Bombings, Assassinations in Algeria, but ‘Civil War Still Far Away’

Algerian security forces in the Bab El Oued neighborhood, once considered a stronghold of the Islamic Salvation Front in the Algerian capital on January 17, 1992. (AFP/Getty Images)
Algerian security forces in the Bab El Oued neighborhood, once considered a stronghold of the Islamic Salvation Front in the Algerian capital on January 17, 1992. (AFP/Getty Images)
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Bombings, Assassinations in Algeria, but ‘Civil War Still Far Away’

Algerian security forces in the Bab El Oued neighborhood, once considered a stronghold of the Islamic Salvation Front in the Algerian capital on January 17, 1992. (AFP/Getty Images)
Algerian security forces in the Bab El Oued neighborhood, once considered a stronghold of the Islamic Salvation Front in the Algerian capital on January 17, 1992. (AFP/Getty Images)

In the midst of Britain’s deliberations on handling and integrating radical Islamists, as well as analyzing the “confessions” of those involved in terrorist bombings to determine whether they were extracted under torture or not, Algeria stood as an indisputable witness to a protracted and violent period, commencing in the early 1990s, ultimately being known as the “Black Decade.”

Daily, news of bombings and assassinations carried out by armed groups against security forces, particularly targeting intellectuals, journalists, and unionists perceived as supporting the Algerian government, continued to unfold.

Supporters of the Islamic Salvation Front (ISF), the Islamic party on the verge of winning power before the cancellation of elections in January 1992, were responsible for much of the violence, as was the case with the bombing of Houari Boumediene Airport in the Algerian capital in August of that year.

However, there were also other armed groups that adopted far more extremist positions than the ISF and carried out some of the most heinous acts of violence witnessed during that era.

One prominent group at the time was the Armed Islamic Group, which later succeeded in unifying a portion of the ISF and other factions under its banner within the framework of what was known as the “Unity Meeting” in 1994.

Amid the near-daily assassinations and bombings, Algeria appeared to be on the brink of a “civil war.”

There was also a growing impression that radical Islamists could succeed in seizing power and overthrowing the government, which was supported by the military and assumed control following the resignation of President Chadli Bendjedid at that time.

That was largely the image that Algeria projected at the time, at least in many international media outlets.

However, it was a false image, as confirmed by the British Ambassador to Algeria, Christopher Battiscombe.

The ambassador acknowledged, in correspondence with the Foreign Office in London (preserved in the British National Archives), that Algeria was indeed witnessing bloody violence but also spoke of the “ordinary life” being experienced in the Algerian capital.

He added that the “civil war” being discussed was still “very much distant” from the reality on the ground.

In addition to the security situation, the ambassador’s correspondences also reveal that the British appeared to be “reserved” in the face of French pressure to provide financial assistance to the Algerian government.

As is well-known, the Algerian authorities were in desperate need of such aid at the time, whether for financing their war against armed groups or for launching projects that could satisfy segments of the population who might be swayed by Islamists in light of the deteriorating conditions in the country.

On March 1, 1993, Battiscombe wrote a letter to the Middle East and North Africa Department at the Foreign Office in London, stating that the ambassador largely agreed with what was stated in a previous letter from the department regarding the security situation in Algeria.

In the correspondence, Battiscombe stated that the level of terrorist events has largely remained unchanged over the past 12 months, with a steady stream of minor attacks, assassinations of policemen, and bombings in public places.

According to Battiscombe, the attacks were occasionally punctuated by significant incidents such as the airport bombing in August, the ambush in which 5 policemen were killed in December, the killing of 4 other policemen in a gun attack in the capital, and the failed assassination attempt against the then Minister of Defense.

Battiscombe highly doubted whether Algerian authorities can ever put an end to such incidents, much more than the British security forces can prevent terrorist attacks by the Irish Republican Army in the UK.

However, while the security situation in Algeria seemed to be heading towards complete chaos, it now appears to me that the terrorists will not succeed in turning Algeria into an ungovernable country or forcing the government to make a radical change in its course, noted Battiscombe.

The ambassador added that despite the continued curfews and the presence of checkpoints guarded by visibly concerned police officers, he believed that most visitors to the Algerian capital are surprised by the generally normal life there.

“We are certainly still far away from the civil war that is often written about in Western media analyses,” wrote Battiscombe.

