October War: Israel Hinted to the US at Using Nuclear Weapons

Israeli Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan and US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (AFP)
Israeli Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan and US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (AFP)
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October War: Israel Hinted to the US at Using Nuclear Weapons

Israeli Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan and US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (AFP)
Israeli Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan and US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (AFP)

The October 1973 war, a defining moment in the Arab Israeli conflict, continues to be a subject of intense scrutiny for both Arab and foreign researchers.

Decades since its outbreak, new information and previously classified documents have come to light, adding complexity and controversy to the narrative of this historic conflict.

Two distinct narratives have emerged, each presenting a vastly different perspective on the War.

The first narrative portrays it as a decisive military victory for the Arab armies, backed by regional support and underscored by the significance of oil as a diplomatic weapon.
The perspective emphasized the role of Arab military forces in challenging the Israeli tanks and fighter jets.

On the other hand, the Israeli narrative praises Tel Aviv's response to the surprise attack on what they call "Yom Kippur."

It highlights Israel's reaction as it faced the unexpected assaults by Egyptian and Syrian forces in the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights.

However, amid these conflicting narratives, questions persist about the proper sequence of events during this pivotal war.

As the 50th anniversary approaches and Egypt and Syria have yet to release their classified documents, there is an increasing urgency to revisit and reassess the war records, particularly regarding communications between the US and world leaders.

- Failure or Overconfidence?

The Israeli surprise from the sudden Arab attack on October 6, 1973, sent shockwaves through various military fronts, creating significant confusion.

It was to such an extent that US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger found himself seeking answers about whether Washington had received any prior warnings about the impending war that were disregarded.

A classified document numbered 63, summarizing meetings at the US State Department on October 23, 1973, sheds light on the situation.

It reveals that Kissinger personally reviewed all pre-war intelligence, outlining a strategy rooted in the unique US-Israeli relationship.

The Director of Intelligence at the US State Department, Ray Cline, attributed the failure of intelligence to predict and prevent the war to their reliance on Israeli assessments.

Signs indicating imminent military action by Egypt and Syria had accumulated as early as September 1973.

Back then, King Hussein of Jordan warned Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir that the Syrian army was in position and ready for action.

- Hours before the Battle

As the clock approached the afternoon of October 6, 1973, the US National Security Council (NSC) held an emergency session to discuss the evolving situation in the Middle East.

A memo from NSC member William Quandt reveals the chaos of that meeting and the heated debates about the seriousness of the Egyptian-Syrian attack and the Soviet evacuation of families from Cairo and Damascus.

The document also highlights an intelligence consensus that Arab states were not prepared to wage war against Israel as long as the military balance remained uneven.

However, the military balance would soon shift dramatically with the outbreak of the conflict.

- Soviet Message

The Soviet Union sent a message to Nixon and Kissinger on that fateful day. The message conveyed that Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev, like the US, was surprised by Egypt and Syria's decision to go to war.

Brezhnev considered this a significant miscalculation and expressed concerns about a catastrophic military or political event for the allies, Egypt and Syria.

- Initial Assessment

Considering the time difference, while it was afternoon Washington time, the National Security Council was meeting regarding developments in the Middle East.

"As Israelis observed Yom Kippur, the Egyptians and Syrians launched their attacks. Just after 2:00 PM (Cairo time), 100,000 Egyptian troops and 1,000 tanks engulfed Israeli forces on the east bank of the Suez Canal while 35,000 Syrian troops and 800 tanks broke through Israeli positions on the Golan Heights," according to the meeting memo.

In the meeting, attendees discussed several options for dealing with risks arising from the cutbacks in Arab oil production and the consequences of a heavy defeat for the Arabs.

Kissinger's advisers proposed reducing Soviet influence, provided that it could not result from a "major Arab defeat" because that could endanger US interests in the region, destroy the possibility of a settlement, and weaken "moderate" Arab regimes.

The advantages of finding ways to "minimize" Arab "loss of face" required serious consideration.

- Kissinger and Eban

Another US memorandum documents a conversation between Kissinger and Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban at 9:07 AM, during which the US official indirectly assured that Washington would not immediately go to the Security Council.

Later, Eban spoke with Kissinger's executive assistant, Lawrence Eagleburger, and registered his appreciation that Kissinger would defer UN action so that Israel had "time to recoup its position."

During this time, it was clear to the US that the Soviets were interested in a cease-fire, and so was President Hafez al-Assad, if the fighting stopped, he would have control of the Golan Heights.

Sadat, however, was not ready to halt until he had a stronger position on the Sinai.

- China exchanges

By 9 PM in Washington, Kissinger conversed with Chinese Ambassador Huang Zhen. He told the Chinese diplomat that Washington's "strategic objective is to prevent the Soviets from getting a dominant position in the Middle East."

