Saudi Arabia’s Shura Council: A Century of Historic Governancehttps://english.aawsat.com/features/4778421-saudi-arabia%E2%80%99s-shura-council-century-historic-governance
Saudi Arabia’s Shura Council: A Century of Historic Governance
The view of Saudi Shura Council in session.
Since the early days of modern Saudi Arabia, King Abdulaziz established key principles, including the use of Shura (consultative) councils as a crucial aspect of his wise governance.
Under his rule, the Shura Council was formed, representing a significant move towards institutionalizing governance practices.
This marked the beginning of a constitutional framework for the developing state.
The constitutional movement began in February 1925 with the first National Council being founded under the speakership of Sheikh Abdul Gadir Al-Shebi.
That council continued for six months until a reshuffle that saw Sheikh Mohammed Al-Marzouki Abou Hussein act as speaker and Shebi as his deputy. The council boasted 15 members and Mohammed Suroor Al-Sabban acted as its secretary.
On August 5, 1925, King Abdulaziz inaugurated the council’s session at its Makkah headquarters.
He delivered the first royal address in two parts: a brief impromptu speech with his directives, and an extended official statement presented by Counselor Hafez Wahba.
This tradition continues to this day, with members considering the royal address as the council’s “work program.”
They formed committees to review and discuss the addressed topics, presenting the results to the king after council approval.
First step
On May 13, 1926, an official announcement was made for the election of consultative councils, including the Shura Council.
A royal decree was issued on May 23, 1926, appointing Sharif Mohammed Sharaf Basha bin Adnan Al-Ghalib as speaker.
The first constitutional document, published later, outlined the creation of the Council.
Formed under the deputyship of the King in the Hijaz in September 1926, with Sheikh Abdulaziz bin Mohammed Al-Otaiqi as the deputy, three councils represented the starting point for Shura development.
They marked an experimental phase for the model upon which the Saudi institutional state is built, including the systems and formation methods of these councils.
On July 8, 1927, in response to recommendations from the Inspection and Reform Committee, the King agreed to a new system for the council.
He replaced its members and reorganized it with his advisor Sharif Mohammed Sharaf Adnan leading the sessions.
Evolution of the Council
This marked the beginning of the Shura Council in its long-standing form.
In the second session, King Abdulaziz saw the need to improve its system. The initial system had 14 articles.
The Council’s new internal rules were issued, consisting of 24 articles. This system remained in place for almost 65 years, during which the council carried out its functions.
After the creation of the Council of Ministers in 1952, which limited the Shura Council's powers, there was a need to update its system to match the changes in various state authorities.
The Council made its first attempt in 1953, preparing a proposal for the development of its system and internal rules, which was submitted for review.
Committees were formed, and in 1962, a committee led by Prince Mishaal bin Abdul Rahman worked on drafting the basic governance system.
In 1980, another committee led by Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz resulted in the creation of the “Shura Council System.”
5,963 meetings in 54 years
Despite a delay in updating the system for about 40 years, the Council’s experience during that period is still remembered in political and administrative circles, with its impact documented in government archives.
According to Saudi Shura historian Dr. Abdulrahman bin Ali Al-Zahrani, the Council held 51 sessions, between 1927 and 1980, conducting a total of 5,963 meetings and issuing 8,583 decisions, including various regulations and instructions.
During this time, the Council boasted 85 members, with each session attended between six and 25 members.
Sheikh Ahmed bin Ibrahim Al-Ghazawi held the longest tenure at 51 years, starting as a secretary and eventually becoming the permanent deputy speaker. Sheikh Mohammed Al-Tayyib Al-Hazazi had the shortest membership, lasting only one month.
Membership extensions were common at the time, with an average tenure of 10-and-a-half years per member.
King Faisal at the helm
King Faisal served as the president of the Council from 1927 until his passing in 1975.
Afterward, the Council remained linked to the monarchy, with the vice president managing its affairs.
It wasn't until 1992, with the royal decree appointing Sheikh Mohammed bin Ibrahim bin Jubair as speaker, that new leadership emerged.
Jubair had been a member of committees studying the Council’s system development since 1962.
The role of vice president was held by individuals like Sheikh Abdullah bin Mohammed Al-Fadl, Saleh Shata, Sheikh Abdullah Al-Shebi, Sharif Mohammed Sharaf Rida, Sheikh Ahmed Al-Ghazawi, and Saadik Dahlan.
