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King Abdulaziz's Final Months: Key Decisions Shaping State, Institutions, and Enduring Legacy

King Abdulaziz in a military parade in Taif, Saudi Arabia (Asharq Al-Awsat)
King Abdulaziz in a military parade in Taif, Saudi Arabia (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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King Abdulaziz's Final Months: Key Decisions Shaping State, Institutions, and Enduring Legacy

King Abdulaziz in a military parade in Taif, Saudi Arabia (Asharq Al-Awsat)
King Abdulaziz in a military parade in Taif, Saudi Arabia (Asharq Al-Awsat)

For decades, the history of King Abdulaziz has captivated historians and researchers of diverse backgrounds and nationalities.

Dozens of research papers, studies, and writings have explored various facets of this history, encompassing not only the political career of the king but also delving into his leadership persona, strategic thinking, military prowess, and visionary aspirations.

It is not merely the history of a monarch but rather the history of a kingdom and the chronicle of a nation.

The writer and diplomat, Khair al-Din al-Zarkali, vividly illustrates how, in less than 50 years, “one man succeeded in establishing what 12 centuries failed to create or bring forth between the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf.”

Al-Zarkali describes this achievement as the unification of emirates, the formation of a nation, the construction of a state, and the establishment of a civilization.

Furthermore, the Saudi author and historian, Mohammed Hussein Zaidan, adds, “King Abdulaziz is the crown jewel of his era. He restored dignity to the Arabian Peninsula within the grand entity.”

British writer and journalist, Cecil Roberts, explains how “King Abdulaziz filled a significant void in history, extending his reign over an expanse comparable to the combined territories of England, France, and Germany.”

“He acquired a kingdom with his sword and secured its protection through politics,” adds Roberts.

It is likely that the king, who lived for approximately 80 years, was born in 1876 in Riyadh, while his death was recorded on 9 November 1953 in Taif.

Despite seven decades having passed since his departure, numerous details surrounding that event require clarification, some demand elucidation, and others necessitate correction.

In addition to these, there is a need for careful scrutiny, verification, and documenting the facts surrounding the king’s death and the official and popular reactions it elicited.

King Abdulaziz was not just a ruler; he was a bearer of a message, a catalyst for progress, a nation-builder, and a unifier of the people.

Documentation and record-keeping also call for an examination of how the sons of King Abdulaziz dealt with this tragic event.

Despite their profound loss, their monumental task of assuming governance responsibilities, orchestrating the transition of power, ensuring the country's stability, and managing state affairs has not received its due share of documentation.

What constitutionalists commonly term as the “power vacuum” in many cases, especially during critical times in a nation’s history, is undoubtedly one of the moments unknown to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia throughout its history.

The reason for this lies in the institutionalized governance framework and constitutional precedents established, with King Abdulaziz taking meticulous measures in the last three months of his life, as depicted in this work.

This November marks the 70th anniversary of King Abdulaziz’s passing.

The throngs that gathered at Riyadh Airport square on the dawn of Saturday, on August 8, 1953, to bid farewell to the founding king were unaware that it would be their final farewell.

At that dawn, the king concluded his prayers, exited from the Murabba Palace for the last time, heading to the airport.

Signs of aging were evident, having been unable to walk for about eight years and relying on a “horse,” a wheelchair gifted to him by the US President Franklin Roosevelt.

In a surge of emotions, Saudi writer and educator Mr. Ahmed Ali Al-Kazimi vividly describes the encounter with the king in 1950.

“We entered the council before the king, and after a while, His Majesty arrived riding a small, beautiful carriage with two large wheels at the back and two small wheels at the front. Above his head was a canopy pushed by one of the attendants,” recounts Al-Kazimi.

“Seeing him in this carriage brought back many memories to my mind, memories of shadows and dreams, all indicating the blessings that accompanied this man throughout his life, from the moment he set out to reclaim the kingdom of his forefathers,” he adds.

The king affectionately named his carriage the “horse” and favored its use.

This decision allowed him to forego walking as he aged and battled with arterial sclerosis, lack of sleep, and stress from overseeing state affairs.

He slept no more than 4 to 6 hours a day and suffered from several episodes that affected his health.

Yet, the king’s charisma, regal presence, and strength remained undiminished, accompanied by the enduring love of the faithful people.

Despite his health challenges, the king was determined to travel to Taif to personally oversee the Hajj season that year.

As the sun rose, the royal plane, a “DC-4 Sky Master,” departed Riyadh around 5:30 AM.

The sunrise seemingly mirrored the dawn of King Abdulaziz's era over Riyadh more than 50 years earlier, marking the unification of the peninsula and the establishment of his rule after centuries of dispersion.

