As Regional Bloc Threatens Intervention in Niger, Neighboring Juntas Vow Mutual Defense 

People with Niger and Russia flags climb the gate to the National Assembly building during a protest in Niamey, Niger, 30 July 2023. (EPA)
People with Niger and Russia flags climb the gate to the National Assembly building during a protest in Niamey, Niger, 30 July 2023. (EPA)
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As Regional Bloc Threatens Intervention in Niger, Neighboring Juntas Vow Mutual Defense 

People with Niger and Russia flags climb the gate to the National Assembly building during a protest in Niamey, Niger, 30 July 2023. (EPA)
People with Niger and Russia flags climb the gate to the National Assembly building during a protest in Niamey, Niger, 30 July 2023. (EPA)

Two West African nations ruled by mutinous soldiers said Monday that military intervention in Niger would be considered a "declaration of war" against them, as the junta attempts to consolidate power after a coup last week.

The West African regional body known as ECOWAS announced travel and economic sanctions against Niger on Sunday over the coup, and said it would use force if the coup leaders don’t reinstate Bazoum within one week. Bazoum's government was one of the West’s last democratic partners against West African extremists.

In a joint statement from the military governments of Mali and Burkina Faso, the two countries wrote that "any military intervention against Niger will be considered as a declaration of war against Burkina Faso and Mali."

Col. Abdoulaye Maiga, Mali's state minister for Territorial Administration and Decentralisation, read the joint statement on Malian state TV Monday evening. The two countries also denounced ECOWAS economic sanctions as "illegal, illegitimate and inhumane" and refused to apply them.

ECOWAS suspended all commercial and financial transactions between its member states and Niger, as well as freezing Nigerien assets held in regional central banks. Niger relies heavily on foreign aid and sanctions could further impoverish its more than 25 million people.

Mali and Burkina Faso have each undergone two coups since 2020, as soldiers overthrew governments claiming they could do a better job fighting increasing violence linked to al-Qaeda and the ISIS group. ECOWAS has sanctioned both countries and suspended them from the bloc, but never threatened to use force.

Also on Sunday, Guinea, another country under military rule since 2021, issued a statement in support of Niger's junta and urged ECOWAS to "come to its senses".

"The sanctions measures advocated by ECOWAS, including military intervention, are an option that would not be a solution to the current problem, but would lead to a human disaster whose consequences could extend beyond Niger’s borders," said Ibrahima Sory Bangoura, general of the brigade in a statement from the ruling party. He added the Guinea would not apply the sanctions.

In anticipation of the ECOWAS decision Sunday, thousands of pro-junta supporters took to the streets in Niamey, denouncing France, waving Russian flags along with signs reading "Down with France" and supporting Russian President Vladimir Putin and telling the international community to stay away.

There has been no clear explanation of the Russian symbols, but the country seems to have become a symbol of anti-Western feelings for demonstrators.

Protesters also burned down a door and smashed windows at the French Embassy before the Nigerien army dispersed them.

Niger could be following in the same footsteps as Mali and Burkina Faso, say analysts, both of which saw protestors waving Russian flags after their respective coups. After the second coup in Burkina Faso in September, protestors also attacked the French Embassy in the capital, Ouagadougou, and damaged and ransacked the Institut Francais, France's international cultural promotion organization.

If ECOWAS uses force, it could also trigger violence between civilians supporting the coup and those against it, Niger analysts say.

While unlikely, "the consequences on civilians of such an approach if putschists chose confrontation would be catastrophic," said Rida Lyammouri, senior fellow at the Policy Center for the New South, a Morocco-based think tank.

Lyammouri does not see a "military intervention happening because of the violence that could trigger," he said.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Sunday commended the resolve of the ECOWAS leadership to "defend constitutional order in Niger" after the sanctions announcement, and joined the bloc in calling for the immediate release of Bazoum and his family.

Also Sunday, junta spokesman Col. Maj. Amadou Abdramane banned the use of social media to put out messages he describe as harmful to state security. He also claimed without evidence that Bazoum’s government had authorized the French to carry out strikes to free Bazoum.

Observers believe Bazoum is being held at his house in the capital, Niamey. The first photos of him since the coup appeared Sunday evening, sitting on a couch smiling beside Chad’s President Mahamat Deby, who had flown in to mediate between the government and the junta.

