Destruction, Lawlessness and Red Tape Hobble Gaza Aid

FILE PHOTO: Trucks are parked at the Nitzana Crossing, in Nitzana, Israel, January 30, 2024. REUTERS/Alexandre Meneghini/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: Trucks are parked at the Nitzana Crossing, in Nitzana, Israel, January 30, 2024. REUTERS/Alexandre Meneghini/File Photo
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Destruction, Lawlessness and Red Tape Hobble Gaza Aid

FILE PHOTO: Trucks are parked at the Nitzana Crossing, in Nitzana, Israel, January 30, 2024. REUTERS/Alexandre Meneghini/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: Trucks are parked at the Nitzana Crossing, in Nitzana, Israel, January 30, 2024. REUTERS/Alexandre Meneghini/File Photo

In mid-March, a line of trucks stretched for 3 kilometers along a desert road near a crossing point from Israel into the Gaza Strip. On the same day, another line of trucks, some 1.5 kilometers long, sometimes two or three across, was backed up near a crossing from Egypt into Gaza.

The trucks were filled with aid, much of it food, for the more than 2 million Palestinians in the war-ravaged enclave. About 50 kilometers from Gaza, more aid trucks – some 2,400 in total – were sitting idle this month in the Egyptian city of Al Arish, according to an Egyptian Red Crescent official.

These motionless food-filled trucks, the main lifeline for Gazans, are at the heart of the escalating humanitarian crisis gripping the enclave. More than five months into Israel’s war with Hamas, a report by a global authority on food security has warned that famine is imminent in parts of Gaza, as more than three-quarters of the population have been forced from their homes and swathes of the territory are in ruins.

Galvanized by reports and images of starving children, the international community, led by the United States, has been pressuring Israel to facilitate the transfer of more aid into Gaza. Washington has airdropped food into the Mediterranean enclave and recently announced it would build a pier off the Gaza coast to help ferry in more aid.

UN officials have accused Israel of blocking humanitarian supplies to Gaza. The European Union’s foreign policy chief alleged Israel was using starvation as a “weapon of war.” And aid agency officials say Israeli red tape is slowing the flow of trucks carrying food supplies.

Israeli officials reject these accusations and say they have increased aid access to Gaza. Israel isn’t responsible for delays in aid getting into Gaza, they say, and the delivery of aid once inside the territory is the responsibility of the UN and humanitarian agencies. Israel has also accused Hamas of stealing aid.

Reuters interviewed more than two dozen people, including humanitarian workers, Israeli military officials and truck drivers, in tracing the tortuous route that aid takes into Gaza in an effort to identify the chokepoints and reasons for delays of supplies. Reuters also reviewed UN and Israeli military statistics on aid shipments, as well as satellite images of the border crossing areas, which revealed the long lines of trucks.

Before the aid shipments enter Gaza, they undergo a series of Israeli checks, and a shipment approved at one stage of the process can later be rejected, according to 18 aid workers and UN officials involved in the aid effort. At one crossing from Israel into Gaza, goods are twice loaded off trucks and then reloaded onto other trucks that then carry the aid to warehouses in Gaza. The aid delivery process can also be complicated by competing international demands, with some countries wanting their contributions to be prioritized.
Aid that does make it into Gaza can be ransacked by desperate civilians, sometimes fall prey to armed gangs, or get held up by Israeli army checkpoints. Half the warehouses storing aid in Gaza are no longer operational after having been hit in the fighting.

“It’s upsetting watching these aid trucks go nowhere and vast humanitarian supplies sit in warehouses when you think about what’s happening, right now, to the people who need them,” said Paolo Pezzati, an Oxfam worker who recently visited the queue of aid trucks near the Egypt-Gaza border.

Before the war began, an average of 200 trucks carrying aid entered Gaza each day, according to UN figures. A further 300 trucks laden with commercial imports, including food, agricultural supplies and industrial materials, also entered each day via Israel. Since the start of the war, an average of around 100 trucks have entered Gaza daily, according to a review of UN and Israeli military statistics on aid shipments.

