Scenarios in Iran in 2024: Regional Openness to Confront Sanctions

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei meets with members of the Assembly of Experts for Leadership in February 2023. (Supreme leader’s website)
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei meets with members of the Assembly of Experts for Leadership in February 2023. (Supreme leader’s website)
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Scenarios in Iran in 2024: Regional Openness to Confront Sanctions

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei meets with members of the Assembly of Experts for Leadership in February 2023. (Supreme leader’s website)
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei meets with members of the Assembly of Experts for Leadership in February 2023. (Supreme leader’s website)

Iran is hoping to continue in 2024 its policy of improving relations with its neighbors and consolidating economic cooperation with regional countries and its allies in an effort to ease the impact of the American and European sanctions and keep its nuclear negotiations alive as the US presidential elections draw near.

Unless Joe Biden’s administration makes an offer that upends the equation, Tehran and Washington will likely continue to exchange messages through their channels without really achieving a diplomatic breakthrough over the nuclear deal until the winner of the elections is announced on November 5.

The new American administration will take office in January 2025 and soon after, Iran will be gearing up to hold presidential elections in spring. President Ebrahim Raisi is likely to run again given the support he enjoys from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Iran is expected to continue its uranium enrichment at high levels and its “catch and release” policy with the International Atomic Energy Agency to prevent the file from being referred to the UN Security Council. The possibility that it may change course and head towards producing a nuclear weapon remains on the table if Iran decides to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and put the nuclear deal out of its misery.

The war on Gaza and its repercussions and the Russian-Ukrainian war will continue to impact Iran’s nuclear and diplomatic negotiations with the US and its western allies.

As it stands, the war on Gaza and conflict in Ukraine will help ease the pressure off Tehran when it comes to the nuclear file or even reining in the Revolutionary Guards’ development of ballistic missiles and drones or backing armed factions that are loyal to its ideology.

The strategy of teetering on the edge of a confrontation with the US and Israel, while exerting maximum pressure through armed groups will be at the top of Iran’s policies. So far, Tehran has steered clear of direct responsibility to avoid the consequences of the attacks on American forces or threats to marine navigation. Iran says it supports these groups, but claims they make their own decisions independently of it.

So, the nuclear file and economic sanctions will continue to dictate Iran’s foreign policy and internal balances.

Elections

Iran is set to hold parliamentary elections in March, marking one of the most important dates on its calendar. The elections will pit the Iranian street against their rulers some 529 days after the eruption of popular protests in wake of the death of Mahsa Amini.

The electoral campaign kicks off days after the 44th commemoration of the Iranian revolution. People will elect 290 lawmakers for a four-year term. Iran will also hold elections for the Assembly of Experts for Leadership. It is unclear how much the alliances of reformists and moderates or even conservative critics of the Iranian president will be able to change the balance of power in the parliament, including the ouster of its speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.

The legislative elections are unlikely to lead to marked change in the political scene given the authorities’ insistence on unifying the directions of the government and parliament, with the decision-making powers that directly answer to Khamenei.

Khamenei and political powers are keen on increasing the voter turnout given the low numbers that showed up for the 2020 parliamentary and 2021 presidential elections. The polls witnessed the lowest ever turnout in four decades.

The last parliamentary elections witnessed a turnout of 42.5 percent and 25.4 percent in Tehran. The turnout in the presidential elections reached 48.8 percent and 26 percent in Tehran or one in four eligible voters took part. The turnout in the capital was the lowest across the country.

Reconciling the street and ballot boxes will be an arduous task, especially in wake of the protests over Amini’s death in police custody in September 2022. The authorities’ crackdown on the protests left over 500 people dead. The consequences of the crackdown persist to this day. Rulers blamed western forces for allegedly stoking the unrest and riots. The authorities ultimately view voter turnout as a “test” of the legitimacy of the regime, which it is missing more than ever before.

Khamenei’s successor

Along with the parliamentary elections, attention will be focused on the elections of the Assembly of Experts for Leadership, which is formed of influential clerics. One of the assembly’s main duties is selecting a successor to the supreme leader if he is no longer capable of carrying on the duties entrusted to him by the assembly. The assembly has been facing serious criticism that it was neglecting its duty to oversee the performance of the supreme leader.

The assembly elections will be very significant next year as Khamenei turns 85 in April. Some clerics affiliated with the moderate and conservative movement, all of whom are former executive members of the body, including former President Hassan Rouhani, are keen on running in the elections.

After Rouhani’s term as president ended, he did not become a member of the Expediency Discernment Council, whose members are chosen by the supreme leader. He will run in the Tehran province, while Raisi sought to avoid a battle in the capital and instead registered his candidacy in the southern Khorasan province. Raisi and Hassan Khomeini, who is backed by the reformist and moderate movement, are possible candidates for the position of supreme leader.



