Abed Rabbo: Arafat Urged Saddam to Withdraw from Kuwait

Saddam Hussein during a meeting with Yasser Arafat in Baghdad in May 1990 (Getty Images)
Saddam Hussein during a meeting with Yasser Arafat in Baghdad in May 1990 (Getty Images)
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Abed Rabbo: Arafat Urged Saddam to Withdraw from Kuwait

Saddam Hussein during a meeting with Yasser Arafat in Baghdad in May 1990 (Getty Images)
Saddam Hussein during a meeting with Yasser Arafat in Baghdad in May 1990 (Getty Images)

Yasser Abed Rabbo, former Secretary-General of the executive committee of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), played a key role in historic talks between Yasser Arafat and Israeli and US officials.
He also participated in meetings with Saddam Hussein after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. His insights shed light on crucial moments. Here's what he said about missed opportunities in negotiations:
“At Camp David in 2000, doubts arose from the start, particularly about American intentions.”
“President Bill Clinton offered a proposal that gave away over 10% of the West Bank, with unclear terms on Jerusalem’s holy sites. This ambiguity favored Israel.”
“Arafat saw these sites as non-negotiable, fearing any compromise would brand him a traitor.”
“He was determined not to be seen as conceding what past leaders hadn’t. Even regarding the Wailing Wall, he insisted it was also the Buraq Wall in Islam, not solely Jewish.”
“For Arafat, protecting these sites meant preserving his legacy as a national hero,” stressed Abed Rabbo.
US ‘Lost Mediator Role’ at Camp David
“Returning to Camp David, the US’ proposal caused a stir and strong reaction because we hadn’t started negotiations with the Israelis. It seemed biased towards Israel,” revealed Abed Rabbo.
According to the Palestinian politician, Washington “quickly withdrew the proposal the next day to open discussions on all issues, including borders, land, Jerusalem, settlements, and refugees.”
The quick withdrawal raised deep doubts among Palestinians.
“It seemed like the Americans had their own agenda, treating their retreat as a tactical move,” said Abed Rabbo.
“This was the first setback for Palestinian negotiators and Yasser Arafat, questioning the sincerity of the process and reliance on the US,” he added.
“Arafat then insisted on direct talks with Ehud Barak to address all issues before involving committees.”
Abed Rabbo noted that Barak avoided direct talks, preferring meetings with Clinton and US representatives as he seemingly relied on their stance against the Palestinians.
“Despite attending committee meetings, Barak refused to engage until they followed his approach. Meetings with Clinton felt hollow, with discussions often echoing Israeli views. It felt like the US and Israel were coordinating without us,” recalled Abed Rabbo.
“This undermined the US role as a mediator,” he concluded.
Arafat’s Error in the Second Intifada
When asked about Iran backing the Oslo Accords’ downfall through suicide attacks, Abed Rabbo said : “I doubt Iran was involved. Hamas led most suicide operations, with other groups also taking part.”
“Arafat made a mistake, hinting to Hamas that he approved these attacks to pressure Israelis. He didn’t condemn the operations themselves, only attacks on civilians by both sides,” clarified Abed Rabbo.

 

