Türkiye’s Kilicdaroglu May Struggle to Close Gap on Erdogan

Kemal Kilicdaroglu, presidential candidate of Türkiye’s main opposition alliance, speaks onstage at the Republican People's Party (CHP) headquarters on election night in Ankara, Türkiye, May 15, 2023. (Reuters)
Kemal Kilicdaroglu, presidential candidate of Türkiye’s main opposition alliance, speaks onstage at the Republican People's Party (CHP) headquarters on election night in Ankara, Türkiye, May 15, 2023. (Reuters)
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Türkiye’s Kilicdaroglu May Struggle to Close Gap on Erdogan

Kemal Kilicdaroglu, presidential candidate of Türkiye’s main opposition alliance, speaks onstage at the Republican People's Party (CHP) headquarters on election night in Ankara, Türkiye, May 15, 2023. (Reuters)
Kemal Kilicdaroglu, presidential candidate of Türkiye’s main opposition alliance, speaks onstage at the Republican People's Party (CHP) headquarters on election night in Ankara, Türkiye, May 15, 2023. (Reuters)

With the Turkish economy in trouble and six political parties campaigning for him, Kemal Kilicdaroglu had been oozing confidence ahead of elections on Sunday, predicting victory and a new "spring" after Recep Tayyip Erdogan's two decades in power.

But his hopes of leading Türkiye into a new era suffered a setback as the first round of the presidential election showed Erdogan with a lead that may prove difficult to overcome ahead of a runoff on May 28.

The head of Türkiye’s biggest opposition party, the mild-mannered Kilicdaroglu has carried the hopes of those Turkish voters desperate to see an end to Erdogan's increasingly authoritarian rule.

While lacking Erdogan's charisma, he has sought to rally voters with an inclusive platform and promises of a democratic reset for the country of 85 million, including a return to the parliamentary system of government and independence for a judiciary critics say Erdogan has used to crack down on dissent.

He has also promised an end to the unorthodox economic policies which Erdogan's critics say are to blame for dizzying inflation and a cost-of-living crisis that has sapped his popularity, and somewhat smoother relations with the West.

Kilicdaroglu, 74, has shown no sign of yielding following Sunday's first round results, accusing Erdogan's AK Party of interfering with the counting and reporting of results. The AK Party has denied this.

"Despite all his slanders and insults, Erdogan did not get the result he expected," Kilicdaroglu told supporters as the results came in.

"The election is not won on the balcony," he said, referring to a celebratory address Erdogan delivered to his supporters from his party's headquarters.

"If our nation says there's to be a 'second round', so be it. We will definitely win this election in the second round. Everyone will see it."

No clear vision?

Erdogan led with 49.5% of the vote on Sunday - short of the 50% needed to win in the first round. Kilicdaroglu got 45%.

Kilicdaroglu's chances may now hinge on an endorsement from Sinan Ogan, a nationalist who finished third with 5.2%.

But Ogan has said he can only support Kilicdaroglu in the runoff if he agrees to offer no concessions to the pro-Kurdish HDP party, which endorsed Kilicdaroglu for president although it is not part of the opposition alliance.

Detractors say Kilicdaroglu - who is scorned by Erdogan after suffering repeated election defeats as chair of the Republican People's Party (CHP) - lacks his opponent's power to rally audiences and fails to offer a clear vision for a post-Erdogan era.

He has been hoping to build on the opposition's 2019 triumph when the CHP defeated Erdogan's ruling AK Party in Istanbul and other big cities in local elections, thanks to support from other opposition party voters.

Kilicdaroglu sought to rally Turks of different stripes into an alliance including nationalists, Islamists, secularists and liberals. Critics have questioned whether he could hold together such an alliance in the event of victory.

Before entering politics, Kilicdaroglu worked in the finance ministry and then chaired Türkiye’s Social Insurance Institution for most of the 1990s. In speeches, Erdogan frequently disparages his performance in that role.

A former economist, he became a member of parliament in 2002 when Erdogan's AKP first swept to power, representing the center-left CHP, a party established by modern Türkiye’s founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk which has struggled to reach beyond its secularist grassroots toward conservatives.

However, he has spoken in recent years of a desire to heal old wounds with devout Muslims and Kurds.

Kilicdaroglu rose to prominence as the CHP's anti-graft campaigner, appearing on TV to brandish dossiers that led to high-profile resignations. A year after losing a mayoral run in Istanbul, he was elected unopposed as party leader in 2010.

His election fueled party hopes of a new start, but support for the CHP has since failed to surpass about 25%. Erdogan's AK party polled 43% in the last parliamentary elections of 2018.

Still, some view Kilicdaroglu as having quietly reformed the party and sidelined hardcore "Kemalists" espousing a rigid version of the ideas of Ataturk, while promoting members seen as more closely aligned with European social democratic values.

Critics say he has failed to bring flexibility to a static CHP and, in the end, imposed himself as presidential candidate over others who polled better head-to-head against Erdogan.

Born in the eastern Tunceli province, Kilicdaroglu is an Alevi, a minority group that follows a faith drawing on Shiite Muslim, Sufi and Anatolian folk traditions.