While the trucks struggle to get into Gaza, the need for aid has risen dramatically, both because of the vast number of displaced people and the devastation of key infrastructure in Israel’s assault. This includes the destruction of bakeries, markets, and farmland whose crops met some of Gaza’s food needs.

“Previous wars weren’t like this,” said Alaa al-Atar, a municipal official, referring to conflicts in Gaza. “There wasn’t the destruction of all sources of subsistence – homes, farmland, infrastructure. There’s nothing left to survive on, just aid,” said Atar, who was displaced from the north to the south of Gaza early in the war.

To meet its minimum needs, aid agencies and UN officials say Gaza currently requires 500 to 600 trucks a day, including humanitarian aid and the commercial supplies that were coming in before the war. That’s about four times the number of trucks getting in now.

In March there has been an uptick, with an average of 150 trucks entering Gaza each day.

Some deliveries are being made by international air drops and via sea, but they aren't making up for shortfalls on the land routes. In the first three weeks of March, the equivalent of some 50 truckloads of aid was airdropped and brought in by sea, a Reuters tally based on Israeli military statistics showed.

The recent food security report, known as the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), found that a lack of aid means almost all households in Gaza are skipping meals every day and adults are cutting back on meals so their children can eat. The situation is particularly dire in northern Gaza, it said, where in nearly two-thirds of households, “people went entire days and nights without eating at least 10 times in the last 30 days.”

A senior Hamas official said Israel is responsible for the inadequate aid flows. The “biggest threat” to the distribution of aid is Israel’s ongoing attacks in Gaza, Hamas official Bassem Naim told Reuters. “The biggest obstacle to getting the aid to the people who need it is the continued gunfire and the continued targeting of aid and those who are handling it,” he said.

WAITING IN THE DESERT

Before some of the aid begins its journey to Gaza, it is flown to Cairo or shipped by sea to Port Said, which borders Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, about 150 kms to the west of Al Arish. From there, it is trucked to the city of Al Arish, on the Mediterranean coast. Some aid is also flown directly to the Egyptian city.

Once in Cairo or Al Arish, the aid undergoes its first check. International agencies submit a detailed inventory of each shipment to the Israeli military via the UN for clearance. Israel has long banned “dual use” items that it says could be used by Hamas to make weapons.

Of 153 requests made to the Israeli authorities for goods to enter Gaza between Jan. 11 and March 15, 100 were cleared, 15 were rejected outright and another 38 were pending, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs told Reuters. UN officials didn’t specify whether a request referred to a specific number of trucks or volume of aid. It takes almost a month on average to get a response, according to minutes of a meeting of aid agencies seen by Reuters.

The Israeli military says it approves almost 99% of the Gaza-bound trucks it inspects and that once the goods are inside the enclave, it is the responsibility of the international aid organizations to distribute it. The inspection process “isn’t the impediment” to aid “getting into the Gaza Strip,” said Shimon Freedman, a spokesman for COGAT, the Israeli military branch that handles aid transfers.

Diplomatic wrangling by countries donating aid can also create snarls in the delivery process. UN officials told Reuters that because aid comes not only from international agencies but also directly from individual donor countries, the process of deciding which trucks go to the front of the queue can be thorny even before they depart Al Arish.

The Egyptian Red Crescent official said donor countries “drop off aid in Al Arish or at Al Arish airport and walk away and say, ‘We gave out aid to Gaza.’” It is the Red Crescent and Egyptian authorities who then bear the responsibility of getting the aid to Gaza, he said.

From Al Arish, the trucks make the 50-kilometer journey to the Rafah crossing point on the Egypt-Gaza border.

Next stop: Israel’s truck-scanning centers.

Once they reach the Rafah crossing, some trucks are then required to drive along the Egypt-Israel border for 40 kilometers to an inspection facility on the Israeli side called Nitzana. Here the goods are physically checked by Israeli soldiers who use scanning machines and sniffer dogs, according to UN and other aid agency staff.