Kissinger wanted to demonstrate to the Arab states that "whoever gets help from the Soviet Union cannot achieve his objective."

The Chinese were sympathetic to the Arab cause, so Kissinger had to be able to ensure progress on Arab grievances.

Perhaps this prompted Kissinger to attempt to reassure the Chinese ambassador, stating that it would be possible for Washington to offer security guarantees for "new borders after the settlement."

- The Second Day

Despite half a century since the war, the first page of a document between Kissinger and Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz is primarily illegible, except for a few scraps on US supply of Sidewinder (air-to-air) missiles and bomb racks.

However, it provides interesting details on the early moments of the war, such as Israeli cabinet debates on whether to preempt or not.

Apparently, advice that Kissinger had given in the past--"whatever happens, don't be the one that strikes first"--played no small part in Meir's thinking.

- A miserably tough day

During the first day of the fighting, Arab forces made significant gains. Given the tremendous strategic value of the Golan Heights, so close to Israeli population centers, the Israelis started to throw in units there first.

To keep officials abreast of developments, the State Department's Middle East Task Force, lodged at the Department's basement Operations Center, regularly issued "sitreps" on military and political consequences.

At the end of the second day of the fighting, it showed a grim situation: "major losses on both sides," a "miserably tough day" for the Israelis.

- Pivotal Moment

The ninth and tenth of October 1973 can be considered a pivotal battle moment.

The Egyptian and Syrian armies surprised everyone with a resounding defeat of Israeli tanks, which had attempted to regain control of the situation in Sinai and the Golan Heights.

Early Tuesday morning, Kissinger received a call from Dinitz that Israeli forces were in a more "difficult" position. A counter-offensive launched the previous day had failed with significant losses.

Dinitz acknowledged that the Israelis had lost over 400 tanks to the Egyptians and 100 to the Syrians.

He explained that Egyptian armor and surface-to-air missiles were taking their toll in the air and ground battle, and the Israeli cabinet had decided that it had to "get all equipment and planes by air that we can."

Kissinger, who had assumed that Tel Aviv could recapture territory without significant aid infusions, was perplexed by the bad news--"Explain to me, how could 400 tanks be lost to the Egyptians?"

Dinitz and Kissinger met privately, without a notetaker, to discuss Meir's request for a secret meeting with Nixon to plea for military aid, a proposal that Kissinger quickly dismissed because it would strengthen Moscow's influence in the Arab world.

- Nuclear blackmail
In a remarkable turn, the document also reveals that to underline the situation's urgency, "Dinitz may have introduced an element of nuclear blackmail into the private discussion."

Meir had rejected military advice for nuclear weapons use. She had ordered at least the arming and alerting of Jericho missiles to influence Washington.

According to the document, "Kissinger has never gone on record on this issue, and no US documentation on the US Israeli nuclear posture during the war has been declassified."

Later, Kissinger was responsive to the pleas for more assistance.

In an evening meeting on the same day, Kissinger informed Dinitz that Nixon had approved the list of "consumable" items sought by the Israelis (except for laser bombs) that would be shipped.

"Moreover, aircraft and tanks would be replaced if the need became acute."

To ensure that the US role had low visibility, Israeli cargo plans would have the El Al markings painted out.

Moreover, the discussion of arrangements to charter US commercial aircraft for shipping war material began on Washington's side.

During that meeting, Dinitz had better news to report progress on the Golan Heights and the massive destruction of Syrian tanks.

- Oil Threat

A report prepared jointly by the US State Department and the National Security Council states that while Arab and Israeli ground forces were "sparring and regrouping," Syrian and Israeli air forces were engaged in battle, and the Israeli Air Force bombed the international airport at Damascus.

Meanwhile, Greek, Israeli, and US intelligence picked up signs that the Soviets were airlifting supplies to their Arab clients.

"The Israelis speculate the main cargo is missiles."

The Soviets had made their airlift decision early in the war, believing that extensive support could enhance Moscow's prestige in the Arab world.

The decision had significant implications for the course of the war; not only did the airlift encourage the Egyptians and Syrians to continue fighting, but it came to be seen in Washington as a "challenge" to US power.

The report also mentions that the US press had already observed an Israeli Boeing 707 picking up missiles and bombs in Virginia.

Moreover, Saudi Arabia's Minister of Petroleum, Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, suggested that "the US military supply of Israel would have a cost cutback in oil production."

 

 



Can Iran Legally Impose Tolls on the Strait of Hormuz?

FILE PHOTO: Cargo ships in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam governance, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: Cargo ships in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam governance, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer/File Photo
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Can Iran Legally Impose Tolls on the Strait of Hormuz?

