Can Sudan Survive?

Displaced people fleeing from Wad Madani in Sudan's Jazira state. AFP
Displaced people fleeing from Wad Madani in Sudan's Jazira state. AFP
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Can Sudan Survive?

Displaced people fleeing from Wad Madani in Sudan's Jazira state. AFP
Displaced people fleeing from Wad Madani in Sudan's Jazira state. AFP

The year 2023 began on a seemingly optimistic note for Sudan. Its leading generals, Burhan of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Hemedti of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) had endorsed a framework agreement to create a civilian transitional government. Tragically, at year end, Sudan faces de facto division like Libya. Its capital is destroyed, ethnic killing rages, 5.5 million Sudanese are displaced and 18 million are experiencing acute hunger.

This is a far cry from what the Sudanese people, the United States and others envisioned following the April 2019 ouster of President Bashir and subsequent formation of a predominantly civilian transitional government. What went wrong? The kleptocratic state created by Bashir proved powerful and enduring despite his ouster. Civilian political actors became increasingly fractious and failed to connect with the women and youth who led the 2018-19 revolution. When the transitional government tried to transition some control of the economy from military hands, Generals Burhan and Hemedti staged a coup in October 2021.

Post-coup, the United Nations, African Union and the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) jointly tried to facilitate a new accommodation between civilian political actors and the generals. The United States supported this effort. The process led to an agreement to establish a new civilian transitional government in April 2023. However, the contentious issue of integration of the RSF and SAF into one army remained unresolved and spoilers took advantage.

On April 15, fighting broke out between SAF and RSF in and around the capital, Khartoum. It quickly spread. At year’s end, the RSF controls four of the five states of Darfur in the west and significant portions of Kordofan in the south as well as much of greater Khartoum. The SAF dominates most areas east of the White Nile. Sudan is de facto divided.

The world has not ignored this new crisis in Sudan. The United States and Saudi Arabia quickly organized negotiations in Jeddah seeking a ceasefire and humanitarian access to displaced Sudanese. Despite the generals’ promises of a ceasefire, fighting continued. Negotiations were suspended. Other external actors also tried their hand at mediation. However, Burhan’s rump government rejected African Union efforts citing the AU’s post-coup suspension of Sudan as evidence of bias. Burhan rejected the IGAD quartet effort claiming its Kenyan leadership favored the RSF. He also stymied any role for the UN’s mission in Sudan. Egypt convened a meeting of neighboring states but that effort failed to stop the fighting. The most horrendous result of the expanding conflict was the slaughter of ethnic Masalit by the RSF and its nomadic tribal allies. Such killing and raping continues to spread unchecked or uncheckable by RSF leadership.

In October 2023, the United States and Saudi Arabia resumed the Jeddah talks and soon secured SAF and RSF agreement to discuss confidence building measures toward establishing a permanent ceasefire. However, the Sudanese generals quickly reverted to their maximalist demands of the other and the fighting continued. IGAD convened an extraordinary summit on December 3 and reportedly generals Burhan and Hemedti agreed to meet within 15 days to discuss a 30-day ceasefire. No sooner had Burhan returned from the summit than his Foreign Ministry began undermining the summit’s outcome. Peace efforts seem to be deadlocked.

Despite recent RSF territorial gains, the fighting also seems headed for deadlock. Can the SAF or RSF decisively defeat the other? While the generals may still believe so, Sudan’s history suggests otherwise. Its prior 38 years of civil war resulted in the country’s partition, not military victory.

Is further division of Sudan what anyone – Sudanese or outside party - really wants? Whose interests are served by such an outcome? Certainly not the interests of the majority of Sudanese who will continue to suffer and die if fighting continues. Certainly not the interests of the United States and Europe which want the ethnic killing to stop, humanitarian relief to flow and democratic governance in Sudan. And hopefully not Sudan’s neighbors who either fear a spillover of insecurity or want to invest in Sudan’s vast mineral, agricultural and commercial potential. Can investments really be secure if two armed camps continue to fight?