The role of Secretary-General saw seven individuals taking charge, including Sheikh Ahmed Al-Ghazawi, Hamza Al-Marzouki Abu Hussein, Fuad Ali Rida, Saadik Dahlan, Alawi Al-Idroos, Mohammed Saeed Jawharji, and Abdel Razak Al-Tayeb.
The last session of the Council during its 51st term took place on September 27, 1980.
From Makkah to Riyadh
But interestingly, after that point, the council didn't stop its work. It continued to function as an entity with its own budget, staff, and headquarters in Makkah’s Shisha neighborhood.
The General Secretariat and administrative operations were based there, and extensions were given to remaining members.
After the death of the Council’s deputy speaker, Sheikh Ahmed Al-Ghazawi, a Royal Decree (No. 2931) was issued on July 14, 1981, appointing Dahlan to replace him.
Dahlan continued in this role until 1992 when the Council’s offices moved to Riyadh.
The Council even had a summer headquarters in Taif.
King Abdulaziz inaugurated the third session and delivered the royal address in Taif on July 27, 1930.
Other key figures also delivered royal addresses in the absence of the King.
These foundations set by King Abdulaziz during a crucial period in the Kingdom’s early years illustrate his dedication to establishing the state’s structure.
Despite focusing on unification wars and ensuring security, he prioritized stabilizing the state's foundations. His successors continued and refined these practices.
A Timeline of the Escalating Tensions Between Iran and Israel over Lebanonhttps://english.aawsat.com/features/5281560-timeline-escalating-tensions-between-iran-and-israel-over-lebanon
Pro-government Iranian demonstrators wave flags of Iran and Lebanon's Hezbollah movement after Israeli strikes on Beirut's southern suburbs in Tehran on June 7, 2026. (AFP)
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A Timeline of the Escalating Tensions Between Iran and Israel over Lebanon
Pro-government Iranian demonstrators wave flags of Iran and Lebanon's Hezbollah movement after Israeli strikes on Beirut's southern suburbs in Tehran on June 7, 2026. (AFP)
The Middle East is suddenly bracing for war again. Iran fired missiles at Israel late Sunday in the first such bombardment in the two months since a ceasefire. Israel launched airstrikes early Monday targeting central and western Iran in response.
The truce in the Iran war that was reached in April has not spread to Lebanon, where Israel has been battling the Iranian-backed Hezbollah group. Israel says it is defending its northern communities that face Hezbollah drone and rocket fire.
Iran sees Israel’s ground invasion, with thousands of troops, and airstrikes in Lebanon as a ceasefire violation. It insists that any deal with the United States must end the fighting there. Israel disagrees.
Here’s a timeline of key events.
Feb. 28 The United States and Israel attack Iran. War begins.
March 2 Hezbollah enters the war by firing rockets at Israel. Israel retaliates.
April 7 A fragile ceasefire in the Iran war is announced, with talks to continue. Israel is not included in them.
April 8 Israel bombards Lebanon’s capital, Beirut, killing over 300 people in a 10-minute attack.
April 14 Lebanon and Israel hold their first direct diplomatic talks in decades in Washington.
April 17 A fragile ceasefire is announced between Israel and Lebanon, but Hezbollah plays no part. Fighting soon resumes from both sides.
May 31 Israel’s ground invasion of Lebanon makes its deepest incursion in over a quarter-century.
June 1 Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu threatens to strike Beirut if Hezbollah attacks don’t stop. US President Donald Trump says Israel and Hezbollah agree to calm the fighting.
June 2 Israeli drone strikes in Lebanon kill 11 people.
June 3 Israel and Lebanon say they agree to renew the fragile ceasefire and create security zones that exclude Hezbollah.
June 4 Hezbollah’s leader rejects the ceasefire agreement and demands that Israel withdraw from Lebanon.
June 5 Iran’s paramilitary Revolutionary Guard says “there will be no calm in the region ” if Israel doesn’t withdraw.
June 6 Israeli airstrikes on southern Lebanon kill three members of the Lebanese military.
June 7 Hezbollah again fires at Israel. Israel strikes Beirut’s southern suburbs. Iran fires at Israel.
