The October 1973 war, a defining moment in the Arab Israeli conflict, continues to be a subject of intense scrutiny for both Arab and foreign researchers.
Decades since its outbreak, new information and previously classified documents have come to light, adding complexity and controversy to the narrative of this historic conflict.
Two distinct narratives have emerged, each presenting a vastly different perspective on the War.
The first narrative portrays it as a decisive military victory for the Arab armies, backed by regional support and underscored by the significance of oil as a diplomatic weapon.
The perspective emphasized the role of Arab military forces in challenging the Israeli tanks and fighter jets.
On the other hand, the Israeli narrative praises Tel Aviv's response to the surprise attack on what they call "Yom Kippur."
It highlights Israel's reaction as it faced the unexpected assaults by Egyptian and Syrian forces in the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights.
However, amid these conflicting narratives, questions persist about the proper sequence of events during this pivotal war.
As the 50th anniversary approaches and Egypt and Syria have yet to release their classified documents, there is an increasing urgency to revisit and reassess the war records, particularly regarding communications between the US and world leaders.
- Failure or Overconfidence?
The Israeli surprise from the sudden Arab attack on October 6, 1973, sent shockwaves through various military fronts, creating significant confusion.
It was to such an extent that US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger found himself seeking answers about whether Washington had received any prior warnings about the impending war that were disregarded.
A classified document numbered 63, summarizing meetings at the US State Department on October 23, 1973, sheds light on the situation.
It reveals that Kissinger personally reviewed all pre-war intelligence, outlining a strategy rooted in the unique US-Israeli relationship.
The Director of Intelligence at the US State Department, Ray Cline, attributed the failure of intelligence to predict and prevent the war to their reliance on Israeli assessments.
Signs indicating imminent military action by Egypt and Syria had accumulated as early as September 1973.
Back then, King Hussein of Jordan warned Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir that the Syrian army was in position and ready for action.
- Hours before the Battle
As the clock approached the afternoon of October 6, 1973, the US National Security Council (NSC) held an emergency session to discuss the evolving situation in the Middle East.
A memo from NSC member William Quandt reveals the chaos of that meeting and the heated debates about the seriousness of the Egyptian-Syrian attack and the Soviet evacuation of families from Cairo and Damascus.
The document also highlights an intelligence consensus that Arab states were not prepared to wage war against Israel as long as the military balance remained uneven.
However, the military balance would soon shift dramatically with the outbreak of the conflict.
- Soviet Message
The Soviet Union sent a message to Nixon and Kissinger on that fateful day. The message conveyed that Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev, like the US, was surprised by Egypt and Syria's decision to go to war.
Brezhnev considered this a significant miscalculation and expressed concerns about a catastrophic military or political event for the allies, Egypt and Syria.
- Initial Assessment
Considering the time difference, while it was afternoon Washington time, the National Security Council was meeting regarding developments in the Middle East.
"As Israelis observed Yom Kippur, the Egyptians and Syrians launched their attacks. Just after 2:00 PM (Cairo time), 100,000 Egyptian troops and 1,000 tanks engulfed Israeli forces on the east bank of the Suez Canal while 35,000 Syrian troops and 800 tanks broke through Israeli positions on the Golan Heights," according to the meeting memo.
In the meeting, attendees discussed several options for dealing with risks arising from the cutbacks in Arab oil production and the consequences of a heavy defeat for the Arabs.
Kissinger's advisers proposed reducing Soviet influence, provided that it could not result from a "major Arab defeat" because that could endanger US interests in the region, destroy the possibility of a settlement, and weaken "moderate" Arab regimes.
The advantages of finding ways to "minimize" Arab "loss of face" required serious consideration.
- Kissinger and Eban
Another US memorandum documents a conversation between Kissinger and Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban at 9:07 AM, during which the US official indirectly assured that Washington would not immediately go to the Security Council.
Later, Eban spoke with Kissinger's executive assistant, Lawrence Eagleburger, and registered his appreciation that Kissinger would defer UN action so that Israel had "time to recoup its position."
During this time, it was clear to the US that the Soviets were interested in a cease-fire, and so was President Hafez al-Assad, if the fighting stopped, he would have control of the Golan Heights.
Sadat, however, was not ready to halt until he had a stronger position on the Sinai.
- China exchanges
By 9 PM in Washington, Kissinger conversed with Chinese Ambassador Huang Zhen. He told the Chinese diplomat that Washington's "strategic objective is to prevent the Soviets from getting a dominant position in the Middle East."
