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Feeding Gaza: Traders Run Gauntlet of Bullets, Bombs and Bribes

Internally displaced Palestinians leave with their belongings following an evacuation order issued by the Israeli army, in Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip, 02 July 2024. EPA/MOHAMMED SABER
Internally displaced Palestinians leave with their belongings following an evacuation order issued by the Israeli army, in Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip, 02 July 2024. EPA/MOHAMMED SABER
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Feeding Gaza: Traders Run Gauntlet of Bullets, Bombs and Bribes

Internally displaced Palestinians leave with their belongings following an evacuation order issued by the Israeli army, in Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip, 02 July 2024. EPA/MOHAMMED SABER
Internally displaced Palestinians leave with their belongings following an evacuation order issued by the Israeli army, in Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip, 02 July 2024. EPA/MOHAMMED SABER

Mohammed describes a delivery job from hell.
"I get screwed on every shipment," the Gazan trader told Reuters. He said he has to fork out more than $14,000 for each truck of food he brings into the besieged enclave to pay sky-high transport costs, bribes to middlemen and protection from looters. That's up from $1,500-$4,000 before the war began in October.
"It's barely worth my while. But I need food, my neighbors need food, the whole of Gaza needs food."
Mohammed said he doesn't like it, but he's forced to hike prices of some fresh food like dairy products, fruit and chicken to 10 times their normal value just to break even, though he knows this puts them out of reach of many hungry Gazans.
He and 17 other people interviewed by Reuters, most of them traders and aid workers in Gaza with direct knowledge of the supply situation, described a chaotic system that often makes it too dangerous or costly for business owners to import food, even as aid agencies warn of the growing risk of famine.
Many of the people requested their full names be withheld to speak freely about sensitive matters, with traders like Mohammed saying they feared reprisals by local gangs or being blacklisted by the Israeli military for speaking out.
The bulk of the money spent on importing food goes on ballooning trucking costs, according to the people interviewed.
Drivers in Israel have increased their rates by as much as threefold because of attacks by Israeli protesters on trucks heading towards Gaza, they said. Cargoes also often have to wait for days, either near their departure points in the occupied West Bank or the Kerem Shalom border crossing from Israel into southern Gaza to be inspected by Israeli soldiers and approved to enter the enclave, they added, further driving up costs.
Once the goods finally make it into Gaza, the sources told Reuters, the hairiest part of the journey begins.
Another trader, Hamuda, who imports pickled vegetables, poultry and dairy goods from the West Bank, said he either pays off local criminal gangs or hires his own armed men to stand on top of the cargoes and ward off looters.
"It's anywhere from $200 to $800 for this. It's worth it for a cargo that can be worth up to $25,000," he said. "The guys I hire are friends or relatives, I need about 3-5 per truck."
Meanwhile, none of the private-sector goods have made it to northern Gaza, where aid agencies say hunger is most acute, because the Israeli military has closed that area off to their commercial deliveries, all eight traders said.
Two aid workers confirmed the only food available in northern Gaza is aid, with no commercial goods for sale. The Israeli military didn't comment on the availability of food for sale in the north, an area dominated by Gaza City and its environs.
The military, which oversees coordination of aid in Gaza, says it lets enough food in from Israel and Egypt for the entire population. It acknowledged aid agencies face "difficulties" in transporting food once it has entered through crossing points including Kerem Shalom, without specifying what the obstacles were.
Distributing aid in Gaza is a "complex task given that it is an active war zone", a spokesperson told Reuters. The military said Palestinian group Hamas, Gaza's ruling group, was exploiting "humanitarian infrastructure for its military needs", without elaborating.
Hamas denied exploiting aid and said it doesn't interfere with food deliveries. It confirmed that traders were hiring armed guards to protect their shipments but said none of those men were linked to Hamas.
"Our utmost goal is to alleviate the suffering of our people," said Hamas government spokesperson Ismail al-Thawabta.
'TOTAL BREAKDOWN OF LAW'
Getting food to the Gaza Strip's mostly displaced population of 2.3 million has been beset by bureaucracy and violence since war broke out on Oct. 7, when a Hamas attack on towns in southern Israel triggered an Israeli bombardment and invasion that has laid waste to the coastal territory.
There are two main tracks of food entry: international aid, which is largely UN or UN-distributed supplies of non-perishables, like rice, flour and tinned goods and has made up the bulk of imports during the war; and commercial deliveries, which include fresh produce important to warding off malnutrition.
The Israeli military allowed commercial food deliveries from Israel and the occupied West Bank to resume in May after its assault on Gaza's southernmost city of Rafah - a key gateway from Egypt - drastically reduced the flow of UN aid to the devastated Palestinian territory.
Reuters, which reported the commercial resumption, is also the first news outlet to detail the ensuing costs and chaos faced by Gazan traders that have impeded their efforts to import fresh food for sale in the enclave's markets and shops.
