I recalled a series of interviews I had with late Lebanese President Elias Hrawi, who spent nine years in office. Among the many topics, we discussed was slain former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and his tumultuous time in office, including his strained relations with Syria and Lebanese former President Emile Lahoud.
As I recalled those interviews, it occurred to me that I had never approached former Lebanese former Foreign Minister Fares Boueiz, who is also Hrawi’s son-in-law, about his experience during those tumultuous years. Boueiz served as foreign minister for eight years, during which Lebanon experienced local and regional upheaval.
What stood out the most for me during our interview was his remark that French former President Jacques Chirac was Hariri’s man in Paris and that then Syrian Vice President Abdulhalim Khaddam was Hariri’s man in Damascus. He also revealed that Damascus had agreed to Hariri becoming prime minister after it had reservations over him.
Divisions in Syria
Hariri’s name had been floated around to become prime minister since the time the Taif Accord was signed in 1989. His name was proposed during the term of PM Omar Karami, but his government would have faced an arduous task of dismantling the militias that were active during the 1975-90 civil war.
Given the challenges, Hariri’s nomination was postponed, Boueiz told Asharq Al-Awsat.
“I believe Syria had reservations over his name. Not the whole of Syria, but some officials,” he added.
So, Karami became prime minister and his government eventually collapsed due to the economic crisis. Hariri’s name was again proposed as his replacement.
No consensus emerged over Hariri’s potential appointment. “It was a complicated situation. We understood that his appointment must be accompanied by certain conditions and after parliamentary elections are held,” Boueiz explained.
“In other words, a new parliament must have been sworn in and Hariri would not have been able to ensure the election of lawmakers who are loyal to him,” he added.
“We later found out that it was impossible for Hariri to be named ahead of the elections, which would ensure the election of a parliament that was close to Syria,” he went on to say. Rashid al-Solh then became prime minister.
Boueiz said he was opposed to the electoral law that the polls were based upon. “Whenever I brought up the issue of amending the law, I was met with total opposition. I couldn’t understand it until I finally went to Damascus and saw the whole picture,” he revealed.
“Hrawi told me that my opposition of the elections was harming his relations with Syria because ‘it believed that I was the one encouraging your positions,’” he stated.
Boueiz and several Maronite politicians eventually headed to Damascus to clear the air. The FM stood firm and clashed with Khaddam, who also held on to his position. Boueiz even threatened to resign as foreign minister due to the dispute. Seeing an impasse, Khaddam contacted chief of staff Hikmat al-Chehabi, whom Boueiz said was notoriously difficult to negotiate with.
“Chehabi informed me that it would be a shame for me to end my political career,” recalled Boueiz, saying he felt threatened. He retorted: “I cannot imagine my political future away from my people and their opinions.” The delegation then returned to Lebanon.
“Hrawi hoped that I would not put myself at loggerheads with Damascus and to not implicate him in the process,” said Boueiz.
He eventually found out why the Syrians wanted the elections to be held as soon as possible. They feared Hariri’s appointment as PM so they wanted to form a parliament that was loyal to them so that they could keep him in check.
Hrawi, for his part, supported Hariri’s appointment because he believed that no other Sunni figure knew how to tackle Lebanon’s economic problems. He believed that Salim al-Hoss, although an honest figure, did not always take the best approach and was slow to act. He was not up to the task of fixing the economy. Rashid al-Solh was not part of the equation and Omar Karami’s political career was in tatters.
So, Hariri was the best option. When Hrawi sensed that Syria had reservations over him, he directly headed to Damascus for talks with President Hafez al-Assad. He demanded Hariri’s appointment, but Assad told him to hold on.
“Two days later, Hrawi revealed to me that a strange thing had happened. Khaddam had asked that they meet him in secret. I was bewildered. Surely, Syrian intelligence would know that he had crossed into Lebanon the moment he passed the border. They would even know of his arrival at Beirut airport. How could he possibly visit Lebanon in secret? Was he conspiring against the regime?” wondered Boueiz.
“At any rate, we didn’t understand the need for secrecy. Khaddam arrived the next day and Hrawi later confided in me about what they discussed. ‘He informed me that I must insist on Assad that Hariri be named prime minister,’” he continued.
Two days later, Chehabi requested a secret meeting with Hrawi. “This was strange indeed,” said Boueiz. “It was no secret that Khaddam was involved in the Lebanese file and that he often visited Lebanon. Chehabi, on the other hand, was only involved in handling the Lebanese army and never visited Lebanon.”
Soon after the meeting was held, Hrawi revealed to Boueiz that Chehabi had also demanded that he insist on Hariri’s appointment.