FILE PHOTO: Cargo ships in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam governance, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: Cargo ships in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam governance, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer/File Photo

Tehran has sought to tighten its grip over the Strait of Hormuz by charging tolls on vessels to ensure safe passage, in conjunction with Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The following explains law governing toll collections and actions that countries opposed to tolls might take, according to Reuters.

WHAT IS THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ?

The Strait of Hormuz is ‌a waterway connecting the Gulf with the Gulf of Oman, and located within Iran's and Oman's territorial waters. It is perhaps the world's most important energy shipping lane. About 20% of the world's oil passes through it.

The waterway is about 104 miles (167 km) long. Its width varies, and at its narrowest point provides 2-mile channels for inbound and outbound shipping, separated by a 2-mile buffer zone.

Iran effectively closed the strait following US-Israeli strikes on the country, and has demanded a right ⁠to collect tolls as a precondition to ending the war. The status of any toll collections so far could not immediately be confirmed.

WHAT LAW GOVERNS PASSAGE ON THE STRAIT?

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, opens new tab, sometimes known as UNCLOS, was adopted in 1982 and has been in force since 1994.

Article 38 provides vessels a right of unimpeded "transit passage" through more than 100 straits worldwide, including the Strait of Hormuz.

The treaty allows a country bordering a strait to regulate passage within its "territorial sea," up to 12 nautical miles from its border, but shall permit "innocent passage."

Passage is innocent if it is not prejudicial to a country's peace, good order and security. Military action, serious pollution, spying and fishing are not permitted. The concept of innocent passage was key to a 1949 International Court ‌of ⁠Justice case concerning the Corfu Channel, along the coasts of Albania and Greece.

Approximately 170 countries and the European Union have ratified UNCLOS. Iran and the United States have not. This raises the question of whether the treaty's rules affording freedom of maritime navigation have become part of customary international law, or bind only ratifying countries.

Experts say UNCLOS has become or is generally viewed as customary international law. Some non-ratifying countries may ⁠argue that they need not follow the treaty because they persistently and consistently object. Iran has argued that it has made such objections. The United States disputes Iran's authority to charge tolls.

HOW CAN TOLLS BE CHALLENGED?

There is no formal mechanism to enforce UNCLOS. The International Tribunal for the Law ⁠of the Sea in Hamburg, Germany, which the treaty established, and the International Court of Justice in The Hague, Netherlands could issue rulings but cannot enforce them.

Countries and businesses have other potential means to counteract tolls.

A willing state or coalition of states could ⁠try to enforce the treaty. The UN Security Council could pass a resolution opposing tolls.

Companies could redirect shipments away from the Strait of Hormuz, and have begun doing so. Countries could expand sanctions targeting financial transactions believed to benefit Iran's government, by sanctioning companies willing to pay tolls.


How China’s Weapons Transfers to Iran Have Evolved Over Decades

FILE PHOTO: A member of the People's Liberation Army stands as the strategic strike group displays DF-5C nuclear missiles during a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2025. REUTERS/Tingshu Wang/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: A member of the People's Liberation Army stands as the strategic strike group displays DF-5C nuclear missiles during a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2025. REUTERS/Tingshu Wang/File Photo
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How China’s Weapons Transfers to Iran Have Evolved Over Decades

FILE PHOTO: A member of the People's Liberation Army stands as the strategic strike group displays DF-5C nuclear missiles during a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2025. REUTERS/Tingshu Wang/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: A member of the People's Liberation Army stands as the strategic strike group displays DF-5C nuclear missiles during a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2025. REUTERS/Tingshu Wang/File Photo

Washington: David Pierson

For much of the last two decades, China has maintained a delicate balance in its military relationship with Iran, offering often indirect assistance instead of arms sales.

That approach is now drawing renewed attention after US officials said intelligence agencies were assessing whether China may have shipped shoulder-fired missiles to Iran in recent weeks. President Trump has said he would impose an additional 50 percent tariff on Chinese goods if the assessment proves accurate. China has denied the claim, calling it “pure fabrication” and has vowed to “resolutely retaliate” if the Trump administration goes through with tariffs.

The American officials said the information obtained by US intelligence agencies was not definitive. But if proven true, it would be a significant tactical change in the way Beijing supports its closest strategic partner in the Middle East.

Chinese arms sales to Iran exploded in the 1980s and have all but vanished in the last decade to comply with a United Nations embargo and US sanctions. Chinese support for Iran in recent years has instead come in the form of components that could be used in both civilian technologies as well as missiles and drones.

China has a major stake in the crisis in Iran. About a third of its total crude oil imports come from the Arabian Gulf.

Here is how China’s military support for Iran has evolved over the years:

The 1980s: The Boom Years

The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980 coincided with major market reforms in China when the leader at the time, Deng Xiaoping, ordered state-owned companies to wean themselves off government support and instead seek commercial profit.