Some items get rejected during the physical inspection, in particular ones Israel believes could be used by Hamas and other armed groups for military purposes. Some shipments carrying dual-use items are sent back to Al Arish. The same item that is let through one day, can be rejected on another day, UN officials and aid workers said.

UN agencies say solar panels, metal tent poles, oxygen tanks, generators and water purification equipment are among the items the military has rejected.

COGAT’S Freedman said there is a publicized list of what constitutes dual-use items, but there isn’t a “blanket ban” on these goods. If Israeli authorities “understand what exactly it is necessary for, we can coordinate it,” he said. But Israel wants to be sure that goods aren’t going to be “used by Hamas for terrorist activities,” he said.

The Israeli military says it can scan a total of 44 trucks an hour at Nitzana and at a crossing from Israel into Gaza where aid trucks are inspected, at Kerem Shalom. But aid agency officials say the actual number scanned is fewer. The military declined to say how many hours Nitzana and Kerem Shalom are open each day.

Once the trucks pass inspection at Nitzana, they make the 40-kilometer journey back to Rafah, where they wait to cross into Gaza.

In late January, groups of Israelis, including friends and relatives of the more than 130 people still being held hostage by Hamas, began protesting against the delivery of aid to Gaza. Between late January and early March, the protests effectively shut down either Nitzana or Kerem Shalom for a total of 16 days, according to aid agencies.

At the Kerem Shalom crossing, goods are unloaded from the scanned trucks and reloaded onto trucks that have been vetted by the Israeli army, according to UN and aid agency workers. These “sanitized” trucks then make a 1 kilometer journey to a warehouse inside Gaza where the aid is again offloaded. The goods are then placed on trucks driven by Palestinians and taken to mostly UN-run warehouses in Rafah.

Under growing international pressure, Israel earlier this month initiated a new route for the delivery of aid directly to northern Gaza, known as the 96th gate. By March 20, COGAT said at least 86 international aid trucks had entered via the new crossing.

“There is a sufficient amount of food entering Gaza every day,” said Col. Moshe Tetro, a COGAT official overseeing Gaza.

The new route was initiated “as part of a pilot in order to prevent Hamas from taking over the aid,” COGAT said in a post on social media site X. Freedman, though, said he didn’t have “specific evidence” he could share about Hamas pilfering aid.

Hamas official Naim rejected the accusation that the group was stealing aid. “We have been cooperating and are cooperating with every single state and humanitarian organization so that the aid reaches people in dire need,” he said.

AN ARDUOUS JOURNEY

Once inside Gaza, the aid shipments face more challenges.
Several convoys have been attacked on the stretch of road from Kerem Shalom to Gaza warehouses by people carrying crude weapons such as axes and box-cutters, according to UN officials and truck drivers. Deeper inside Gaza, others have been swarmed by crowds of people desperate for food.

In an incident that galvanized aid efforts, more than 100 people were killed in late February when a crowd descended on an aid convoy organized by Israel.
Security for food convoys traveling the short distance from the crossing points to warehouses in Rafah also deteriorated after several strikes by the Israeli military killed at least eight policemen in Gaza, according to UN officials. Israel says all police are members of Hamas.

“Whether they’re Hamas or not I don’t know, but they were doing a job for us in terms of crowd control,” said Jamie McGoldrick, a senior UN official. “The police are less willing to do that now.”

Aid agencies mostly now negotiate their own security with local communities, McGoldrick said.

Reuters reported recently that armed and masked men from an array of clans and factions in Gaza had begun providing security to aid convoys.

Police officers in Gaza “are Hamas, they are part of the Hamas terrorist organization,” COGAT’s Freedman said. Israel doesn’t target humanitarian convoys, “we try to assist them, but Hamas is our enemy.”

Storing aid in Gaza has also become a problem. Warehouses have been damaged by the fighting and occasionally looted. Of the 43 warehouses in Gaza that were operational before the war, only 22 are now working, according to the Logistics Cluster, a UN-run logistics facilitator for aid agencies.