‘A Moral Red Line’? World on Cusp of Autonomous Weapons Revolution

Pedestrians look on as a van, displaying a screen asking for a Treaty on AI Weapons, drives through Westminster in London, Wednesday, Nov. 11, 2026. (AP)
Pedestrians look on as a van, displaying a screen asking for a Treaty on AI Weapons, drives through Westminster in London, Wednesday, Nov. 11, 2026. (AP)
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‘A Moral Red Line’? World on Cusp of Autonomous Weapons Revolution

Pedestrians look on as a van, displaying a screen asking for a Treaty on AI Weapons, drives through Westminster in London, Wednesday, Nov. 11, 2026. (AP)
Pedestrians look on as a van, displaying a screen asking for a Treaty on AI Weapons, drives through Westminster in London, Wednesday, Nov. 11, 2026. (AP)

Lethal autonomous weapons powered by artificial intelligence are set to revolutionize warfare but there is no proper regulatory or legal framework governing the new technology.

A conference starting Monday at the United Nations in Geneva will discuss how to establish curbs and prohibitions on such weapons, called killer robots by some.

But some analysts doubt the discussions at the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) will keep pace with the fast-changing weapons.

AFP looks at three key questions ahead of the conference.

- What are LAWS? -

Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) "can identify, select, and engage a target without the intervention of a human operator in the execution of these tasks," said Jean-Marc Rickli, head of global and emerging risks at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy.

Autonomous weapons have long existed. An anti-personnel mine "is an autonomous weapon in the sense that it explodes when someone steps on it," said Laure de Roucy-Rochegonde of the Centre for Geopolitics of Technology at the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI).

But with the proliferation of AI-enhanced drones, such weapons are now "capable of selecting and engaging a target that was not predetermined, adapting to their environment without human intervention," said Rickli.

So the critical issue for potential regulators lies in determining the level of human control over the decision to employ such a weapon.

The United States refers to an "appropriate levels of human judgement" in the use of autonomous weapons.

France maintains that a human must remain in the decision-making loop and bans "lethal autonomous weapons systems" (LAWS) but permits "partially autonomous" systems known as PLAWS.

"The human role is always ensured through what is termed 'appropriate control' by a military commander -- a concept that varies in scope depending on the system's criticality and the operational context," said Rear Admiral Vincent Sebastien, deputy director of the French defense ministry's Agency for Defense Artificial Intelligence (AMIAD).

- The ethical issues?

"We are now dangerously close to crossing a moral red line: the autonomous targeting of humans by machines," UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, and International Committee of the Red Cross president Mirjana Spoljaric warned in a joint statement in August.

But analysts said the Geneva discussions, while important, will touch only part of the issue.

Today, the diminishing role of humans is being driven by the growing use of AI in analysis and targeting.

Rickli said the scope of the agenda in Geneva is "very narrow".

"It fails to encompass the full range of issues surrounding AI on the battlefield" -- an area where its use is expanding, particularly in target generation.

He said this was seen in the US-Israeli war against Iran this year "where the Americans engaged as many as 1,000 targets per day" inside Iran.

"There are a host of problems and unacceptable risks associated with targeting and decision-support systems," added de Roucy-Rochegonde. "Part of this debate concerns systems that are already widely deployed on the battlefield."

"What kind of human supervision is required to ensure that the operator is genuinely exercising their own judgement rather than simply providing a rubber stamp for the machine's recommendations?" she asked.

- How quickly is the situation changing?

The autonomous weapons to be discussed in Geneva are not yet in widespread use, although analysts have noted that they have been deployed by Russia in its invasion of Ukraine, as well as US attacks in Iran.

But the spread is inevitable.

"Autonomy will very quickly become a reality on the battlefield," warned rear admiral Sebastien.

"Autonomous weapon systems are not part of a distant future -- a race towards greater autonomy in weapons systems is already well underway," Guterres and Spoljaric said in their statement.

Yet significant doubts and dangers remain, Dario Amodei, head of the AI giant Anthropic, warned this year: "Today, frontier AI systems are simply not reliable enough to power fully autonomous weapons."

But ultimately, the incentive for major powers is too strong.

Swarms of autonomous drones -- which "aim to neutralize an adversary through saturation" -- would be highly effective, and some states view them as a crucial strategic advantage, said Rickli.

In January, the Chinese defense ministry described swarms of autonomous drones as the "new face of warfare."

"In an era of sharp military competition, the first state to normalize fully autonomous lethal strikes will reset expectations for everyone else," said Gerald Mako, a research affiliate of Cambridge University in the Small Wars Journal.