As for Arafat’s influence being a barrier to the growth of Hamas, Abed Rabbo admitted that the Palestinian leader initially cracked down on Hamas.
“As the second intifada unfolded after Yitzhak Rabin’s death and Ariel Sharon’s provocative visit to Al-Aqsa, Arafat saw Hamas’ attacks as pressure tactics on Israelis,” revealed Abed Rabbo.
In summary, Arafat’s stance shifted over time, initially cracking down on Hamas but later seeing attacks as a means to pressure Israelis.
After Rabin’s death, during a transitional phase that included Shimon Peres and Benjamin Netanyahu’s election in 1996, the first meeting with Netanyahu occurred at an Israeli military base at the Erez checkpoint, near the entrance to Gaza.
“I was with Arafat in his first meeting with Netanyahu. Another person was there, but I can't recall who,” said Abed Rabbo.
Netanyahu started that meeting by telling Arafat he opposed the Oslo Accords signed with Peres and Rabin.
“With this new government, those agreements are over. We'll follow a principle of reciprocity: positive steps get positive responses, negative steps get negative ones,” Netanyahu told Arafat, according to Abed Rabbo.
In the meeting, Abed Rabbo asked Netanyahu: “Even if we accept this, which we don't because the Oslo Accord binds both Israel and us, who decides if our actions are positive or negative?”
“We decide,” said Netanyahu.
“Then you're both the opponent and the judge,” replied Abed Rabbo.
“It was clear it wouldn't work. Arafat asked for a private meeting but left feeling Netanyahu wanted to destroy Oslo. Since then, Arafat became more cautious, knowing saving Oslo faces big challenges,” recalled Abed Rabbo.
Saddam Compared Jerusalem’s Lights to Baghdad’s
Asked if Arafat misjudged Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, Abed Rabbo said: “Definitely. Arafat opposed the invasion internally but feared losing ties with Saddam. His regional support was weak, especially with Hafez al-Assad’s Syria.”
“He spent years in Tunisian exile. His Jordan ties were tense. Despite good Gulf relations, Arafat hoped for a peaceful resolution, but feared losing ties if Saddam fell.”
“Saddam’s support for the Palestinian liberation movement was significant,” said Abed Rabbo.
“Arafat valued not just the financial aid but also logistical support, ensuring communication between Iraq, the West Bank, and Gaza through Jordan.”
“I was with Arafat when he met Saddam Hussein after the Kuwait invasion. Arafat urged Saddam to withdraw, fearing Iraq's fate.”
Recalling the meeting, Abed Rabbo said: “We met in a modest villa in Baghdad’s Al Zawraa Park. Arafat was open, expressing concern over Iraq's fate.”
“I’ve accounted for everything,” Saddam assured Arafat, standing at the villa’s door, overlooking Baghdad.
“Abu Ammar, I see Jerusalem’s lights as I see Baghdad’s now before me. It signifies Jerusalem’s liberation,” remarked Saddam at the time.
Abed Rabbo was born in Jaffa in 1945 and moved to Lebanon after the Nakba. At fifteen, he joined the Arab Nationalists Movement under Mohsen Ibrahim. He studied economics and political science at the American University in Cairo.
In 1968, he helped establish the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine with George Habash and others. The next year, he co-founded the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. He later founded the Fida Party in 1990 and stepped down in 2004.
Abed Rabbo met Yasser Arafat during the Battle of Karameh in 1968. They formed a strong bond, allowing him to play a key role in US-PLO dialogue.
He led the Palestinian delegation in talks with the US in 1989 and was active in the Oslo Accords negotiations. He held ministerial positions after Palestinian leaders returned, and he attended many meetings with Israeli and US officials.
From 2005 to 2015, he served as Secretary-General of the PLO’s Executive Committee. He left due to disputes with Mahmoud Abbas. His role allowed him to engage in meetings with Arab and global leaders. He also shared a close friendship with Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish.



What to Know about the Tensions between Iran and the US before Their Third Round of Talks

The flags of US and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. Iran and US will hold third round of nuclear talks on 26 April 2025, in Muscat. (EPA)
The flags of US and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. Iran and US will hold third round of nuclear talks on 26 April 2025, in Muscat. (EPA)
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What to Know about the Tensions between Iran and the US before Their Third Round of Talks

The flags of US and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. Iran and US will hold third round of nuclear talks on 26 April 2025, in Muscat. (EPA)
The flags of US and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. Iran and US will hold third round of nuclear talks on 26 April 2025, in Muscat. (EPA)

Iran and the United States will hold talks Saturday in Oman, their third round of negotiations over Tehran’s rapidly advancing nuclear program.

The talks follow a first round held in Muscat, Oman, where the two sides spoke face to face. They then met again in Rome last weekend before this scheduled meeting again in Muscat.

Trump has imposed new sanctions on Iran as part of his “maximum pressure” campaign targeting the country. He has repeatedly suggested military action against Iran remained a possibility, while emphasizing he still believed a new deal could be reached by writing a letter to Iran’s 85-year-old Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to jumpstart these talks.