In mid-March, an Israeli airstrike hit a UN food distribution center in southern Gaza, killing several people. Israel said it killed a Hamas commander in the attack. Hamas said the man targeted by Israel was a member of its police force.

From the warehouses, aid is delivered to southern Gaza, where the majority of the population is now located.

Making deliveries to northern Gaza is more fraught.

Roads to the north have been bombed by Israel and there are delays as trucks are held up or denied access at Israeli army checkpoints, say UN and other aid agency officials. Aid convoys are also often looted before reaching their destination by crowds of people desperate for food, UN officials said.

UN officials told Reuters that humanitarian agencies had made 158 requests to the Israeli military to deliver aid to northern Gaza from the beginning of the war to March 14. Of those, the military denied 57, they said.

COGAT’s Freedman said some requests to move aid inside Gaza have been rejected because aid agencies didn’t coordinate sufficiently with Israel.
“They weren't able to tell us exactly where that aid was going,” he said. “And if we don't know where it's going to, we don't know it's not going to end up in the hands of Hamas.”
In southern Gaza, residents are desperately waiting for aid.
“People have nothing to eat at all, nor do they have a place to stay, or a refuge,” said Suleiman al-Jaal, a local truck driver who said he has been attacked transporting aid in Gaza. “This is not a life. No matter how much aid they bring in, it’s not enough.”



Iran in a Quarter Century: Clash Between the ‘Revolution’ and the State

An Iranian woman walks by the former US embassy in Tehran. (AFP)
An Iranian woman walks by the former US embassy in Tehran. (AFP)
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Iran in a Quarter Century: Clash Between the ‘Revolution’ and the State

An Iranian woman walks by the former US embassy in Tehran. (AFP)
An Iranian woman walks by the former US embassy in Tehran. (AFP)

For the past quarter century, Iran endured a bitter conflict between the ideological aspects of the “revolution” and the strategic view aimed at protecting the state and its interests in a changing world.

Despite hopes for radical change, attempts to achieve reform collided with resistance from the traditional centers of power, preventing real reconciliation between the contradiction in the principles of the “revolution” and the demands of national reforms, or at least achieving some form of sustainable agreement between these opposing movements.

Since 2000, Iran witnessed the election of five presidents with limited jurisdiction, and five parliamentary elections, which were dominated by either of the main reformist and conservative movements, amid the ongoing debate over the nature of rule, its agenda and priorities.

Since the 1979 revolution, the jurisdiction of the parliament and government has been fully under the control of the decision-making centers in the country, with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei at the top of the pyramid. The supreme leader enjoys almost absolute power, making him above all state institutions.

Meanwhile, the role of the military and political institutions, such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Guardian Council, expanded as they maintained their role in protecting the ideological principles of the ruling system. The system is based on a constitution that is in turn based on the Wilayat al-Faqih. These institutions are the main tools for preserving the identity of the “Islamic Republic” and bolstering its position that is hostile to the West.

Some 45 years after its “Islamic Revolution”, Iran has yet to reconcile the contradictions between its principles and national interests. (Getty Images)

Khatami and shift in the conflict

The beginning of the new millennium in Iran coincided with a decisive moment in reformist President Mohammed Khatami’s term (1997-2005). The period was marked with the intensification of the confrontation between the reformists and conservatives. The latter sought to obstruct reforms pursued by Khatami, especially in civil freedoms and freedom of expression.

The non-elected institutions that are under Khamenei’s direct supervision, such as the Guardian Council and judiciary, played a decisive role in obstructing reform measures, creating challenges for the reformists in achieving their political and social agendas.

Khatami’s term in office witnessed a major shift in the clash between the supporters of the ideology of the revolution and those calling for achieving strategic interests. He believed that the reforms were a strategic need to secure the continuity of the system of rule and its ability to adapt to internal and external changes. His critics, however, believed that his approach threatened the very foundations of the Wilayat al-Faqih.

Iran worked on improving its relations with the West and boosting its national identity through the Dialogue Among Civilizations, but the September 11, 2001, attacks and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 were a blow to these efforts.