In Taiwan, Jensen Huang’s ‘Flawless’ Image Damaged by Affairs

Photos of Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang during a previous visit are displayed at a local snack shop in Taipei on November 13, 2026. (AFP)
Photos of Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang during a previous visit are displayed at a local snack shop in Taipei on November 13, 2026. (AFP)
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In Taiwan, Jensen Huang’s ‘Flawless’ Image Damaged by Affairs

Photos of Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang during a previous visit are displayed at a local snack shop in Taipei on November 13, 2026. (AFP)
Photos of Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang during a previous visit are displayed at a local snack shop in Taipei on November 13, 2026. (AFP)

Taiwan-born Jensen Huang, the former boss of Nvidia, was feted like a rock star on visits to his birthplace, posing for selfies with fans and being mobbed by journalists.

His spectacular downfall might change that.

Huang's once "flawless" image in Taiwan has been shattered by revelations of two extramarital affairs -- including one with a woman accused of being a Chinese spy -- that forced him to resign from the company he founded.

"I thought he had the persona of a devoted husband, and it turns out he's kind of a scumbag," Ivan Liang, 28, told AFP during his lunch break on Friday.

Huang has been a source of pride and inspiration for many Taiwanese. While other tech titans kept a low profile, Huang was chatty and charming in public, readily signing autographs and posing for photos.

"I definitely think my perception of him has changed because, after all, he originally had that 'nation's dad' image," said Leo Fu, a 42-year-old import distributor.

"I feel like that image of him has probably taken a hit in the eyes of the general public in Taiwan."

Dessert shop owner Jane Hsieh, 70, still has fond memories of Huang visiting her store on multiple occasions for one of her traditional tofu puddings.

"Before this, he felt like such a flawless person," Hsieh told AFP in her shop where photos of her and her husband posing with the leather-jacketed Huang, his wife Lori, and son Spencer, are proudly displayed.

"It's just a shame because he gave everyone the impression that he was a really great guy, and he was always very polite when he came here," she said.

While her feelings about Huang have changed as a result of the affairs, Hsieh said she would not remove the photos from her shop.

"Why kick someone when they're down?" she said.

- 'Pretty outrageous' -

At the Chinese restaurant where one of Huang's lovers -- identified as suspected Chinese spy Alice Huang -- was filmed kissing him on the cheek in May 2025, a plate signed by Huang on the same night is still on display.

Staff were reluctant to talk about the infamous evening to AFP on Friday, only saying they were always focused on serving their customers.

"I think it's pretty outrageous," 38-year-old Chen Yu-ting, who works in finance, said of Huang's affair with someone believed to have spied for Beijing.

"If the other person really was trying to use him, it seems like he was just way too easily deceived," she said.

"Given his status, he really should be paying much closer attention to the people around him and who he associates with."

While Huang's affairs have tarnished his reputation, some Taiwanese are more concerned about the impact the scandal could have on Taiwan's economy and stock market.

Huang has generated huge amounts of wealth for the island at the centre of the global artificial intelligence (AI) technology boom.

Nvidia's advanced chips critical to the AI buildout are made by Taiwanese tech titan TSMC and have helped drive Taiwans' stocks to record highs and push its economy into double-digit growth.

Ivan Liang, who works in imports and exports, said he was "very worried".

"The market crashed... a few days ago, and then Nvidia's stock price just kept dropping and dropping and dropping," Liang said.

"I don't trade US stocks myself, but the US and Taiwan stock markets definitely move in tandem and affect each other," he said.

"Whatever he does is none of my business -- I only care about my money."


Can One Security Force Implement Resolution 1701 and the Framework Agreement in Southern Lebanon?

A UNIFIL military vehicle patrols the southern Lebanese town of Ibl al-Saqi (AFP)
A UNIFIL military vehicle patrols the southern Lebanese town of Ibl al-Saqi (AFP)
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Can One Security Force Implement Resolution 1701 and the Framework Agreement in Southern Lebanon?

A UNIFIL military vehicle patrols the southern Lebanese town of Ibl al-Saqi (AFP)
A UNIFIL military vehicle patrols the southern Lebanese town of Ibl al-Saqi (AFP)

Countries involved in Lebanon are considering a security force to replace the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) when its mandate expires at year-end.

The force would support the Lebanese army in implementing agreements and international resolutions in southern Lebanon. But can a new force enforce both UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and the US-brokered framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel?

Talks have produced broad agreement on the need for such a force, but its composition, mandate, operating procedures and participating countries remain undecided.

The uncertainty was reflected in a statement by Group of Seven foreign ministers after their Nov. 9-10 meeting in Paris. They called for a robust, credible, and long-lasting security architecture in Lebanon to support the Lebanese Armed Forces, in line with Resolution 1701 and to advance implementation of the Trilateral Framework.