Chinese state-run defense companies were suddenly empowered to export their wares. That resulted in a deluge of Chinese missiles, fighter jets, tanks, armored vehicles and assault rifles being sold to Iran starting in 1982 and peaking in 1987, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

At the same time, China sold even more arms to Iraq, resulting in a situation in which the two warring sides clashed with each other using the same Chinese weapons.

The Reagan administration opposed China’s arms sales to Iran, particularly Silkworm anti-ship cruise missiles. Tehran used the missiles in attacks in Kuwaiti waters in 1987 that struck an American-owned tanker and an American-registered tanker.

The United States responded by curbing exports of some high-technology products to China. China denied selling arms directly to Iran, but said it would do more to prevent its military exports from reaching Iran through intermediaries.

The 1990s: Technology Transfers

Following the war, Iran set out to develop its own military-industrial base with the help of China. One of its key products was the Noor anti-ship cruise missile, which had been reverse-engineered through purchases of Chinese C-802 cruise missiles.

“China played a major role in supporting Iran’s military modernization for decades, especially in developing Iran’s missile capabilities,” said Brian Hart, a fellow with the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Iran also received help from China in building missile-production facilities and even in constructing a missile test range east of Tehran, wrote Bates Gill, a longtime China expert, in the Middle East Review of International Affairs.

Under US pressure to curtail its sale of finished weapons, particularly missiles, to Iran, China began increasing exports of machine tools and components that could be used for both military and civilian purposes.

The 2000s to the Present: Dual-Use Technologies

In 2006, the United Nations imposed sanctions on Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. China voted in favor of the resolution and largely pivoted away from new, formal arms contracts with Tehran.

The shift was as much about regional strategy as it was about international law. Starting in the mid-2010s, China began deepening its strategic relationships with Gulf countries including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as Qatar.

China continued to supply Iran with dual-use technologies and materials that have helped it amass an arsenal of missiles and drones.

That included chemicals used to produce fuel for ballistic missiles and components for drones, such as radio frequency connectors and turbine blades.

But Mr. Hart said China was still “a critical form of support, given Iran’s reliance on ballistic missiles and drones to attack US and Israeli forces and other countries in the region.”

The US Treasury Department has sanctioned Chinese and Hong Kong front companies it says were set up to source parts and ingredients for ballistic missiles and drones for Iran.

Suspicions are also growing that Iran is using its access to China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system, an alternative to the US-owned Global Positioning System, for military purposes. Last month, a US congressional agency said BeiDou may have been used to direct Iran’s drone and missile strikes across the Middle East.

The New York Times


A Look at Sudan’s War by the Numbers

Sudanese refugees, who have fled the violence in their country, line up to receive food rations from World Food Program (WFP), in Adre Chad July 20, 2023. (Reuters)
Sudanese refugees, who have fled the violence in their country, line up to receive food rations from World Food Program (WFP), in Adre Chad July 20, 2023. (Reuters)
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A Look at Sudan’s War by the Numbers

Sudanese refugees, who have fled the violence in their country, line up to receive food rations from World Food Program (WFP), in Adre Chad July 20, 2023. (Reuters)
Sudanese refugees, who have fled the violence in their country, line up to receive food rations from World Food Program (WFP), in Adre Chad July 20, 2023. (Reuters)

Sudan is entering a fourth year of war between the military and paramilitary forces.

The fighting has pushed many people into famine, caused a huge displacement crisis and left over 30 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. Parties have been accused of committing atrocities like ethnic cleansing, extrajudicial killings and sexual violence against civilians.

Here's a look at the war by the numbers:

59,000 At least this many people have been killed, according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data, or ACLED. Aid groups say the true toll could be much higher as access to areas of fighting across the vast country remains limited.

4.5 million About this many people have fled the country to places like Egypt, South Sudan, Libya and Chad.

9 million About this many people remain displaced in Sudan.

19 million More than this many people face acute hunger, according to the World Food Program.

24% This is the amount that fuel prices have shot up in Sudan since conflict in the Middle East escalated.

354 This is the number of community kitchens that have closed over the last six months after providing a lifeline for millions of people, according to Islamic Relief.

Over 4,300 About this many children have been killed or maimed in the war, according to UNICEF.

8 million At least this many children are still out of school, according to UNICEF.

11% About this many schools are being used by warring sides or are shelters for displaced people, according to UNICEF.

63% This many of Sudan's health facilities are fully or partially functioning, according to World Health Organization chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus.

217 This is the number of verified attacks on health facilities since the war began, according to the WHO.

1,032 This was the number of civilians killed by air and drone strikes in 2025, according to ACLED, as a surge in drone strikes took a growing toll.