Iran saw in the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime in neighboring Iraq an opportunity to expand its ideological influence through supporting groups that were affiliated with Iran or were established within its territory. The nuclear file also undermined the Dialogue Among Civilizations initiative and efforts to build trust with the West, thereby increasing Iran’s isolation and regional and international tensions.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guards played a main role in the nuclear program and regional wars. (Khamenei’s official website)

IRGC and the regional role

The IRGC played a main role in issues related to the nuclear program, internal developments and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq at the end of Khatami’s term.

In Afghanistan, the IRGC supported the United States in ousting the Taliban from power. In Iraq, the IRGC’s Quds Force led armed Iraqi factions in bolstering Iranian influence that persist to this day. Under General Qassem Soleimani’s leadership, the Quds Force also expanded its operations in Lebanon, helping establish a network that ran parallel to Iranian diplomacy in regional politics.

Iran felt threatened by the US’ bolstered military presence in the region, leading it to expand its security and strategic plans, starting with the nuclear and ballistic missiles programs.

In 2002, the discovery of secret nuclear facilities aroused suspicions among the international community about Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the possibility that it would pursue the production of a nuclear bomb. Amid the rising tensions, the West shifted its priorities towards Tehran to curbing its nuclear activities. Moreover, US officials, especially during President George W. Bush’s term, threatened on numerous occasions to use military force against Iran if it continued to pursue its nuclear ambitions.

Iran has bolstered its influence in the Middle East, stoking tensions with regional powers. (AP)

Nuclear file and internal tensions

The nuclear file has been a source of tension inside and outside Iran ever since. On the domestic level, it sparked debate about the country’s national priorities. The reformists sought to maintain Tehran’s international relations and ease tensions, while the conservatives clung on to their ideological principles.

In 2003, Tehran declared that it was voluntarily ending its uranium enrichment as part of the Amad Plan agreement reached with the European troika. In return, it received a pledge that the file would not be referred to the UN Security Council and that economic ties would be established with Europe. That same year, Iran heavily promoted Khamenei’s fatwa that barred the production, storing or use of nuclear weapons.

The US, however, remained suspicious of Iran’s intentions. It believed that agreements were not enough and it accused Iran of expanding its nuclear program, leading it to impose sanctions on its banks and energy sector. During the term of President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, it referred the program to the Security Council – a move that was welcomed by the international community. The move prompted Iran to adopt an aggressive policy against western powers.

Iran has never officially declared that it was developing nuclear weapons. In 2007, US intelligence released a report that said Tehran had stopped its nuclear weapons development in 2003, helping to soften the American position against it.

Throughout Ahmedinejad’s eight years in office, tensions rose with the West over the nuclear program. Tehran raised its level of uranium enrichment to 20 percent while the president insisted on his country’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology. In return, crippling sanctions were imposed on its nuclear program, oil exports and economy.

Khamenei meets with veterans from the Iraqi-Iranian war. (EPA)

Iran and the ‘Arab Spring’

On the foreign level, Iran aspired to bolster relations with Arab, African and Latin American countries. It also backed armed groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas.

With the eruption of the “Arab Spring” revolts, Iran sought to consolidate its influence in the Middle East, especially in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, stoking tensions with regional powers and Arab countries. Supporting Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria was also a top priority for Ahmedinejad before he was succeeded by Hassan Rouhani.

On the domestic level, Iran went through a huge crisis after Ahmedinejad won the 2009 elections. The wave of “Green Movement” demonstrations erupted in protest against the elections results between Ahmedinejad, and reformist candidates Mir Hossein Moussavi and Mehdi Karroubi.

After Ahmedinejad’s term ended, Iran tried to ease tensions with the West. It took part in nuclear negotiations aimed at managing tensions with the major powers. Two years of negotiations led to the 2015 nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), that suspended UN sanctions on Iran and lifted restrictions on its nuclear program.

The supreme leader played a pivotal role in the negotiations. He set red lines when it came to maintaining Iran’s right to uranium enrichment, lifting economic sanctions and refusing visits to military facilities by international inspectors.