No further agreements were announced.

US envoy to visit Beirut

Attention now turns to a visit to Beirut on Monday by US Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz, who is due to meet with President Joseph Aoun.

Recent media reports suggest Washington is moving to replace UNIFIL in southern Lebanon with a verification committee and substitute the framework agreement for Resolution 1701.

The resolution ended a 33-day war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006. Its main provisions included an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and the deployment of additional UN troops to monitor the cessation of hostilities alongside the Lebanese army.

Lebanon, Israel and the United States signed the Trilateral Framework Agreement in Washington on June 26, setting out a phased process to end the conflict and restore Lebanese sovereignty over the country's entire territory.

Under the agreement, the Lebanese army would gradually assume security control of designated "pilot zones" as non-state armed groups are disarmed and their military infrastructure dismantled, paving the way for a phased Israeli withdrawal.

The agreement also calls for a US-backed military coordination group to oversee and verify implementation.

It remains unclear whether separate international forces would replace UNIFIL and oversee the framework agreement, whether the two mandates could be merged, or whether Resolution 1701 would be dropped in favor of the agreement, with a single force assigned to implement it.

'Complicated' transition

A diplomatic source described the situation as "complicated," saying the current transition differs from the circumstances surrounding Resolution 1701.

At the time, a new military and political reality had emerged that the parties sought to preserve, the source told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Today, the source said, the mandate, powers, composition and operating procedures of any force replacing UNIFIL remain unclear.

The framework agreement also presents a legal obstacle.

"It is an understanding between three parties and cannot be imposed on the international community or assumed to have its automatic endorsement," the source said.

Turning it into a Security Council resolution would be difficult, the source added, because some member states could object.

Israel's position

Israel appears reluctant to accept a new international force to replace UNIFIL, which it accuses of having allowed Hezbollah to expand toward its border.

According to details emerging from recent negotiations over the framework agreement's implementation, Israel wants direct oversight of efforts to verify that the pilot zones are free of Hezbollah weapons and military infrastructure.

It favors a mechanism giving it a continuing monitoring and operational role rather than relying on reports from an independent international body.

Fundamental differences

Military and strategic expert Brigadier General Khalil Helou said UNIFIL's departure would render Resolution 1701 meaningless, effectively allowing the framework agreement to take its place.

"Resolution 1701 contains clear provisions and has a legal dimension, unlike the US-sponsored framework agreement, which requires negotiations to implement each of its provisions," Helou told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Merging the two would therefore be difficult, he said.

The framework agreement also makes no provision for foreign forces to implement it. Instead, it outlines understandings between Lebanon and Israel, with a military annex setting out reciprocal steps, he added.

Legal obstacles

Legally, a single force could implement both Resolution 1701 and the framework agreement. But constitutional and legal expert Adel Yamin said the nature of its mandate would pose further obstacles.

"Verifying disarmament is more intrusive than providing conventional support to the army," Yamin told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Such a mission could require clearer rules of engagement, raising questions about the host state's consent, he said.

Yamin also cited reports that Israel opposed an international force including French troops and that Washington considered Resolution 1701 obsolete, favoring the framework agreement as a basis for direct communication between the Lebanese and Israeli militaries.

One option, he said, would be a UN force or mission to implement Resolution 1701 alongside a multinational mechanism to oversee the framework agreement.

But that would risk overlapping powers and conflicting reports.

UN umbrella for framework agreement

International efforts are also being discussed to bring the framework agreement under UN auspices, potentially superseding Resolution 1701.

Yamin outlined several legal routes.

One would be to register the agreement with the UN Secretariat under Article 102 of the UN Charter, provided it qualifies as a treaty.

Registration would not give the agreement effective UN backing but would allow it to be invoked before UN bodies, he said.

Another option would be for the parties to send identical letters seeking Security Council endorsement, followed by a presidential statement or resolution welcoming the agreement.

The council could also endorse the agreement and annex it to a resolution, or establish a new force or expand an existing mandate to implement it, following the model of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF).

But Yamin warned that UN backing would be a double-edged sword.

It would internationalize Israel's withdrawal obligations rather than leave them dependent solely on US guarantees. At the same time, it would place Lebanon's commitments to bring weapons under exclusive state control under tighter international scrutiny.

Yamin also cautioned against incorporating into a UN resolution any provisions that could cast doubt on Israel's obligation to withdraw immediately from Lebanon.

Such provisions should not gain international legal cover, he said, arguing that any clause undermining Lebanon's sovereignty or territorial integrity would violate both the UN Charter and the Lebanese Constitution and would be automatically void.