June 8 Israel launches airstrikes in the early morning targeting central and western Iran in response to Iranian missile fire. Iranian state television reports the sound of explosions being heard in Isfahan, Tabriz and Tehran, without elaborating.
Health Workers at the Epicenter of Congo’s Ebola Outbreak Labor with Little Pay or Resthttps://english.aawsat.com/features/5281250-health-workers-epicenter-congo%E2%80%99s-ebola-outbreak-labor-little-pay-or-rest
A health worker disinfects an ambulance at the Mongbwalu treatment center that transported a suspected Ebola patient in Mongbwalu, Congo, Friday, June 5, 2026. (AP)
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Health Workers at the Epicenter of Congo’s Ebola Outbreak Labor with Little Pay or Rest
A health worker disinfects an ambulance at the Mongbwalu treatment center that transported a suspected Ebola patient in Mongbwalu, Congo, Friday, June 5, 2026. (AP)
Dr. Richard Lokudu, the medical director of Mongbwalu General Referral Hospital, has received barely any compensation for his work on the front line of one of Congo's deadliest Ebola virus outbreaks.
Lokudu and several of his colleagues work all day at the hospital treating an influx of patients. Notifications of suspected cases come even late at night.
“I have not received my allowance (and) what happened to others could happen to me as well,” Lokudu told The Associated Press. “Despite all the infection prevention and control measures we are implementing, we do not know what may happen.”
Health authorities believe the outbreak, which took the eastern region of Congo by surprise after spreading silently for weeks without detection, started in the bustling mining area of Mongbwalu in Ituri province.
Mining conditions conducive to virus spread Mongbwalu has emerged as the epicenter of the rare Bundibugyo type. The town attracts large numbers of laborers who work in large gold mines with muddy pools of gold deposits, narrow pits and caves. They live in low-income areas including crowded camps and have little access to proper health protocols.
The conditions increase the possibility of transmitting the disease, which spreads through close contact with bodily fluids of the sick and deceased such as sweat, blood, feces and vomit.
There also has been widespread skepticism regarding the disease, making the job of medical treatment more difficult for Lokudu and his colleagues, while some of the health workers and first responders have died from the disease.
“It is one thing to be far away and hear statistics being reported, but what is happening on the ground is enormous,” Lokudu said. “People are sacrificing their rest and comfort for this cause. There should be recognition that they deserve compensation. These workers should receive their salaries regularly.”
The Congolese government did not respond to a request for comment from the AP.
Minimal resources available
Congolese authorities have confirmed 452 cases including 82 deaths. On Thursday, the Central African nation recorded 71 new cases in a day, which authorities said is a sign of “active community transmission.”
The rare Bundibugyo type has no approved vaccines or treatment, so health workers have been targeting symptoms. The government said at least five people have recovered from Ebola since the outbreak was officially confirmed by Congo's Ministry of Health on May 15.
The disease “had a big head start,” according to World Health Organization Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus. Hospitals in the region could not test for the right type of Ebola that had begun spreading several weeks before confirmation.
Health workers are handling the disease with minimal resources as agencies have been scrambling to bring aid into the region. Masks, gloves, boots and medications were initially all in short supply.
“There has been an erosion of the health system,” said Heather Kerr, country director for the International Rescue Committee in Congo. “There has not been investment in the health system, and this has been going on for years.”
Tough conditions for health workers
“During the first week, we did not even have time to go home and eat. The second week was the same. We only eat once a day, what amounts to breakfast in the evening,” said Alice Bamuhinga, a nurse at the Mongbwalu hospital.
Even with widespread skepticism and disregard for health protocols, many in the town are becoming aware of the outbreak's grave reality.
Asero Jeanne had five children. Two died from the disease within two weeks. When her daughter became ill, the family thought it was malaria and neighbors advised them to avoid the hospital, saying “anyone who went there would die immediately,” according to Jeanne, 52.
The daughter died after three weeks of moving between hospitals and home, followed by a son who died days after. Then Jeanne became sick.
“I saw about 20 people die,” Jeanne said. “I watched them being taken to the morgue, yet God is allowing me to leave here alive. I thank the doctors.”
World Health Organization offers a plan
Tedros, the WHO director-general, on Friday launched a $518 million plan to combat the outbreak, saying “containing Ebola depends on political commitment, sustained financing, and the trust and engagement of communities.”