Khamenei cautiously supported Rouhani’s negotiating team at the nuclear talks despite pressure from conservative movements. The negotiations struck a balance between ideology and strategic interests as Iran sought to maintain its “revolutionary” slogans, while adapting to international changes, confronting economic and security challenges and continuing to fund its regional activities to ensure that it remained a main player in the Middle East.

The IRGC continued to consolidate Iran’s influence in the region, especially in Syria and Iraq, and Khamenei threatened to expel American forces from the region. The tensions alarmed the American administration leading then President Donald Trump to pull Washington out of the nuclear deal in 2018.

Qassem Soleimani. (Tasnim)

Patience in handling pressure

In confronting Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign, including preventing Iran from selling oil, Tehran adopted a policy of “walking on the edge of the abyss” and of “strategic patience.” Regional tensions also spiked with the IRGC seizing oil tankers after Tehran threatened to block oil shipping lanes. Trump consequently designated the IRGC as terrorist.

Trump would also order the killing of Quds Forces commander Soleimani in Baghdad in January 2020. The move took Iranian-American tensions to a whole new level and threatened to spark a direct war between the two countries.

In a leaked 2021 recording, then foreign minister Mohammed Javad Zarif called for striking a balance between foreign policy and the policy on the field, a reference to the Quds Force that leads the IRGC’s foreign operations. The recordings exposed an internal rift between the ideological and pragmatic movements in Iran, with the latter wanting to achieve interests, such as the lifting of sanctions.

Zarif defended his conviction that diplomatic work relies on the situation on the ground and vice versa, meaning diplomacy can grant “international legitimacy” to achievements on the field.

When US President Joe Biden came to office, Khamenei used his influence to support the IRGC and showed limited leniency in managing tensions through new nuclear negotiations. Biden tried to return to the nuclear pact with Tehran, but Iran’s unprecedented nuclear measures adopted by conservative late President Ebrahim Raisi and Russia’s war on Ukraine thwarted diplomacy.

18 December 2024, Iran, Tehran: Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian speaks during the Cabinet meeting in Tehran. (Iranian Presidency/dpa)

Raisi and the ‘revolutionary government’

Under Raisi, Tehran pursued diplomacy at the negotiating table with the West, but the talks never made it to the finish line.

His term in office was cut short by his death in a helicopter crash in May 2024. His time in power was marked by loyalty to the supreme leader’s view of forming a “revolutionary government” and limiting state power to conservatives.

Raisi effectively followed in the same footsteps as Ahmedinejad: Tehran sought rapprochement with regional forces, while hoping to circumvent sanctions and speed up its nuclear activities.

Raisi was succeeded by Masoud Pezeshkian, who was backed reformists. He pledged to maintain the policy of turning to the east and bolstering relations with China and Russia. He also sought to lift sanctions on Iran by returning to nuclear negotiations.

On the regional level, Tehran’s “shadow war” with Israel came out to the open and the two sides traded direct blows. Following Raisi’s death, Iran continued to suffer more setbacks, notably the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria and the weakening of Hezbollah and Hamas’ roles. These developments will weaken the IRGC’s regional role, but it could seek to compensate for its losses in other regions, even inside Iran itself.

Pezeshkian and internal reconciliation

Pezeshkian’s presidency is seen as an opportunity to achieve internal reconciliation in Iran at a critical time when the people are preoccupied with the issue of Khamenei’s successor. Iran is unlikely to introduce radical change to its relations with the West and Pezeshkian may be granted limited jurisdiction in the nuclear negotiations.

Soon after Trump’s re-election as president, Pezeshkian stressed the need to manage relations and the confrontation with the US. He said his government will follow the strategy of the ruling system.

Pezeshkian will likely receive the backing of the supreme leader and IRGC to reach a settlement that would ease pressure on Iran. This does not necessarily mean that Iran will be moving away from the edge of the abyss. On the contrary, it could reflect an attempt to widen the margin for maneuver amid the tensions with the West. Iran is expected to follow this approach in the near future or at least when the identity of the third supreme leader is revealed.