Many wonder if anyone on that plane ascending to the skies could have foreseen that it was their last journey, and that the sun of King Abdulaziz was bidding farewell amidst the takeoff of a squadron of planes carrying the king’s entourage, princes, senior statesmen, the retinue, and the guard.

At precisely 8:20 AM, the royal plane touched down at Hail Airport.

Crown Prince Prince Saud and Foreign Minister Prince Faisal ascended to greet the arrival of the monarch.

On the airport grounds, crowds assembled, including princes, scholars, ministers, Shura Council members, prominent merchants, military leaders, tribal chiefs, mayors, and a multitude of Saudi citizens.

Subsequently, a military band rendered honors to His Majesty, the royal anthem echoed, and applause filled the airport.

A large pavilion was erected for the reception, drawing crowds from Makkah, Madinah, Jeddah, Taif, and their surroundings, all eager to extend their greetings to the king.

The royal procession then left Hail Airport en route to Taif, with villagers lining the sides of the road, joyfully greeting their revered monarch.

As the procession reached the entrance of Taif, the artillery fired 21 welcoming shots, and young cadets from military schools stood in salute, echoing words of welcome and loyalty.

The crowds, extending from the entrance of Taif to the palace (currently King Faisal Road), lined the route, singing national songs.

Triumphal arches, decorations, and Saudi flags adorned the road, raised in all the streets and markets of Taif.

Upon arrival at the Royal Palace, a military salute was rendered, and the royal anthem was played.

Later that evening, the king received delegations from the people of Taif.

A poem by an esteemed poet was recited during the reception, with the locals delivering their words through the schoolteacher at Al-Aziziya School, Mr. Ahmed Kamal, representing them.

The king’s program continued with the reception of official and popular delegations, and the management of state affairs.

The bustling Royal Palace in the city of Taif continued to be filled every day with delegations from various classes, eager to greet our revered king and welcome his auspicious presence.

His Majesty graciously met with them while attending to the ongoing execution of state affairs, the administration of its high policies, and the guidance of its responsible ministries and departments.

His Majesty efficiently reviewed and summarized matters brought to his attention.

The latest official update on King Abdulaziz’s activities in Taif was his reception of the Grand Mufti, Sheikh Mohammed bin Ibrahim Al Al-Sheikh, on October 10, 1953.

On the same day, the king issued one of his most significant and final royal decrees, forming the Council of Ministers and appointing Crown Prince Prince Saud as its head.

The Crown Prince, in turn, delegated the vice-presidency of the council to Prince Faisal.

King Abdulaziz aimed to solidify the institutional framework of the state before his passing, organizing the governance structure and the hierarchy of succession.

From that point forward until the passing of the founding king, the news prominently focused on the activities of the Crown Prince, who served as the Prime Minister and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

This shift indicated King Abdulaziz’s intention to complete the foundational structure of the state and organize the governance apparatus, setting the stage for a clear succession plan.

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Iran in a Quarter Century: Clash Between the ‘Revolution’ and the State

An Iranian woman walks by the former US embassy in Tehran. (AFP)
An Iranian woman walks by the former US embassy in Tehran. (AFP)
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Iran in a Quarter Century: Clash Between the ‘Revolution’ and the State

An Iranian woman walks by the former US embassy in Tehran. (AFP)
An Iranian woman walks by the former US embassy in Tehran. (AFP)

For the past quarter century, Iran endured a bitter conflict between the ideological aspects of the “revolution” and the strategic view aimed at protecting the state and its interests in a changing world.

Despite hopes for radical change, attempts to achieve reform collided with resistance from the traditional centers of power, preventing real reconciliation between the contradiction in the principles of the “revolution” and the demands of national reforms, or at least achieving some form of sustainable agreement between these opposing movements.

Since 2000, Iran witnessed the election of five presidents with limited jurisdiction, and five parliamentary elections, which were dominated by either of the main reformist and conservative movements, amid the ongoing debate over the nature of rule, its agenda and priorities.

Since the 1979 revolution, the jurisdiction of the parliament and government has been fully under the control of the decision-making centers in the country, with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei at the top of the pyramid. The supreme leader enjoys almost absolute power, making him above all state institutions.

Meanwhile, the role of the military and political institutions, such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Guardian Council, expanded as they maintained their role in protecting the ideological principles of the ruling system. The system is based on a constitution that is in turn based on the Wilayat al-Faqih. These institutions are the main tools for preserving the identity of the “Islamic Republic” and bolstering its position that is hostile to the West.

