What's Next for Iran's Government after Death of its President in Helicopter Crash?

The Iranian flag is seen flying over a street in Tehran, Iran, February 1, 2023. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS/File Photo Purchase Licensing Rights
The Iranian flag is seen flying over a street in Tehran, Iran, February 1, 2023. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS/File Photo Purchase Licensing Rights
TT

What's Next for Iran's Government after Death of its President in Helicopter Crash?

The Iranian flag is seen flying over a street in Tehran, Iran, February 1, 2023. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS/File Photo Purchase Licensing Rights
The Iranian flag is seen flying over a street in Tehran, Iran, February 1, 2023. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS/File Photo Purchase Licensing Rights

The death of Iran's president is unlikely to lead to any immediate changes in Iran's ruling system or to its overarching policies, which are decided by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

But Ebrahim Raisi, who died in a helicopter crash Sunday, was seen as a prime candidate to succeed the 85-year-old supreme leader, and his death makes it more likely that the job could eventually go to Khamenei's son, The AP reported.

A hereditary succession would pose a potential crisis of legitimacy for the Islamic Republic, which was established as an alternative to monarchy but which many Iranians already see as a corrupt and dictatorial regime. Here's a look at what comes next.

HOW DOES IRAN'S GOVERNMENT WORK?

Iran holds regular elections for president and parliament with universal suffrage.

But the supreme leader has final say on all major policies, serves as commander-in-chief of the armed forces and controls the powerful Revolutionary Guard.

The supreme leader also appoints half of the 12-member Guardian Council, a clerical body that vets candidates for president, parliament and the Assembly of Experts, an elected body of jurists in charge of choosing the supreme leader.

In theory, the clerics oversee the republic to ensure it complies with Islamic law. In practice, the supreme leader carefully manages the ruling system to balance competing interests, advance his own priorities and ensure that no one challenges the Islamic Republic or his role atop it.

Raisi, a hard-liner who was seen as a protege of Khamenei, was elected president in 2021 after the Guardian Council blocked any other well-known candidate from running against him, and turnout was the lowest in the history of the Islamic Republic. He succeeded Hassan Rouhani, a relative moderate who had served as president for the past eight years and defeated Raisi in 2017.

After Raisi's death, in accordance with Iran's constitution, Vice President Mohammad Mokhber, a relative unknown, became caretaker president, with elections mandated within 50 days. That vote will likely be carefully managed to produce a president who maintains the status quo.

That means Iran will continue to impose some degree of Islamic rule and crack down on dissent. It will enrich uranium, support armed groups across the Middle East and view the West with deep suspicion.

WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR SUCCESSION?

Presidents come and go, some more moderate than others, but each operates under the structure of the ruling system.

If any major change occurs in Iran, it is likely to come after the passing of Khamenei, when a new supreme leader will be chosen for only the second time since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Khamenei succeeded the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Khomeini, in 1989.

The next supreme leader will be chosen by the 88-seat Assembly of Experts, who are elected every eight years from candidates vetted by the Guardian Council. In the most recent election, in March, Rouhani was barred from running, while Raisi won a seat.

Any discussion of the succession, or machinations related to it, occur far from the public eye, making it hard to know who may be in the running. But the two people seen by analysts as most likely to succeed Khamenei were Raisi and the supreme leader's own son, Mojtaba, 55, a Shiite cleric who has never held government office.

WHAT HAPPENS IF THE SUPREME LEADER'S SON SUCCEEDS HIM?

Leaders of the Islamic Republic going back to the 1979 revolution have portrayed their system as superior.

The transfer of power from the supreme leader to his son could spark anger, not only among Iranians who are already critical of clerical rule, but supporters of the system who might see it as un-Islamic.

Western sanctions linked to the nuclear program have devastated Iran's economy. And the enforcement of Islamic rule, which grew more severe under Raisi, has further alienated women and young people.

The Islamic Republic has faced several waves of popular protests in recent years, most recently after the 2022 death of Mahsa Amini, who had been arrested for allegedly not covering her hair in public. More than 500 people were killed and over 22,000 were detained in a violent crackdown.

Raisi's death may make the transition to a new supreme leader trickier, and it could spark more unrest.