Attacks on food trucks have surged since Israel launched its May 7 Rafah offensive, which has deepened the chaos in Gaza by scattering the 1.5 million people who had been sheltering in tent camps there, according to the traders and aid workers.
The UN supplies that are still getting through to Gaza, via Kerem Shalom or northern crossings, are far more vulnerable to criminal gangs because, unlike private businesses, UN agencies can't pay for armed protection, according to six aid workers involved in coordinating food deliveries. One estimated that about 70% of the food trucks were being attacked.
"We are confronted with a near total breakdown of law and order with truck drivers being regularly threatened or assaulted," Philippe Lazzarini, head of UN relief agency UNRWA, told Reuters. "Far too many trucks have been looted."
The difficulties faced by aid agencies mean the commercial track has begun to make up a larger proportion of food entering Gaza, though the flow remains erratic, according to the eight traders interviewed.
They said private-sector supplies had comprised between 20 and 100 trucks a day - each carrying up to 20 tonnes of food - since the Rafah assault was launched. During this period, Israeli military data shows an average of 150 aid and commercial food trucks a day have entered in total.
That is well short of the 600 trucks a day that the US Agency for International Development says is required to address the threat of famine.
The commercial food coming in is also expensive, and scant replacement for international aid that has already been paid for by donor countries and organizations, according to the six aid workers.
"Some items have increased at least 15-fold in cost," said Majed Qishawi, of the Norwegian Refugee Council in Gaza. "Basic items ... have disappeared from the market because of a severe drop in aid and commercial trucks arriving."
ISRAELI PROTESTERS ATTACK
Traders described a long and perilous process to deliver food from their suppliers in Israel and the West Bank to their intended destinations in Gaza, a 100-mile journey at most, with trouble looming far before goods reach the war-torn enclave.
Several Gaza-bound cargoes, transported by Israeli drivers or by Palestinian drivers who have permission to work in Israel, were blocked or attacked by Israeli protesters in May in a spree of violence which prompted Washington to sanction one involved group with links to Israeli settlers. The protesters said they were preventing supplies from getting to Hamas.
"Israeli drivers in particular have hiked their transport prices because of the attacks - sometimes by three times," said another trader, Samir. "A $1,000 trip can cost $3,000."
Cargoes then often get stuck in lines of trucks before they can enter Gaza, with long waits costing importers about $200 to $300 per day per truck, he added.
The delays are caused by a general backlog in getting food into Gaza, according to the 18 sources interviewed who also include Palestinian and Western officials.
Reuters couldn't independently verify the logjam at the Gaza border as Israel mostly bars journalists from Gaza and its crossing points.
The traders and aid workers said that for two weeks at the start of June, the Israeli military suspended all entry for commercial goods while a backlog of humanitarian aid was cleared. One trader shared a text message from an Israeli military coordinator for supplies into Gaza on June 9 telling him that commercial flows were "on hold until further notice", though Reuters couldn't verify its authenticity.
The commercial track opened up again around the Muslim Eid al-Adha holiday beginning on June 15, the people said.
BRIBES & PROTECTION RACKETS
Once food cargoes are allowed to cross into Gaza, the goods are loaded onto different trucks with local drivers to be distributed to vendors in the enclave, the traders said.
They are now in a war zone.
Stretches of road in Rafah and the southern city of Khan Younis that were considered relatively safe before the Rafah invasion are now notorious for attacks, the traders said.
Three of the aid workers said truck lootings were a daily occurrence while Hamuda, the trader, estimated that about six times as many trucks are being ransacked now compared with before the Rafah assault.
Some trucks are attacked for cargoes carrying rarer commodities such as meat or fresh fruit, Hamuda said. Many others are attacked by gangs who have secretly arranged to smuggle goods inside food deliveries, especially tobacco.
One Gazan trader shared a photo of cigarettes smuggled inside a hollowed-out watermelon, though Reuters couldn't verify its authenticity.
Another obstacle is ongoing Israeli operations, according to the traders who said they have no military official to contact in real time while their trucks are inside Gaza.
If a road is closed by fighting or bombardment, they have no way of figuring out a safe alternative, or relaying this information to their drivers who are often outside cellphone coverage, they added.
Three traders said that last month they began paying larger, better-connected Gazan businessmen who have regular coordination with the Israeli military to secure the entry of their cargoes and protection for their trucks to their destinations.
The traders, who declined to identify the middlemen, said this service alone can cost up to $14,000 to get the goods to their destination safely.
One of the traders, Abu Mohammed, said he had to weigh up how much he could sell his cargo for. "After hiking my prices to compensate for the transport costs, maybe I make a couple of hundred dollars. Maybe I break even," he said.
"I also risk losing everything," he added. "If the shipment is ransacked, my money's been wasted."