Some 45 years after its “Islamic Revolution”, Iran has yet to reconcile the contradictions between its principles and national interests. (Getty Images)

Khatami and shift in the conflict

The beginning of the new millennium in Iran coincided with a decisive moment in reformist President Mohammed Khatami’s term (1997-2005). The period was marked with the intensification of the confrontation between the reformists and conservatives. The latter sought to obstruct reforms pursued by Khatami, especially in civil freedoms and freedom of expression.

The non-elected institutions that are under Khamenei’s direct supervision, such as the Guardian Council and judiciary, played a decisive role in obstructing reform measures, creating challenges for the reformists in achieving their political and social agendas.

Khatami’s term in office witnessed a major shift in the clash between the supporters of the ideology of the revolution and those calling for achieving strategic interests. He believed that the reforms were a strategic need to secure the continuity of the system of rule and its ability to adapt to internal and external changes. His critics, however, believed that his approach threatened the very foundations of the Wilayat al-Faqih.

Iran worked on improving its relations with the West and boosting its national identity through the Dialogue Among Civilizations, but the September 11, 2001, attacks and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 were a blow to these efforts.

Iran saw in the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime in neighboring Iraq an opportunity to expand its ideological influence through supporting groups that were affiliated with Iran or were established within its territory. The nuclear file also undermined the Dialogue Among Civilizations initiative and efforts to build trust with the West, thereby increasing Iran’s isolation and regional and international tensions.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guards played a main role in the nuclear program and regional wars. (Khamenei’s official website)

IRGC and the regional role

The IRGC played a main role in issues related to the nuclear program, internal developments and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq at the end of Khatami’s term.

In Afghanistan, the IRGC supported the United States in ousting the Taliban from power. In Iraq, the IRGC’s Quds Force led armed Iraqi factions in bolstering Iranian influence that persist to this day. Under General Qassem Soleimani’s leadership, the Quds Force also expanded its operations in Lebanon, helping establish a network that ran parallel to Iranian diplomacy in regional politics.

Iran felt threatened by the US’ bolstered military presence in the region, leading it to expand its security and strategic plans, starting with the nuclear and ballistic missiles programs.

In 2002, the discovery of secret nuclear facilities aroused suspicions among the international community about Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the possibility that it would pursue the production of a nuclear bomb. Amid the rising tensions, the West shifted its priorities towards Tehran to curbing its nuclear activities. Moreover, US officials, especially during President George W. Bush’s term, threatened on numerous occasions to use military force against Iran if it continued to pursue its nuclear ambitions.

Iran has bolstered its influence in the Middle East, stoking tensions with regional powers. (AP)

Nuclear file and internal tensions

The nuclear file has been a source of tension inside and outside Iran ever since. On the domestic level, it sparked debate about the country’s national priorities. The reformists sought to maintain Tehran’s international relations and ease tensions, while the conservatives clung on to their ideological principles.

In 2003, Tehran declared that it was voluntarily ending its uranium enrichment as part of the Amad Plan agreement reached with the European troika. In return, it received a pledge that the file would not be referred to the UN Security Council and that economic ties would be established with Europe. That same year, Iran heavily promoted Khamenei’s fatwa that barred the production, storing or use of nuclear weapons.

The US, however, remained suspicious of Iran’s intentions. It believed that agreements were not enough and it accused Iran of expanding its nuclear program, leading it to impose sanctions on its banks and energy sector. During the term of President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, it referred the program to the Security Council – a move that was welcomed by the international community. The move prompted Iran to adopt an aggressive policy against western powers.

Iran has never officially declared that it was developing nuclear weapons. In 2007, US intelligence released a report that said Tehran had stopped its nuclear weapons development in 2003, helping to soften the American position against it.

Throughout Ahmedinejad’s eight years in office, tensions rose with the West over the nuclear program. Tehran raised its level of uranium enrichment to 20 percent while the president insisted on his country’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology. In return, crippling sanctions were imposed on its nuclear program, oil exports and economy.

Khamenei meets with veterans from the Iraqi-Iranian war. (EPA)

Iran and the ‘Arab Spring’

On the foreign level, Iran aspired to bolster relations with Arab, African and Latin American countries. It also backed armed groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas.

With the eruption of the “Arab Spring” revolts, Iran sought to consolidate its influence in the Middle East, especially in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, stoking tensions with regional powers and Arab countries. Supporting Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria was also a top priority for Ahmedinejad before he was succeeded by Hassan Rouhani.

On the domestic level, Iran went through a huge crisis after Ahmedinejad won the 2009 elections. The wave of “Green Movement” demonstrations erupted in protest against the elections results between Ahmedinejad, and reformist candidates Mir Hossein Moussavi and Mehdi Karroubi.

