Ukraine Has an Array of New Western Weapons. What Advantages Could They Offer in a Counteroffensive?

A Ukrainian serviceman of 28th brigade shoots a Maxim gun towards Russian positions at the frontline in Donetsk region, Ukraine, Wednesday, June 21, 2023. (AP)
A Ukrainian serviceman of 28th brigade shoots a Maxim gun towards Russian positions at the frontline in Donetsk region, Ukraine, Wednesday, June 21, 2023. (AP)
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Ukraine Has an Array of New Western Weapons. What Advantages Could They Offer in a Counteroffensive?

A Ukrainian serviceman of 28th brigade shoots a Maxim gun towards Russian positions at the frontline in Donetsk region, Ukraine, Wednesday, June 21, 2023. (AP)
A Ukrainian serviceman of 28th brigade shoots a Maxim gun towards Russian positions at the frontline in Donetsk region, Ukraine, Wednesday, June 21, 2023. (AP)

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Ukraine’s military was largely reliant on Soviet-era weaponry, from tanks to artillery to fighter jets.

While that arsenal helped Ukraine fend off an assault on the capital of Kyiv and prevent a total rout in the early weeks of the war, billions of dollars in military assistance has since poured into the country, including more modern Western-made weapons.

Ukraine’s counteroffensive, now in its early stages, could offer a glimpse of whether and to what extent the newer weapons systems have strengthened Kyiv’s ability to stand up to Russia.

Analysts are cautiously optimistic.

"Ukraine is in a much better position to be able to conduct a combined arms warfare than where they were in the beginning of Russia’s full-scale reinvasion of Ukraine," George Barros, a Russia analyst for the Center for Strategic International Studies said.

Here’s a look at some of the Western weapons sent to Ukraine and what advantages they might offer.

Striking targets

One sophisticated US-made rocket launcher sent to Ukraine has received a lot of attention — and for good reason: High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems gave Kyiv's forces the ability to hit targets farther away and with much greater accuracy than Soviet-designed ones.

In the fall counteroffensive, the HIMARS — which currently give troops the capability to strike a target up to 80 kilometers (50 miles) away and then quickly move on — were used to destroy bridges near the southern city of Kherson, cutting Russian troops off from one another and their supply routes.

Ukraine has since clamored for longer-range missiles that can also be launched by the HIMARS and could reach up to 300 kilometers (190 miles) away. But the U.S. and its allies have been reluctant to provide them.

However, Washington agreed in February to send Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bombs, which have a range of 150 kilometers (90 miles) when fired by HIMARS, and the UK announced the delivery of Storm Shadow cruise missiles — with a range of 550 kilometers (340 miles).

Both weapons already have been spotted in combat, extending Ukraine’s reach.

Air defense

Throughout the war, Russia has rained missiles down on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure almost daily.

To defend against those barrages, the West has sent Ukraine the Patriot and the Avenger air defense systems.

At $4 million per round, Patriot missiles are meant to shield against larger ballistic missile attacks, leaving simpler weapons to deal with the cheap, slow-flying Iranian exploding drones often used by the Russians.

Even with these new air defense systems, Ukraine has struggled to protect its territory against daily Russian attacks.

Russia has relied on long-range ballistic and cruise missiles to strike targets deep in Ukraine, avoiding a risk to its warplanes after losing many of them in the initial stages of the invasion. Moscow’s failure to win control of Ukrainian airspace was one of the biggest surprises of the war.

Ukraine also has kept its much smaller air force made of Soviet-made Sukhoi and Mig-29 jets away from the front line and used them to launch missiles from large distances to minimize losses.

Ukraine long has pushed for Western jets, but their delivery isn’t expected any time soon.

"Ukraine would be a lot in a better position for a more decisive victory and success on a shorter timeline if we took these decisions a lot faster," Barros said.

Artillery

Long known as the "King of Battle," artillery systems are key in any war — but especially the one in Ukraine. Russian troops have dug themselves in throughout the south and east of the country. Driving them out will require significant artillery.

Artillery can take out buildings and enemy weapons from reasonable distances and cause such chaos that opposing troops are forced to withdraw. Ukrainian forces are making heavy use of artillery in the battles around Zaporizhzhia, where the beginnings of the counteroffensive are unfolding.