Kissinger wanted to demonstrate to the Arab states that "whoever gets help from the Soviet Union cannot achieve his objective."
The Chinese were sympathetic to the Arab cause, so Kissinger had to be able to ensure progress on Arab grievances.
Perhaps this prompted Kissinger to attempt to reassure the Chinese ambassador, stating that it would be possible for Washington to offer security guarantees for "new borders after the settlement."
- The Second Day
Despite half a century since the war, the first page of a document between Kissinger and Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz is primarily illegible, except for a few scraps on US supply of Sidewinder (air-to-air) missiles and bomb racks.
However, it provides interesting details on the early moments of the war, such as Israeli cabinet debates on whether to preempt or not.
Apparently, advice that Kissinger had given in the past--"whatever happens, don't be the one that strikes first"--played no small part in Meir's thinking.
- A miserably tough day
During the first day of the fighting, Arab forces made significant gains. Given the tremendous strategic value of the Golan Heights, so close to Israeli population centers, the Israelis started to throw in units there first.
To keep officials abreast of developments, the State Department's Middle East Task Force, lodged at the Department's basement Operations Center, regularly issued "sitreps" on military and political consequences.
At the end of the second day of the fighting, it showed a grim situation: "major losses on both sides," a "miserably tough day" for the Israelis.
- Pivotal Moment
The ninth and tenth of October 1973 can be considered a pivotal battle moment.
The Egyptian and Syrian armies surprised everyone with a resounding defeat of Israeli tanks, which had attempted to regain control of the situation in Sinai and the Golan Heights.
Early Tuesday morning, Kissinger received a call from Dinitz that Israeli forces were in a more "difficult" position. A counter-offensive launched the previous day had failed with significant losses.
Dinitz acknowledged that the Israelis had lost over 400 tanks to the Egyptians and 100 to the Syrians.
He explained that Egyptian armor and surface-to-air missiles were taking their toll in the air and ground battle, and the Israeli cabinet had decided that it had to "get all equipment and planes by air that we can."
Kissinger, who had assumed that Tel Aviv could recapture territory without significant aid infusions, was perplexed by the bad news--"Explain to me, how could 400 tanks be lost to the Egyptians?"
Dinitz and Kissinger met privately, without a notetaker, to discuss Meir's request for a secret meeting with Nixon to plea for military aid, a proposal that Kissinger quickly dismissed because it would strengthen Moscow's influence in the Arab world.
- Nuclear blackmail
In a remarkable turn, the document also reveals that to underline the situation's urgency, "Dinitz may have introduced an element of nuclear blackmail into the private discussion."
Meir had rejected military advice for nuclear weapons use. She had ordered at least the arming and alerting of Jericho missiles to influence Washington.
According to the document, "Kissinger has never gone on record on this issue, and no US documentation on the US Israeli nuclear posture during the war has been declassified."
Later, Kissinger was responsive to the pleas for more assistance.
In an evening meeting on the same day, Kissinger informed Dinitz that Nixon had approved the list of "consumable" items sought by the Israelis (except for laser bombs) that would be shipped.
"Moreover, aircraft and tanks would be replaced if the need became acute."
To ensure that the US role had low visibility, Israeli cargo plans would have the El Al markings painted out.
Moreover, the discussion of arrangements to charter US commercial aircraft for shipping war material began on Washington's side.
During that meeting, Dinitz had better news to report progress on the Golan Heights and the massive destruction of Syrian tanks.
- Oil Threat
A report prepared jointly by the US State Department and the National Security Council states that while Arab and Israeli ground forces were "sparring and regrouping," Syrian and Israeli air forces were engaged in battle, and the Israeli Air Force bombed the international airport at Damascus.
Meanwhile, Greek, Israeli, and US intelligence picked up signs that the Soviets were airlifting supplies to their Arab clients.
"The Israelis speculate the main cargo is missiles."
The Soviets had made their airlift decision early in the war, believing that extensive support could enhance Moscow's prestige in the Arab world.
The decision had significant implications for the course of the war; not only did the airlift encourage the Egyptians and Syrians to continue fighting, but it came to be seen in Washington as a "challenge" to US power.
The report also mentions that the US press had already observed an Israeli Boeing 707 picking up missiles and bombs in Virginia.
Moreover, Saudi Arabia's Minister of Petroleum, Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, suggested that "the US military supply of Israel would have a cost cutback in oil production."