Both the United States and France have sent troops and hundreds of millions of dollars of military and humanitarian aid in recent years to Niger, which was a French colony until 1960. The country was seen as the last working with the West against extremism in a Francophone region where anti-French sentiment had opened the way for the Russian private military group Wagner.

After neighboring Mali and Burkina Faso ousted the French military and began working with Wagner mercenaries, Blinken visited Niger in March to strengthen ties and announce $150 million in direct assistance, calling the country "a model of democracy."

The US will consider cutting aid if the coup is successful, the State Department said Monday. Aid is "very much in the balance depending on the outcome of the actions in the country," said department spokesman Matt Miller. "US assistance hinges on continued democratic governance in Niger."

France said Monday that President Emmanuel Macron is closely monitoring the situation in Niger and has discussed the crisis with regional leaders and European and international partners.

The sanctions could be disastrous and Niger needs to find a solution to avoid them, Prime Minister Ouhoumoudou Mahamadou told French media outlet Radio France Internationale on Sunday.

"When people say there’s an embargo, land borders are closed, air borders are closed, it’s extremely difficult for people ... Niger is a country that relies heavily on the international community," he said.

In the capital of Niger, many people live in makeshift shelters tied together with slats of wood, sheets and plastic tarps because they can’t pay rent. They scramble daily to make enough money to feed their children.

Since the 1990s, the 15-nation ECOWAS has tried to protect democracies against the threat of coups, with mixed success.

Four nations are run by military governments in West and Central Africa, where there have been nine successful or attempted coups since 2020.

In the 1990s, ECOWAS intervened in Liberia during its civil war, one of the bloodiest conflicts in Africa and one that left many wary of intervening in internal conflicts. In 2017, ECOWAS intervened in Gambia to prevent the new president’s predecessor, Yahya Jammeh, from disrupting the handover of power. Around 7,000 troops from Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal entered the country, according to the Global Observatory, which provides analysis on peace and security issues. The intervention was largely seen as accomplishing its mission.



From Haftar to Dbeibah: The Map of Control and Influence in Libya

Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
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From Haftar to Dbeibah: The Map of Control and Influence in Libya

Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 

Libya, once held together under the iron grip of Muammar Gaddafi, exploded into chaos after his ouster in 2011. Fourteen years later, the country remains fractured, yet a new map of military, political, and territorial control has emerged. It reflects not stability but shifting alliances, entrenched divisions, and the tug-of-war between rival powers vying for supremacy, from Khalifa Haftar in the east to Abdul Hamid Dbeibah in the west.

In 2014, General Khalifa Haftar, a former Gaddafi-era officer, launched a campaign to rebuild Libya’s disbanded army. As Tripoli and other western cities welcomed Islamist factions and extremist militias, Haftar began consolidating forces under a new banner -the Libyan National Army. Backed by the eastern-based House of Representatives, he was formally appointed commander-in-chief in 2015 by Speaker Aguila Saleh and was promoted to Field Marshal the following year.

Haftar’s supporters, such as Khaled Al-Turjuman, view this effort as a revival of the national military. What began as a force of just over 300 personnel has reportedly grown to more than 120,000 officers and soldiers. A recent military parade in Benghazi put this strength on full display, showcasing a broad arsenal of advanced weaponry. Haftar took the opportunity to issue a warning to rivals: “In the critical moment, the army will have the final word.”

Haftar’s influence extends beyond eastern Libya. His forces have consolidated control from Benghazi through Sirte and Jufra in the center, down to the southern borders with Sudan, Chad, Niger, and Algeria. One of the most strategically vital areas under his command is the oil crescent along the northeastern coast, encompassing Ras Lanuf, Sidra, Brega, and Zueitina, essential hubs for Libya’s oil exports.

Since 2019, Haftar has shifted his focus further south, targeting key cities such as Sabha, Brak al-Shati, and Ubari, and extending his reach to the far southwest in Ghat. He also controls southeastern border areas like Kufra, Al-Jawf, Al-Uwaynat, and the Tibesti Mountains near Chad. This southern push, some analysts argue, is part of a calculated strategy to project power beyond the traditional east-west divide. While Tripoli remains home to key sovereign institutions such as the Central Bank and National Oil Corporation, Haftar’s growing territorial grip has led critics to accuse him of attempting to militarize the state.

Military analyst Adel Abdul Kafi notes that most of Libya’s southern borders are now under Haftar’s effective control. He also points to a US-backed initiative involving joint forces from the east and west to secure Libya’s frontiers and coastlines.