As for French pressure to provide financial assistance to the Algerian government, it is worth noting here that the European Currency Unit (ECU) was the currency unit used in Europe at that time before the adoption of the “Euro” and the transformation of the European Group into the EU.

The Fourth Protocol of the European Group (covering the period from 1992 to 1996) called for a more generous treatment towards Mediterranean countries such as Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.

The protocol increased the European Group’s spending by 28% compared to the Third Protocol and provided funding for projects carried out by Algeria and its partners in the Arab Maghreb Union.

The Fourth Protocol also allowed Algeria to access larger loans and draw on allocations of 70 million European currency units, compared to 54 million units in the Third Protocol. This move coincided with a parallel effort by the World Bank, which increased its assistance to Algeria as part of an economic reform program.

The actual reason for the British reservations regarding the French initiative to provide European financial assistance to Algeria remained unclear.

However, it is known that at that time, radical Islamists accused European countries that supported the Algerian government of backing “military rule” in their country.

Extremists also issued threats of retaliation against countries that provided aid to the Algerian authorities, which may have raised concerns among some nations that feared their assistance to Algeria could lead to extremist attacks on their interests or citizens.

 

 



Iran’s Larijani, the Man Whose Power Grew During Mideast War

06 February 2009, Bavaria, Munich: Ali Larijani, then chairman of the Iranian parliament, speaks at the 45th Munich Security Conference in Munich. (dpa)
06 February 2009, Bavaria, Munich: Ali Larijani, then chairman of the Iranian parliament, speaks at the 45th Munich Security Conference in Munich. (dpa)
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Iran’s Larijani, the Man Whose Power Grew During Mideast War

06 February 2009, Bavaria, Munich: Ali Larijani, then chairman of the Iranian parliament, speaks at the 45th Munich Security Conference in Munich. (dpa)
06 February 2009, Bavaria, Munich: Ali Larijani, then chairman of the Iranian parliament, speaks at the 45th Munich Security Conference in Munich. (dpa)

When Israeli and US strikes killed Ali Khamenei at the start of the Middle East war, Iran's security chief Ali Larijani became even more powerful than he had been for decades.

Israel's Defense Minister Israel Katz said on Tuesday that Larijani had been killed, though Iran's authorities have not confirmed his death.

Larijani had since the start of the war played a far more visible role than the new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, who has not been seen in public since he was appointed to replace his slain father.

The security chief, on the other hand, was seen walking with crowds at a pro-government rally last week in Tehran, in a sign of defiance against Israel and the US.

His killing, if confirmed, would be a major blow against Iran, undermining a key figure seen as capable of navigating both ideology and diplomacy.

- Pragmatist -

Adept at balancing ideological loyalty with pragmatic statecraft, Larijani was central prior to the war to Iran's nuclear policy and strategic diplomacy.

Bespectacled and known for his measured tone, the 68-year-old was believed to enjoy the confidence of the late Khamenei, after a long career in the military, media and legislature.

In 2025, after Iran's last war with Israel and the US, he was appointed head of Iran's top security body, the Supreme National Security Council -- a position he had held nearly two decades earlier -- coordinating defense strategies and overseeing nuclear policy.

He later became increasingly visible in the diplomatic arena, travelling to Gulf states such as Oman and Qatar as Tehran cautiously engaged in nuclear negotiations that were ultimately scuppered by the war.

- 'Canny operator' -

"Larijani is a true insider, a canny operator, familiar with how the system operates," Ali Vaez, the International Crisis Group's project director for Iran, said before the Middle East war began.

Born in Najaf, Iraq in 1957 to a prominent Shiite cleric who was close to the Islamic Republic's founder Khomeini, Larijani's family has been influential within Iran's political system for decades.

Some of his relatives have been the targets of corruption allegations over the years, which they denied.

He earned a PhD in Western Philosophy from the University of Tehran.

A veteran of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps during the Iran-Iraq war, Larijani later headed state broadcasting IRIB for a decade from 1994 before serving as parliamentary speaker from 2008 to 2020.

In 1996, he was appointed as Khamenei's representative to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). He later became secretary of the SNSC and chief nuclear negotiator, leading talks with Britain, France, Germany and Russia between 2005 and 2007.

He ran in the 2005 presidential elections, losing to populist candidate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, with whom he later had disagreements over nuclear diplomacy.

Larijani was then disqualified from running for president in both 2021 and 2024.

Observers viewed his return as the head of the SNSC as signaling a turn reflecting his reputation as a conservative capable of combining ideological commitment with pragmatism.