“This was very odd because Chehabi did not involve himself in these issues. Hrawi told me that there appears to be a problem in Syria. It seems it was split between a camp that supported Hariri and another that didn’t. It was obvious that Khaddam and Chehabi backed Hariri, while the other camp, which we were not aware of, didn’t want him at all. In the end, one had to go back to Assad and see what he wanted,” said Boueiz.
These were the first signs of a dispute in Syria. Others emerged during an Islamic summit in Tehran in 1993. Hariri had become prime minister at that point.
Boueiz recalled how he had met with head of the Syrian Republican Guard Adnan Makhlouf at the event. “He called out to me: ‘You are the bold one.’ Then, along with several senior officers, we strolled the conference hall and he began to insult some senior Syrian officials, including Khaddam, Chehabi and Ghazi Kanaan. He told me that ‘this Hariri was buying the Syrian regime,’” meaning some officials were being bribed.
Boueiz returned to Beirut and informed Hrawi of what happened. This indicated deep divisions within the Syrian command. “This means that from now on, you must listen to Assad alone,” Boueiz advised Hrawi. “We were convinced that a major dispute was happening in Syria and that Hariri was at the heart of it.”
A problem called ‘Emile Lahoud’
I asked Boueiz about Emile Lahoud, whom Hrawi had appointed as army commander at the beginning of his tenure. Lahoud was known as a staunch Damascus ally, a position that would eventually put him at odds with Hariri.
Boueiz said Hrawi had asked him about his opinion of the various candidates for the position of army chief, including Michel Aoun and Lahoud. “Lahoud is a naval officer in a country that does not have a strong navy,” said Boueiz. “I don’t recall that Lahoud had ever waged any actual battles. Aoun, on the other hand, had seen battles his entire life.”
“I asked Hrawi why he was asking me about my opinion, and he said that it appears that late former president Rene Mouawad had promised Lahoud that he would be named army chief. The Syrians also made the same pledge.”
“Lahoud put Syria at ease because he was not politicized and didn’t really deal in politics. He communicated with Damascus on a daily basis through then deputy intelligence chief Jamil al-Sayyed. He knew in detail what Damascus wanted. From there, I believe is when trust was built between them,” Boueiz said.
“Lahoud knew early on that a camp in Syria was opposed to Hariri. He built his policies based on this. Lahoud actually had no personal problems with Hariri, and he didn’t even deal in politics. He had no reason to have differences with Hariri except for the fact that one camp in Syria did not want him,” he continued.
Chirac and Hariri
I had to ask Boueiz about Chirac’s involvement in Lebanon in support of his friend, Hariri.
“Of course, Chirac was a close friend of Hariri. When Hrawi’s term neared its end, Chirac sensed – perhaps through Hariri’s request – that he needed to act because Lahoud appeared to be the most likely successor. This would not be good for Hariri, to whom Lahoud showed unconcealed animosity,” continued the former FM.
Before the end of Hrawi’s term, Chirac visited Lebanon. During a protocol visit to the Foreign Ministry, the French leader requested that he and Boueiz share a car ride to the presidential palace.
“In the car, he told me: ‘You are Lebanon’s hope and Hariri is also Lebanon’s big hope. If you don’t reach an agreement, a military figure will be elected, and you will both be destroyed.’ I smiled at him and replied: ‘Mr. President, I want to assure you that I have no differences with Hariri. We have no personal disputes at all. But Hariri, had from the start, sought hegemony. I personally, cannot tolerate such an approach, especially when it violates the constitution, laws, norms and balances.’”
“I may have been one of the few politicians who didn’t benefit from Hariri. I feared that the decision to name Lahoud had already been taken. Chirac informed me that nothing yet had been decided. He requested that the three of us meet to put disputes behind us. I agreed.”
Later that night Boueiz, Chirac and Hariri met and the FM laid out his grievances. He explained that he viewed Lebanon from the angle of the republic, while Hariri had a different approach. He explained that he came from a legal background, while Hariri was a businessman and sometimes businessmen cross legal lines so that they can complete their affairs quickly.
He also explained the delicate sectarian balances in the country, saying he refused to allow Hariri to violate them because he would be letting down his sectarian community. He noted that Hariri had not lived in Lebanon long enough to understand these balances.
Chirac had hoped that Boueiz and Hariri would reach an understanding. Should they forge an alliance, they would be able to greatly influence the political scene. Boueiz was reluctant because he was convinced that the decision to elect Lahoud had already been taken and would not be impacted by political shifts.
“The meeting ended, and the coming days proved that I was right and that the decision over Lahoud had been made,” Boueiz said.
