recent years, now believe that they are in a stronger position to press this demand.

They are now demanding that Europe reconsider its “three nos” in Syria: opposition to normalization, reconstruction and lifting of sanctions before progress is made in the political process.

Other European countries and the US have held coordination meetings in recent days to counter this argument: yes, the earthquake resulted in a humanitarian disaster that demands a response in Syria and Türkiye, but this does not mean abandoning the “three nos” and the political process.

The European division was evident in the position on a conference on Syria and Türkiye’s reconstruction that was called for by the European Union to be held late next month. Countries that have normalized ties with Damascus have called for the Syrian government to be invited and for political agendas to be dropped. They have also demanded calling off a donor conference that is set for Brussels in June. These countries have also said they were prepared to carry out direct unilateral moves with Damascus away from European consensus.

Several factors will determine how Arab and western forces approach Damascus in the coming months. This in turn will determine balances of power and alliances in Syria. One critical factor is how relief aid and funds will be delivered to the devastated region and just how committed various parties are to pledges made behind closed doors. These issues will gain significance in the coming weeks as the extent of the tragedy caused by the earthquake becomes clearer.



From Haftar to Dbeibah: The Map of Control and Influence in Libya

Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
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From Haftar to Dbeibah: The Map of Control and Influence in Libya

Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 

Libya, once held together under the iron grip of Muammar Gaddafi, exploded into chaos after his ouster in 2011. Fourteen years later, the country remains fractured, yet a new map of military, political, and territorial control has emerged. It reflects not stability but shifting alliances, entrenched divisions, and the tug-of-war between rival powers vying for supremacy, from Khalifa Haftar in the east to Abdul Hamid Dbeibah in the west.

In 2014, General Khalifa Haftar, a former Gaddafi-era officer, launched a campaign to rebuild Libya’s disbanded army. As Tripoli and other western cities welcomed Islamist factions and extremist militias, Haftar began consolidating forces under a new banner -the Libyan National Army. Backed by the eastern-based House of Representatives, he was formally appointed commander-in-chief in 2015 by Speaker Aguila Saleh and was promoted to Field Marshal the following year.

Haftar’s supporters, such as Khaled Al-Turjuman, view this effort as a revival of the national military. What began as a force of just over 300 personnel has reportedly grown to more than 120,000 officers and soldiers. A recent military parade in Benghazi put this strength on full display, showcasing a broad arsenal of advanced weaponry. Haftar took the opportunity to issue a warning to rivals: “In the critical moment, the army will have the final word.”

Haftar’s influence extends beyond eastern Libya. His forces have consolidated control from Benghazi through Sirte and Jufra in the center, down to the southern borders with Sudan, Chad, Niger, and Algeria. One of the most strategically vital areas under his command is the oil crescent along the northeastern coast, encompassing Ras Lanuf, Sidra, Brega, and Zueitina, essential hubs for Libya’s oil exports.

Since 2019, Haftar has shifted his focus further south, targeting key cities such as Sabha, Brak al-Shati, and Ubari, and extending his reach to the far southwest in Ghat. He also controls southeastern border areas like Kufra, Al-Jawf, Al-Uwaynat, and the Tibesti Mountains near Chad. This southern push, some analysts argue, is part of a calculated strategy to project power beyond the traditional east-west divide. While Tripoli remains home to key sovereign institutions such as the Central Bank and National Oil Corporation, Haftar’s growing territorial grip has led critics to accuse him of attempting to militarize the state.

Military analyst Adel Abdul Kafi notes that most of Libya’s southern borders are now under Haftar’s effective control. He also points to a US-backed initiative involving joint forces from the east and west to secure Libya’s frontiers and coastlines.

Control over Libya’s energy resources remains a central pillar of Haftar’s power. Beyond the oil ports along the coast, he oversees several major oilfields in the south. The Sharara field in Ubari, producing approximately 315,000 barrels per day, and the El Feel (Elephant) field, with around 70,000 barrels daily, are among the most significant. Though these fields are managed by the National Oil Corporation headquartered in Tripoli, protection on the ground often comes from a patchwork of facility guards and local militias -- some loyal to Haftar, others to Dbeibah, and some switching sides as needed.