Larijani supported the landmark 2015 nuclear deal with world powers which unraveled three years later after US President Donald Trump withdrew from the agreement.

In March 2025, Larijani warned that sustained external pressure could alter Iran's nuclear posture.

"We are not moving towards (nuclear) weapons, but if you do something wrong in the Iranian nuclear issue, you will force Iran to move towards that because it has to defend itself," he told state television.

Larijani repeatedly insisted negotiations with Washington should remain confined to the nuclear file and defended uranium enrichment as Iran's sovereign right.

- Violent repression -

Larijani was among officials sanctioned by the US in January over what Washington described as "violently repressing the Iranian people", following nationwide protests which erupted weeks earlier due to the rising cost of living.

According to rights groups, thousands of people were killed in the government's brutal crackdown of the protests.

Larijani acknowledged that economic pressures had "led to the protests", but blamed the violence which ensued on foreign involvement by the United States and Israel.


Who Is Leading Iran? Western Sources Map the Inner Circle of the New Supreme Leader

 A demonstrator holds a portrait of the Mojtaba Khamenei during the Quds day in London, England, Sunday, March 15, 2026. (AP)
A demonstrator holds a portrait of the Mojtaba Khamenei during the Quds day in London, England, Sunday, March 15, 2026. (AP)
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Who Is Leading Iran? Western Sources Map the Inner Circle of the New Supreme Leader

 A demonstrator holds a portrait of the Mojtaba Khamenei during the Quds day in London, England, Sunday, March 15, 2026. (AP)
A demonstrator holds a portrait of the Mojtaba Khamenei during the Quds day in London, England, Sunday, March 15, 2026. (AP)

Western diplomatic sources have outlined to Asharq Al-Awsat the tight inner circle surrounding Iran’s new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, shedding light on the key figures shaping decision-making at a critical moment for the country.

According to these sources, any serious discussion of a comprehensive ceasefire in the ongoing war with Israel and the US is unlikely to begin until this inner circle concludes that the country has reached a point of military exhaustion and that prolonging the conflict would only deepen its strategic predicament.

The sources also dismissed claims over Khamenei’s lack of experience over decision-making. Khamenei has long been involved in the decision-making process within the office of his late father, former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, they stressed. He has also maintained extensive ties with Iran’s military leadership, particularly within the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

A key figure in this circle is Mohsen Rezaei, appointed by Mojtaba Khamenei as a senior military adviser. Often described as a “man of war”, Rezaei is also believed to have been among those who advised Khomeini to accept the ceasefire with Iraq at the end of the Iran-Iraq War, when Iranian forces were reportedly exhausted.

The sources identified several influential figures in the Supreme Leader’s inner circle. The most prominent among them is parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a former IRGC commander who is said to have played a leading role during last year’s 12-day conflict with Israel.

Other key figures include General Ahmad Vahidi, the commander of the IRGC, who previously served as minister under both presidents Ebrahim Raisi and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and was the first commander of the Quds Force, the foreign arm of the IRGC.

General Rahim Safavi, a senior adviser during the tenure of the slain Khamenei, General Ali Abdollahi, head of operations at the armed forces’ general staff, General Majid Mousavi, commander of the IRGC’s missile unit, and Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri, head of its naval forces, are also part of the new supreme leader’s inner circle.

Despite the heavy blows, the Iranian regime has so far succeeded in preventing any fragmentation within its military and leaderships, the sources noted.

Developments indicate that Iran’s military leadership had preprepared a strategy aimed at making any war against it extremely costly for both the region and the global economy.

This strategy, they said, rests on two main pillars: first, “drawing Gulf states into the theater of war through missile and drone attacks under the pretext of targeting US presence”; and second, “causing widespread or total disruption to maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.”

The sources added that Tehran is betting on what it perceives as US President Donald Trump’s limited patience for prolonged conflict, especially amid rising oil prices, which Iran hopes could approach $200 per barrel, the proximity of US midterm elections, and the lack of broad public support for war.

On the other side, US and Israeli forces have escalated strikes in an effort to demonstrate the scale of destruction inflicted on Iran’s military arsenal and defense industries.

The objective of regime change appears to have receded in favor of a strategy of attrition, one that could compel Iran to scale back what the sources described as its “self-destructive behavior.”