Control over Libya’s energy resources remains a central pillar of Haftar’s power. Beyond the oil ports along the coast, he oversees several major oilfields in the south. The Sharara field in Ubari, producing approximately 315,000 barrels per day, and the El Feel (Elephant) field, with around 70,000 barrels daily, are among the most significant. Though these fields are managed by the National Oil Corporation headquartered in Tripoli, protection on the ground often comes from a patchwork of facility guards and local militias -- some loyal to Haftar, others to Dbeibah, and some switching sides as needed.

Haftar commands a network of military bases that support his campaigns in the east, center, and south. These include the Jufra Airbase, used as a launchpad during his failed 2019 offensive on Tripoli; Al-Khadim (also known as Al-Kharouba), where drone operations have been reported; Al-Abrag and Gamal Abdel Nasser airbases in the east; the Tamanhent base near Sabha; and Brak Al-Shati, which secures critical southern supply lines. Another strategic base, Ma’tan al-Sarra near Kufra, is rumored to host Russian forces, giving Moscow a potential gateway to the African Sahel.

Haftar’s military strength is matched by political clout. Though the eastern-based government of Osama Hammad is not internationally recognized, it operates with Haftar’s backing and funds development projects through the Libya Development and Reconstruction Fund, headed by Qassem Haftar, the commander’s son. Despite their expired mandates, the House of Representatives and the High Council of State continue to pass legislation and negotiate over the formation of a new government—deepening Libya’s institutional deadlock.

The Presidential Council, headed by Mohamed al-Menfi, was established under the 2020 Geneva agreement and holds formal international legitimacy. However, its actual power is limited. Though it is nominally the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, internal divisions and political agreements strip it of much of its authority. Even in the west, where it is based, the Council is overshadowed by the Government of National Unity under Abdul Hamid Dbeibah.

Dbeibah’s legitimacy has come under increasing scrutiny, especially after violent clashes erupted in Tripoli in May, sparked by the killing of militia leader Abdul Ghani Al-Kikli (Ghneiwa). These confrontations exposed the fragility of the security landscape in the capital and significantly weakened Dbeibah’s position. Though his term officially ended after being appointed in early 2021, he refuses to step down without elections, leaning on continued international support.

Despite controlling public spending and state institutions, Dbeibah’s grip on security is largely dependent on a volatile network of militias. Previously aligned with powerful groups like the Stability Support Apparatus and the Special Deterrence Force, Dbeibah has since fallen out with many of these factions. Following Ghneiwa’s death, he disbanded the SSA and entered into open conflict with Abdul Rauf Kara’s Deterrence Force, escalating tensions across Tripoli.

Today, Dbeibah relies primarily on the 444th Combat Brigade, led by Major General Mahmoud Hamza, who also heads Military Intelligence in western Libya. He is supported by the Joint Operations Force in Misrata and other militia groups, including Battalion 55 under Muammar Al-Dawi. These forces benefit from extensive support from Türkiye, which provides Bayraktar TB2 drones, limited radar systems, and military training facilities under prior agreements signed with former Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj.

Western Libya’s military infrastructure includes several important bases. Al-Watiya Airbase, southwest of Tripoli near the Tunisian border, is vital for control over the western region. Mitiga Airbase in Tripoli, currently controlled by the Deterrence Force, serves as a civilian and military airport. Abu Sitta Naval Base in Tripoli functions as the headquarters of the General Staff, with strong Turkish naval ties. Misrata Airbase, among the country’s most fortified, hosts Turkish personnel and hardware. Other key sites include Yarmouk Camp in Tripoli -- now reportedly housing Syrian mercenaries --April 7 Camp in Bab Ben Ghashir, and the Khums Naval Base near the city of Khums.

Tripoli remains the nerve center of Libya’s institutional framework, hosting the Unity Government, the Presidential Council, the High Council of State, the Central Bank, and the National Oil Corporation. Yet, control over western Libya’s border regions with Tunisia, Algeria, and Niger remains tenuous. In areas like Ubari, Ghat, and Murzuq -home to Tuareg and Tebu communities - authority shifts frequently among competing forces.

The frontline between the rival eastern and western coalitions lies just west of Sirte. Haftar’s forces control the city, while Dbeibah’s militias are stationed in its outskirts, near Misrata. Buwairat al-Husun marks the main demarcation line. Periodic troop mobilizations and skirmishes in the area fuel ongoing fears of a new confrontation.