For the fighting and current de facto division to end, compromises need to be made among all parties’ interests. Where to begin? Probably not with Sudan’s generals who are still seeking military victory and offering no plausible path to peace. Perhaps begin with those who are enabling the continued fighting. Recently appointed UN Secretary General Special Envoy Ramtane Lamamra has the experience and gravitas necessary to engage all parties connected to the conflict to stop the fighting and open space for a political solution. The imminent appointment of an IGAD special envoy could also help, provided there is unity of effort with Lamamra. Perhaps a non-official “track two” effort could also be helpful in finding a formula that satisfies enough of each parties’ interests to end the fighting and find a political path to re-unify Sudan. However, true national unification will require the support of the vast majority of the Sudanese people. That means the civilian political and grassroots movements, which are becoming increasingly unified, need to be at the center of any formula for lasting peace and stability. Since independence, Sudan mostly experienced military rule and it became a brittle state. Cobbling together another military-dominated government and hoping for a different outcome is futile.

Might the United States and Europe support such an interests-based approach entailing many compromises? Might they be better able to achieve the security, humanitarian and governance objectives of the Sudanese people by doing so? Could they support deals cut by Sudan’s generals and civilian leaders with the country’s regional partners? In other words, could they compromise some of their interests if those fueling and fighting the war are willing to do the same?

Sudan’s survival depends on ending the fighting. That requires adroit diplomacy, facilitated by a trusted, disinterested party, to secure compromises of both Sudanese and external interests.



The Fragile Israel-Hezbollah Truce is Holding so Far, Despite Violations

Mariam Kourani removes a toy car from the rubble of her destroyed house after returning with her family to the Hanouiyeh village in southern Lebanon, on Nov. 28, 2024, following a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. (AP Photo/Hussein Malla, File)
Mariam Kourani removes a toy car from the rubble of her destroyed house after returning with her family to the Hanouiyeh village in southern Lebanon, on Nov. 28, 2024, following a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. (AP Photo/Hussein Malla, File)
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The Fragile Israel-Hezbollah Truce is Holding so Far, Despite Violations

Mariam Kourani removes a toy car from the rubble of her destroyed house after returning with her family to the Hanouiyeh village in southern Lebanon, on Nov. 28, 2024, following a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. (AP Photo/Hussein Malla, File)
Mariam Kourani removes a toy car from the rubble of her destroyed house after returning with her family to the Hanouiyeh village in southern Lebanon, on Nov. 28, 2024, following a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. (AP Photo/Hussein Malla, File)

A fragile ceasefire between Israel and the Lebanon's Hezbollah has held up for over a month, even as its terms seem unlikely to be met by the agreed-upon deadline.

The deal struck on Nov. 27 to halt the war required Hezbollah to immediately lay down its arms in southern Lebanon and gave Israel 60 days to withdraw its forces there and hand over control to the Lebanese army and UN peacekeepers.

So far, Israel has withdrawn from just two of the dozens of towns it holds in southern Lebanon. And it has continued striking what it says are bases belonging to Hezbollah, which it accuses of attempting to launch rockets and move weapons before they can be confiscated and destroyed, The AP reported.

Hezbollah, which was severely diminished during nearly 14 months of war, has threatened to resume fighting if Israel does not fully withdraw its forces by the 60-day deadline.

Yet despite accusations from both sides about hundreds of ceasefire violations, the truce is likely to hold, analysts say. That is good news for thousands of Israeli and Lebanese families displaced by the war still waiting to return home.

“The ceasefire agreement is rather opaque and open to interpretation,” said Firas Maksad, a senior fellow with the Middle East Institute in Washington. That flexibility, he said, may give it a better chance of holding in the face of changing circumstances, including the ouster of Syria's longtime leader, Bashar Assad, just days after the ceasefire took effect.

With Assad gone, Hezbollah lost a vital route for smuggling weapons from Iran. While that further weakened Hezbollah’s hand, Israel had already agreed to the US-brokered ceasefire.

Hezbollah began firing rockets into Israel on Oct. 8, 2023 — the day after Hamas launched a deadly attack into Israel that ignited the ongoing war in Gaza. Since then, Israeli air and ground assaults have killed more than 4,000 people in Lebanon, including hundreds of civilians. At the height of the war, more than 1 million Lebanese people were displaced.