The sources suggested that the new supreme leader may initially find it difficult to adopt a flexible or conciliatory stance in his first test of leadership. However, a growing sense that continued attrition could trigger internal unrest — or even raise questions about the regime’s survival — may ultimately lead senior military figures to conclude that preserving the system justifies accepting painful compromises.

They also warned that missile and drone attacks targeting Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries could prove counterproductive, particularly as they have largely struck civilian targets.

The sources stressed that the Gulf states’ significant regional and international standing could form the basis for mounting global pressure on Iran to agree to a ceasefire. When that moment comes, Tehran may find that the war has set it back by years.


Why Iranian Drones Are Hard to Stop

Protesters hold a mockup of Iranian-made drone Shahed-136, during a rally marking al-Quds Day (Jerusalem Day), amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, outside the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, March 13, 2026. (EPA)
Protesters hold a mockup of Iranian-made drone Shahed-136, during a rally marking al-Quds Day (Jerusalem Day), amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, outside the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, March 13, 2026. (EPA)
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Why Iranian Drones Are Hard to Stop

Protesters hold a mockup of Iranian-made drone Shahed-136, during a rally marking al-Quds Day (Jerusalem Day), amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, outside the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, March 13, 2026. (EPA)
Protesters hold a mockup of Iranian-made drone Shahed-136, during a rally marking al-Quds Day (Jerusalem Day), amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, outside the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, March 13, 2026. (EPA)

Cheap and deadly, Iranian-designed Shahed drones have inflicted major damage in the Middle East war, and have anti-jamming and other capabilities that make them difficult to stop.

- Offline navigation -

Designed to explode on impact, Shahed drones connect to GPS to register their location shortly before or after takeoff, then typically turn off their receivers, said Thomas Withington, a researcher at Britain's Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).

The drones then travel long distances towards their target using gyroscopes that measure their speed, direction and position -- known as an "inertial navigation system".

"GPS is going to get jammed by whatever is protecting the target," Withington told AFP.

"If you look at a map of GPS jamming at the moment in the Middle East, you see that there's a lot of jamming... By not using the GPS, you avoid that."

The drones can then return to GPS just before impact for a more precise strike, or remain offline.

"It's not always necessarily very accurate, but it's as accurate as it needs to be," said Withington.

- Anti-jamming mechanisms -

Russia has been making Shahed-style drones to use in its war in Ukraine.

The US-based Institute for Science and International Security found in 2023 that those drones used "state-of-art antenna interference suppression" to remove enemy jamming signals while preserving the desired GPS signal.

Anti-jamming mechanisms were found in the wreckage of an Iranian-made drone that struck Cyprus in the opening days of the Middle East war, a European industry source told AFP.

"They have put (the Shahed) together using off-the-shelf parts, but it has... many of the capabilities that US military GPS equipment has," Todd Humphreys, a professor of aerospace engineering at the University of Texas at Austin, told AFP.

Defending against them now requires sophisticated electronic warfare equipment.

"The Shaheds have been upgraded," said Ukrainian air force spokesman Yuriy Ignat.

- Stealth materials -

The Shahed is built from "lightweight radar-absorbing materials", such as plastic and fiberglass, a 2023 RUSI paper said.

Their small size and low altitude allow them to slip through aerial defense systems.

- Other positioning systems? -

Some experts think Iran is using multiple positioning systems, making it easier for its drones to dodge jamming.

Serhii Beskrestnov, a technology adviser to the Ukrainian defense ministry, said Iran is using the BeiDou system, a Chinese rival to the US-developed GPS.

And the Russia-made version of Shaheds uses both BeiDou and the Russian equivalent, GLONASS, he said.

Others suspect Iran may be using LORAN, a radio navigation system developed during World War II.

LORAN, which does not require satellites, largely fell out of use when GPS emerged.

But Iran said in 2016 it was reviving the technology, which requires a network of large ground-based transmitters, though experts have not confirmed it is active today.

- Counter-strategies -

Militaries have mainly defended against Shaheds by shooting them down with cannon fire, missiles and interceptor drones, with the United States and Israel also developing lasers.

But jamming can work, as Ukraine has shown, as can "spoofing", which involves hacking into the drone's navigation system to change its destination.

Ukraine used electronic warfare to neutralize 4,652 attack drones from mid-May to mid-July 2025 -- not far off the number it shot down in the same period, 6,041, according to AFP analysis of Ukrainian military data.

Its experts insist that electronic and conventional defenses are often used in tandem against the drones.