Khamenei has warned Iran would respond to any attack with an attack of its own.

Here’s what to know about the letter, Iran’s nuclear program and the tensions that have stalked relations between Tehran and Washington since the 1979 revolution.

Why did Trump write the letter? Trump dispatched the letter to Khamenei on March 5, then gave a television interview the next day in which he acknowledged sending it. He said: “I’ve written them a letter saying, ‘I hope you’re going to negotiate because if we have to go in militarily, it’s going to be a terrible thing.’”

Since returning to the White House, the president has been pushing for talks while ratcheting up sanctions and suggesting a military strike by Israel or the US could target Iranian nuclear sites.

A previous letter from Trump during his first term drew an angry retort from the supreme leader.

But Trump’s letters to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in his first term led to face-to-face meetings, though no deals to limit Pyongyang’s atomic bombs and a missile program capable of reaching the continental US.

How did the first round go? Oman, a sultanate on the eastern edge of the Arabian Peninsula, hosted the first round of talks between Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and US Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff. The two men met face to face after indirect talks and immediately agreed to this second round in Rome.

Witkoff later made a television appearance in which he suggested 3.67% enrichment for Iran could be something the countries could agree on. But that’s exactly the terms set by the 2015 nuclear deal struck under US President Barack Obama, from which Trump unilaterally withdrew America.

Witkoff hours later issued a statement underlining something: “A deal with Iran will only be completed if it is a Trump deal.” Araghchi and Iranian officials have latched onto Witkoff’s comments in recent days as a sign that America was sending it mixed signals about the negotiations.

Yet the Rome talks ended up with the two sides agreeing to starting expert-level talks this Saturday. Analysts described that as a positive sign, though much likely remains to be agreed before reaching a tentative deal.

Why does Iran’s nuclear program worry the West? Iran has insisted for decades that its nuclear program is peaceful. However, its officials increasingly threaten to pursue a nuclear weapon. Iran now enriches uranium to near weapons-grade levels of 60%, the only country in the world without a nuclear weapons program to do so.

Under the original 2015 nuclear deal, Iran was allowed to enrich uranium up to 3.67% purity and to maintain a uranium stockpile of 300 kilograms (661 pounds). The last report by the International Atomic Energy Agency on Iran’s program put its stockpile at 8,294.4 kilograms (18,286 pounds) as it enriches a fraction of it to 60% purity.

US intelligence agencies assess that Iran has yet to begin a weapons program, but has “undertaken activities that better position it to produce a nuclear device, if it chooses to do so.”

Ali Larijani, an adviser to Iran’s supreme leader, has warned in a televised interview that his country has the capability to build nuclear weapons, but it is not pursuing it and has no problem with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s inspections. However, he said if the US or Israel were to attack Iran over the issue, the country would have no choice but to move toward nuclear weapon development.

“If you make a mistake regarding Iran’s nuclear issue, you will force Iran to take that path, because it must defend itself,” he said.

Why are relations so bad between Iran and the US? Iran was once one of the US’s top allies in the Middle East under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who purchased American military weapons and allowed CIA technicians to run secret listening posts monitoring the neighboring Soviet Union. The CIA had fomented a 1953 coup that cemented the shah’s rule.

But in January 1979, the shah, fatally ill with cancer, fled Iran as mass demonstrations swelled against his rule. The revolution followed, led by Khomeini, and created Iran’s theocratic government.

Later that year, university students overran the US Embassy in Tehran, seeking the shah’s extradition and sparking the 444-day hostage crisis that saw diplomatic relations between Iran and the US severed. The Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s saw the US back Saddam Hussein. The “Tanker War” during that conflict saw the US launch a one-day assault that crippled Iran at sea, while the US later shot down an Iranian commercial airliner that the American military said it mistook for a warplane.

Iran and the US have see-sawed between enmity and grudging diplomacy in the years since, with relations peaking when Tehran made the 2015 nuclear deal with world powers. But Trump unilaterally withdrew America from the accord in 2018, sparking tensions in the Middle East that persist today.