Efforts to contain the disease also have been hindered by the conflict between the government and Rwanda-backed M23 rebel group, in addition to attacks by extremist militants.
For health workers on the front line of Congo's Ebola outbreak, the work has become harder as the disease spreads faster than their current treatment capacity.
“Despite the alerts we receive and the teams we have on site, we lack the means to travel into the field,” Lokudu said. “As a result, there are alerts we are unable to investigate.”
How Did Tehran Enter the Palestinian Arena?https://english.aawsat.com/features/5281191-how-did-tehran-enter-palestinian-arena
A photo released by Iran's Nour News of a previous meeting between Khamenei and Sinwar
A compelling story is often enough to send a journalist in search of the man who carries it. The search becomes even more urgent when that man carries two. That was the case many years ago when I set out to find Anis Naccache.
As a young Lebanese activist, Naccache joined Fatah’s student battalion and later worked under the patronage of Khalil al-Wazir — better known as Abu Jihad — a member of Fatah’s Central Committee. My curiosity was piqued when I learned that Naccache had served as an aide to the famed Venezuelan militant Carlos the Jackal during the kidnapping of OPEC ministers in Vienna on December 21, 1975. The world had never witnessed an operation of that kind.
Carlos became an international celebrity, much to the annoyance of the man who had dispatched him on the mission — Wadie Haddad, the head of external operations for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. I suspected that speaking with Naccache might also open a path to Carlos himself. It did. But Vienna was only part of Naccache’s story.
When anti-Shah demonstrations erupted in Iran in 1978, Naccache obtained Abu Jihad’s permission to train Iranian opponents of the Shah in camps operated by Fatah in Lebanon. He would later go further. In an interview I conducted with him, he claimed that the idea of creating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was born during a meeting in a Beirut apartment attended by a handful of individuals. The idea was later conveyed to the leaders of the Iranian Revolution, who embraced it on the principle that regular armies could not be trusted.
After the revolution’s victory, Naccache traveled to Tehran.
One day, in a small gathering, participants discussed the danger posed by Shapour Bakhtiar, the Shah’s last prime minister, who was living in exile. Some feared that enemies of the revolution might rally around him to destabilize, or even overthrow the new regime.
Former Iranian Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar in Paris the day after an assassination attempt against him in 1980 (AFP)
According to Naccache, the idea of eliminating Bakhtiar was raised. He revealed that a revolutionary court had sentenced Bakhtiar to death and that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had approved the sentence without publicly announcing it, effectively transforming it into something akin to a fatwa authorizing his killing.
Bakhtiar was living in France under heavy protection. Tehran had not yet developed teams capable of conducting foreign operations. Naccache said he volunteered for the mission with a small group. He obtained Bakhtiar’s telephone number, called claiming to be a journalist seeking an interview, and was surprised to receive an appointment. He visited the residence, conducted the interview, and studied the premises and the vulnerabilities in its security arrangements.
On July 18, 1980, Naccache and his team returned to assassinate Bakhtiar. A reinforced door prevented them from reaching their target. The operation left two policemen and a French woman dead. Naccache was wounded and arrested.
Throughout the 1980s, Iran’s demand for his release overlapped with a series of kidnappings of French nationals in Lebanon by shadowy organizations seeking to exchange them for Naccache. After ten years in prison, France eventually struck a deal and released him.
When I asked who in Iran had known about the assassination plan, he replied: “I informed Mohsen Rafighdoost, who was responsible for the Guards’ administrative staff, and Mohsen Rezaei, a member of its command.”
The Lebanese-Palestinian-Iranian overlap would emerge elsewhere. Imad Mughniyeh — known as Hajj Radwan and accused of involvement in attacks against Israelis, Americans, and Arab targets — had for a time served in Yasser Arafat’s security detail before joining Hezbollah, the centerpiece of Iran’s project in Lebanon and the wider region. Naccache told me that he had personally trained Mughniyeh at the latter’s request.
Naccache spoke with fascination and confidence about the Iranian project, and I listened carefully. He said the region would undergo profound transformations and that revolutionary Iran believed its responsibility began with “liberating the Middle East from American occupation, whether direct or disguised.”
According to him, leaders of the Revolutionary Guards believed that “the American thread” was what guaranteed the stability and survival of many regimes in the region, and that cutting that thread would transform the Middle East’s map and balance of power.