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Iran in a Quarter Century: Clash Between the ‘Revolution’ and the State

An Iranian woman walks by the former US embassy in Tehran. (AFP)
An Iranian woman walks by the former US embassy in Tehran. (AFP)
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Iran in a Quarter Century: Clash Between the ‘Revolution’ and the State

An Iranian woman walks by the former US embassy in Tehran. (AFP)
An Iranian woman walks by the former US embassy in Tehran. (AFP)

For the past quarter century, Iran endured a bitter conflict between the ideological aspects of the “revolution” and the strategic view aimed at protecting the state and its interests in a changing world.

Despite hopes for radical change, attempts to achieve reform collided with resistance from the traditional centers of power, preventing real reconciliation between the contradiction in the principles of the “revolution” and the demands of national reforms, or at least achieving some form of sustainable agreement between these opposing movements.

Since 2000, Iran witnessed the election of five presidents with limited jurisdiction, and five parliamentary elections, which were dominated by either of the main reformist and conservative movements, amid the ongoing debate over the nature of rule, its agenda and priorities.

Since the 1979 revolution, the jurisdiction of the parliament and government has been fully under the control of the decision-making centers in the country, with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei at the top of the pyramid. The supreme leader enjoys almost absolute power, making him above all state institutions.

Meanwhile, the role of the military and political institutions, such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Guardian Council, expanded as they maintained their role in protecting the ideological principles of the ruling system. The system is based on a constitution that is in turn based on the Wilayat al-Faqih. These institutions are the main tools for preserving the identity of the “Islamic Republic” and bolstering its position that is hostile to the West.

Some 45 years after its “Islamic Revolution”, Iran has yet to reconcile the contradictions between its principles and national interests. (Getty Images)

Khatami and shift in the conflict

The beginning of the new millennium in Iran coincided with a decisive moment in reformist President Mohammed Khatami’s term (1997-2005). The period was marked with the intensification of the confrontation between the reformists and conservatives. The latter sought to obstruct reforms pursued by Khatami, especially in civil freedoms and freedom of expression.

The non-elected institutions that are under Khamenei’s direct supervision, such as the Guardian Council and judiciary, played a decisive role in obstructing reform measures, creating challenges for the reformists in achieving their political and social agendas.

Khatami’s term in office witnessed a major shift in the clash between the supporters of the ideology of the revolution and those calling for achieving strategic interests. He believed that the reforms were a strategic need to secure the continuity of the system of rule and its ability to adapt to internal and external changes. His critics, however, believed that his approach threatened the very foundations of the Wilayat al-Faqih.