 

 

 

 

 

 



Yemeni Platform Warns of Houthis Expanding Influence to Horn of Africa

Yemenis lift placards and flags during a rally in the Houthi-controlled capital Sanaa in solidarity with Palestinians on July 26, 2024, amid the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip between Israel and the Palestinian Hamas movement. (AFP)
Yemenis lift placards and flags during a rally in the Houthi-controlled capital Sanaa in solidarity with Palestinians on July 26, 2024, amid the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip between Israel and the Palestinian Hamas movement. (AFP)
TT

Yemeni Platform Warns of Houthis Expanding Influence to Horn of Africa

Yemenis lift placards and flags during a rally in the Houthi-controlled capital Sanaa in solidarity with Palestinians on July 26, 2024, amid the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip between Israel and the Palestinian Hamas movement. (AFP)
Yemenis lift placards and flags during a rally in the Houthi-controlled capital Sanaa in solidarity with Palestinians on July 26, 2024, amid the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip between Israel and the Palestinian Hamas movement. (AFP)

A Yemeni platform focused on organized crime and money-laundering, PTOC, has warned of the dangers of the Iran-backed Houthi militias expanding their activities and influence to the Horn of Africa.

In a report, it said the militias were actively seeking to expand their operations there with the direct supervision of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and in coordination with the Lebanese Hezbollah militia, which is also backed by Tehran.

This is the first time that a report is filed about the Houthi plans in the Horn of Africa.

Asharq Al-Awsat received a copy of the report that details the Houthis’ expansionist plans at Iran’s direction. It discusses the Houthis’ smuggling and armament operations, recruitment and training of Africans, and identifies the officials responsible for the militias’ project in the Horn of Africa.

Overseeing the foreign expansion are leading Houthi officials Abdulwahed Abu Ras, Al-Hassan al-Marrani and Abu Haidar al-Qahoum, as well as head of the so-called security and intelligence agency Abdulhakim al-Khiwani and foreign operations agency official Hassan al-Kahlani, or Abu Shaheed.

The report also highlighted the role played by deputy Houthi foreign minister Hussein al-Azzi through diplomatic sources and figures in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Sudan and Kenya to forge intelligence, security, political and logistical ties.

Training

The report said the Houthis were keen on establishing “sensitive intelligence centers” throughout the Horn of Africa and countries surrounding Yemen. They are working on training cadres “as soon as possible” so that they can be “effectively activated at the right time to achieve the Quranic mission and common interests of all resistance countries, especially Iran, Gaza and Lebanon.”

The report obtained documents that reveal how the Houthis have established ties with African figures to “complete preparations and operations in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa to support the Houthis should they come under any international political or diplomatic pressure.”

Leading officials

The report identified several Houthi figures who are overseeing these operations, starting with IRGC official “Abu Mahdi” to the owner of the smallest boat that is used for smuggling weapons in the Red Sea.

It also spoke of the relations forged with the al-Shabaab al-Qaeda affiliate in Somalia and the African mafia to smuggle Africans to Yemen in what the report described as one of the most dangerous human trafficking and organized crimes.

The PTOC report said the Houthis have recruited Africans from various countries, especially in wake of the militias’ coup in Sanaa in 2014. They have been subjected to cultural and military training and deployed at various fronts, such as Taiz, the west coast, Marib and the border.

Some of the recruits have returned to their home countries to expand the Houthi influence there.

Abu Ras and al-Kahlani

The report named Abdulwahed Naji Mohammed Abu Ras, or Abu Hussein, as the Houthis’ top official in expanding their influence in the Horn of Africa. A native of the Jawf province, he was tasked directly by top Iranian political officials and the IRGC in running this file.

Among his major tasks is coordinating with the IRGC and Houthis and directly overseeing the smuggling of IRGC and Hezbollah members from and to Yemen.

Abu Ras has avoided the spotlight for several years during which he has handled the Houthis’ most dangerous intelligence and political files.

He served as secretary of foreign affairs at the security and intelligence agency until Hassan al-Kahlani's appointment to that post. Abu Ras was then promoted to his current position at the recommendation of Houthi leader Abdulmalek al-Houthi and the IRGC leadership.

Al-Kahlani, also known as Abu Shaheed, was born in the Hajjah province in 1984. He is a known Houthi security operative as he grew up among the Houthis in Saada and Sanaa and joined the militias at a young age.

The report said al-Kahlani was part of the Sanaa terrorist cell that carried out several bombings and assassinations in wake of the killing of Houthi founder Hassan al-Houthi in 2004. He was also among the Houthi leaderships that took part in the coup in Sanaa.

Al-Kahlani now works directly under Abu Ras. He is known for his close ties to the IRGC and has been using this relationship to impose himself as the top official in the security and intelligence agency, exposing the struggle for power between him and the actual head of the agency Abdulhakim al-Khiwani.