When I asked whether General Qassem Soleimani belonged to this camp, Naccache replied that he was among its leading figures and was working systematically to undermine the American presence throughout the region.
“The revolution never concealed its desire to expel America from Iran and from the region,” he said. “The first message was the seizure of the Americans in their embassy in Tehran. The second was the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut. Hajj Imad helped deliver other messages.”
He also argued that the program of tunnels, missiles, and drones was designed to reduce the strategic value of America’s regional allies by demonstrating that their territory was vulnerable and that alliance with Washington could not guarantee their security.
“If Israel is an American aircraft carrier,” he asked, “what remains of its prestige when every inch of it can be reached by the missiles of the Axis of Resistance?”
Naccache also maintained that Hassan Nasrallah’s personality had earned him the trust of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and elevated him to the role of a partner in shaping Iran’s Arab policies, particularly in countries bordering Palestine.
“Nasrallah and Soleimani,” he underlined, “are closest to the Leader’s heart.”
Perhaps the most striking thing I heard from Naccache was his prediction that “the major blow” was coming. “Sooner or later,” he said, “missiles will rain down on Israel from every direction. Many who emigrated there will regret their decision, and those doubts will open the door to the end of this entity.”
What I heard from Naccache was more explicit than what I later heard in the offices of Islamic Jihad, Hamas, or Hezbollah leaders, though it pointed in the same direction.
Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, the secretary-general of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, was equally convinced that the blow was coming. Khaled Mashaal was more cautious when discussing Iran’s role. Hassan Nasrallah, by contrast, never felt the need to conceal that Iran was Hezbollah’s principal source of weapons, funding, and strategic backing.
The historic handshake between Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin on the White House lawn following the signing of the Oslo Accords, under the auspices of US President Bill Clinton, in Washington in September 1993 (Getty Images)
Revolutionary Iran and the Palestinian Obsession
From the outset, Khomeini’s Iran sought influence in several regional arenas. None preoccupied it more than the Palestinian arena. Yasser Arafat, however, had no intention of placing the Palestinian cause in the custody of Iran’s revolutionary regime. Nor was he prepared to hand Palestinian decision-making to any power on earth.
To preserve the independence of that decision, he forged alliances, fought battles, and moved from one capital to another, resisting those who sought to turn Palestine into a bargaining chip in negotiations with the great powers. His long struggle with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad belonged to that category. “Palestine is a cause for me,” Arafat used to say. “For Assad, it is a card to be played.”
Arafat quickly concluded that the Iranian Revolution lacked what he described to some aides as “realism, careful calculations, and restraints.” He felt that some of its leaders were guided by illusions, particularly in their underestimation of both the United States and the Soviet Union.
Nor was he prepared to place the Palestinian revolution under the guardianship of Khomeini’s revolution. He sensed that the new Iran would soon find itself in conflict not only with its neighbors but with more distant powers as well.
Arafat’s appearance in Tehran six days after the revolution’s victory was historic, but it did not lead him to pledge allegiance to Khomeini as others did. He kept his distance.
When Iranian revolutionaries seized American hostages in the US embassy in Tehran, Arafat explored the possibility of mediation. Tehran rejected the idea. It reacted similarly when he attempted to mediate after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War. Iran therefore began searching for other Palestinian allies. In time, it also contributed to weakening Arafat’s authority. Then came a development larger than Khomeini’s Iran could comfortably tolerate.
On September 13, 1993, the Oslo Accords were signed. Yasser Arafat shook hands with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on the White House lawn under the sponsorship of President Bill Clinton. Arafat had unleashed a second geopolitical earthquake, the first having been launched by Anwar Sadat.
His legitimacy remained intact. His image was inseparable from the first bullet fired by Fatah in the mid-1960s, an act widely credited with reviving the Palestinian cause. Iran felt threatened. It feared losing the bridge through which it hoped to reach the Sunni street and mobilize it against the “Great Satan,” not merely against Israel.
Tehran therefore intensified its investment in Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas. Arafat’s calculations diverged not only from Iran’s but also from those of the so-called camp of “steadfastness and confrontation.”
The hostility directed toward him became intense.
During an interview in Damascus, Ahmed Jibril, secretary-general of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command, accused Arafat of treason. I asked whether he had ever sent someone to assassinate him.