Iran worked on improving its relations with the West and boosting its national identity through the Dialogue Among Civilizations, but the September 11, 2001, attacks and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 were a blow to these efforts.

Iran saw in the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime in neighboring Iraq an opportunity to expand its ideological influence through supporting groups that were affiliated with Iran or were established within its territory. The nuclear file also undermined the Dialogue Among Civilizations initiative and efforts to build trust with the West, thereby increasing Iran’s isolation and regional and international tensions.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guards played a main role in the nuclear program and regional wars. (Khamenei’s official website)

IRGC and the regional role

The IRGC played a main role in issues related to the nuclear program, internal developments and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq at the end of Khatami’s term.

In Afghanistan, the IRGC supported the United States in ousting the Taliban from power. In Iraq, the IRGC’s Quds Force led armed Iraqi factions in bolstering Iranian influence that persist to this day. Under General Qassem Soleimani’s leadership, the Quds Force also expanded its operations in Lebanon, helping establish a network that ran parallel to Iranian diplomacy in regional politics.

Iran felt threatened by the US’ bolstered military presence in the region, leading it to expand its security and strategic plans, starting with the nuclear and ballistic missiles programs.

In 2002, the discovery of secret nuclear facilities aroused suspicions among the international community about Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the possibility that it would pursue the production of a nuclear bomb. Amid the rising tensions, the West shifted its priorities towards Tehran to curbing its nuclear activities. Moreover, US officials, especially during President George W. Bush’s term, threatened on numerous occasions to use military force against Iran if it continued to pursue its nuclear ambitions.

Iran has bolstered its influence in the Middle East, stoking tensions with regional powers. (AP)

Nuclear file and internal tensions

The nuclear file has been a source of tension inside and outside Iran ever since. On the domestic level, it sparked debate about the country’s national priorities. The reformists sought to maintain Tehran’s international relations and ease tensions, while the conservatives clung on to their ideological principles.

In 2003, Tehran declared that it was voluntarily ending its uranium enrichment as part of the Amad Plan agreement reached with the European troika. In return, it received a pledge that the file would not be referred to the UN Security Council and that economic ties would be established with Europe. That same year, Iran heavily promoted Khamenei’s fatwa that barred the production, storing or use of nuclear weapons.

The US, however, remained suspicious of Iran’s intentions. It believed that agreements were not enough and it accused Iran of expanding its nuclear program, leading it to impose sanctions on its banks and energy sector. During the term of President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, it referred the program to the Security Council – a move that was welcomed by the international community. The move prompted Iran to adopt an aggressive policy against western powers.

Iran has never officially declared that it was developing nuclear weapons. In 2007, US intelligence released a report that said Tehran had stopped its nuclear weapons development in 2003, helping to soften the American position against it.

Throughout Ahmedinejad’s eight years in office, tensions rose with the West over the nuclear program. Tehran raised its level of uranium enrichment to 20 percent while the president insisted on his country’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology. In return, crippling sanctions were imposed on its nuclear program, oil exports and economy.

Khamenei meets with veterans from the Iraqi-Iranian war. (EPA)

Iran and the ‘Arab Spring’

On the foreign level, Iran aspired to bolster relations with Arab, African and Latin American countries. It also backed armed groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas.

With the eruption of the “Arab Spring” revolts, Iran sought to consolidate its influence in the Middle East, especially in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, stoking tensions with regional powers and Arab countries. Supporting Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria was also a top priority for Ahmedinejad before he was succeeded by Hassan Rouhani.

On the domestic level, Iran went through a huge crisis after Ahmedinejad won the 2009 elections. The wave of “Green Movement” demonstrations erupted in protest against the elections results between Ahmedinejad, and reformist candidates Mir Hossein Moussavi and Mehdi Karroubi.

After Ahmedinejad’s term ended, Iran tried to ease tensions with the West. It took part in nuclear negotiations aimed at managing tensions with the major powers. Two years of negotiations led to the 2015 nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), that suspended UN sanctions on Iran and lifted restrictions on its nuclear program.

The supreme leader played a pivotal role in the negotiations. He set red lines when it came to maintaining Iran’s right to uranium enrichment, lifting economic sanctions and refusing visits to military facilities by international inspectors.