Ukraine had plenty of artillery to begin with — but now it has American M777s and German Panzerhaubitze 2000 howitzers, both of which are more accurate and powerful than what it started the war with.

Tanks and armored vehicles

Ukraine needs the "punching force" of tanks and other fighting vehicles if it's going to break through Russian lines, Barros said.

Tanks delivered thus far — which include multiple models of German Leopards and the British Challengers — are more sophisticated than the Soviet-designed T-64 and T-72 tanks Ukraine relied on at the start of the invasion.

They also have far better armor and can strike more accurately than Russia's tanks, according to Craig Cartier, a retired Soviet Union analyst for the US with more than three decades of experience.

The US, meanwhile, has sent Bradley fighting vehicles, which offer better protection for troops they carry and have better firepower compared to Soviet-era armored vehicles that Ukraine has used.

All of these vehicles can inflict high casualties and destroy other weapons systems, making them invaluable for a counteroffensive.

Training

Perhaps most crucial to Ukraine’s success, however, has been the Ukrainians themselves. Both Barros and Cartier said the experience and training of Ukrainian troops, not just the weapons provided by the West, has made them a lethal force.

The Ukrainians "have demonstrated the ability to not only master the equipment and tactics, but to be able to do things nobody else has been able to do, as demonstrated by their (air defense) wizardry," Cartier said.

In the UK and Germany, in addition to other neighboring countries, Ukrainian forces have been trained on infantry tactics and on certain specialized equipment, such as the Challenger-2 tanks.

It's impossible to know how the counteroffensive will unfold, Barros said.

"What I will say is every single time that the Ukrainians have had an opportunity to demonstrate their fortitude and resolve on the battlefield, they’ve always outperformed expectations," he said.



Gemayel to Asharq Al-Awsat: Khaddam was Assad’s Stick to Apply Pressure

Relations between Gemayel and Khaddam were highly tense (Getty)
Relations between Gemayel and Khaddam were highly tense (Getty)
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Gemayel to Asharq Al-Awsat: Khaddam was Assad’s Stick to Apply Pressure

Relations between Gemayel and Khaddam were highly tense (Getty)
Relations between Gemayel and Khaddam were highly tense (Getty)

Late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad was a masterful negotiator, fiercely protective of his image and reputation. He was known for exhausting his guests with lengthy detours into history before addressing the substance of any talks.

Assad had an exceptional ability to restrain his anger, circling around an issue before striking again — often with calculated patience.

He avoided coarse language, allowing resentments to speak for themselves, but he never forgave those he believed had tried to derail his vision. Among them, according to accounts, were Yasser Arafat, Kamal Jumblatt, Bashir Gemayel, Amine Gemayel, and Samir Geagea.

In dealing with rivals and pressuring opponents, Assad often relied on a trusted enforcer: Abdel Halim Khaddam, his long-time foreign minister and later vice president. In the second part of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Lebanese President Amine Gemayel said Khaddam was Assad’s “stick,” used to assert control.

Many Lebanese politicians believed Khaddam’s bluntness was not personal, but rather a reflection of an official mandate from his mentor.

Assad rarely issued direct threats. Instead, he preferred subtle intimidation — as when he told Gemayel that his aides had once suggested blowing up President Anwar Sadat’s plane to prevent him from reaching Jerusalem.

Khaddam, the late Syrian strongman’s long-serving envoy, was known for humiliating both allies and foes who dared defy Damascus’ directives. His tactics were often unsettling — deliberately designed to leave visitors unnerved and pliant by the time they reached Assad’s office.

In a conversation in Paris during his retirement, Khaddam defended his hardline methods, saying they were not meant to insult but to prevent potentially dangerous confrontations. “The aim was to avoid escalation that could lead to security agencies taking over, which might have resulted in worse outcomes,” he said.

In the same meeting, Khaddam accused former Lebanese President Amine Gemayel of obstructing a political solution in Lebanon, calling him “hesitant and suspicious.”

He also acknowledged Assad was caught off guard when the Tripartite Agreement collapsed. The Syrian leader, Khaddam said, had not believed anyone in Lebanon would openly defy Syria — or the other Lebanese factions who had signed the accord.