“No,” Jibril replied, “but every morning I turn on the radio hoping to hear of the birth of a Palestinian Islambouli.”
He was referring to Khalid Islambouli, the man who assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.
“I Have Lived Longer Than I Expected”
If Iran failed to draw Arafat beneath its mantle, it had greater success among Palestinian Islamists. Dr. Fathi Shiqaqi, the founder and secretary-general of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, opened the first window. The story began when Shiqaqi was a student at Zagazig University in Egypt. During the upheavals of 1978, fellow students asked him to prepare a ten-page paper on the events unfolding in Iran. The assignment captivated him.
He immersed himself in Islamic sources, Khomeini’s writings, and Muslim Brotherhood thought. He emerged convinced that the revolution in Iran was Islamic rather than sectarian.
Instead of a ten-page report, he produced a booklet titled Khomeini: The Islamic Solution and the Alternative. The booklet drew the attention of Egyptian authorities, who imprisoned him. He would later be jailed again and eventually leave Egypt secretly. He was arrested by Israeli authorities in Gaza in 1983 and again in 1986 before being deported from Palestine in August 1988.
The Israelis failed to appreciate that expelling Shiqaqi would strengthen his relationship with Iran and Hezbollah. Tehran welcomed him warmly. Khomeini received him in 1988 and pledged support for Islamic Jihad in both arms and funding. Thus Islamic Jihad became Iran’s first significant breakthrough into the Palestinian arena.
Ghassan Charbel, Editor-in-Chief of Asharq Al-Awsat, during an interview with the late Islamic Jihad leader Ramadan Shalah in December 2002 (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Following the Arafat-Rabin handshake, Shiqaqi contacted Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, who would later succeed him as leader of the movement. At the time, Shallah was living in the United States and pursuing an academic career.
“The time has come,” Shiqaqi told him. Shallah later explained to me that the phrase signaled a decision “to go further in jihadist action.” The era of suicide bombings was approaching.
On January 22, 1995, Islamic Jihad carried out a devastating double suicide attack at Beit Lid near Tel Aviv, killing 20 Israeli soldiers. Rabin vowed to punish those responsible, even if they were beyond Israel’s borders. It was widely understood that he had ordered Shiqaqi’s assassination. Only days later I visited Shiqaqi in his modest apartment in Damascus. “I am still young,” he said immediately. “It is not yet time for my memoirs. We still have much work ahead of us.”
When I asked about Rabin’s threats, he dismissed them.
“I believe I have lived longer than I expected,” he replied. “The blood of martyrs produces more fighters and escalates the confrontation. We are not concerned by such threats. In the end, as Imam Ali said, destiny is the guardian of life’s appointed term.”
The phrase stayed with me. So did the feeling that our first interview might also be our last. Israel does not easily forgive those who target its soldiers. Mossad’s reach is long, and Rabin was not a man likely to leave such a challenge unanswered.
On October 26, 1995, Mossad found Shiqaqi in Malta and killed him as he returned from Libya.
Ramadan Shallah later told me that Israeli intelligence had penetrated Libyan security and discovered the alias Shiqaqi was using: Ibrahim al-Shawish, a secret known only to Shiqaqi and Shallah.
Hassan Nasrallah and Ali Khamenei (Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader)
"If He Lives, He Will Become the Khomeini of the Arabs"
In Beirut, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah learned of Shiqaqi's assassination and immediately traveled to Damascus. He met Shallah and advised the movement to select a new secretary-general, just as Hezbollah had done after Israel assassinated its secretary-general Abbas al-Musawi, and to announce the successor's name in the statement mourning the previous leader.
According to Shallah, Nasrallah argued that doing so would help preserve the morale of the resistance camp. But, he added, Nasrallah did not interfere in the selection process itself, as that was an internal Islamic Jihad matter and the movement's allies trusted its choices.
Shallah also recalled that Shiqaqi greatly admired Nasrallah: "I was visiting Beirut at the end of 1989 when Dr. Fathi, may he rest in peace, returned from a Hezbollah event at which Nasrallah had spoken. At the time, Nasrallah was not yet secretary-general but a resistance official. Dr. Fathi spoke about him with tremendous admiration. I expressed surprise at the extent of his admiration, and in the presence of several brothers he said: 'If this man lives long enough, he will become the Khomeini of the Arabs.'"