Khamenei cautiously supported Rouhani’s negotiating team at the nuclear talks despite pressure from conservative movements. The negotiations struck a balance between ideology and strategic interests as Iran sought to maintain its “revolutionary” slogans, while adapting to international changes, confronting economic and security challenges and continuing to fund its regional activities to ensure that it remained a main player in the Middle East.

The IRGC continued to consolidate Iran’s influence in the region, especially in Syria and Iraq, and Khamenei threatened to expel American forces from the region. The tensions alarmed the American administration leading then President Donald Trump to pull Washington out of the nuclear deal in 2018.

Qassem Soleimani. (Tasnim)

Patience in handling pressure

In confronting Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign, including preventing Iran from selling oil, Tehran adopted a policy of “walking on the edge of the abyss” and of “strategic patience.” Regional tensions also spiked with the IRGC seizing oil tankers after Tehran threatened to block oil shipping lanes. Trump consequently designated the IRGC as terrorist.

Trump would also order the killing of Quds Forces commander Soleimani in Baghdad in January 2020. The move took Iranian-American tensions to a whole new level and threatened to spark a direct war between the two countries.

In a leaked 2021 recording, then foreign minister Mohammed Javad Zarif called for striking a balance between foreign policy and the policy on the field, a reference to the Quds Force that leads the IRGC’s foreign operations. The recordings exposed an internal rift between the ideological and pragmatic movements in Iran, with the latter wanting to achieve interests, such as the lifting of sanctions.

Zarif defended his conviction that diplomatic work relies on the situation on the ground and vice versa, meaning diplomacy can grant “international legitimacy” to achievements on the field.

When US President Joe Biden came to office, Khamenei used his influence to support the IRGC and showed limited leniency in managing tensions through new nuclear negotiations. Biden tried to return to the nuclear pact with Tehran, but Iran’s unprecedented nuclear measures adopted by conservative late President Ebrahim Raisi and Russia’s war on Ukraine thwarted diplomacy.

18 December 2024, Iran, Tehran: Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian speaks during the Cabinet meeting in Tehran. (Iranian Presidency/dpa)

Raisi and the ‘revolutionary government’

Under Raisi, Tehran pursued diplomacy at the negotiating table with the West, but the talks never made it to the finish line.

His term in office was cut short by his death in a helicopter crash in May 2024. His time in power was marked by loyalty to the supreme leader’s view of forming a “revolutionary government” and limiting state power to conservatives.

Raisi effectively followed in the same footsteps as Ahmedinejad: Tehran sought rapprochement with regional forces, while hoping to circumvent sanctions and speed up its nuclear activities.

Raisi was succeeded by Masoud Pezeshkian, who was backed reformists. He pledged to maintain the policy of turning to the east and bolstering relations with China and Russia. He also sought to lift sanctions on Iran by returning to nuclear negotiations.

On the regional level, Tehran’s “shadow war” with Israel came out to the open and the two sides traded direct blows. Following Raisi’s death, Iran continued to suffer more setbacks, notably the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria and the weakening of Hezbollah and Hamas’ roles. These developments will weaken the IRGC’s regional role, but it could seek to compensate for its losses in other regions, even inside Iran itself.

Pezeshkian and internal reconciliation

Pezeshkian’s presidency is seen as an opportunity to achieve internal reconciliation in Iran at a critical time when the people are preoccupied with the issue of Khamenei’s successor. Iran is unlikely to introduce radical change to its relations with the West and Pezeshkian may be granted limited jurisdiction in the nuclear negotiations.

Soon after Trump’s re-election as president, Pezeshkian stressed the need to manage relations and the confrontation with the US. He said his government will follow the strategy of the ruling system.

Pezeshkian will likely receive the backing of the supreme leader and IRGC to reach a settlement that would ease pressure on Iran. This does not necessarily mean that Iran will be moving away from the edge of the abyss. On the contrary, it could reflect an attempt to widen the margin for maneuver amid the tensions with the West. Iran is expected to follow this approach in the near future or at least when the identity of the third supreme leader is revealed.