Nicknamed by Turkish media as "Gandhi Kemal" because of a passing resemblance with his slight, bespectacled appearance, he captured the public imagination in 2017 when he launched his 450 km "March for Justice" from Ankara to Istanbul over the arrest of a CHP deputy.



Yemeni Platform Warns of Houthis Expanding Influence to Horn of Africa

Yemenis lift placards and flags during a rally in the Houthi-controlled capital Sanaa in solidarity with Palestinians on July 26, 2024, amid the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip between Israel and the Palestinian Hamas movement. (AFP)
Yemenis lift placards and flags during a rally in the Houthi-controlled capital Sanaa in solidarity with Palestinians on July 26, 2024, amid the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip between Israel and the Palestinian Hamas movement. (AFP)
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Yemeni Platform Warns of Houthis Expanding Influence to Horn of Africa

Yemenis lift placards and flags during a rally in the Houthi-controlled capital Sanaa in solidarity with Palestinians on July 26, 2024, amid the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip between Israel and the Palestinian Hamas movement. (AFP)
Yemenis lift placards and flags during a rally in the Houthi-controlled capital Sanaa in solidarity with Palestinians on July 26, 2024, amid the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip between Israel and the Palestinian Hamas movement. (AFP)

A Yemeni platform focused on organized crime and money-laundering, PTOC, has warned of the dangers of the Iran-backed Houthi militias expanding their activities and influence to the Horn of Africa.

In a report, it said the militias were actively seeking to expand their operations there with the direct supervision of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and in coordination with the Lebanese Hezbollah militia, which is also backed by Tehran.

This is the first time that a report is filed about the Houthi plans in the Horn of Africa.

Asharq Al-Awsat received a copy of the report that details the Houthis’ expansionist plans at Iran’s direction. It discusses the Houthis’ smuggling and armament operations, recruitment and training of Africans, and identifies the officials responsible for the militias’ project in the Horn of Africa.

Overseeing the foreign expansion are leading Houthi officials Abdulwahed Abu Ras, Al-Hassan al-Marrani and Abu Haidar al-Qahoum, as well as head of the so-called security and intelligence agency Abdulhakim al-Khiwani and foreign operations agency official Hassan al-Kahlani, or Abu Shaheed.

The report also highlighted the role played by deputy Houthi foreign minister Hussein al-Azzi through diplomatic sources and figures in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Sudan and Kenya to forge intelligence, security, political and logistical ties.

Training

The report said the Houthis were keen on establishing “sensitive intelligence centers” throughout the Horn of Africa and countries surrounding Yemen. They are working on training cadres “as soon as possible” so that they can be “effectively activated at the right time to achieve the Quranic mission and common interests of all resistance countries, especially Iran, Gaza and Lebanon.”

The report obtained documents that reveal how the Houthis have established ties with African figures to “complete preparations and operations in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa to support the Houthis should they come under any international political or diplomatic pressure.”

Leading officials

The report identified several Houthi figures who are overseeing these operations, starting with IRGC official “Abu Mahdi” to the owner of the smallest boat that is used for smuggling weapons in the Red Sea.

It also spoke of the relations forged with the al-Shabaab al-Qaeda affiliate in Somalia and the African mafia to smuggle Africans to Yemen in what the report described as one of the most dangerous human trafficking and organized crimes.

The PTOC report said the Houthis have recruited Africans from various countries, especially in wake of the militias’ coup in Sanaa in 2014. They have been subjected to cultural and military training and deployed at various fronts, such as Taiz, the west coast, Marib and the border.

Some of the recruits have returned to their home countries to expand the Houthi influence there.

Abu Ras and al-Kahlani

The report named Abdulwahed Naji Mohammed Abu Ras, or Abu Hussein, as the Houthis’ top official in expanding their influence in the Horn of Africa. A native of the Jawf province, he was tasked directly by top Iranian political officials and the IRGC in running this file.

Among his major tasks is coordinating with the IRGC and Houthis and directly overseeing the smuggling of IRGC and Hezbollah members from and to Yemen.

Abu Ras has avoided the spotlight for several years during which he has handled the Houthis’ most dangerous intelligence and political files.

He served as secretary of foreign affairs at the security and intelligence agency until Hassan al-Kahlani's appointment to that post. Abu Ras was then promoted to his current position at the recommendation of Houthi leader Abdulmalek al-Houthi and the IRGC leadership.

Al-Kahlani, also known as Abu Shaheed, was born in the Hajjah province in 1984. He is a known Houthi security operative as he grew up among the Houthis in Saada and Sanaa and joined the militias at a young age.

The report said al-Kahlani was part of the Sanaa terrorist cell that carried out several bombings and assassinations in wake of the killing of Houthi founder Hassan al-Houthi in 2004. He was also among the Houthi leaderships that took part in the coup in Sanaa.

Al-Kahlani now works directly under Abu Ras. He is known for his close ties to the IRGC and has been using this relationship to impose himself as the top official in the security and intelligence agency, exposing the struggle for power between him and the actual head of the agency Abdulhakim al-Khiwani.