After Ahmedinejad’s term ended, Iran tried to ease tensions with the West. It took part in nuclear negotiations aimed at managing tensions with the major powers. Two years of negotiations led to the 2015 nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), that suspended UN sanctions on Iran and lifted restrictions on its nuclear program.

The supreme leader played a pivotal role in the negotiations. He set red lines when it came to maintaining Iran’s right to uranium enrichment, lifting economic sanctions and refusing visits to military facilities by international inspectors.

Khamenei cautiously supported Rouhani’s negotiating team at the nuclear talks despite pressure from conservative movements. The negotiations struck a balance between ideology and strategic interests as Iran sought to maintain its “revolutionary” slogans, while adapting to international changes, confronting economic and security challenges and continuing to fund its regional activities to ensure that it remained a main player in the Middle East.

The IRGC continued to consolidate Iran’s influence in the region, especially in Syria and Iraq, and Khamenei threatened to expel American forces from the region. The tensions alarmed the American administration leading then President Donald Trump to pull Washington out of the nuclear deal in 2018.

Qassem Soleimani. (Tasnim)

Patience in handling pressure

In confronting Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign, including preventing Iran from selling oil, Tehran adopted a policy of “walking on the edge of the abyss” and of “strategic patience.” Regional tensions also spiked with the IRGC seizing oil tankers after Tehran threatened to block oil shipping lanes. Trump consequently designated the IRGC as terrorist.

Trump would also order the killing of Quds Forces commander Soleimani in Baghdad in January 2020. The move took Iranian-American tensions to a whole new level and threatened to spark a direct war between the two countries.

In a leaked 2021 recording, then foreign minister Mohammed Javad Zarif called for striking a balance between foreign policy and the policy on the field, a reference to the Quds Force that leads the IRGC’s foreign operations. The recordings exposed an internal rift between the ideological and pragmatic movements in Iran, with the latter wanting to achieve interests, such as the lifting of sanctions.

Zarif defended his conviction that diplomatic work relies on the situation on the ground and vice versa, meaning diplomacy can grant “international legitimacy” to achievements on the field.

When US President Joe Biden came to office, Khamenei used his influence to support the IRGC and showed limited leniency in managing tensions through new nuclear negotiations. Biden tried to return to the nuclear pact with Tehran, but Iran’s unprecedented nuclear measures adopted by conservative late President Ebrahim Raisi and Russia’s war on Ukraine thwarted diplomacy.

18 December 2024, Iran, Tehran: Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian speaks during the Cabinet meeting in Tehran. (Iranian Presidency/dpa)

Raisi and the ‘revolutionary government’

Under Raisi, Tehran pursued diplomacy at the negotiating table with the West, but the talks never made it to the finish line.

His term in office was cut short by his death in a helicopter crash in May 2024. His time in power was marked by loyalty to the supreme leader’s view of forming a “revolutionary government” and limiting state power to conservatives.

Raisi effectively followed in the same footsteps as Ahmedinejad: Tehran sought rapprochement with regional forces, while hoping to circumvent sanctions and speed up its nuclear activities.

Raisi was succeeded by Masoud Pezeshkian, who was backed reformists. He pledged to maintain the policy of turning to the east and bolstering relations with China and Russia. He also sought to lift sanctions on Iran by returning to nuclear negotiations.

On the regional level, Tehran’s “shadow war” with Israel came out to the open and the two sides traded direct blows. Following Raisi’s death, Iran continued to suffer more setbacks, notably the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria and the weakening of Hezbollah and Hamas’ roles. These developments will weaken the IRGC’s regional role, but it could seek to compensate for its losses in other regions, even inside Iran itself.

Pezeshkian and internal reconciliation

Pezeshkian’s presidency is seen as an opportunity to achieve internal reconciliation in Iran at a critical time when the people are preoccupied with the issue of Khamenei’s successor. Iran is unlikely to introduce radical change to its relations with the West and Pezeshkian may be granted limited jurisdiction in the nuclear negotiations.

Soon after Trump’s re-election as president, Pezeshkian stressed the need to manage relations and the confrontation with the US. He said his government will follow the strategy of the ruling system.

Pezeshkian will likely receive the backing of the supreme leader and IRGC to reach a settlement that would ease pressure on Iran. This does not necessarily mean that Iran will be moving away from the edge of the abyss. On the contrary, it could reflect an attempt to widen the margin for maneuver amid the tensions with the West. Iran is expected to follow this approach in the near future or at least when the identity of the third supreme leader is revealed.