“President Assad had many cards to play. President Sarkis had none,” recalled former Lebanese Foreign Minister Fouad Boutros, reflecting on the stark imbalance between Syria and Lebanon during Elias Sarkis’s presidency.

Assad, he said, had the power to topple or paralyze the Lebanese government before Sarkis even returned to Beirut. “Sarkis had no leverage over Assad,” Boutros noted. “But while Sarkis often showed flexibility, he would stand firm when asked to compromise Lebanon’s core principles.”

Boutros, who played a key role in Lebanon’s diplomacy during the civil war, said he had to exercise utmost restraint to keep Khaddam — Syria’s often abrasive envoy — from derailing talks with personal attacks or inflammatory language.

The dynamic, he suggested, was not unique to Sarkis. It also echoed the later, uneasy relationship between Gemayel and Assad.

Gemayel recalled a cold and confrontational relationship with Khaddam, describing him as “the stick and the poison” used by Assad to pressure Beirut into submission.

“There was no warmth between us from the beginning,” Gemayel told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“Khaddam used underhanded tactics to undermine the presidency and sow division within my team. While President Assad treated me with respect and politeness, he needed someone to apply pressure — and that was Khaddam,” he added.

Gemayel said Khaddam was behind all the pressure campaigns Syria waged against him — all with Assad’s full knowledge. “Assad played the courteous statesman. Khaddam handled the dirty work. Syria wanted me to sign agreements harmful to Lebanon’s interests, and Khaddam was the one tasked with forcing my hand.”

Despite Khaddam’s harsh demeanor, Gemayel said he never allowed him to overstep.

“I kept him in check. He didn’t dare cross the line with me. We were once in a meeting with President Assad, and Khaddam had been spreading ridiculous rumors beforehand. When he spoke up, I turned to Assad and said: ‘Mr. President, we have a problem with Khaddam. Please ask him to stop acting like a spy when dealing with us.’”

Khaddam, Gemayel said, tried to intimidate many Lebanese politicians — but not him.

“He was rude, even insolent to the point of absurdity. But he knew that if he said anything out of line with me, I would respond immediately.”

Assad’s Subtle Control and the Language of Minorities

Assad understood early on the fragility of Lebanon’s sectarian makeup. To him, the country was a meeting place for minorities — one that always needed an external patron to manage its wars and truces. He allowed for limited victories, but never total defeat, ensuring that no side could do without Syria’s oversight.

Assad sought to rule Syria indefinitely, with Lebanon as a backyard extension of his regime. Yet unlike his brother Rifaat, he avoided openly sectarian rhetoric or calls for partition. Rifaat, according to Gemayel, once suggested dividing both Syria and Lebanon along sectarian lines during a conversation with Lebanese leaders Walid Jumblatt and Marwan Hamadeh.

When asked whether he ever felt his dialogue with Assad was, at its core, a conversation between an Alawite and a Maronite, Gemayel replied: “No — that was Rifaat’s language. He used to say minorities must come together and show solidarity. But that narrative was never pushed by President Assad or his inner circle. It was always tailored to serve their own agenda.”

Assad’s political strategy was built on gathering leverage — and minority groups were central to that plan. His ties with Lebanon’s Druze community, and his clash with Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt, fit squarely within this framework. Assad relied on Syria’s own Druze population, as well as the Christian minority, to tighten his grip on the country’s diverse communities and align them under the banner of his regime.

“Assad had a firm hold on the minorities,” Gemayel said, adding that “he brought them all together to make them part of the Syrian system.”

Tensions between Syria’s Alawite leadership and the country’s Sunni majority were well known, Gemayel added, particularly through the candid rhetoric of Assad’s brother, Rifaat.

“Rifaat was open about the hostility between Alawites and Sunnis,” Gemayel said. “In his conversations with us, it was clear. But with President Assad, there was no visible sign of that. What lay beneath the surface, only God knows — but in our dealings with him, we never felt it.”

Gemayel Dismisses Reports of a Syria-Lebanon Confederation Proposal

Asked about longstanding claims that former Lebanese President Camille Chamoun had once proposed a confederation between Lebanon and Syria to Hafez al-Assad, Gemayel was quick to reject the idea.