I asked Shallah which model Palestinian factions drew upon when they began carrying out suicide operations. He replied that they had been inspired by the model pioneered by the Lebanese resistance when Abu Zaynab carried out the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut.
Hamas and the Road to Tehran
Despite Iran’s successes with Islamic Jihad, its greatest achievement was drawing Hamas into its regional program, exploiting the movement’s need for weapons and funding. Tehran had long sought an opening. Israel inadvertently provided one.
In late 1992, after members of the Qassam Brigades kidnapped and killed an Israeli officer, Israel deported roughly 415 Palestinian activists from Gaza and the West Bank, most of them affiliated with Hamas. Among them were future leaders such as Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi and Ismail Haniyeh.
Lebanon refused to receive them, and the deportees remained for months in the border area of Marj al-Zohour, transforming their tent encampment into a center for meetings, prayers, lectures, and solidarity visits.
The Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah quickly seized the opportunity. They supplied food, medicine, and shelter. As relationships developed, they trained some of the deportees in explosives, secure communications, and combat tactics. Iran saw in Hamas a prize far larger than Islamic Jihad because of its much broader popular base. The relationship did not begin smoothly.
Some Hamas figures remained wary of Iran because of Sunni-Shiite sensitivities. Others hesitated to accept Iranian funding for fear that it would tie the movement to a political agenda rooted in Iran’s revolutionary worldview.
Over time, those reservations faded. Iranian support became institutionalized. When Hamas seized control of Gaza in June 2007 and expelled the Palestinian Authority, Tehran and Hezbollah recognized a major opportunity.
For Soleimani and Nasrallah, an autonomous Gaza offered the possibility of integrating Hamas into the concept of the “unity of fronts” and preparing it to participate in the long-awaited “major blow.”
The relationship would face serious tests, particularly after Hamas leaders left Syria rather than support Bashar al-Assad’s campaign against the uprising. Iranian and Syrian circles attacked Khaled Mashaal, accusing him of abandoning the resistance camp.
Iran reduced its support, though it never entirely severed assistance to the Qassam Brigades. Differences also emerged over Iran’s role in Yemen and allegations of Shiite proselytization there.
Yet Soleimani and Nasrallah remained committed to preserving the Palestinian component of the Axis of Resistance.
Gradually, relations recovered. Soleimani rewarded Hamas with an extensive program of financing, weapons transfers, local arms production inside Gaza, and advanced training. In 2012, Yahya Sinwar — released from an Israeli prison the previous year — was elected to Hamas’ political leadership in Gaza. Five years later he became head of the movement in the territory.
That same year, Ismail Haniyeh succeeded Khaled Mashaal as chairman of Hamas’ Political Bureau after Mashaal had held the post for twenty-one years.
The military wing gained increasing influence, particularly through Sinwar’s close relationship with the Qassam Brigades and their commander, Mohammed Deif.
An Iranian woman holds a poster featuring Ismail Haniyeh during his funeral procession in Tehran. The poster also depicts Qassem Soleimani, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, Fathi Shiqaqi, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Imad Mughniyeh and Mohsen Fakhrizadeh (AFP).
Sinwar’s Flood
On October 7, 2023, Sinwar and Deif realized their ambition. They launched what they called “Al-Aqsa Flood.” The following day, Hezbollah found itself under pressure to respond to the message sent by the architects of the operation and joined what it termed the campaign to support Gaza.
The world was startled by Israel’s vulnerability in the opening hours, especially after it became clear that the attack had left more than a thousand Israelis dead and scores taken hostage. But after the initial shock, Israel’s war machine awakened and opened multiple fronts.
Benjamin Netanyahu viewed the operation as bearing unmistakable Iranian fingerprints. The retaliation was severe, from Hezbollah in Lebanon all the way to Iran’s Supreme Leader himself. Sinwar’s Flood altered the face of Gaza and Lebanon. It also contributed to the downfall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.
For the first time, American strikes hit Iranian nuclear facilities. Israeli aircraft dominated the skies over Tehran, while Iranian missiles struck targets inside Israel.
The Iranian roar eventually erupted into war, one that unsettled the region, rattled the global economy, and whose consequences remain unresolved.
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