UN: Most Oil Removed from Decaying Safer Tanker Off Yemen

Workers prepare to transfer oil from the 47-year-old supertanker FSO Safer (L) to a UN-purchased replacement vessel in a bid to avert a catastrophic spill in the Red Sea off war-torn Yemen - AFP
Workers prepare to transfer oil from the 47-year-old supertanker FSO Safer (L) to a UN-purchased replacement vessel in a bid to avert a catastrophic spill in the Red Sea off war-torn Yemen - AFP
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UN: Most Oil Removed from Decaying Safer Tanker Off Yemen

Workers prepare to transfer oil from the 47-year-old supertanker FSO Safer (L) to a UN-purchased replacement vessel in a bid to avert a catastrophic spill in the Red Sea off war-torn Yemen - AFP
Workers prepare to transfer oil from the 47-year-old supertanker FSO Safer (L) to a UN-purchased replacement vessel in a bid to avert a catastrophic spill in the Red Sea off war-torn Yemen - AFP

Most of the oil on board a rusting supertanker off war-torn Yemen has been moved to a replacement vessel in a bid to avert a catastrophic spill, the United Nations has said.

The transfer of 1.14 million barrels of Marib light crude from the 47-year-old FSO Safer to the new vessel started last week.

"More than half the oil aboard the decaying FSO Safer has been transferred to the replacement vessel Yemen in the past seven days," the UN resident coordinator for Yemen, David Gressly, said on social media on Tuesday.

Gressly had previously said the entire transfer would take less than three weeks.

The UN Development Program project manager for the Safer, Mohammed Mudawi, said more than 636,000 barrels of oil had been pumped to the replacement tanker.

"We reached the 55 percent mark today (Wednesday) at 9:00 am (0600 GMT)," Mudawi told AFP.

"Pumping continues very smoothly."

The UN hopes the $143 million operation -- for which it is still $20 million short -- will eliminate the risk of an environmental disaster that it estimates would cost $20 billion to clean up.

Because of the Safer's position in the Red Sea, a spill would also cost billions of dollars per day in shipping disruptions through the Bab al-Mandab Strait to the Suez Canal, while devastating ecosystems, coastal fishing communities and lifeline ports.

The Safer, a floating storage and offloading facility, has been moored around 50 kilometres (30 miles) from the port of Hodeida since the 1980s.

The ageing vessel, with its corroding hull, is carrying four times as much oil as was spilled in the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster off Alaska.



Report: Hamas Tried to Convince Iran to Join Oct. 7 Attack

Hamas leader Yahya al-Sinwar. (AFP file photo)
Hamas leader Yahya al-Sinwar. (AFP file photo)
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Report: Hamas Tried to Convince Iran to Join Oct. 7 Attack

Hamas leader Yahya al-Sinwar. (AFP file photo)
Hamas leader Yahya al-Sinwar. (AFP file photo)

The minutes of 10 meetings among Hamas’s top leaders showed that the Palestinian armed group had avoided escalation several times since 2021 as it sought Iran’s support to launch a large assault on Israel, The New York Times reported on Saturday.

A report by Ronen Bergman, Adam Rasgon and Patrick Kingsley, said that for more than two years, Hamas leader Yahya al-Sinwar huddled with his top commanders and plotted what they hoped would be the most devastating and destabilizing attack on Israel in the group’s four-decade history.

The documents, which represent a breakthrough in understanding Hamas, also show extensive efforts to deceive Israel about its intentions as the group laid the groundwork for a bold assault and a regional conflagration that Sinwar hoped would cause Israel to “collapse.”

The documents consist of minutes from 10 secret planning meetings of a small group of Hamas political and military leaders in the run-up to the attack, on Oct. 7, 2023. The minutes include 30 pages of previously undisclosed details about the way Hamas’s leadership works and the preparations that went into its attack.

The documents, which were verified by The New York Times, lay out the main strategies and assessments of the leadership group.

Hamas initially planned to carry out the attack, which it code-named “the big project,” in the fall of 2022. But it delayed executing the plan as it tried to persuade Iran and Hezbollah to participate.

Also, as they prepared arguments aimed at Hezbollah, the Hamas leaders said that Israel’s “internal situation” — an apparent reference to turmoil over Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s contentious plans to overhaul the judiciary — was among the reasons they were “compelled to move toward a strategic battle.”

In July 2023, Hamas dispatched a top official to Lebanon, where he met with a senior Iranian commander and requested help with striking sensitive sites at the start of the assault.

The senior Iranian commander told Hamas that Tehran and Hezbollah were supportive in principle, but needed more time to prepare; the minutes do not say how detailed a plan was presented by Hamas to its allies.

The documents also say that Hamas planned to discuss the attack in more detail at a subsequent meeting with Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader at the time, but do not clarify whether the discussion happened.

Hamas felt assured of its allies’ general support, but concluded it might need to go ahead without their full involvement — in part to stop Israel from deploying an advanced new air-defense system before the assault took place.