Hezbollah rockets forced some 60,000 from their homes in northern Israel, and killed 76 people in Israel, including 31 soldiers. Almost 50 Israeli soldiers were killed during operations inside Lebanon.

Here’s a look at the terms of the ceasefire and its prospects for ending hostilities over the long-term.

What does the ceasefire agreement say? The agreement says that both Hezbollah and Israel will halt “offensive” military actions, but that they can act in self-defense, although it is not entirely clear how that term may be interpreted.

The Lebanese army is tasked with preventing Hezbollah and other militant groups from launching attacks into Israel. It is also required to dismantle Hezbollah facilities and weapons in southern Lebanon — activities that might eventually be expanded to the rest of Lebanon, although it is not explicit in the ceasefire agreement.

The United States, France, Israel, Lebanon and the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon, known as UNIFIL, are responsible for overseeing implementation of the agreement.

“The key question is not whether the deal will hold, but what version of it will be implemented,” Maksad, the analyst, said.

Is the ceasefire being implemented? Hezbollah has for the most part halted its rocket and drone fire into Israel, and Israel has stopped attacking Hezbollah in most areas of Lebanon. But Israel has launched regular airstrikes on what it says are militant sites in southern Lebanon and in the Bekaa Valley.

Israeli forces have so far withdrawn from two towns in southern Lebanon - Khiam and Shamaa. They remain in some 60 others, according to the International Organization for Migration, and around 160,000 Lebanese remain displaced.

Lebanon has accused Israel of repeatedly violating the ceasefire agreement and last week submitted a complaint to the UN Security Council that says Israel launched some 816 “ground and air attacks” between the start of the ceasefire and Dec. 22, 2024.

The complaint said the attacks have hindered the Lebanese army's efforts to deploy in the south and uphold its end of the ceasefire agreement.

Until Israel hands over control of more towns to the Lebanese army, Israeli troops have been destroying Hezbollah infrastructure, including weapons warehouses and underground tunnels. Lebanese authorities say Israel has also destroyed civilian houses and infrastructure.

What happens after the ceasefire has been in place for 60 days? Israel's withdrawal from Lebanese towns has been slower than anticipated because of a lack of Lebanese army troops ready to take over, according to Lt. Col. Nadav Shoshani, a military spokesman. Lebanon disputes this, and says it is waiting for Israel to withdraw before entering the towns.

Shoshani said Israel is satisfied with the Lebanese army's control of the areas it has already withdrawn from, and that while it would prefer a faster transfer of power, security is its most important objective.

Israel does not consider the 60-day timetable for withdrawal to be “sacred,” said Harel Chorev, an expert on Israel-Lebanon relations at Tel Aviv University who estimates that Lebanon will need to recruit and deploy thousands more troops before Israel will be ready to hand over control.

Hezbollah officials have said that if Israeli forces remain in Lebanon 60 days past the start of the ceasefire, the militant group might return to attacking them. But Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Kassem said Wednesday that, for now, the group is holding off to give the Lebanese state a chance to "take responsibility” for enforcing the agreement.

Over the final two months of the war, Hezbollah suffered major blows to its leadership, weapons and forces from a barrage of Israeli airstrikes, and a ground invasion that led to fierce battles in southern Lebanon. The fall of Assad was another big setback.

“The power imbalance suggests Israel may want to ensure greater freedom of action after the 60-day period,” Maksad, the analyst, said. And Hezbollah, in its weakened position, now has a “strong interest” in making sure the deal doesn't fall apart altogether “despite Israeli violations,” he said.

While Hezbollah may not be in a position to return to open war with Israel, it or other groups could mount guerilla attacks using light weaponry if Israeli troops remain in southern Lebanon, said former Lebanese army Gen. Hassan Jouni. And even if Israel does withdraw all of its ground forces, Jouni said, the Israeli military could could continue to carry out sporadic airstrikes in Lebanon, much as it has done in Syria for years.