Haftar commands a network of military bases that support his campaigns in the east, center, and south. These include the Jufra Airbase, used as a launchpad during his failed 2019 offensive on Tripoli; Al-Khadim (also known as Al-Kharouba), where drone operations have been reported; Al-Abrag and Gamal Abdel Nasser airbases in the east; the Tamanhent base near Sabha; and Brak Al-Shati, which secures critical southern supply lines. Another strategic base, Ma’tan al-Sarra near Kufra, is rumored to host Russian forces, giving Moscow a potential gateway to the African Sahel.

Haftar’s military strength is matched by political clout. Though the eastern-based government of Osama Hammad is not internationally recognized, it operates with Haftar’s backing and funds development projects through the Libya Development and Reconstruction Fund, headed by Qassem Haftar, the commander’s son. Despite their expired mandates, the House of Representatives and the High Council of State continue to pass legislation and negotiate over the formation of a new government—deepening Libya’s institutional deadlock.

The Presidential Council, headed by Mohamed al-Menfi, was established under the 2020 Geneva agreement and holds formal international legitimacy. However, its actual power is limited. Though it is nominally the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, internal divisions and political agreements strip it of much of its authority. Even in the west, where it is based, the Council is overshadowed by the Government of National Unity under Abdul Hamid Dbeibah.

Dbeibah’s legitimacy has come under increasing scrutiny, especially after violent clashes erupted in Tripoli in May, sparked by the killing of militia leader Abdul Ghani Al-Kikli (Ghneiwa). These confrontations exposed the fragility of the security landscape in the capital and significantly weakened Dbeibah’s position. Though his term officially ended after being appointed in early 2021, he refuses to step down without elections, leaning on continued international support.

Despite controlling public spending and state institutions, Dbeibah’s grip on security is largely dependent on a volatile network of militias. Previously aligned with powerful groups like the Stability Support Apparatus and the Special Deterrence Force, Dbeibah has since fallen out with many of these factions. Following Ghneiwa’s death, he disbanded the SSA and entered into open conflict with Abdul Rauf Kara’s Deterrence Force, escalating tensions across Tripoli.

Today, Dbeibah relies primarily on the 444th Combat Brigade, led by Major General Mahmoud Hamza, who also heads Military Intelligence in western Libya. He is supported by the Joint Operations Force in Misrata and other militia groups, including Battalion 55 under Muammar Al-Dawi. These forces benefit from extensive support from Türkiye, which provides Bayraktar TB2 drones, limited radar systems, and military training facilities under prior agreements signed with former Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj.

Western Libya’s military infrastructure includes several important bases. Al-Watiya Airbase, southwest of Tripoli near the Tunisian border, is vital for control over the western region. Mitiga Airbase in Tripoli, currently controlled by the Deterrence Force, serves as a civilian and military airport. Abu Sitta Naval Base in Tripoli functions as the headquarters of the General Staff, with strong Turkish naval ties. Misrata Airbase, among the country’s most fortified, hosts Turkish personnel and hardware. Other key sites include Yarmouk Camp in Tripoli -- now reportedly housing Syrian mercenaries --April 7 Camp in Bab Ben Ghashir, and the Khums Naval Base near the city of Khums.

Tripoli remains the nerve center of Libya’s institutional framework, hosting the Unity Government, the Presidential Council, the High Council of State, the Central Bank, and the National Oil Corporation. Yet, control over western Libya’s border regions with Tunisia, Algeria, and Niger remains tenuous. In areas like Ubari, Ghat, and Murzuq -home to Tuareg and Tebu communities - authority shifts frequently among competing forces.

The frontline between the rival eastern and western coalitions lies just west of Sirte. Haftar’s forces control the city, while Dbeibah’s militias are stationed in its outskirts, near Misrata. Buwairat al-Husun marks the main demarcation line. Periodic troop mobilizations and skirmishes in the area fuel ongoing fears of a new confrontation.