“That’s absolutely not true,” he said. “President Chamoun would never have made such a proposal. A lot of things were said at the time. There were even reports that US envoy Dean Brown had suggested relocating Lebanon’s Christians to California — all of it nonsense, poetic talk with no grounding in reality.”

Gemayel also addressed one of the most controversial moments in US diplomacy during Lebanon’s 1988 presidential crisis: the phrase reportedly used by US envoy Richard Murphy — “Mikhael Daher or chaos.”

Daher, a Christian MP close to Damascus, had been floated as the only candidate acceptable to both Syria and the United States.

But Washington later distanced itself from the deal. The episode, Gemayel said, underscored a period in which American pressure aligned more with Syrian — and by extension, Israeli — interests, leaving Lebanon’s sovereignty hanging in the balance.

Gemayel confirmed that US envoy Richard Murphy did indeed issue the stark ultimatum in 1988. The phrase, which became emblematic of foreign interference in Lebanon’s presidential crisis, reflected what Gemayel described as Washington’s unwillingness to confront Damascus — despite acknowledging its destabilizing role in Lebanon.

“Yes, Murphy said it,” Gemayel affirmed to Asharq Al-Awsat.

“The Americans had a problem — they wanted Syria, and they didn’t. They knew Syria was playing a destructive role in Lebanon, but they didn’t want to challenge it. They kept trying to find common ground with Syria, not with us.”

According to Gemayel, the US saw Daher — a respected Christian parliamentarian close to Damascus — as a palatable compromise. “They thought Daher was a respectable figure who might be acceptable to the Lebanese, so they went along with Syria’s choice,” he said.

Washington, he added, had consistently prioritized pragmatism over principle in Lebanon, often aligning with whichever side could deliver results — even if it came at Beirut’s expense.

“It was the same with the May 17 Agreement with Israel,” Gemayel said, referring to the short-lived 1983 accord.

“The US couldn't pressure Israel, so Lebanon had to pay. And they couldn’t pressure Syria either — Syria was stubborn, had resources, and they didn’t want a confrontation. So they kept trying to sell us solutions that weren’t in Lebanon’s interest.”

“The Americans were always looking for the quickest deal,” he added. “They wanted to please both Syria and Israel. With Syria, it was clear — they didn’t want to upset Assad, because they knew who held the real power in Lebanon.”

Gemayel said that while he personally held the reins in decision-making and negotiations with Syria during his time in office, several close advisers and intermediaries played essential roles in laying the groundwork for dialogue with Damascus.

“The relationship and final decisions were in my hands,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“I was the one doing the actual negotiating. But when it came to preparation, the late Jean Obeid played a very valuable role. He was intelligent, committed to Lebanon’s interests, and had close ties with the Syrians. He couldn’t get everything done, but he managed to ease certain issues,” said Gemayel.

Gemayel also credited Eli Salem, another aide, for navigating delicate talks with Syrian officials — particularly with Khaddam.

“Salem had a knack for getting through on specific points,” Gemayel said. “He had good chemistry with Khaddam, and that helped, especially since Khaddam and I didn’t get along.”

One figure who unexpectedly played a constructive role, according to Gemayel, was Brigadier General Jamil al-Sayyed, then an intelligence officer stationed in Lebanon’s eastern Bekaa Valley.

“You may be surprised,” he said, “but Jamil al-Sayyed was very helpful. Whenever I was heading to Damascus, I would stop in the Bekaa to meet him. He gave me very precise insights into what was happening at the Syrian presidential palace and the broader picture in Damascus. He was well-informed, sincere, and provided intelligence that wasn’t widely available — information that truly benefited Lebanon.”

Asked whether Syria was uneasy about the role of veteran journalist and diplomat Ghassan Tueni in his administration, Gemayel said the Syrians had little affection for him.

“There was never any warmth toward Ghassan,” he said. “He came with me to Syria just once, and it was clear there was tension. Whenever he was present, things got heated. Ghassan and Khaddam were like a ping-pong match — constantly hitting the ball back and forth.”

The friction, Gemayel explained, stemmed in large part from Tueni’s association with An-Nahar, the Beirut daily he helped lead, which often published sharp criticism of Syria.

“Syria never appreciated An-Nahar,” Gemayel said. “Even if Ghassan tried to distance himself from specific articles, the content was out there for everyone to see — and the Syrians didn’t forget it.”